The last battle of the battleship Kirishima. Kuznetsov Alexey Viktorovich Battleships of Japan

Time is relentless and cruel.

There are still veterans of the Second World War, but there are fewer and fewer of them. And basically these are those who were drafted in 1944-1945.

The last World War I veteran to live, Claude Stanley Chulz, died in Australia at the age of 110 in 2011.

But there is still an opportunity to see and get to know as many as two participants in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. These veterans took part in one of the bloodiest naval battles this war - the Tsushima battle, and from different opposing sides.

One is the Aurora cruiser, and the other is the Mikasa, a Japanese battleship and flagship of the Japanese fleet during the Battle of the Tsushima Strait.

As for the Aurora, I met the legendary cruiser at the age of 13, when I came to relatives in Leningrad for the winter vacation. My aunt Nina was active, she dragged me through all the museums, and, of course, to the Aurora. I had the shock of visiting the first real warship. In addition, fighting aunt Nina arranged for me an autograph of the former stoker from the Aurora, he led the tour. Apparently it was a member of the Aurora crew of the 40s or 50s, on the eve of the cruiser becoming a museum ship in 1961.

Cruisers of the Pallada type, which include the Aurora, were ordered by the Naval Department as part of Russia's large-scale shipbuilding program in 1895.

By design, these were armored cruisers designed to perform the functions of reconnaissance cruisers and combat enemy merchant shipping at a relatively small distance from the bases. The main work was completed by the summer of 1896, and it was decided to build three cruisers of the same type at St. Petersburg shipyards. Immediately on the stocks of the shipyard "Galerny Island" (now OJSC "Admiralty Shipyards"), work began on the construction of two cruisers "Pallada" and "Diana", and in September 1986, work began on the construction of a third cruiser in the New Admiralty, which on March 31, 1897 was named "Aurora".

The official laying of the ship was made on May 23, 1897 in a solemn atmosphere, and already on May 11, 1900 at 11:15 a.m., under the thunder of artillery salute of the ships standing on the Neva, the cruiser "Aurora" was launched.

Fitting work was carried out for two years - the completion of hull work and the installation of main machines and steam boilers. Having completed the acceptance tests on September 18, 1903, the Aurora cruiser joined the combat forces of the Russian fleet.

Unlike Russia late XIX century, Japan did not yet have its own shipbuilding industry during this period. At the same time, after a radical restructuring of the state machine, which in Japan is called the Meiji revolution,this countrybegan to actively modernize its own army and navy based on the technical achievements of the West.

In 1886, the Japanese government invited the famous French designer E. Bertin, who had a significant influence on the shipbuilding program of Japan, to the post of chief ship engineer of its nascent fleet. In Yokosuka, Bertin designed and built a military port in 1890, which still functions as a base for the Japanese Navy. The Japanese gratefully preserve the house in which the engineer lived.

However, in the field of naval construction, the Japanese still focused primarily on the main trendsetter of the then fashion - Great Britain. For this reason, the battleship Mikasa was ordered in 1898 and built at the Vickers shipyard in Barrow. By the way, this Vickers & Sons company was very remarkable. In addition to warships, she built, though a little later, also aircraft, and the first English airships, as well as machine guns of her own original design.

The British built the ship very quickly: it was laid down on January 24, 1899, launched on November 8, 1900, and already on March 1, 1902 it was completely completed and sent from Plymouth to Japan. So it turns out that both veterans are practically the same age.

If the Pallada-class cruisers were named after Greek goddesses, then the Japanese battleships of the 1889-1899 program were named after the geographical objects of Japan. Fuji, Asahi, Mikasa are mountains, Hatsuse is a river, Shikishima is an island and the name of the ancient capital of Japan. Six new battleships of the Japanese fleet, including the Mikasa, formed the 1st combat detachment of the First Squadron.

In turn, the Aurora cruiser was also intended to strengthen the naval forces in the Pacific Ocean, where a conflict with Japan was brewing and where the Pallas and Diana of the same type had already moved. Therefore, already a week after commissioning, on September 25, 1903, the ship left Kronstadt.

But the cruiser was not destined to reach its destination. News of the treacherous attack of the Japanese fleet on Port Arthur caught the Aurora in the African port of Djibouti. Further navigation was interrupted, and the ship returned to the Baltic on April 5, 1904, where it was included in the 2nd Pacific Squadron, formed for combat operations in the Far Eastern Maritime Theater.

"Aurora" entered the detachment of cruisers of Rear Admiral O.A. Enquista ("Aurora", "Oleg", "Dmitry Donskoy" and "Vladimir Monomakh"). Baptism of fire cruiser Aurora took over from Tsushima on May 14.

During the entire battle, the Aurora followed the Oleg, on which the commander of the detachment, Rear Admiral O. A. Enkvist, held the flag. These two ships, possessing an advantage in speed and armament, in comparison with their two older brothers, the Donskoy and the Monomakh, each time ended up in exactly the place from which the greatest danger emanated. To use the greater power of their artillery, they approached the enemy at the shortest possible distances, up to 24 cables. There were moments when the cruisers were under fire from four or even ten Japanese ships at once.

In order to prevent the enemy from shooting and at the same time to keep his place in the ranks, the Aurora had to constantly change course and speed. During the battle, which lasted for the cruiser from 14:30 to 18:00, Aurora received 10 direct hits from shells. In the bottom picture "Aurora" after the Tsushima battle

During the battle, the Aurora flag was knocked down by fragments several times, but it was raised again. After the tackle on which he was raised was broken, and the flag fell for the seventh time, boatswain Vasily Kozlov, under enemy fire, climbed onto the mast and secured it in place.

Fires repeatedly broke out on the cruiser, several compartments were flooded, two chimneys, the surface part of the hull, superstructures were seriously damaged, the foremast was half-recaptured, all boats, boats and longboats were broken by fragments, five guns and all rangefinder stations were out of order. 303 - 152-mm shells, 1282 - 75-mm cartridges, 320 - 37-mm cartridges were used in the battle.

On the Aurora, 10 people were killed in the battle, including the commander of the cruiser E.R. Egoriev, 89 people were wounded, 6 of them fatally and 18 seriously (8 people died of wounds). Captain 1st Rank Egoriev died at that unfortunate moment when a 75-mm shell exploded on the gangway of the front bridge, next to the conning tower. At the same time, the fragments of the shell and the ladder, having hit the wheelhouse through the observation embrasure, were reflected from its dome and scattered in different directions. All the officers who were at that moment in the wheelhouse were wounded and only Yegoriev was killed on the floor.

During the Battle of Tsushima, Mikasa was the flagship of the commander of the Japanese fleet, Admiral Togo.

This is what the conning tower of the battleship "Mikasa" looks like, the thickness of the armor is impressive

However, Admiral Togo spent the entire battle, being on an open navigation bridge.

View from the bridge

During the battle, "Mikasa" was at the head of the column of Japanese battleships and was one of the main targets for Russian ships. The order of the commander of the Russian squadron, Admiral Rozhdestvensky, was - the signal "1", which meant: "To hit on the head" (in fact, this was his first and last order in battle, not counting the order to transfer command, the lack of proper command was one of the reasons for the defeat of our fleet).

"Mikasa" came under concentrated fire from the ships of the Russian fleet, it was hit by 6 12-inch and 19 6-inch shells. However, the battleship did not receive severe damage. A 12-inch shell exploded in the barrel of the right 305 mm gun of the nose turret, damaging the gun and putting the left gun out of action.

Another 12-inch shell exploded in the same gun 2 hours earlier without causing any damage. One 6-inch gun was disabled after 19 rounds, other damage to the ship's armament was another 6-inch gun, which was disabled by a successful hit by a Russian 6-inch shell in the gun port. During the battle, the battleship fired 124 12-inch shells, more than any other ship.

In total, Mikasa was hit more than 40 times during the battle, including 10 12-inch and 22 6-inch shells, but none of them caused serious damage. The exact number of killed and wounded on the Mikasa is not known. According to Japanese sources, the battleship lost 110 people killed and 590 wounded during the battle.

The Tsushima battle turned out to be a disaster for the Russian fleet. Twenty ships (!!!) went to the bottom, several fell into the hands of the Japanese. During the battle, 4,830 Russian sailors were killed, and about 10,000 were injured. The total losses of the Japanese, according to their sources, amounted to 117 killed and about 900 wounded. The wounded Admiral Rozhdestvensky handed over command to Rear Admiral Nebogatov, who handed over the ships remaining from the defeated squadron to the mercy of the winner. Nebogatov and his headquarters were brought aboard the Mikas through these doors.

"Aurora" managed to escape capture. Together with Oleg and Zhemchug, which joined the detachment, Aurora was attacked by Japanese destroyers during the night of May 14/15. The detachment broke away from the main forces of the squadron and, after unsuccessful attempts to break through to the north towards Vladivostok, the cruisers were forced to leave for the neutral Philippine port of Manila, where they were interned by the Americans until the end of the war.

As for the battleship "Mikasa", after the battle, he needed to repair all the towers of the main caliber, as well as to replace cracked armor plates. For repairs, he went to the port of Sasebo. And this is where luck left him. Escaped from the fire of the entire Russian squadron during the battle of Tsushima, six days after the signing of the Portsmouth Treaty, which put an end to the war of the Russo-Japanese war, on the night of September 12, 1905, Mikasa, after an explosion and fire, sank in the harbor of Sasebo . 250 people died (according to other sources, 114 people), and 340 people were injured. The battleship sank on an even keel at a depth of 11 meters. The ship was raised only after three attempts a year later on August 14, 1906.

After the rise, the battleship was restored until March 24, 1908 and put into operation on August 24, 1908. During the First World War, the Mikasa served to protect the Japanese coast. In 1921, the battleship took part in supporting the operations of the Japanese invaders in Soviet Siberia, arriving in Vladivostok. September 16, 1921 battleship"Mikasa" in the fog, heading to Vladivostok from the northern tip of Sakhalin, landed on rocks south of Askold Island (30 miles southwest of Vladivostok). The situation was so dangerous that rescue was considered impossible, and only ten days later, on September 26, thanks to a strong storm, it was possible to remove it from the stones, take it to the dock in Vladivostok under the escort of the Fuji battleship and the Kasuga armored cruiser.

"Aurora" after the signing of a peace treaty with Japan and a lengthy repair in Manila returned to the Baltic.

She made trips around the world, performing representative functions. In a short period, the cruiser visited the Mediterranean Sea and Atlantic Ocean visiting Algeria, Bizerte, Villefranche, Smyrna, Naples, Gibraltar and a number of other ports.

the first world war"Aurora" met, making training flights with students of the Marine Corps in the Baltic. Contrary to popular belief, the cruiser did not take an active part in this war. At first, the Aurora patrolled the Gulf of Finland with other ships, then covered the minesweepers and once supported the ground units with artillery fire. The cruiser did not receive a single serious damage during all the years of the war.

In the autumn of 1916, the Aurora finally returned to Kronstadt, and then moved to Petrograd for major repairs.

A long stay in the port had a detrimental effect on the crew of the Aurora: the sailors and junior commanders fell into the bad company of the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and anarchists. Well, then you know.

Until 1922, the cruiser was mothballed in Kronstadt, and the crew repelled Yudenich's attack on Petrograd.

After a major overhaul, the cruiser became part of the Soviet Navy in 1923.

If the Aurora experienced a rebirth, then under the terms of the Washington Treaty of 1922, in the same year, the battleship Mikasa was excluded from the lists of the Japanese fleet.

November 12, 1926 it was turned into a memorial ship. The battleship was brought into a pit specially dug and filled with water near the water area of the port of Yokosuka, which was then covered with earth to the waterline. Looks, frankly, creepy

From that moment on, "Mikasa" became the object of the military-patriotic education of Japanese youth. With the outbreak of World War II, mass excursions of kamikaze pilots began to be organized on the battleship. before the last flight.

In 1945, the Americans bombed the battleship, either blindly or out of principle. After the Second World War, guns and superstructures were dismantled on the battleship, but the remaining hull was not easy to dismantle, and so it stood until January 20, 1960. Then it began to be restored again. On May 27, 1961, these works were completed and Mikasa again became a monument to the Japanese fleet and Admiral Togo in the Battle of Tsushima.

Aurora during the Great Patriotic War stood in the harbor of Oranienbaum. The guns were once again removed from the ship, and its nine guns mounted on the coastal battery defended the approaches to the city. The Germans did not pay much attention to the decrepit veteran, trying first to disable the best Soviet ships (such as the Kirov cruiser), but the ship still received its portion of enemy shells. On September 30, 1941, the half-sunken cruiser, damaged as a result of artillery shelling, sat down on the ground.

After the war, the Aurora was raised and in 1947 the cruiser took her now traditional place at the Nakhimov School.

True, now "Aurora" is not in its place, only the coffee shop of the same name remains.

And where is the ship of the revolution? September 21, 2014 "Aurora" was towed to the repair dock Kronstadt Marine Plant of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation for the next overhaul

By the way, the old rusty “barge” in the foreground of the picture, in front of the “Aurora”, is most likely a floating workshop, converted from a single-tower monitor “Sagittarius”, one of the oldest ships of the Russian fleet (laid down on 06/01/1863, launched on 05/21/1864 ., entered service on 07/16/1865 as an armored turret boat). But that's a completely different story.

Well, in conclusion. In my past life, in 1985, I was part of an expedition on a test vessel. Our route passed through the Tsushima Strait. When they reached the place of the death of Russian ships, the entire crew lined up on the helipad and paid tribute to the old maritime tradition: wreaths of fresh flowers were lowered into the sea.

Eternal memory to all sailors who died for the Fatherland!

The evolution of Japanese armadillos

The first of the Japanese battleships "Fuso" had a displacement of 3718 tons, four 240-mm guns of the main caliber in a casemate protected by iron armor, and a horizontally placed double-expansion piston machine that gave it a speed of 13 knots, and the last, "Aki", a displacement of 21800 tons , four 305 mm and twelve 254 mm guns in twin turrets, Krupp armor and steam turbines that gave it a 20-knot speed. The Japanese dreadnoughts, which replaced the battleships, surpassed these parameters a little later.

The 240 mm main battery casemate artillery on the Fuso increased to 305 mm on the Chin Yen and moved to barbettes mounted diagonally to provide maximum fire at sharp bow and stern course angles. On the "Fuji" and subsequent battleships, the barbettes were located at the extremities along the diametrical plane, keeping this position unchanged, like the caliber.

The medium artillery on all the ships described was placed side by side, as on sailboats, except for the Chin Yen, where it was in light towers installed at the ends. These guns were in casemates on Fuso, Shikishima, Hatsuse, Asahi, Mikasa, Kashima, Katori, Tsukuba, Ikoma, in casemates and behind shields on Fuji " and "Yashima", in the towers on the "Kurama" and "Ibuki", increasing in caliber to 203 mm. Part of the medium artillery increased to 254 mm (and began to be considered the main one) with the installation first in single-gun turrets on the Kashima and Katori, and then in two-gun turrets on the Sazuma and Aki. Small-caliber artillery from the tops, bridges, superstructures, upper deck on battleships during the war with Russia, having increased from machine-gun caliber to 76 and 120 mm on the Sazuma and Aki, moved to the casemates, replacing the middle one.

The 356 mm surface torpedo tubes on the Fuso and the Chin Yen of the Fuji have already begun to move below the waterline, increasing in caliber to 457 mm, creating many problems and not bringing any benefit. Interestingly, already at the beginning of the century, a number of experiments showed that the charging compartments of torpedoes did not explode when fragments and shells hit them, but hitting a compressed air tank caused an explosion. Steel boxes, wire steel mats, with which they tried to close surface vehicles in an artillery battle, only increased the number of fragments. Before the war with Japan, the provisions in force in the Russian fleet required 40-45 mines for a barrage on a squadron battleship. The British and the Japanese had on their ships only the means to destroy the barriers.

The Fuso body was built of iron. But already at the end of the 60s of the 19th century, the French artilleryman Martin, by melting scrap iron together with cast iron in special regenerative furnaces proposed by the German engineer Siemens, obtained large quantities of cast mild steel suitable for shipbuilding. The French were the first to switch to steel. "Chin Yen" was built already from steel and iron. All other Japanese battleships, starting with the Fuji, were built of steel.

The iron forged armor that appeared on the battleships had exhausted its capabilities, and it was not advisable to further increase the thickness of the iron plates, but this was not necessary. In 1880, steel-iron armor appeared, obtained by the English industrialist Wilson by pouring molten steel onto a forged iron plate. After hardening the steel, armor was obtained that had a hard, but brittle outer and soft (damping impact of the projectile) inner layer. In terms of resistance, it surpassed iron by 20-25%.

But the resulting gain in weight did not go to increase the booking area: the displacement of the armadillos grew too quickly. Therefore, the first major trophy of the Japanese fleet, the Chin Yen, unlike the Fuso, did not have a fully armored side along the waterline, but had an armored deck, which was installed on all subsequent Japanese battleships.

The experience of the Japanese-Chinese and Spanish-American wars convincingly confirmed the need for reliable armor protection to ensure not only unsinkability, but also the survivability of ships and their weapons. After a little over 10 years, the American Harvey proposed a method for processing case-hardened steel, which made it possible to increase the resistance of new armor by about 30% compared to steel-iron. Fuji and Yashima received such armor, but they also did not have a full belt, because chrome steel shells appeared. Only the citadel had to be defended again.

Soon, nickel additives were added to the steel, which gave the armor a slightly different name: "garveenickel". Shikishima, Hatsuse, Asahi received a full waterline belt from it, on which, for the first time in the Japanese fleet, deck armor in the citadel area was made with side bevels. Armor was installed on the Mikasa from case-hardened and one-sided hardened chromium-nickel steel plates, which were processed according to the Krupp method, and they surpassed the garve ones in resistance by 16%. This type of armor was placed on all other battleships in Japan.

A certain superiority, which at times turned out to be on the side of the armor, led to an insufficiently realistic assessment of the artillery and the distance of the artillery battle. Many experts, including Russians, believed that artillery was capable of causing serious damage to the surface of the ship, but was not capable of destroying it due to the low possibility of influencing its underwater part, which was reflected in the transfer of experience of sailing ships, which were easier to burn than drown.

The horizontally positioned double-expansion machines on the Fuso and Chin Yen provided these ships with a speed of 13.2 and 15.4 knots, respectively, during trials. The vertical installation of triple expansion machines on the Fuji and subsequent ships, the use of Belleville water-tube boilers on the Shikishima, Hatsus, Asahi, Mikasa, Nikloss on the Kashima and Katori, increasing the steam pressure made it possible to achieve speed a little more than 18 knots without any special prospects for its further increase. Increasing the speed required an increase in the power of steam engines, and, consequently, an increase in the weight of machines and boilers, which was difficult to do with the determined weight load norms for armadillos.

Further improvement of machines and boilers, an increase in their power made it possible to achieve a speed of 21.9 knots on the Ikoma, and 22.5 on the Kurama. The installation of Curtis turbines on the Ibuki and Aki did not allow this value to be surpassed, and the honor of speed records remained with the dreadnoughts.

On Ikoma, in addition to coal, oil also appeared for the first time as fuel, which was repeated on two battleships of the Kurama type and on the last two of the Sazuma type. Three wars showed the importance the Japanese attached to predominance at sea from the very beginning of hostilities, and the battleships played a role in gaining this superiority. decisive role…

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Bloody Friday November 13, 1942 ended with the defeat of the Japanese fleet. Vice Admiral Abe Hiroake lost the battleship "Hiei" and two destroyers, not having completed his main task - the bombardment of the Henderson Field airfield. The Americans also suffered heavy losses: the formation of Admiral Daniel Callahan (Task Forces 67.4 and 62.4) was defeated and withdrew from the battle. The convoy of Japanese transports continued to move towards Guadalcanal, for its safe passage it was necessary to neutralize the Henderson Field airfield.

The last trumps of the parties

In the hands of Vice Admiral William Halsey, the 16th and 64th operational formations remained, including the aircraft carrier Enterprise, as well as two main trump cards, the presence of which the Japanese did not suspect - the newest battleships Washington and South Dakota. Not knowing about them, Admiral Yamamoto decided to continue the main task, and with the same forces. He ordered the commander of the 2nd Fleet, Vice Admiral Kondo Nobutake, to organize the bombardment of the airfield on the night of November 14-15, while covering the convoy with units of the 38th Infantry Division going to Guadalcanal.

Vice Admiral Kondo Nobutake.
zeljeznice.net

On the evening of November 13, Admiral Kondo with the aircraft carrier Junyo, the battleships Kongo and Haruna, the heavy cruisers Atago, Takao and Tone, the light cruiser Sendai and three destroyers was in the area of the Ontong Jawa Atoll - north of the Solomon Islands and about 500 miles east of Rabaul. South-west of it, in the area of Shortland Island, was Vice Admiral Mikawa Gunichi's Outer South Seas Compound - heavy cruisers Maya, Suzuya, Chokai, Kinugasa (7th cruiser division), light cruisers Isuzu ” and “Tenryu”, as well as eight destroyers. Admiral Tanaka's cover destroyers escorted a convoy of 12 transports heading to Guadalcanal along the New Georgia Strait (the Americans called it "Slot" - the Slit). The convoy was supposed to reach the island after sunset on 14 November.

However, Kondo did not dare to throw all his forces into battle. "Kongo", "Haruna" (3rd division of battleships) and "Tone" he left near Ontong Java, taking with him only two heavy and one light cruisers. Further, the remnants of Admiral Abe's forces - the battleship "Kirishima", the cruiser "Nagara" and 6 destroyers - joined his Strike Force, the rest of the destroyers entered the protection of the convoy of transports.

Failure of Admiral Mikawa

Having received the order to fire, Mikawa's cruiser unit moved southeast along the Slot Strait to bombard the Henderson Field airfield on the night of November 13-14 (before the rest of the forces and the transport convoy arrived). Meanwhile, on the evening of November 13 (at 19:15), Rear Admiral Willis Lee's Task Force 64 (two battleships and four destroyers) separated from the USS Enterprise group and moved north at a speed of 26 knots. The aircraft carrier itself and the ships accompanying it (the 16th task force) also moved north in order to be able to cover the ships off Guadalcanal with their aircraft.

The actions of the Japanese forces on the afternoon of November 14, 1942. Air attacks on Vice Admiral Mikawa's compound (7th Cruiser Division) and Admiral Tanaka's Transport Group.

However, Admiral Lee's battleships were too far away to intercept Mikawa's cruisers, which reached Savo Island half an hour after midnight on November 14th. From 02:20 to 03:40 Admiral Nishimura's Bombardment Force (heavy cruisers Chokai, Maya, and Suzuya, each carrying ten 203-mm guns) fired 1,370 high-explosive shells at the airfield. They were supported by the destroyers Mochizuki and Amagiri, while the rest of Mikawa's ships covered the cruisers from the west. At this time, American torpedo boats from Tulagi attacked the Japanese formation three times, but were not successful - the Japanese did not even notice these attacks.

As the sun rose, Nishimura's cruisers withdrew to the west and joined the rest of Mikawa's ships at 8 o'clock in the morning. Literally a few minutes later, the Japanese were attacked by dive bombers from the Henderson airfield - despite the shelling, it continued to function. Soon they were joined by aircraft from the Enterprise air group.

At 08:36, the old cruiser Kinugasa received a direct hit on the forward turret, and several more bombs exploded nearby. Fires started on the ship; about an hour later, the team managed to deal with them, but then the Kinugasu was attacked by three more bombers. From several close explosions, the cruiser's cars were out of order, the ship lost its course, and the commander gave the order to leave it. At 11:22 a.m., the Kinugasa sank 15 miles east of Rendova Island, killing 51 people.

The heavy cruiser Chokai was damaged by several nearby explosions, and a downed American aircraft crashed into the Maya: an anti-aircraft gun, a torpedo tube and two searchlights were damaged, 37 people died. The light cruiser Isuzu was also damaged by nearby explosions and lost its course. He was towed to Shortland, then he went on his own to Truk, and from there to the metropolis, where he was under repair in Yokohama until the end of April.

The stakes are rising

Having received a report that American aircraft from Henderson Field continue to operate, Admiral Yamamoto ordered another strike against him - now with Kondo's ships and the remnants of Abe's formation. The Japanese had to raise the stakes, because the fate of the convoy was at stake, which could become easy prey for American aviation.

American dive bomber SBD-3 Downless.
collections.naval.aviation.museum

Already at 08:30, American reconnaissance aircraft detected a Japanese transport connection north of New Georgia Island and reported that it had again turned towards Guadalcanal. Even before noon, two aircraft from the Enterprise attacked Japanese transports and, according to the reports of the pilots, damaged two of them. Nevertheless, Halsey did not want to take risks and ordered the Enterprise air group to be transferred to Henderson Field, and the aircraft carrier itself to move south so as not to fall under possible Japanese attacks: the American admiral knew that Kondo had an aircraft carrier somewhere.

Halsey's decision turned out to be unsuccessful: the airfield experienced an acute shortage of personnel and equipment, the airfield was plowed up with Japanese shells. Therefore, takeoff and landing were difficult, and the bombs had to be carried to the aircraft manually. Nevertheless, already at about 13:00, the first group of base aircraft (17 Downless dive bombers, eight Avenger torpedo bombers and eight Flying Fortresses from Espiritu Santo under the cover of eight Wildcat fighters) attacked the Japanese convoy. Two transports were sunk, another was damaged and was forced to return to Shortland Island.

The actions of American aviation against the transport group of Admiral Tanaka in the Strait of New Georgia on the afternoon of November 14, 1942.
ibiblio.org

At 14:30, the second wave appeared - 24 "Dauntless" from the squadrons of the "Enterprise" and eight "Flying Fortresses". They managed to damage another transport, which also "lost the race." At 15:30, the third wave arrived - five Dauntless and eight Flying Fortresses, they sank two transports. The last raid took place at 17:15 north of the Russell Islands. It involved 17 "Dauntless" and four "Flying Fortresses", which managed to damage one transport. The fate of another transport remains unknown - it was either damaged along the way, or lagged behind the convoy even before the raids began.

At the Russell Islands, Admiral Tanaka lingered, either not wanting to risk the last four transports, or waiting for darkness. It was not until about 8 pm that he resumed his movement towards Guadalcanal, which was only 50 miles away.

Battleships open fire

Meanwhile, during daylight hours on November 14, Admiral Lee's battleships reached Guadalcanal. By 9 p.m., Task Force 64 was 9 miles west of Cape Esperance. Waiting for the enemy, Lee moved north, then rounded Savo Island and turned back to Guadalcanal. His ships were lined up in a single column: the first were four destroyers, "Washington" and "South Dakota" kept behind.

The first phase of the battle at Guadalcanal (Japanese version).
Campaigns of the Pacific War. Proceedings of the commission for the study of strategic bombing of aircraft of the United States

Kondo's ships sailed towards Guadalcanal from the northeast. The Japanese admiral understood that the enemy was somewhere nearby, so he sent forward patrol - the 19th division of the 3rd squadron of destroyers of Rear Admiral Hashimoto Shintaro as part of the light cruiser Sendai and three destroyers. At 10:10 p.m., Sendai was 10 miles northeast of Savo Island when her lookouts spotted American ships 5 miles to starboard bow. Hashimoto decided to split his forces: he ordered the destroyers Ayanami and Uranami to circle Savo Island on the right and attack the Americans from the west.

The rest of the Kondo Strike Force was a "hodgepodge": there were the remains of the 11th battleship division (Kirishima), the 4th cruiser division and fragments of four destroyer divisions from two different squadrons. Having received a report about the discovery of the enemy, Admiral Kondo separated the cruiser Nagara from his squadron with four destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral Kimura and also sent them around Savo Island from the west. Now only two destroyers remained with him, which went first, followed by the heavy cruisers Atago and Takao, and the battleship Kirishima closed the column.

Battle of Guadalcanal: composition of enemy squadrons.
M. Morozov, E. Granovsky. Guadalcanal! Part 2

Surprisingly, but true: despite the presence of radar, by that time the Americans had not detected the enemy. At 22:52, at the latitude of Cape Esperance (the northern tip of Guadalcanal), Admiral Lee ordered his column to turn sharply to the west. It was not until 11:00 pm that Washington's search radar detected the Sendai cruiser 10 miles to the north.

For another quarter of an hour neither side opened fire. Only at 23:17 "Washington" from a distance of 75 cab fired the first volley of 406-mm guns at the "Sendai". A couple of minutes later, the South Dakota joined him. The Japanese cruiser abruptly turned around and, together with the destroyer Shikinami, went north, putting up a smoke screen. There were no hits, and the ships soon disappeared from radar.

At this point, Ayanami and Uranami had circled Savo Island and were now moving towards the American convoy. 5 miles behind them and a little to the north, the cruiser Nagara was moving with four destroyers. In fact, the Japanese completed the first task of the battle: their destroyers and light cruisers approached the enemy column at a distance of a torpedo salvo.

Battleship "South Dakota" at the shipyard in Norfolk, August 20, 1943.
history.navy.mil

At about 23:20, Ayanami and Uranami were discovered by American destroyers, which at 23:22 opened fire from a distance of 65 cab. In response, both Japanese destroyers also opened fire, hitting the lead Walk with 127-mm shells, and at 23:30 they turned slightly to the left and fired torpedoes - they all missed the target.

Only at 23:35, the Guin, which was fourth in the column, discovered and fired on the Nagara and its destroyers. The Japanese responded with artillery fire and a torpedo salvo - at that moment the ships were traverse each other, and the distance between the columns was only 22 cab. "Guin" received two hits by shells (in the engine room and stern), but kept moving; the battleship "Washington" had to make a lapel to get around the damaged destroyer. 140-mm shells from the cruiser "Nagara" hit the destroyer "Preston", destroyed her engine room and demolished the rear funnel. A fire broke out on the ship, and in just 10 minutes it sank (116 people died).

In the meantime, at 23:38, the already damaged Walk was hit by a torpedo, and after 4 minutes it sank, slightly ahead of the Preston (76 people died, six more of the rescued destroyer Meade later died of wounds). Another torpedo hit the Benham, tearing off her bow, but the ship remained afloat and sank only the next day. The Americans did not have time to fire torpedoes, but the destroyer Ayanami was sunk by their artillery fire (its crew removed the Uranami).

Battle of Guadalcanal on the night of November 14-15, 1942. General scheme.
F. Sherman. War in the Pacific. Aircraft carriers in battle

Around 23:40 Kimura's formation, led by the cruiser Nagara, turned back to the west, passing very close to Savo Island; around the same time, the remnants of the Hashimoto formation, the cruiser Sendai and the destroyer Shikinami, caught up with him. It was only at that moment that the Kimura sailors felt that something very large was in front of them. The searchlights were turned on on the Shirayuki, and in their light, shrouded in powder smoke, the South Dakota appeared to the Japanese, walking at the end of Admiral Lee's column. For the first time in eleven months of the war, Japanese sailors met with an American battleship.

The Troubles of the South Dakota

It was at 23:33 on the South Dakota that the fuses of the main switchboard were suddenly knocked out - apparently from concussions when firing at the Sendai. For three minutes, half of the ship's services were de-energized, including the aft tower, as well as the 6th and 8th twin 127th universal installations (it was possible to put them into operation much later). During this time, they managed to lose the Washington ahead of them on the bridge. Then a padded "Guin" appeared on the way - in order to get around it, the terminal battleship made a coordinate to the right. Perhaps it was this maneuver that saved the South Dakota - all eight torpedoes from the Nagara, fired a couple of minutes earlier, passed by.

In the meantime, Admiral Kondo's main force (Barrage Force) turned west at 23:16 to pass north of Savo Island and still bombard Henderson Field. However, when the battle broke out on the other side of Savo, Kondo turned south again at 23:30, and at 23:40 he saw an American battleship 80 cab southeast of him, illuminated by the searchlights of Japanese destroyers.

The situation was ideal for shooting. "Kirishima" and the cruisers accompanying it immediately opened fire, and "Atago", in addition, fired a salvo of eight torpedoes - however, they also did not hit anywhere. Kondo clung to the American battleship like a hunting dog - at 23:53 he turned back on his course so as not to lose the enemy. In a few minutes, the Japanese battleship managed to fire 117 main battery shells. The South Dakota received a total of 25 hits from 152 to 356 mm calibers (including at least one main caliber from Kirishima).

Battle of Guadalcanal. Map from the report of the commander of the battleship "Washington".
navsource.org

A 356 mm shell hit the upper deck of the American battleship next to the end turret, pierced it, making a hole measuring 1 x 3 m, and exploded, hitting the 440 mm turret barbette and leaving a 40 mm pothole and many deep cracks in it. The middle armored deck was not pierced. The fragments damaged the interior, superstructures, the right catapult and several 20-mm machine guns.

In addition, 18 203 mm shells from Atago and Takao, six 152 mm from Kirishima and another 127 mm hit the battleship. One of the 203 mm armor-piercing shells penetrated the side above the waterline and penetrated about 8 inches into the 310 mm armor of the main belt. From two hits of 203-mm shells in the waterline area and one under the waterline, water began to flow inside the hull. Fires broke out on the battleship, all three artillery radars, fire control systems and a radio station failed.

Battleship battle on the night of November 14-15, 1942 (Japanese version).
Campaigns of the Pacific War. Proceedings of the commission for the study of strategic bombing of aircraft of the United States

The return fire of the South Dakota turned out to be inaccurate, the American battleship inflicted the greatest damage on itself - the very first salvo of the third tower destroyed both reconnaissance aircraft standing at the stern. At 00:08, the battleship stopped firing. By this time, he lost contact with other ships, around 00:15 he turned to the left, left the battle and went alone to Noumea. Here, part of the damage was repaired, after which the battleship went to the United States, where it was under repair for another three months (until the end of February 1943).

Death blow

The Americans were helped by the fact that their battleships were separated. "Washington" went unnoticed in the dark, and "Kirishima" was well illuminated by flashes of its own volleys. Admiral Lee's flagship was somewhat delayed in opening fire, starting firing only at 00:05. However, from a “pistol” distance of less than 30 cabs, his shells, unlike the South Dakota shells, flew accurately. Over the next 7 minutes, Kirishima was hit by at least nine 406-mm shells - some modern researchers believe that there were up to twenty hits, including seven underwater ones. Admiral Kondo's flagship lost control and caught fire, the rudder compartment was flooded and the rudder jammed 10° to starboard. Both bow towers were out of order, and the fourth tower jammed. By 00:12 "Kirishima" lost speed and heavily listed to starboard.

The battleship "Washington" fires on the battleship "Kirishima".
navsource.org

However, Lee did not have time to finish off Kirishima. Finding out that he did not have a single destroyer intact, the admiral ordered to go south. Three of the four destroyers of the 64th task force were sunk, and the Guin was heavily damaged (she returned to service only in April 1943).

Meanwhile, at 00:30, Kondo informed his ships that the bombardment of the airfield had been canceled and ordered the heavy cruisers to withdraw to the north. At 00:40, the artillery battle ended, and the Japanese heavy cruisers received no significant hits. On 18 November they returned to Truk.

Having received information about the battle with the American battleships, Admiral Tanaka sent forward the destroyers "Kagero" and "Oyashio" from guarding the transports, ordering them to attack any enemy ships on the way to Cape Tassafaronga. At 00:39, the destroyers fired torpedoes at the Washington, but did not score any hits.

Final battle

The Nagara and destroyers were left with the damaged battleship. For some time it seemed that Kirishima could be saved: the fires were extinguished, the ship started moving again. However, it was not possible to correct the steering, and the attempt to control the machines was unsuccessful. In addition, due to flooding, the roll to starboard continued to increase.

The end of the battle at Guadalcanal (Japanese version).
Campaigns of the Pacific War. Proceedings of the commission for the study of strategic bombing of aircraft of the United States

Shortly before 3 a.m., the cruiser Nagara tried to take the Kirishima in tow, but this attempt failed. Then the battleship commander ordered the crew to leave the ship. This was done on time: at 03:25, the battleship fell to starboard and quickly sank 7.5 miles northwest of Savo Island. In 1992, he was found lying on the bottom of the keel, the nose was broken off. The destroyers "Asagumo", "Teruzuki" and "Samidare" removed 1098 members of his crew from the "Kirishima" and retreated to the northeast; 212 people died on the battleship.

Meanwhile, the connection of Admiral Tanaka with the last four transports (Kinugawa-maru, Hirokawa-maru, Yamaura-maru and Yamatsuki-maru) continued to move forward. At 2:15 a.m., his ships finally reached Cape Tassafaronga, where they began unloading. The night was moonlit, and the Americans raised aircraft from the Henderson airfield to attack, at the same time starting shelling of the unloading site from the Lunga Point area. All four transports were hit and caught fire, they had to throw themselves ashore. Of the entire 38th division, only 2,000 soldiers reached the island, they managed to unload 1,500 bags of rice and 260 shots for mountain howitzers. Four transports and about 5,000 soldiers died at the crossing.

Japanese transports washed ashore at Cape Tassafaronga, November 15, 1942.
wwiiarchives.net

In addition to Kirishima, on the night of November 15, the Japanese lost only the destroyer Ayanami. The heavy cruiser Atago (repairs in Kure from December 17, 1942 to January 20, 1943) and the light cruiser Nagara (repairs in Maizuru from December 27, 1942 to January 20, 1943) received minor damage. The current repair of the Takao hull and mechanisms in Yokosuka from November 24 to December 18, 1942 was not associated with combat damage.

Despite the defeat of the imperial fleet, in this battle, the parties lost an almost equal number of sailors - 242 Americans and 249 Japanese. Vice Admiral Kondo Nobutake did not suffer any formal punishment - in April 1943 he even received the rank of full admiral, and in August he was appointed to the Supreme Military Council of the empire. However, in December 1943 he was transferred to the post of commander of the fleet of the Kitaisky region, and in May 1945 he was dismissed.

Results

The reason for the defeat of Admiral Kondo was the unwillingness of the Japanese naval command to throw all their forces into battle: four of the oldest and weakest battleships were allocated for operations in the Solomon Islands, the only advantage of which was high speed, which allowed them to operate in conjunction with heavy cruisers. But of these four ships, Yamamoto allowed only two to be used, and Kondo threw them into battle one by one. He did not dare to move the aircraft carrier Zunio closer to Guadalcanal, so Tanaka's transports were left without air cover.

Transport "Kinugawa-maru" at Cape Tassafaronga, 1943.
history.navy.mil

The Americans experienced similar problems: Admiral Halsey sought to keep his only aircraft carrier as far south as possible, and it was not until November 14 that he decided to throw both battleships into battle. Both sides experienced an acute shortage of destroyers - this was especially evident for the Japanese in the second battle, when Kimura's formation managed to attack the American battleships from a "pistol" distance of two dozen cables. But the Japanese had only four destroyers and a light cruiser, and as a result, only two torpedoes found targets. But the massive night torpedo attack was the trump card of the Japanese sailors, more than once bringing them success in previous battles.

The battle of November 13-15 was a turning point in the battles for Guadalcanal. Until that moment, the Japanese, despite all the successes of the Americans, continued to block their bridgehead at Lunga Point and even increased the size of their forces faster than the enemy had time to do. From mid-November, Japanese troops began not only to be outnumbered by the Americans, but also to experience an acute shortage of ammunition. The supply of Guadalcanal had to continue with destroyers and high-speed transports converted from old destroyers - they transported mainly containers with food and ammunition and could not take equipment on board. Before the Japanese, the prospect of evacuating troops from the island more and more clearly arose.

To be continued…

Sources and literature:

Campaigns of the Pacific War. Materials of the commission for the study of strategic bombing by aircraft of the United States. M.: Military Publishing, 1956
Paul Stephen Dall. Battle path of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Yekaterinburg: Mirror, 1997
U.S.S. South Dakota (BB57). Gunfire damage. Battle of Guadalcanal 14-15 November, 1942. Preliminary Design Section Bureau of Ships. Navy Department, June 1, 1947 (War damage report #57)
Robert Lundgren, "Kirishima Damage Analysis" (PDF), www.navweapons.com
http://www.combinedfleet.com
https://www.history.navy.mil
http://www.ibiblio.org

I bring to your attention a magnificent book dedicated to the Japanese battleships of the times Russo-Japanese War. Navarnoe, this is the most detailed monograph on this topic.

Annotation :

The Japanese naval miracle of the early 20th century, which turned the Land of the Rising Sun into a superpower, became possible only thanks to the amazing rationalism of the Teikoku Kaigun (Imperial Navy). Unlike the confusion and vacillation that prevailed in the naval headquarters and admiralties of many countries (and especially in Russia), the Japanese made practically no mistakes, adopting from the British allies all the most advanced - equipment, tactics, combat training, basing and supply systems - and in the shortest possible time creating "from scratch" a modern fleet that dominates the Far Eastern waters. And its core and main strike force six excellent British-built ironclads became, which played a decisive role in the war against Russia. True, the Hatsuse and Yashima did not live to see the general battle, having been blown up by mines near Port Arthur in May 1904, but the Fuji, Shikishima, Asahi and the flagship of Admiral Togo Mikasa became the main victors of Tsushima . It was they who went at the head of the 1st combat detachment, shooting the Russian battleships one by one. It was their 12-inch, 400-kilogram "suitcases" that inflicted extensive damage on our ships, turning their superstructures and unarmoured ends into piles of scrap metal, causing numerous fires, floods and capsizing. However, the phenomenal blasting effect of shimoza had to be paid for by an increased risk of self-detonation - just a week after the signing of the peace treaty, Mikasa sank from the detonation of ammunition and returned to service only three years later. And in 1926, the famous battleship was turned into a museum - introduced into a specially dug pit in Yokosuka and covered with earth along the waterline, it remains in this form to this day ...
In the new book by the leading naval historian, you will find comprehensive information about the creation, combat use and post-war fate of all Japanese battleships without exception. Collector's edition on top quality coated paper illustrated with hundreds of exclusive drawings and photographs.

3. Europe is building a Japanese fleet

In a dispute with Russia for primacy in Far East Japan used English traditions, culture, science and technology with exceptional vigor. English were the rules of service in the navy, uniforms, the art of shooting, weapons and ships. And it was not a simple borrowing of customs. With art that distinguishes the Land of the Rising Sun from all countries of the world, the Japanese even then showed an amazing ability to find the most appropriate application for all the achievements of world civilization that fell into their hands. It was the Japanese phenomenon that remains incomprehensible today, which first appeared in the war with Russia and continues to amaze the world today.

In the meantime, the Japanese began with a careful study and development of the English experience. The combat effectiveness of the ship and squadron was the main criterion. Accordingly, training was introduced in the speed of loading guns, 19-knot speed was achieved from battleships, in successive cycles of loading towers, those mechanized stages that could be done manually were eliminated. Thanks to this, the "obsolete", but much simpler, and therefore reliable installations with hydraulic drives surpassed the latest Russians with electric drives in the rate of fire. Where manual drive or ammunition feeding provided time savings, they were irrevocably preferred.

Without falling into Hamlet's doubts, the Marine Technical Committee (MTC) made it a rule to supply each ship with exactly 25, not 20 boilers. The Vickers system shutters for the British Armstrong guns turned out to be just as highly productive on Japanese ships. In contrast to the Kane shutters for 152-mm French guns and the Russian Rosenberg shutters for 305-mm guns, the English shutters provided almost 2 times higher rate of fire.

The Japanese treated with the same care the novelties that had just appeared (after the American-Spanish war, 1898) in equipping the fleets: optical sights and basic rangefinders. Unlike the Russian fleet, which by 1900 was able to purchase six rangefinders through a stump-deck (thanks to the "savings of Admiral V.P. Verkhovsky"), and did not even think about optical sights, Japan immediately began mass orders, which had the goal of immediately to equip all new ships with priceless instruments. The Japanese were not embarrassed by the use in English projects ships, as it were, listed as barbette, but in reality full-fledged tower installations of 305-mm guns. In general, with sufficiently high tactical and technical characteristics of the ships and always providing for reinforced artillery weapons, the Japanese did not pursue dubious novelty, preferring solutions proven by experience.

Just as responsibly, comprehensively weighing and carefully checking everything technical solutions, the Japanese were evaluating and weighing the ships they ordered. All battleships were ordered with the terms of execution in the shortest 30-month period for those times. The ships were supposed to arrive in Japan by 1902. English loans and the huge indemnity collected from China (Russia paid the money) made it possible to carry out the first large program of 1895 (95 million yen) on time and in 1896 to undertake the construction of the second half of the fleet (145 million yen), which included six first-class armored cruisers, a series of light cruisers, a large number of destroyers. (Another significant difference from the Russian program) the necessary expenses for comprehensive combat training and a fleet repair system were provided.

Always striving for accelerated readiness of ships, they did not insist on the Krupp armor that had already appeared instead of the armored one and were content with a slight improvement in the projects of the British fleet's battleships already built earlier. It can be said that English battleships built by English engineers at English shipyards were supposed to resist the Russian ships on the side of Japan. So, the first Japanese battleship of a new construction (launched in 1896), repeating the main design decisions of the English battleship Majestic (1895), with the same incomplete Harvey armor belt, had its thickness increased to 407 mm, elongated to 40 calibers four 305 mm guns, 10 152 mm guns, increased speed. Due to the reduced width of the hull (22.27 m instead of 22.86 m) and the use of forced air, the speed of the Japanese ship reached 18.5-19.2 knots, instead of 17-17.9 on the Majestic.

As usually happened with foreign orders, the Fuji type (Blekwell shipyard) and later laid down, but earlier (February 28, 1896) launched Shikishima (Armstrong shipyard in Elswick) were improved by the British, bringing the displacement to 15,000 tons and adopted for the construction in 1898-1899 of a series of three battleships of the Formidable type. This project, in turn, was finalized for the construction in the same 1898 and 1899 of two Japanese battleships Shikishima and Asahi. With the same 15,000-ton displacement and increased width from 22.86 to 23.16 m, they had a smaller number of 152-mm guns (14 instead of 16), a reduced supply of coal and 229-mm Harvey armor instead of Krupp's. The speed of the first (16907 hp) was 18.78, the second (16360 hp) -18.3 knots.

Closely copying the finished samples of the recognized best English battleships (it was decided not to spend money on an experiment with the type of the German "Braunschweig"), the Japanese and their armored cruisers ordered by English samples. Of the projects that the most reputable cruising company in Elswick could offer, the choice was made in favor of ships of moderate displacement, which, having increased speed against battleships and outperforming Russian cruisers, had strong artillery and reliable armor protection, which would allow them to operate in conjunction with armadillos.

Rejecting too bulky, designed for ocean navigation, high-sided, 11-14 thousand-ton cruisers Royal Navy types "Powerfull" and "Argonaut" (respectively, the type of Russian "Rurik" and "Russia"), the Japanese recognized two Elswick cruisers, built in 1896 and in 1897 for the Chilean government, as suitable for their requirements. Of these, "Esmeralda" (7000 tons) belonged to the class of high-speed (23 knots) ocean raiders. And soon it became a prototype for cruisers of the same class, but only with 152-mm artillery of the Monmouth type, built to counter the Russian 23-knot cruisers of the Varyag, Askold, Bogatyr types.

The second - "O'Higgins" (8500 tons) had a speed of only 21 knots, but was distinguished by reinforced artillery: (4 203 mm and 10 152 mm) and armor (belt along the waterline 178 mm instead of 152 mm). Recognized as the best, this project became the prototype for the head "Asama" built at the same Elswick plant. For confident actions together with battleships in the project, the number of 203-mm guns (in two towers) was increased to four, 152-mm guns to fourteen. The absence of a forecastle, the rejection of cruising wooden (with copper) plating and the use of Krupp armor made it possible to provide for an upper armor belt with a thickness of 152 mm.

The construction of these 9800-ton, 21 knots cruisers - in 1898 "Asama", "Tokiva" (Elsvik, Armstrong), in 1899 and 1900 "Izumo", "Iwate" (ibid.), in 1899 - "Yakumo", ("Volcano", Germany) and "Azuma" (Saint-Nazaire, France) should have alerted the Russian Naval Ministry no less than the construction of formidable 15,000-ton battleships. Together, they could easily paralyze Russia's remaining naval superiority. Against such ships, battleships of a clearly reinforced class were required.

The task of increasing their fire and speed characteristics, armor and mine protection became obvious. This was also prompted by the composition of the rest of the ships created by the hands of Europe of the Japanese (to the envy of everyone balanced) fleet. Indeed, in it even ships of the second plan - light cruisers and destroyers were deeply thought out optimal types.

The order of the previously built Elswick cruisers (from the series that won at Yalu in 1895) was continued with a displacement limited to 4800 tons, powerful weapons, including 203-mm guns, an armored deck and increased (against the previous 18 knots) 22 knots speed. Now they could play the role of long-range scouts with the squadron. In 1898, one of these cruisers, the Chiyoda, was built in England, the other Kassagi in the USA, becoming the prototype for the Russian cruiser Varyag. Modeled on the famous Elswick cruiser "Esmeralda" (in 1883 after the purchase from Chile - "Izumo"), which S.O. Makarov called "an excellent fighting vehicle", Japan from 1890 to 1906 built six of these small cruisers (five at its own shipyards) with lightweight artillery (120-152 mm), intended for patrols and reconnaissance. These ships fully corresponded to the type of squadron cruisers (Emden, Breslau, Magdeburg) that were consistently developed in the German fleet (up to World War II). 30-knot, 380-ton destroyers ("fighters") were ordered in England according to the best projects of the Yarrow company. This is their main speed, and often artillery superiority made essentially useless all the then built and exclusively 26-27-knot, 240-ton ("economy"!) Russian destroyers.

It is impossible not to recognize the exceptional, one might say, ideal thoughtfulness of the Japanese program, in which each class of ships had a clearly defined purpose and in which attack ships - battleships - were provided only with especially favorable conditions for the development of their characteristics. The order for the majority of the ships in Europe meant that Russia, developing a response program, willy-nilly entered into competition with all the scientific and industrial potential that had undertaken to serve Japan. After all, once in Eastern war 1854-1856 (Yes, perhaps, in the war with Turkey in 1877-1878) Russia lost such a competition. And, therefore, special efforts of intellect, organization and foresight were needed in order not to lose this time.

Thus, by virtue of the laws of logic and elementary concepts of strategy, a picture of the events of those years is presented today. But something prevented people from correctly assessing the situation and drawing the right conclusions. It is extremely difficult to penetrate into this mysteriously programmed phenomenon of the inferiority of human consciousness, but this is the eternal attraction of history, which requires finding at least a partial explanation for this phenomenon.