Partisan warfare in the Patriotic War of 1812. The partisan movement is “the cudgel of the people's war. Denis Davydov as a poet

Chigvintseva S.V.

Introduction

In our time - the time of grandiose social transformations - the need for a deep understanding of the steep moments in the course of social development and the role of the masses in history is more acutely felt than ever. In this regard, it seems relevant to us today to address the topic of the partisan movement during the Patriotic War, the 200th anniversary of which our country is celebrating this year.

The purpose of the work is to determine the role of the partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812, using the materials of history and literature in an integrated manner.

The objectives of the work are to consider the causes of the emergence of a wide wave of the partisan movement and its significance in the military events of the autumn-winter of 1812.

The theme of the partisan movement of 1812 is represented by a fairly wide range of sources and studies in the historical literature. The drawn range of sources allowed us to divide them into two groups. The first includes legal and government documents. The second group of sources includes diaries of eyewitnesses of the events of the Patriotic War of 1812.

Research methods - analysis of sources, applied a problem-thematic approach to literature, clearly showing the significance of the actions of partisans in alliance with the troops of the people's militia during the autumn-winter period of 1812.

The novelty of the study lies in the integrated approach to using information from literary and historical sources in the analysis of the events of the Patriotic War.

The chronological framework of the study covers the second half of 1812.

The structure of the work corresponds to the set goal and objectives and consists of: an introduction, two chapters with paragraphs, a conclusion, a list of references and references.

ChapterI. Reasons for the development of the partisan movement

Napoleon did not prepare for any of the wars as carefully as for a campaign against Russia. The plan for the upcoming campaign was developed in the most detailed way, the theater of military operations was carefully studied, huge warehouses of ammunition, uniforms and food were created. 1,200 thousand people were put under arms. As the great Russian writer L.N. Tolstoy rightly notes: “Half of the army was quartered within the vast empire of Napoleon in order to keep the conquered countries in obedience, in which the national liberation movement was rising against the Napoleonic yoke.”

Historian A.Z. Manfred focuses on what Russia knew about Napoleon's preparations for war. The Russian ambassador in Paris, Prince A. B. Kurakin, starting from 1810, delivered to the Russian military ministry accurate information about the number, armament and deployment of French troops. Valuable information was delivered to him by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government of Napoleon Ch. Talleyrand, as well as J. Fouche.

Since 1810, the rearmament of the Russian army began, the strengthening of its western borders. However, the archaic recruiting system did not allow to prepare the necessary manpower reserves for the upcoming war. The Russian army numbered about 240 thousand people and was divided into three groups: the first army (M. B. Barclay de Tolly) covered the Petersburg direction, the second (P. I. Bagration) - Moscow, the third (A. P. Tormasova) - Kiev .

The usual tactic of warfare by Napoleon was to win 1-2 major battles and thus decide the outcome of the war. And this time, Napoleon's plan was to use his numerical superiority in border battles to defeat the first and second armies one by one, then capture Moscow and St. Petersburg. Napoleon's strategic plan was frustrated when - in June-August 1812, the Russian armies retreated, they decided to unite in Vitebsk, and then Smolensk. In the very first days, a partisan movement began (20 thousand peasants rose). G.R. Derzhavin wrote about those days:

“In the fiery dawn of the previous battles:
Every village was boiling
Crowds of bearded warriors ...

And cunning warrior
He suddenly called his eagles
And burst into Smolensk ...

We shielded ourselves here
Threshold of Moscow - doors to Russia;
Here the Russians fought like animals,
Like angels! (between 1812-1825)

In August, the army and the people demanded that M. I. Kutuzov be appointed commander-in-chief. The battle of Borodino showed the courage of the Russian army, the French retreated to their original positions, but Moscow had to surrender to the French.

Leaving Moscow, Kutuzov made a remarkable maneuver: having created the appearance of a retreat along the Ryazan road, he moved with the main forces to the Kaluga road, where he stopped in September 1812 near the village of Tarutino (80 km from Moscow). He wrote: “Always fearing that the enemy would not take control of this road with his main forces, which would deprive the army of all its communications with the most grain-producing provinces, I found it necessary to detach the 6th corps with the general of infantry (infantry - the author) Dokhturov: on Kaluga Borovsky road to the side of the village of Folminsky. Soon after this partisan, Colonel Seslavin really opened the movement of Napoleon, striving with all his forces along this road to Borovsk.

The war of 1812 appears in the image of Tolstoy as a people's war. The author creates many images of peasants, soldiers, whose judgments together make up the people's worldview.

In the Tarutinsky camp, the formation of a new Russian army began, the troops were given rest, and partisan detachments tried to replenish their reserves and equipment. N.A. Durova wrote about those days as follows: “In the evening, our regiment was ordered to be on horseback. ... Now we have become a rearguard and will cover the retreat of the army.

Historian V.I. Babkin believes that "partisan detachments, parts of the militia of the 1st district were an essential element in the plan for preparing and carrying out the victorious offensive of the Russian army." In our opinion, we can agree with the author on this, since in a report to Alexander I, M. I. Kutuzov wrote: “During the retreat ... I made it a rule for myself ... to wage an incessant small war, and for this I put ten partisans on the wrong foot in order to be able to take away all the ways from the enemy, who thinks in Moscow to find all kinds of food in abundance. During the six-week rest of the Main Army at Tarutino, my partisans instilled fear and horror in the enemy, taking away all means of food.

However, the researcher L. G. Beskrovny does not agree with our opinion, who believes that the partisans mostly acted spontaneously, without coordinating "their actions with the forces of the high command."

While the Russian army had the opportunity in a calm situation to replenish with new fresh forces, the enemy, surrounded in Moscow, was forced to conduct continuous military operations against the partisans. Thanks, among other things, to the actions of the partisans, there was virtually no break in hostilities against Napoleon during the Tarutino period. Having occupied Moscow, the enemy received neither respite nor peace. On the contrary, during his stay in Moscow, he suffered significant damage from the blows of the people's forces. To help the militia and partisans, M.I. Kutuzov allocated army flying detachments of regular cavalry to strengthen the blockade of Moscow and strike at enemy communications. In our opinion, the clear interaction of the main elements of the "small war" - militias, partisans and army flying detachments, made it possible for M.I. Kutuzov to create a solid foundation for a victorious counteroffensive.

The campaign in Russia was not like those that Napoleon had had to lead before. Armand de Caulaincourt, who was under Napoleon, wrote: “There were no local residents, no prisoners could be taken, no stragglers along the way, we had no spies ... The remaining residents were all armed; no vehicles could be found. Horses were harassed for trips for food ... ". Such was the nature of the "small war". Around the main French forces in Moscow, an internal front was formed, consisting of militias, partisans and flying detachments.

Thus, the main reasons for the rise of a broad wave of the partisan movement were the application to the peasants of the demand of the French army for the delivery of food, uniforms, fodder; robbery of native villages by the soldiers of Napoleon Bonaparte; brutal methods of treatment of the population of our country; the spirit of freedom that reigned in the atmosphere of the "age of liberation" (XIX century) in Russia.

ChapterII. The rise of the wave of the partisan movement in the autumn-winter of 1812

On October 10, 1812, being isolated, fearing the indignation of his multinational hungry army, Napoleon left Moscow. Moscow burned for 6 days, 2/3 of the houses died, the peasants went to the forests. A guerrilla war broke out. In the memory of the Russian people, partisan heroes remained, whom L.N. Tolstoy called "the club of the people's war" - D. Davydov, I. S. Dorokhov, A. N. Seslavin, A. S. Figner, the peasant Gerasim Kurin, the elder Vasilisa Kozhina. The partisans destroyed about 30 thousand enemy soldiers during the war years. G.R. dedicated his poems to D. Davydov. Derzhavin, A.N. Seslavin - F.N. Glinka, the patriotism of the common people was sung by V.V. Kapnist.

Among historians, there are different points of view on the role of partisans in the liberation struggle of 1812. Thus, if Academician E.V. there was neither occupation nor Russian state power (that is, it actually carried out management functions in it), the historian A.S. Markin considers this opinion an exaggeration.

If we consider the question of the emergence of the partisan movement, here you can see different opinions of historians. E.V.Tarle believes that it originated in the Poresensky, Krasinsky and Smolensky counties in July 1812, since the population of these counties first of all suffered from the invaders. But as the enemy army moved deeper into Russia, he notes, the entire population of the Smolensk province rose to the fight. The Sychevsk zemstvo police officer Boguslavsky, the leader of the Sychevsk nobility Nakhimov, Major Emelyanov, retired captain Timashev and others took part in its organization. Historian Troitsky N.A. argues differently - it showed itself later, in Smolensk in August 1812: “The partisans of the Smolensk province dealt a tangible blow to the enemy, and also helped the Russian army a lot. In particular, the detachment of the merchant of the city of Porechye Nikita Minchenkov helped the army detachment to liquidate the detachment of the French under the command of General Pino.

The episode of the Patriotic War of 1812, connected with the activities of the peasant detachment of Gerasim Matveyevich Kurin (1777-1850), for many decades has served as a textbook illustration of the thesis of the peasant partisan war against the Napoleonic invaders.

On September 24, 1812, the foragers of the French corps of Ney, who arrived from Bogorodsk, plundered and burned the Vokhon village of Stepurino. Kurin expected the appearance of the enemy, dividing his three thousandth squad into three parts, which began to methodically beat the French. On the same day, in the evening, Ney's corps, along with other corps stationed around Moscow, received an order to return to the capital. Upon receipt of the news of the occupation of Bogorodsk by the French, the Vokhonsky volost gathering, of course, with the approval of the local head Yegor Semyonovich Stulov, decided to form a squad for self-defense, women, the elderly, children and movable property to hide in the forests. The gathering also instructed the local peasant Gerasim Kurin to command the squad.

One of the large peasant partisan detachments of up to four thousand people was led in the region of the city of Gzhatsk (Moscow region) by the soldier Yeremey Chetvertakov. In the Smolensk province in the Sychevsky district, a partisan detachment of four hundred people was led by a retired soldier S. Yemelyanov The detachment fought 15 battles, destroyed 572 enemy soldiers and captured 325 Frenchmen.

However, it is necessary to note the peculiarity noted by the researcher V. I. Babkin - economic (state) peasants (unlike landowners and monasteries) have always been an island of stability and were not prone to anarchy. For example, by 1812, the Vokhonskaya volost consisted mainly of economic peasants, in comparison with their privately owned counterparts, who had long, by law, enjoyed greater personal freedom.

In our opinion, it is necessary to see the difference between the peasant and army partisan detachments. If the peasant detachments were organized by the peasants G. Kurin, the peasant Vasilisa Kozhina in the Smolensk province, the former ordinary soldier Yeremey Chetvertakov, then the first army partisan detachment was created on the initiative of M. B. Barclay de Tolly. Its commander was General F.F. Vintsengerode, who led the combined Kazan Dragoon (equestrian), Stavropol, Kalmyk and three Cossack regiments, which began to operate in the city of Dukhovshchina.

Seslavin Alexander Nikitich (1780-1858) was a lieutenant general, in 1812 a colonel, commander of the Sumy hussar regiment, who, on behalf of M.I. active Russian army.

A real thunderstorm for the French was the detachment of Denis Davydov. This detachment arose on the initiative of Davydov himself, lieutenant colonel, commander of the Akhtyrsky hussar regiment. Together with his hussars (riders lightly armed with a saber and a carbine), he retreated as part of the army of P.I. Bagration to Borodin. A passionate desire to be even more useful in the fight against the invaders prompted D. Davydov "to ask for a separate detachment." D. Davydov asked General P.I. Bagration to allow him to organize a partisan detachment for operations behind enemy lines. For the "test" M.I. Kutuzov allowed D. Davydov to take 50 hussars and 80 Cossacks and go to Medynen and Yukhnov. Having received a detachment at his disposal, D. Davydov began bold raids on the rear of the enemy. In the very first skirmishes near the villages of Tsarev Zaymishcha and Slavkogo, he achieved success: he defeated several detachments of the French, captured a wagon train with ammunition.

An army partisan flying detachment is a mobile unit deployed to various areas of military operations. For example, a detachment of General I. S. Dorokhov operated from Gzhatsk to Mozhaisk. Captain A. S. Figner with his flying detachment attacked the French on the road from Mozhaisk to Moscow. In the Mozhaisk region and to the south, a detachment of Colonel I. M. Vadbolsky operated as part of the Mariupol Hussar Regiment and 500 Cossacks.

Acting, according to the order of the commander-in-chief, between Mozhaisk and Moscow, a detachment of retired soldiers and Colonel A.S. Figner, along with other partisans, helped armed peasants near Moscow in the extermination of small detachments of marauders, intercepting French couriers and convoys.

In early October 1812, Napoleon, leaving Moscow, moved to Kaluga, where the food warehouses of the Russian army were located, hoping to spend the winter there. Russian troops pursued the enemy, inflicting sensitive blows on him. In those years, M.I. Kutuzov addressed the army with the following words: “... Napoleon, not seeing anything else ahead, as a continuation of a terrible people's war, capable of destroying his entire army in a short time, seeing in every inhabitant a warrior, a common one ... undertook hasty retreat."

Thus, the general offensive of the Russian army was successfully combined with a "small war". The fight against the enemy, together with the army, was successfully fought by tens of thousands of militia warriors and popular partisan detachments. On December 25, 1812, Alexander I published a special Manifesto on the expulsion of the enemy from Russia and the end of the Patriotic War. On this occasion, N.A. Durova noted in her notes: “The French fought furiously. Ah, man is terrible in his frenzy! All the properties of the wild beast are then united in it. Not! This is not courage. I do not know what to call this wild, bestial courage, but it is unworthy of being called fearlessness.

The Patriotic War of 1812 ended with the victory of the Russian people, who waged a just, liberation struggle. The reason for the rise of the partisan movement in the autumn-winter of 1812 was the following: the Napoleonic invasion caused enormous damage to the country's economy, brought innumerable misfortunes and suffering to the people. Hundreds of thousands of people died, no less became crippled; many cities and villages were destroyed, many cultural monuments were plundered and destroyed.

The significance of the partisan movement in the Patriotic War was manifested in the following: the actions of the partisans raised the spirit of patriotism in battles with the enemy, the national self-consciousness of the Russian people grew; helping the regular army, the partisans made it clear to Napoleon that he would not win the war with lightning speed, and his plans for world domination were destroyed.

Conclusion

The historical past of the people, historical memory, the system of generally significant patterns of behavior at such critical moments in history as the Patriotic War - this is not a complete list of those facts that influence the formation of the personality of the 21st century. Hence the relevance of our appeal to the theme of the role of the masses, the organization of the partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812.

The Patriotic War of 1812 ended with the victory of the Russian people.

In the course of our work, we came to the following conclusions:

If we consider the question of the emergence of the partisan movement, E.V. Tarle believes that it originated in the Smolensk province; Troitsky N.A. - it showed itself later, in Smolensk; Manfred A.Z. - during the capture of Mogilev and Pskov.

Among the reasons for the emergence of the peasant and army partisan movement, historians distinguish such as: the application to the peasants of the requirement of the French army to hand over food, uniforms, fodder to them; robbery of villages by soldiers of Napoleon Bonaparte; brutal methods of treatment of the population of our country; the spirit of freedom that reigned in the atmosphere of the "age of liberation" (XIX century) in Russia.

The role of the partisan movement in World War II was as follows:

1. replenish the reserves of the Russian army with people and equipment,
2. they destroyed the forces of the French army in small detachments, transmitted information about the French to the Russian army,
3. destroyed carts with food and ammunition that went to the French in Moscow.
4. Napoleon's plans for a blitzkrieg against Russia failed.

The significance of the partisan movement was manifested in the growth of the national identity of the peasantry and all strata of Russian society, the growing sense of patriotism and responsibility for the preservation of their history and culture. The close interaction of the three forces (militia, peasant partisans and army flying detachments) ensured enormous success in the "small war". The great Russian writer L.N. Tolstoy, conveying the spirit of that time, noted: "... the cudgel of the people's war rose with all its formidable and majestic strength and, without asking anyone's tastes and rules, rose, fell and nailed the French until the whole invasion died."

Notes

From the report of M.I. Kutuzov to Alexander I about the battle of Maloyaroslavets // Reader on the history of Russia from ancient times to the present day / Comp. A.S. Orlov, V.A. Georgiev, N.G. Georgieva and others - M .: PBOYuL, 2000, From the report of M.I. Kutuzov to Alexander I about the battle of Borodino // Reader on the history of Russia from ancient times to the present day // Tamzhe et al.

Zhilin P.A. The death of the Napoleonic army in Russia. Ed. 2nd. - M., 1974. - S. 93.

From the appeal of M.I. Kutuzov to the army about the beginning of the expulsion of Napoleon from Russia // Reader on the history of Russia from ancient times to the present day. - M., 2000. - S. 271.

Durova N.A. Notes of a cavalry girl. - Kazan, 1979. - S. 45.

Tolstoy L.N. War and peace: in 4 volumes - M., 1987. - V.3. - S. 212.

List of used sources and literature

1. Sources

1.1 Borodino. Documents, letters, memoirs. - M.: Soviet Russia, 1962. - 302 p.

1.2. From the report of M.I. Kutuzov to Alexander I about the battle of Borodino // Reader on the history of Russia from ancient times to the present day / Comp. A.S. Orlov, V.A. Georgiev, N.G. Georgieva et al. – M.: PBOYuL, 2000. – P. 268-269.

1.3. From the report of M.I. Kutuzov to Alexander I about the battle of Maloyaroslavets // Reader on the history of Russia from ancient times to the present day / Comp. A.S.Orlov, V.A.Georgiev, N.G.Georgieva and others - M.: PBOYuL, 2000. - P. 270-271.

1.4. From the appeal of M.I. Kutuzov to the army about the beginning of the expulsion of Napoleon from Russia // Reader on the history of Russia from ancient times to the present day / Comp. A.S. Orlov, V.A. Georgiev, N.G. Georgieva et al. – M.: PBOYuL, 2000. – P. 271.

1.5.Davydov D.V. Diary of partisan actions // http://www.museum.ru/1812/Library/Davidov1/index.html.

2. Literature

2.1. Babkin V.I. People's militia in the Patriotic War of 1812 - M.: Sotsekgiz, 1962. - 212 p.

2.2. Beskrovny L. G. Partisans in the Patriotic War of 1812 // Questions of History. - 1972. - No. 1. - S. 13-17.

2.3. Bogdanov L.P. The Russian army in 1812. Organization, management, armament. - M.: Military Publishing House, 1979. - 275 p.

2.4. Glinka F.N. Partisan Seslavin //lib.rtg.su/history/284/17.html

2.5. Derzhavin G.R. 1812 //lib.rtg.su/history/284/17.html

2.6. Durova N.A. Notes of a cavalry girl. Reissue. - Kazan, 1979. - 200 p.

2.7. Zhilin P.A. The death of the Napoleonic army in Russia. Ed. 2nd. - M., 1974. - 184 p.

2.8. Kapnist V.V. Vision of a Russian crying over Moscow in 1812…//lib.rtg.su/history/284/17.html

protracted military conflict. The detachments, in which people were united by the idea of ​​the liberation struggle, fought on an equal footing with the regular army, and in the case of a well-organized leadership, their actions were highly effective and largely decided the outcome of the battles.

Partisans of 1812

When Napoleon attacked Russia, the idea of ​​strategic guerrilla warfare arose. Then, for the first time in world history, Russian troops used a universal method of conducting military operations on enemy territory. This method was based on the organization and coordination of the actions of the rebels by the regular army itself. To this end, trained professionals - "army partisans" - were thrown over the front line. At this time, the detachments of Figner, Ilovaisky, as well as the detachment of Denis Davydov, who was a lieutenant colonel of Akhtyrsky, became famous for their military exploits.

This detachment was separated from the main forces longer than others (for six weeks). The tactics of Davydov's partisan detachment consisted in the fact that they avoided open attacks, swooped in by surprise, changed the direction of attacks, and felt for the enemy's weak points. the local population helped: the peasants were guides, spies, participated in the extermination of the French.

In the Patriotic War, the partisan movement was of particular importance. The basis for the formation of detachments and units was the local population, who were well acquainted with the area. In addition, it was hostile to the invaders.

The main goal of the movement

The main task of the guerrilla war was the isolation of enemy troops from its communications. The main blow of the people's avengers was directed at the supply lines of the enemy army. Their detachments violated communications, prevented the approach of reinforcements, the supply of ammunition. When the French began to retreat, their actions were aimed at destroying ferry crossings and bridges across numerous rivers. Thanks to the active actions of the army partisans, almost half of the artillery was lost by Napoleon during the retreat.

The experience of conducting a partisan war in 1812 was used in the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945). During this period, this movement was large-scale and well organized.

The period of the Great Patriotic War

The need to organize a partisan movement arose due to the fact that most of the territory of the Soviet state was captured by German troops, who sought to make slaves and eliminate the population of the occupied regions. The main idea of ​​the partisan war in the Great Patriotic War is the disorganization of the activities of the Nazi troops, inflicting human and material losses on them. For this, fighter and sabotage groups were created, and a network of underground organizations was expanded to direct all actions in the occupied territory.

The partisan movement of the Great Patriotic War was bilateral. On the one hand, detachments were created spontaneously, from people who remained in the territories occupied by the enemy, and sought to protect themselves from mass fascist terror. On the other hand, this process was organized, under the leadership from above. Diversionary groups were thrown behind enemy lines or organized in advance on the territory, which was supposed to be left in the near future. To provide such detachments with ammunition and food, caches with supplies were first made, and they also worked out the issues of their further replenishment. In addition, issues of secrecy were worked out, the places for basing detachments were determined in the forest after the front retreated further to the east, and the provision of money and valuables was organized.

traffic guidance

In order to lead the guerrilla war and sabotage struggle, workers from among the local residents who were well acquainted with these areas were thrown into the territory captured by the enemy. Very often, among the organizers and leaders, including the underground, were the leaders of the Soviet and party organs, who remained in the territory occupied by the enemy.

The guerrilla war played a decisive role in the victory of the Soviet Union over Nazi Germany.

The invasion of foreign invaders caused an unprecedented popular upsurge. Literally the whole of Russia rose to fight the invaders. The peasantry, as the class with the strongest spiritual traditions, unitedly, in a single outburst of patriotic feelings, stood up against the invaders.

The invasion of foreign invaders caused an unprecedented popular upsurge. Literally the whole of Russia rose to fight the invaders. Napoleon miscalculated when, trying to win over the peasants to his side, he announced to them that he would abolish serfdom. Not! The peasantry, as the class with the strongest spiritual traditions, unitedly, in a single outburst of patriotic feelings, stood up against the invaders.

Immediately after the appearance of the enemy army in Lithuania and Belarus, a spontaneous partisan movement of local peasants was born. The partisans inflicted significant damage on foreigners, destroyed enemy soldiers, and upset the rear. At the very beginning of the war, the French army felt a shortage of food and fodder. Due to the death of horses, the French were forced to abandon 100 guns in Belarus.

The people's militia was actively created in Ukraine. 19 Cossack regiments were formed here. Most of them were armed and maintained at their own expense by the peasants.

Peasant partisan detachments arose in the Smolensk region and in other occupied regions of Russia. A powerful partisan movement also operated on the territory of the Moscow province. Such folk heroes as Gerasim Kurin and Ivan Chushkin distinguished themselves here. Some of the peasant detachments numbered several thousand people. For example, the detachment of Gerasim Kurin consisted of 5,000 people. The detachments of Yermolai Chetvertakov, Fyodor Potapov, Vasilisa Kozhina were widely known.

The actions of the partisans inflicted heavy human and material losses on the enemy, and disrupted his connection with the rear. In just six weeks of autumn, the partisans destroyed about 30,000 enemy soldiers. Here is what is said in the report on the actions of peasant partisan detachments in the territory of only one Moscow province (written by the Governor-General of Moscow F.V. Rastopchin):

REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF PEASANT PARTISAN GROUPS

AGAINST NAPOLEON'S ARMY IN MOSCOW PROVINCE

In pursuance of his highest and. in. of will, the news of the brave and commendable deeds of the settlers of the Moscow province, who unanimously and courageously took up arms against the parties sent from the enemy to rob and incite parties, is given here for general information, with the indication of the names and deeds of those merchants, philistines and peasants who in this time most distinguished themselves.

Bogorodsk district Egor Stulov, head of the Vokhon economic volost, Ivan Chushkin of Sotsky, and Gerasim Kurin, a peasant, and Emelyai Vasiliev, head of the Amerevsky volost, having gathered the peasants under their jurisdiction and inviting also neighboring ones, courageously defended themselves from the enemy and not only did not allow him to ruin and rob their villages, but, reflecting and driving away the enemies, the Vokhon peasants beat and took up to fifty in full, while the Amerev peasants up to three hundred people. Such courageous deeds of theirs were testified and approved in writing by the head of the Vladimir militia, Mr. Lieutenant General Prince Golitsyn.

In Bronnitsky district peasants of the villages: Shubin, Veshnyakov, Konstantinov, Voskresensky and Pochinok; villages: Salvacheva, Zhiroshkina, Rogacheva, Ganusova, Zalesye, Golushina and Zhdanskaya, according to appeals from the Zemstvo police, up to 2 thousand armed horsemen and footmen repeatedly gathered on the road leading to the city of Podol, where, under cover in the forest, they waited with the Cossacks of the enemy, who, passing from Bronnitsy to the aforementioned city, ravaged entire villages. Finally, they saw a detached enemy detachment, which included up to 700 people, which, with the help of the Cossacks, they courageously attacked and, putting 30 people in place, forced the others to drop their weapons and took them prisoner with their carts and booty. These prisoners were escorted by the Cossacks to our Main Army. In this incident, they distinguished themselves most for their bravery and courage, encouraging others to defend against enemies: the village of Konstantinov, the headman Semyon Tikhonov, the village of Salvacheva, the headman Yegor Vasilyev, and the village of Pochinok, the headman Yakov Petrov.

The villagers of Zalesye, the peasants, noticing that the one who called himself a Russian native served the French, immediately seized him and handed him over to the Cossacks who were in their village for presentation where they should.

The village of Ganusov, the peasant Pavel Prokhorov, seeing 5 French people riding towards him, set off on horseback in a Cossack dress and, not having a firearm with him, took them prisoner with only one lance and delivered them to the Cossacks for sending on command.

In the villages of Velin, Krivtsy and Sofyin, the peasants, arming themselves against the French, who arrived in sufficient numbers to rob the holy churches and to seduce those living in these places, not only did not allow them to do so, but, having overcome, exterminated them. In this case, 62 yards with all buildings and property were burned from enemy shots in the village of Sofyino.

The villages of Mikhailovskaya Sloboda and Yaganova, the villages of Durnikha, Chulkova, Kulakova and Kakuzeva, peasants daily up to 2 thousand people gathered for the Borovsky transport of the Moscow River to the mountain, having the strictest supervision of the crossing of enemy detachments. Some of them dressed in a Cossack dress and armed themselves with tsiks to greatly intimidate their enemies. -They repeatedly hit and drove the enemy; and on September 22, seeing that the enemy detachment, quite numerous, stretched along the other side of the river to the village of Myachkovo, many of them, together with the Cossacks, crossed the river ford and, attacking the enemies swiftly, 11 people were put in place and 46 people were taken prisoner with weapons, horses and two wagons; the rest, having been scattered, fled.

In the Bronnitsky district, during the defeat and dispersion of the enemy detachment, which was striving to plunder the village of Myachkovo, the peasants of the village of Durnikha showed the greatest courage: Mikhailo Andreev., Vasily Kirillov and Ivan Ivanov; the villages of Mikhailovskaya Sloboda: Sidor Timofeev, Yakov Kondratiev and Vladimir Afanasiev; the village of Yaganova: the headman Vasily Leontiev and the peasant Fedul Dmitriev, who encouraged others to cross the river and attack the enemy. In the village of Vokhrin and the villages of Lubniv and Lytkarino, the inhabitants, arming themselves against small enemy detachments, often exterminated the naked, and the inhabitants of Vokhrin lost 84 yards with all their buildings and property from the burning, and in Lubnin two master's yards were burned - horse and cattle. Two Frenchmen came to the village of Khripav and, taking a horse harnessed to a cart that was standing behind the yards, mounted it and drove into the forest. The peasant of that village, Yegor Ivanov, who was guarding the village, seeing this, chased after them with an ax and threatened to cut them down if they did not leave the horse. The robbers, seeing that they could not leave him, were frightened, abandoned the cart with the horse and ran themselves; but the aforesaid peasant, unharnessing his horse from the cart, pursued them on horseback, and first cut one of them, and then overtook and killed the other.

Volokolamsk district. The peasants of this district, who were constantly armed until the very removal of the enemies from there, courageously repulsed all their attacks, taking many prisoners, and exterminating others on the spot. When the police captain who was in charge of these peasants was away to carry out other assignments, then the order and authority over them were entrusted to Mr. Actual Privy Councilor and Senator Alyabyev to the steward Gavril Ankudinov, who, as well as those who were with him, Mr. Alyabyev, courtyard people : Dmitry Ivanov, Fedor Feopemptov, Nikolai Mikhailov, also the economic Seredinsky volost, the village of Seredy, the volost head Boris Borisov and his son Vasily Borisov, the village of Burtsev, the volost headman Ivan Ermolaev, the volost clerk Mikhailo Fedorov, the peasant Filipp Mikhailov, the village of Podsukhina, the peasants Kozma Kozmin and Gerasim Semyonov, they acted excellently against the enemy and were always the first to strive for him, setting an example to others with their fearlessness.

Zvenigorod district. When almost all of this district was already occupied by the enemy, except for a small part of the villages lying on the side of the provincial city of Voskresensk, which the enemy detachments did not have time to occupy, then the city and surrounding residents, even from the places occupied by the enemy, united, decided unanimously to defend the city of Voskresensk. They armed themselves with whatever they could, established a guard and agreed among themselves that, at the ringing of bells from her, everyone should immediately gather there on horseback and on foot. According to this conventional sign, they always flocked in considerable numbers, armed with guns, pikes, axes, pitchforks, scythes, and repeatedly drove away the enemy parties approaching Voskresensk from the side of Zvenigorod and Ruza. They often fought near the city itself and far from it, sometimes alone, sometimes with the Cossacks, they killed many, took them in full and delivered them to the Cossack teams, so that more than 2 thousand enemies were exterminated in one Zvenigorod district and by the townsfolk alone. Thus, the city of Voskresensk, some villages and the monastery, called New Jerusalem, were saved from the invasion and ruin of the enemy. In this, they distinguished themselves: the head of the economic Velyaminovskaya volost, Ivan Andreev, who, in addition to being engaged in the outfit and ordering people, went out on horseback to the battle and inspired courage in others by his example; of the village of Luchinsky, Mr. Golokhvastov, Sotsky Pavel Ivanov, who also not only dressed up people, but always himself with his children was in battles, in which he was wounded with one of his sons; Nikolai Ovchinnikov, a tradesman from Zvenigorod, who lived in Voskresensk, went to battle more than once and was wounded in the arm; Resurrection merchant Pentiokhov, Zvenigorod tradesman Ivan Goryainov, courtyard people: Prince Golitsyn - Alexei Abramov, gentlemen] Colonshna - Alexei Dmitriev and Prokhor Ignatiev, gentlemen] Yaroslavova - Fedor Sergeyev, patrimonial elders: the village of Ilyinsky gr. Osterman - Egor Yakovlev, the village of Ivashkov mister] Ardalionova - Ustin Ivanov and a peasant of the same village Yegor Alekseev. All of them have been in battle many times and encouraged others to exterminate and drive away the enemy.

Serpukhov district. When the enemy parties were divided for robbery, then the peasants who remained in the houses used cunning to exterminate the enemies of the fatherland. They tried first to get them drunk and mislead them, and then they attacked them. In this way, 5 people were killed in the state-owned village of Stromilov 5, in the village of Lopasna 2, in the village of Teterkah (Mr.] Zhukov) 1, in the village of Dubna (Mr.] Akimov) 2, in the village of Artishchevo (Mr.] Volkov) 7 people. Burmese Akim Dementyev and Countess A. A. Orlova-Chesmenskoy of the village of Khatuni, clerk Ivan Ilyin and landowner Orlova of the village of Gorok Burmese Nikifor Savelyev, according to rumors, the enemy is walking along the Kashira road , gathered the departments of their peasants and, arming them with pikes, pitchforks, axes and house guns of Count Orlov, boldly expected the enemy in the village of Papushkina, who, having learned about it and being in small forces, was forced to pass by.

Ruza district. The peasants, having armed themselves and wound up in each village to collect the bell, hastily gathered up to several thousand people when enemy detachments appeared and attacked the enemy parties with such unanimity and courage that more than a thousand of them were exterminated by them, not counting those taken with their help by the Cossacks in captivity. On the past October 11, having gathered up to 1,500 people, they helped the Cossacks and completely drive the enemy out of Ruza.

According to Vereyskomu county. When the enemy repeatedly attacked the Vyshegorodsky estate of Countess Golovkina in the last days of August and at the beginning of September, it was always repulsed by the patrimonial elders Nikita Fedorov, Gavril Mironov and the clerks of the same landowner Alexei Kirpichnikov, Nikolai Uskov and Afanasiev * Shcheglov with the peasants. In October, when the enemy, returning from Moscow, attempted to cross the Protva river (on which a flour mill with five posts was built) in order to plunder the Church of the Assumption of the Most Holy Theotokos and located near the landowner's house and the state-owned bread store, in which more than 500 quarters of rye were stored, at that time, the aforementioned clerks - Alexei Kirpichnikov and Nikolai Uskov, having gathered peasants up to 500 people, tried by all means to repel the enemy, who had up to 300 people in his detachment. The peasant Pyotr Petrov Kolupanov and her wife, Countess Golovkina, of the village of Lobanova, the peasant Emelyan Minaev, who were workers at the mill in the Mozhaisk district of the economic Reitarsky volost of the Ilyinsky settlement, torn down the lava on the dam and, dismantling the boards, drained the water , which kept the enemy party and saved the aforementioned church, the landowner's house with all the services, the bakery shop, also church houses and the embankment settlement, in which there are 48 peasant houses. The villages of Dubrova and Ponizovye with the churches in them were also saved in the same way, by the defense from the peasants of these and villages close to them, who were especially encouraged by the advice and exhortations of the Verona cathedral priest John Skobeev, who was in the village of Dubrov, to whom the sexton also contributed a lot Vasily Semyonov, who not only encouraged others, but also participated in repelling the enemy himself.

This news. sent and certified by the commander-in-chief in Moscow, General of Infantry, Count F. V. Rostopchin. The commanding people mentioned in it are distinguished by the highest behavior with the St. George 5th class badge, and the rest with a silver medal on the Vladimir ribbon with the inscription: "for love for the fatherland." Without a doubt, many excellent and courageous deeds of other peasants, according to information that has not come down to them, remain unknown.

Simultaneously with the peasants, army partisan detachments operated, formed by order of the command for reconnaissance and military operations behind enemy lines. The first army partisan commander was hussar lieutenant colonel Denis Vasilyevich Davydov. Here is how he himself recalls how he became a partisan:

“Seeing myself useful to the fatherland no more than an ordinary hussar, I decided to ask myself a separate command, despite the words uttered and extolled by mediocrity: do not ask anywhere and do not refuse anything. On the contrary, I have always been sure that in our craft he only fulfills his duty, who crosses his line, is not equal in spirit, as in shoulders, in a line with comrades, asks for everything and does not refuse anything.

With these thoughts, I sent a letter to Prince Bagration with the following content:

“Your Excellency! You know that, having left the post of your adjutant, which is so flattering to my pride, and joining the hussars, I had partisan service as a subject both according to the strength of my years, and experience, and, if I dare say, according to my courage. Circumstances lead me to this time in the ranks of my comrades, where I have no will of my own and, consequently, I can neither undertake nor accomplish anything remarkable. Prince! You are my only benefactor; let me come to you to explain my intentions; if they are pleasing to you, use me at my will and be reliable that the one who held the rank of Bagration's adjutant for five years in a row will support this honor with all the reverence that the plight of our dear fatherland requires. Denis Davydov.

On the twenty-first of August the prince called me to his place; presenting myself to him, I explained to him the benefits of guerrilla warfare under the circumstances of the time. “The enemy follows one path,” I told him, “this path has gone out of measure in its length; transports of vital and combat food of the enemy cover the area from Gzhat to Smolensk and beyond. Meanwhile, the vastness of the part of Russia lying in the south of the Moscow Route contributes to the twists and turns not only of the parties, but of our entire army. What are the crowds of Cossacks doing at the vanguard? Leaving a sufficient number of them to maintain the outposts, it is necessary to divide the rest into parties and let them into the middle of the caravan following Napoleon. Will strong troops go to them? “They have plenty of room to avoid defeat. Will they be left alone? - They will destroy the source of strength and life of the enemy army. Where will she get supplies and food from? - Our land is not so abundant that the roadside part could feed two hundred thousand troops; weapons and gunpowder factories - not on the Smolensk road. In addition, the return appearance of our villagers among the villagers scattered from the war will encourage them and turn the military war into a people's war. Prince! I'll tell you frankly: the soul hurts from everyday parallel positions! It's time to see that they do not close the bowels of Russia. Who does not know that the best way to defend the object of the enemy's aspirations is not in a parallel, but in a perpendicular or, at least, in an indirect position of the army relative to this object? And therefore, if the retreat, chosen by Barclay and continued by the most illustrious, does not stop, Moscow will be taken, peace is signed in it, and we will go to India to fight for the French! I'll lie down here! In India, I will disappear with a hundred thousand of my compatriots without a name and for a benefit alien to Russia, and here I will die under the banner of independence, around which the villagers will crowd, grumbling at the violence and godlessness of our enemies ... And who knows! Maybe an army determined to operate in India! .. "

The prince interrupted the indiscreet flight of my imagination; he shook hands with me and said: “Today I will go to the most illustrious and tell him your thoughts.”

In addition to the detachment of D.V. Davydov, the detachments of A.N. Seslavin, A.S. Figner, I.S. Dorokhov, N.D. Kudashev, I.M. Vadbolsky also successfully operated. The partisan movement was such an unexpected and unpleasant surprise for the French occupiers that they tried to accuse Russia of violating the rules of war; the head of the General Staff of the French Army, Marshal Berthier, even sent Colonel Bertemi to the Headquarters of M.I. Kutuzov with a letter full of indignation. To which Kutuzov replied with a letter with the following content:

Colonel Berthemy, whom I allowed to pass to my main quarters, handed me the letter that Your Grace had instructed him to convey to me. About everything that is the subject of this new appeal, I immediately presented it to the Imperial Majesty, and the transmitter of this was, as you no doubt know, Adjutant General Prince Volkonsky. However, considering the long distance and bad roads at this time of the year, it is impossible that I can already receive an answer on this matter. Therefore, it only remains for me to refer to what I had the honor to say on this subject to General Lauriston. However, I will repeat here the truth, the significance and strength of which you, the prince, will undoubtedly appreciate: it is difficult to stop a people who are hardened by everything that they have seen, a people who have not seen wars on their land for two hundred years, a people ready to sacrifice themselves for homeland and who makes no distinction between what is accepted and what is not accepted in ordinary wars.

As for the armies entrusted to me, I hope, prince, that everyone recognizes in their mode of action the rules that characterize a brave, honest and generous people. In the course of my many years of military service, I have never known any other rules, and I am sure that the enemies with whom I have ever fought have always done justice to my principles.

Accept, Prince, the assurances of my deepest respect.

Commander-in-Chief of the Armies Field Marshal

Prince Kutuzov

The partisan and militia movement made a huge contribution to the defeat and extermination of the enemy. Cutting off the enemy's communications, destroying his detachments, instilling fear and horror in him, hour after hour, it brought the inevitable defeat of the invaders closer. And the experience gained by the people in 1812 was very useful in the future.

Russian Civilization

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The Patriotic War of 1812 was one of the turning points in Russian history, a serious shock to Russian society, which faced a number of new problems and phenomena that still require reflection by modern historians.

One such phenomenon was the People's War, which spawned an incredible amount of rumors and then enduring legends.

The history of the Patriotic War of 1812 has been studied to a sufficient extent, but at the same time there are many controversial episodes in it, since there are conflicting opinions in assessing this event. Differences begin from the very beginning - from the causes of the war, go through all the battles and personalities and end only with the departure of the French from Russia. The question of the popular partisan movement is not fully understood until today, which is why this topic will always be relevant.

In historiography, this topic is presented quite fully, however, the opinions of domestic historians about the partisan war itself and its participants, about their role in the Patriotic War of 1812, are extremely ambiguous.

Dzhivelegov A.K. wrote the following: “The peasants participated in the war only after Smolensk, but especially after the surrender of Moscow. If there had been more discipline in the Grand Army, normal relations with the peasants would have been established very soon. But the foragers turned into marauders, from whom the peasants “naturally defended themselves, and for protection, precisely for protection and for nothing else, peasant detachments were formed ... all of them, we repeat, meant exclusively self-defense. The People's War of 1812 is nothing more than an optical illusion created by the ideology of the nobility...” (6, p. 219).

The opinion of the historian Tarle E.V. was a little more condescending, but on the whole it was similar to the opinion of the author presented above: “All this led to the fact that the mythical “peasant partisans” began to be attributed to what the retreating Russian army actually carried out. There were classical partisans, but mostly only in the Smolensk province. On the other hand, the peasants were terribly annoyed by endless foreign foragers and marauders. And, of course, they were actively resisted. And yet “many peasants fled into the forests at the approach of the French army, often simply out of fear. And not from some great patriotism” (9, p. 12).

Historian Popov A.I. does not deny the existence of peasant partisan detachments, however, he believes that it is wrong to call them the word “partisans”, that they were more like a militia (8, p. 9). Davydov clearly distinguished between "partisans and villagers." In the leaflets, partisan detachments are clearly distinguished from "peasants from the villages adjacent to the theater of war", who "arrange militias among themselves"; they fix the difference between armed settlers and partisans, between “our detached detachments and zemstvo militias” (8, p. 10). So the accusations by Soviet authors of noble and bourgeois historians that they did not consider the peasants to be partisans are completely groundless, because their contemporaries did not consider them as such.

Modern historian N.A. Troitsky in his article “The Patriotic War of 1812. From Moscow to the Neman” wrote: “In the meantime, a guerrilla war, destructive for the French, broke out around Moscow. Peaceful townspeople and villagers of both sexes and all ages, armed with whatever - from axes to simple clubs, multiplied the ranks of partisans and militias ... The total number of people's militia exceeded 400 thousand people. In the war zone, almost all the peasants who were able to bear arms became partisans. It was the nationwide upsurge of the masses, who came out in defense of the Fatherland, that became the main reason for Russia's victory in the war of 1812 "(11)

In pre-revolutionary historiography, there were facts discrediting the actions of partisans. Some historians called the partisans marauders, showed their indecent actions not only in relation to the French, but also in relation to ordinary residents. In many works of domestic and foreign historians, the role of the resistance movement of the broad masses, who responded to a foreign invasion with a nationwide war, is clearly belittled.

Our study presents an analysis of the works of such historians as: Alekseev V.P., Babkin V.I., Beskrovny L.G., Bichkov L.N., Knyazkov S.A., Popov A.I., Tarle E.V. ., Dzhivilegov A.K., Troitsky N.A.

The object of our study is the partisan war of 1812, and the subject of the study is the historical assessment of the partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812.

At the same time, we used the following research methods: narrative, hermeneutic, content analysis, historical-comparative, historical-genetic.

Based on all of the above, the purpose of our work is to give a historical assessment of such a phenomenon as the guerrilla war of 1812.

1. Theoretical analysis of sources and works related to the topic of our study;

2. To identify whether such a phenomenon as the "People's War" took place according to the narrative tradition;

3. Consider the concept of "partisan movement of 1812" and its causes;

4. Consider the peasant and army partisan detachments of 1812;

5. Conduct their comparative analysis in order to determine the role of peasant and army partisan detachments in achieving victory in the Patriotic War of 1812.

Thus, the structure of our work looks like this:

Introduction

Chapter 1: People's War According to the Narrative Tradition

Chapter 2: General characteristics and comparative analysis of partisan detachments

Conclusion

Bibliography

Chapter 1

Modern historians often question the existence of the People's War, believing that such actions of the peasants were carried out solely for the purpose of self-defense and that detachments of peasants should by no means be distinguished as separate types of partisans.

In the course of our work, a large number of sources were analyzed, ranging from essays to collections of documents, and allowing us to understand whether such a phenomenon as the "People's War" took place.

Reporting documentation always provides the most reliable evidence, since it lacks subjectivity and clearly traces information that proves certain hypotheses. Many different facts can be found in it, such as: the size of the army, the names of the detachments, the actions at various stages of the war, the number of casualties and, in our case, facts about the location, number, methods and motives of the peasant partisan detachments. In our case, this documentation includes manifestos, reports, government messages.

1) It all started with the "Manifesto of Alexander I on the collection of the Zemstvo militia of 1812 on July 6." In it, in plain text, the tsar calls on the peasants to fight the French troops, believing that only a regular army will not be enough to win the war (4, p. 14).

2) Typical raids on small detachments of the French are perfectly traced in the report of the marshal of the nobility from Zhizdra to the civil governor of Kaluga (10, p. 117)

3) From the report of E.I. Vlastova Ya.X. Wittgenstein from the town of Bely "On the actions of the peasants against the enemy" from the government report "On the activities of peasant detachments against the army of Napoleon in the Moscow province", from the "Short journal of military operations" on the struggle of the peasants of Velsky district. Smolensk lips. with the army of Napoleon, we see that the actions of peasant partisan detachments really took place during the Patriotic War of 1812, mainly in the Smolensk province (10, p. 118, 119, 123).

Memoirs, like memories, are not the most reliable source of information, since, by definition, memoirs are notes of contemporaries that tell about events in which their author directly took part. Memoirs are not identical to the chronicle of events, since in the memoirs the author tries to comprehend the historical context of his own life, accordingly, memoirs differ from the chronicles of events in subjectivity - in that the events described are refracted through the prism of the author's consciousness with their own sympathy and vision of what is happening. Therefore, memoirs, unfortunately, in our case practically do not provide evidence.

1) The attitude of the peasants in the Smolensk province and their readiness to fight is clearly traced in the memoirs of A.P. Buteneva (10, p. 28)

2) From the memoirs of I.V. Snegirev, we can conclude that the peasants are ready to defend Moscow (10, p. 75)

However, we see that memoirs and memoirs are not a reliable source of information, since they contain too many subjective assessments, and we will not take them into account in the end.

Notes And letters are also subject to subjectivity, but their difference from memoirs is such that they were written directly at the time of these historical events, and not for the purpose of subsequently familiarizing the masses with them, as is the case with journalism, but as personal correspondence or notes, respectively, their reliability although it is questioned, but they can be considered as evidence. In our case, notes and letters provide us with evidence not so much of the existence of the People's War as such, but they prove the courage and strong spirit of the Russian people, showing that peasant partisan detachments were created in large numbers based on patriotism, and not from the need for self-defense.

1) The first attempts at peasant resistance can be traced in a letter from Rostopchin to Balashov dated August 1, 1812 (10, p. 28)

2) From the notes of A.D. Bestuzhev-Ryumin dated August 31, 1812, from a letter to P.M. Longinova S.R. Vorontsov, from the diary of Ya.N. Pushchin about the battle of the peasants with the enemy detachment near Borodino and about the mood of the officers after leaving Moscow, we see that the actions of the peasant partisan detachments during the Patriotic War of 1812 were caused not only by the need for self-defense, but also by deep patriotic feelings and the desire to protect their homeland. enemy (10, p. 74, 76, 114).

Publicism at the beginning of the XIX century in the Russian Empire was subjected to censorship. So in the "First censorship decree" of Alexander I of July 9, 1804, the following is stated: "... censorship is obliged to consider all books and writings intended for distribution in society", i.e. in fact, it was impossible to publish anything without the permission of the controlling body, and, accordingly, all descriptions of the exploits of the Russian people could turn out to be banal propaganda or a kind of “call to action” (12, p. 32). However, this does not mean that journalism does not provide us with any evidence of the existence of the People's War. With the seeming severity of censorship, it is worth noting that she coped with the tasks set not in the best way. Professor of Illion University Marianna Tex Choldin writes: "... a significant number of "harmful" writings penetrated the country despite all the efforts of the government to prevent this" (12, p. 37). Accordingly, journalism does not claim to be 100% reliable, but it also provides us with some evidence of the existence of the People's War and a description of the exploits of the Russian people.

Having analyzed the “Notes of the Fatherland” about the activities of one of the organizers of the peasant partisan detachments Yemelyanov, the correspondence to the newspaper “Northern Post” about the actions of the peasants against the enemy and the article by N.P. Polikarpov "Unknown and elusive Russian partisan detachment", we see that excerpts from these newspapers and magazines reinforce the evidence of the existence of peasant partisan detachments as such and confirm their patriotic motives (10, p. 31, 118; 1, p. 125) .

Based on this reasoning, one can conclude that the most useful in proving the existence of the People's War was reporting documentation because of the lack of subjectivity. Reporting documentation provides proof of the existence of the People's War(description of the actions of peasant partisan detachments, their methods, number and motives), and notes And letters confirm that the formation of such detachments and the People's War itself was caused by Not only in order to self defense, but also based on deep patriotism And courage Russian people. Publicism also reinforces both these judgments. Based on the above analysis of numerous documentation, we can conclude that contemporaries of the Patriotic War of 1812 were aware that the People's War had taken place and clearly distinguished peasant partisan detachments from army partisan detachments, and were also aware that this phenomenon was not caused by self-defense. Thus, from all of the above, we can say that there was a People's War.

Chapter 2. General characteristics and comparative analysis of partisan detachments

The partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812 is an armed conflict between the multinational army of Napoleon and Russian partisans on the territory of Russia in 1812 (1, p. 227).

Guerrilla warfare was one of the three main forms of the Russian people's war against the invasion of Napoleon, along with passive resistance (for example, the destruction of food and fodder, burning their own houses, going into the forests) and massive participation in militias.

The reasons for the emergence of the Partisan war were associated, first of all, with the unsuccessful start of the war and the retreat of the Russian army deep into its territory showed that the enemy could hardly be defeated by the forces of regular troops alone. This required the efforts of the whole people. In the overwhelming majority of the areas occupied by the enemy, he perceived the "Great Army" not as his liberator from serfdom, but as an enslaver. Napoleon did not even think about any liberation of the peasants from serfdom or improvement of their disenfranchised position. If at the beginning promising phrases were uttered about the liberation of serfs from serfdom, and even they talked about the need to issue some kind of proclamation, then this was only a tactical move with which Napoleon hoped to intimidate the landowners.

Napoleon understood that the liberation of the Russian serfs would inevitably lead to revolutionary consequences, which he feared most of all. Yes, this did not meet his political goals when entering Russia. According to Napoleon's comrades-in-arms, it was “important for him to strengthen monarchism in France, and it was difficult for him to preach the revolution in Russia” (3, p. 12).

The very first orders of the administration established by Napoleon in the occupied regions were directed against the serfs, in defense of the serf landowners. The provisional Lithuanian "government", subordinate to the Napoleonic governor, in one of the very first decrees obliged all peasants and rural residents in general to unquestioningly obey the landlords, to continue to perform all work and duties, and those who would evade were to be severely punished, involving for this , if circumstances so require, military force (3, p. 15).

The peasants quickly realized that the invasion of the French conquerors put them in an even more difficult and humiliating position, something in which they were before. The peasants also associated the struggle against foreign enslavers with the hope of liberating them from serfdom.

In reality, things were somewhat different. Even before the start of the war, Lieutenant Colonel P.A. Chuikevich compiled a note on the conduct of an active partisan war, and in 1811 the work of the Prussian colonel Valentini "Small War" was published in Russian. This was the beginning of the creation of partisan detachments in the war of 1812. However, in the Russian army they looked at the partisans with a significant degree of skepticism, seeing in the partisan movement "a pernicious system of divisive action of the army" (2, p. 27).

The partisan forces consisted of detachments of the Russian army operating in the rear of Napoleon's troops; Russian soldiers who escaped from captivity; volunteers from the local population.

§2.1 Peasant partisan detachments

The first partisan detachments were created even before the Battle of Borodino. On July 23, after connecting with Bagration near Smolensk, Barclay de Tolly formed a flying partisan detachment from the Kazan Dragoon, three Don Cossack and Stavropol Kalmyk regiments under the general command of F. Wintzingerode. Wintzingerode was supposed to act against the left flank of the French and provide communication with Wittgenstein's corps. The flying detachment of Wintzingerode also proved to be an important source of information. On the night of July 26-27, Barclay received word from Wintzingerode from Velizh about Napoleon's plans to advance from Porechye to Smolensk in order to cut off the Russian army's escape routes. After the Battle of Borodino, the Wintzingerode detachment was reinforced by three Cossack regiments and two battalions of rangers and continued to operate against the enemy's flanks, breaking up into smaller detachments (5, p. 31).

With the invasion of the Napoleonic hordes, the locals initially simply left the villages and went to forests and areas remote from hostilities. Later, retreating through the Smolensk lands, the commander of the Russian 1st Western Army, M.B. Barclay de Tolly urged his compatriots to take up arms against the invaders. His proclamation, which was obviously based on the work of the Prussian colonel Valentini, indicated how to act against the enemy and how to wage guerrilla warfare.

It arose spontaneously and was a speech by small scattered detachments of local residents and soldiers lagging behind their units against the predatory actions of the rear units of the Napoleonic army. Trying to protect their property and food supplies, the population was forced to resort to self-defense. According to the memoirs of D.V. Davydov, “in every village the gates were locked; with them stood old and young with pitchforks, stakes, axes, and some of them with firearms” (8, p. 74).

The French foragers sent to the countryside for food faced not only passive resistance. In the region of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, detachments of peasants made frequent day and night raids on enemy carts, destroyed his foragers, and captured French soldiers.

Later, the Smolensk province was also plundered. Some researchers believe that it was from this moment that the war became domestic for the Russian people. Here the popular resistance also gained the widest scope. It began in Krasnensky, Porechsky districts, and then in Belsky, Sychevsky, Roslavl, Gzhatsky and Vyazemsky counties. At first, before the appeal of M.B. Barclay de Tolly, the peasants were afraid to arm themselves, fearing that they would then be held accountable. However, later this process became more active (3, p. 13).

In the city of Bely and Belsky district, peasant detachments attacked parties of the French that made their way to them, destroyed them or took them prisoner. The leaders of the Sychevsk detachments, police officer Boguslavsky and retired major Yemelyanov, armed their villagers with guns taken from the French, established proper order and discipline. Sychevsk partisans attacked the enemy 15 times in two weeks (from August 18 to September 1). During this time, they destroyed 572 soldiers and captured 325 people (7, p. 209).

Residents of the Roslavl district created several peasant detachments on horseback and on foot, arming the villagers with pikes, sabers and guns. They not only defended their county from the enemy, but also attacked marauders who made their way to the neighboring Yelnensky county. Many peasant detachments operated in the Yukhnovsky district. Organizing defense along the river. Ugra, they blocked the path of the enemy in Kaluga, provided significant assistance to the army partisan detachment D.V. Davydov.

In the Gzhatsk district, another detachment was also active, created from peasants, headed by Yermolai Chetvertak (Chetvertakov), a private of the Kiev Dragoon Regiment. The detachment of Chetvertakov began not only to protect the villages from marauders, but to attack the enemy, inflicting significant losses on him. As a result, in the entire space of 35 versts from the Gzhatsk pier, the lands were not devastated, despite the fact that all the surrounding villages lay in ruins. For this feat, the inhabitants of those places “with sensitive gratitude” called Chetvertakov “the savior of that side” (5, p. 39).

Private Eremenko did the same. With the help of the landowner Michulovo, by the name of Krechetov, he also organized a peasant detachment, with which on October 30 he exterminated 47 people from the enemy.

The actions of the peasant detachments were especially intensified during the stay of the Russian army in Tarutino. At this time, they widely deployed the front of the struggle in the Smolensk, Moscow, Ryazan and Kaluga provinces.

In the Zvenigorod district, peasant detachments destroyed and captured more than 2 thousand French soldiers. Here the detachments became famous, the leaders of which were the volost head Ivan Andreev and the centurion Pavel Ivanov. In the Volokolamsk district, such detachments were led by retired non-commissioned officer Novikov and private Nemchinov, volost head Mikhail Fedorov, peasants Akim Fedorov, Filipp Mikhailov, Kuzma Kuzmin and Gerasim Semenov. In the Bronnitsky district of the Moscow province, peasant detachments united up to 2 thousand people. History has preserved for us the names of the most distinguished peasants from the Bronnitsky district: Mikhail Andreev, Vasily Kirillov, Sidor Timofeev, Yakov Kondratiev, Vladimir Afanasiev (5, p. 46).

The largest peasant detachment in the Moscow region was a detachment of Bogorodsk partisans. In one of the first publications for 1813 about the formation of this detachment, it was written that “the economic volosts of Vokhnovskaya, the head of Yegor Stulov, the centurion Ivan Chushkin and the peasant Gerasim Kurin, the head of Amerevsky, Emelyan Vasiliev, gathered peasants subordinate to them, and also invited neighboring ones” (1, p. .228).

The detachment numbered in its ranks about 6 thousand people, the leader of this detachment was the peasant Gerasim Kurin. His detachment and other smaller detachments not only reliably protected the entire Bogorodsk district from the penetration of French marauders, but also entered into an armed struggle with the enemy troops.

It should be noted that even women participated in sorties against the enemy. Subsequently, these episodes were overgrown with legends and in some cases did not even remotely resemble real events. A typical example is with Vasilisa Kozhina, to whom popular rumor and propaganda of that time attributed neither more nor less leadership of the peasant detachment, which in reality was not.

During the war, many active members of the peasant detachments were awarded. Emperor Alexander I ordered to reward people subordinate to Count F.V. Rostopchin: 23 people "in charge" - with the insignia of the Military Order (George Crosses), and the other 27 people - with a special silver medal "For Love for the Fatherland" on the Vladimir ribbon.

Thus, as a result of the actions of military and peasant detachments, as well as militias, the enemy was deprived of the opportunity to expand the zone controlled by him and create additional bases for supplying the main forces. He failed to gain a foothold either in Bogorodsk, or in Dmitrov, or in Voskresensk. His attempt to get additional communications that would link the main forces with the corps of Schwarzenberg and Rainier was thwarted. The enemy also failed to capture Bryansk and reach Kiev.

§2.2 Army partisan detachments

Along with the formation of large peasant partisan detachments and their activities, army partisan detachments played an important role in the war.

The first army partisan detachment was created on the initiative of M. B. Barclay de Tolly. Its commander was General F.F. Vintsengerode, who led the combined Kazan Dragoon, 11 Stavropol, Kalmyk and three Cossack regiments, which began to operate in the area of ​​​​the city of Dukhovshchina.

A real thunderstorm for the French was the detachment of Denis Davydov. This detachment arose on the initiative of Davydov himself, lieutenant colonel, commander of the Akhtyrsky hussar regiment. Together with his hussars, he retreated as part of Bagration's army to Borodin. A passionate desire to be even more useful in the fight against the invaders prompted D. Davydov "to ask for a separate detachment." In this intention, he was strengthened by Lieutenant M.F. Orlov, who was sent to Smolensk to find out the fate of the seriously wounded General P.A. Tuchkov. After returning from Smolensk, Orlov spoke about the unrest, the poor protection of the rear in the French army (8, p. 83).

While driving through the territory occupied by Napoleonic troops, he realized how vulnerable the French food warehouses, guarded by small detachments. At the same time, he saw how difficult it was to fight without an agreed plan of action for the flying peasant detachments. According to Orlov, small army detachments sent behind enemy lines could inflict great damage on him and help the actions of the partisans.

D. Davydov asked General P.I. Bagration allowed him to organize a partisan detachment for operations behind enemy lines. For a "test" Kutuzov allowed Davydov to take 50 hussars and 1280 Cossacks and go to Medynen and Yukhnov. Having received a detachment at his disposal, Davydov began bold raids on the rear of the enemy. In the very first skirmishes near Tsarev - Zaymishch, Slavsky, he achieved success: he defeated several French detachments, captured a wagon train with ammunition.

In the autumn of 1812, partisan detachments surrounded the French army in a continuous mobile ring.

Between Smolensk and Gzhatsk, a detachment of Lieutenant Colonel Davydov, reinforced by two Cossack regiments, operated. From Gzhatsk to Mozhaisk, a detachment of General I.S. Dorokhov. Captain A.S. Figner with his flying detachment attacked the French on the road from Mozhaisk to Moscow.

In the Mozhaisk region and to the south, a detachment of Colonel I. M. Vadbolsky operated as part of the Mariupol Hussar Regiment and 500 Cossacks. Between Borovsk and Moscow, the roads were controlled by a detachment of Captain A.N. Seslavin. Colonel N.D. was sent to the Serpukhov road with two Cossack regiments. Kudashiv. On the Ryazan road there was a detachment of Colonel I.E. Efremov. From the north, Moscow was blocked by a large detachment of F.F. Vintsengerode, who, separating small detachments from himself to Volokolamsk, to the Yaroslavl and Dmitrov roads, blocked the access of Napoleon's troops to the northern regions of the Moscow region (6, p. 210).

The main task of the partisan detachments was formulated by Kutuzov: “Since now the autumn time is coming, through which the movement of a large army becomes completely difficult, I decided, avoiding a general battle, to wage a small war, because the separate forces of the enemy and his oversight give me more ways to exterminate him , and for this, being now 50 versts from Moscow with the main forces, I give away important parts from me in the direction of Mozhaisk, Vyazma and Smolensk ”(2, p. 74). Army partisan detachments were created mainly from the Cossack troops and were not the same in size: from 50 to 500 people. They were tasked with bold and sudden actions behind enemy lines to destroy his manpower, strike at garrisons, suitable reserves, disable transport, deprive the enemy of the opportunity to get food and fodder, monitor the movement of troops and report this to the General Staff of the Russian Army. . The commanders of the partisan detachments were indicated the main direction of action and were informed of the areas of operations of neighboring detachments in case of joint operations.

Partisan detachments operated in difficult conditions. At first, there were many difficulties. Even the inhabitants of villages and villages at first treated the partisans with great distrust, often mistaking them for enemy soldiers. Often the hussars had to change into peasant caftans and grow beards.

Partisan detachments did not stand in one place, they were constantly on the move, and no one except the commander knew in advance when and where the detachment would go. The actions of the partisans were sudden and swift. To fly like snow on the head, and quickly hide became the basic rule of the partisans.

Detachments attacked individual teams, foragers, transports, took away weapons and distributed them to the peasants, took tens and hundreds of prisoners.

On the evening of September 3, 1812, Davydov's detachment went to Tsarev-Zaimishch. Short of 6 miles to the village, Davydov sent reconnaissance there, which established that there was a large French convoy with shells, guarded by 250 horsemen. The detachment at the edge of the forest was discovered by French foragers, who rushed to Tsarevo-Zaimishche to warn their own. But Davydov did not let them do this. The detachment rushed in pursuit of the foragers and almost broke into the village with them. The baggage train and its guards were taken by surprise, and an attempt by a small group of Frenchmen to resist was quickly crushed. 130 soldiers, 2 officers, 10 wagons with food and fodder ended up in the hands of the partisans (1, p. 247).

Sometimes, knowing in advance the location of the enemy, the partisans made a sudden raid. So, General Wintsengerode, having established that in the village of Sokolov - 15 there is an outpost of two squadrons of cavalry and three companies of infantry, singled out 100 Cossacks from his detachment, who quickly broke into the village, killed more than 120 people and captured 3 officers, 15 non-commissioned officers -officers, 83 soldiers (1, p. 249).

The detachment of Colonel Kudashiva, having established that there were about 2,500 French soldiers and officers in the village of Nikolsky, suddenly attacked the enemy, killed more than 100 people and took 200 prisoners.

Most often, partisan detachments set up ambushes and attacked enemy vehicles on the way, captured couriers, and freed Russian prisoners. The partisans of the detachment of General Dorokhov, acting along the Mozhaisk road, on September 12 seized two couriers with dispatches, burned 20 boxes of shells and captured 200 people (including 5 officers). On September 6, a detachment of Colonel Efremov, having met an enemy column heading for Podolsk, attacked it and captured more than 500 people (5, p. 56).

The detachment of Captain Figner, who was always in the vicinity of the enemy troops, in a short time destroyed almost all the food in the vicinity of Moscow, blew up the artillery park on the Mozhaisk road, destroyed 6 guns, exterminated up to 400 people, captured a colonel, 4 officers and 58 soldiers (7 , p. 215).

Later, partisan detachments were consolidated into three large parties. One of them, under the command of Major General Dorokhov, consisting of five battalions of infantry, four squadrons of cavalry, two Cossack regiments with eight guns, on September 28, 1812, took the city of Vereya, destroying part of the French garrison.

§2.3 Comparative analysis of peasant and army partisan detachments in 1812

Peasant partisan detachments arose spontaneously in connection with the oppression of the peasants by the French troops. Army guerrilla detachments arose with the consent of the top command leadership due to the insufficient effectiveness of the regular regular army, on the one hand, and with the chosen tactics aimed at disuniting and exhausting the enemy, on the other hand.

Basically, both types of partisan detachments operated in the region of Smolensk and adjacent cities: Gzhaisk, Mozhaisk, etc., as well as in the following counties: Krasnensky, Porechsky, Belsky, Sychevsky, Roslavl, Gzhatsky, Vyazemsky.

The composition and degree of organization of the partisan detachments were radically different: the first group consisted of peasants who began their activities due to the fact that the invading French troops aggravated the already poor situation of the peasants with their first actions. In this regard, this group included men and women, young and old, and at first acted spontaneously and not always in a coordinated manner. The second group consisted of the military (hussars, Cossacks, officers, soldiers), created to help the regular army. This group, being professional soldiers, acted more cohesively and harmoniously, most often taking not by quantity, but by skill and ingenuity.

Peasant partisan detachments were armed mainly with pitchforks, spears, axes, and less often with firearms. Army partisan detachments were equipped better and better.

In this regard, peasant partisan detachments carried out raids on carts, set up ambushes, and sorties to the rear. Army partisan detachments exercised control over roads, destroyed food depots and small French detachments, carried out raids and raids on larger enemy detachments, and staged sabotage.

In quantitative terms, the peasant partisan detachments outnumbered the army ones.

The results of the activities were also not too similar, but, perhaps, equally important. With the help of peasant partisan detachments, the enemy was deprived of the opportunity to expand the zone he controlled and create additional bases for supplying the main forces, while with the help of army partisan detachments, Napoleon's army was weakened and subsequently destroyed.

Thus, the peasant partisan detachments stopped the strengthening of Napoleon's army, and the army partisan detachments helped the regular army to destroy it, which was no longer able to increase its power.

Conclusion

It was not by chance that the War of 1812 was called the Patriotic War. The popular character of this war was most clearly manifested in the partisan movement, which played a strategic role in the victory of Russia. Responding to reproaches of "a war against the rules," Kutuzov said that such were the feelings of the people. In response to a letter from Marshal Berthier, he wrote on October 8, 1818: “It is difficult to stop a people who have been embittered by everything they have seen; a people who for so many years did not know the war on their territory; people ready to sacrifice themselves for the Motherland...” (1, p. 310).

In our work, on the basis of evidence from multiple analyzed sources and works, we proved that peasant partisan detachments existed on a par with army partisan detachments, and this phenomenon was also caused on the wave of patriotism, and not out of people's fear of the French "oppressors".

Activities aimed at attracting the masses of the people to active participation in the war proceeded from the interests of Russia, correctly reflected the objective conditions of the war and took into account the broad possibilities that manifested themselves in the national liberation war.

The guerrilla war that unfolded near Moscow made a significant contribution to the victory over Napoleon's army and the expulsion of the enemy from Russia.

Bibliography

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DAVYDOV DENIS VASILIEVICH (1784 - 1839) - lieutenant general, ideologist and leader of the partisan movement, participant in the Patriotic War of 1812, Russian poet of the Pushkin Pleiades.

Born July 27, 1784 in Moscow, in the family of brigadier Vasily Denisovich Davydov, who served under the command of A.V. Suvorov. A significant part of the childhood years of the future hero passed in a military situation in Little Russia and Slobozhanshchina, where his father served, commanding the Poltava light horse regiment. Once, when the boy was nine years old, Suvorov came to visit them. Alexander Vasilyevich, looking at the two sons of Vasily Denisovich, said that Denis "this daring one will be a military man, I will not die, but he will win three battles already." Denis remembered this meeting and the words of the great commander for the rest of his life.

In 1801, Davydov entered the service of the Guards Cavalry Guard Regiment and the following year he was promoted to cornet, and in November 1803 to lieutenant. Because of the satirical poems, he was transferred from the guard to the Belarusian hussar regiment with the rank of captain. From the beginning of 1807, Denis Davydov, as an adjutant to P.I.Bagration, took part in military operations against Napoleon in East Prussia. For exceptional bravery shown in the battle of Preussisch-Eylau, he was awarded the Order of St. Vladimir IV degree.

During the Russo-Swedish War of 1808-1809. in the detachment of Kulnev he went through all of Finland to Uleaborg, occupied the island of Carlier with the Cossacks and, returning to the vanguard, retreated across the ice of the Gulf of Bothnia. In 1809, during the Russian-Turkish war, Davydov was under Prince Bagration, who commanded troops in Moldova, participated in the capture of Machin and Girsovo, in the battle of Rassevat. When Bagration was replaced by Count Kamensky, he entered the vanguard of the Moldavian army under the command of Kulnev, where, according to him, "he completed the course of an outpost school begun in Finland."

At the beginning of the war of 1812, Davydov, with the rank of lieutenant colonel of the Akhtyrsky hussar regiment, was in the vanguard troops of General Vasilchikov. When Kutuzov was appointed commander-in-chief, Davydov, with the permission of Bagration, appeared to the most illustrious prince and asked for a partisan detachment to be in his command. After the battle of Borodino, the Russian army moved to Moscow, and Davydov, with a small detachment of 50 hussars and 80 Cossacks, went west, to the rear of the French army. Soon the successes of his detachment led to the full-scale deployment of the partisan movement. In one of the very first sorties, Davydov managed to capture 370 Frenchmen, while recapturing 200 Russian prisoners, a cart with cartridges and nine carts with provisions. His detachment, at the expense of the peasants and the liberated prisoners, grew rapidly.

Constantly maneuvering and attacking, Davydov's detachment haunted the Napoleonic army. Only in the period from September 2 to October 23, he captured about 3,600 enemy soldiers and officers. Napoleon hated Davydov and ordered him to be shot on the spot upon arrest. The French governor of Vyazma sent one of his best detachments to capture him, consisting of two thousand horsemen with eight chief officers and one staff officer. Davydov, who had half as many people, managed to drive the detachment into a trap and take him prisoner along with all the officers.

During the retreat of the French army, Davydov, together with other partisans, continued to pursue the enemy. Davydov's detachment, together with the detachments of Orlov-Denisov, Figner and Seslavin, defeated and captured the two thousandth brigade of General Augereau near Lyakhov. Pursuing the retreating enemy, Davydov defeated a three thousandth cavalry depot near the city of Kopys, dispersed a large French detachment near Belynichi and, having reached the Neman, occupied Grodno. During the campaign of 1812, Davydov was awarded the Orders of St. Vladimir, 3rd class and St. George, 4th class.

During the foreign campaign of the Russian army, Davydov distinguished himself in the battles of Kalisz and La Rothiere, entered Saxony with the vanguard, captured Dresden. For the heroism shown by Davydov during the storming of Paris, he was awarded the rank of major general. The fame of the brave Russian hero thundered throughout Europe. When Russian troops entered a city, all the inhabitants went out into the street and asked about him in order to see him.

After the war, Denis Davydov continued to serve in the army. He wrote poetry and military-historical memoirs, corresponded with the most famous writers of his era. Participated in the Russian-Persian war of 1826-1828. and in the suppression of the Polish uprising of 1830-1831. He was married to Sofya Nikolaevna Chirkova, with whom he had 9 children. D.V. Davydov spent the last years of his life in the village of Upper Maza, which belonged to his wife, where he died on April 22, 1839, at the age of 55, from an apoplexy. The ashes of the poet were transported to Moscow and buried in the cemetery of the Novodevichy Convent.

SESLAVIN ALEXANDER NIKITICH (1780 - 1858) - major general, participant in the Patriotic War of 1812, famous partisan.

He was educated in the 2nd Cadet Corps, served in the Guards Horse Artillery. In 1800, Emperor Paul awarded Lieutenant Seslavin with the Order of St. John of Jerusalem. Participated in the wars with Napoleon in 1805 and 1807. In 1807 he was wounded at Heilsberg, awarded a golden sword with the inscription "For Bravery", then he distinguished himself near Friedland. During the Russian-Turkish war of 1806-1812 he was wounded for the second time - in the arm, with crushing of the bone.

At the beginning of the Patriotic War of 1812, he served as adjutant to General M. B. Barclay de Tolly. Participated in almost all the battles of the 1st Russian army. For the special courage shown in the Battle of Borodino, he was awarded the Order of St. George, 4th degree.

With the beginning of the guerrilla war, Seslavin was given command of a flying detachment and proved to be a talented intelligence officer. The most outstanding feat of Seslavin was the discovery of the movement of Napoleon's army along the Borovskaya road to Kaluga. Thanks to this information, the Russian army managed to block the French road at Maloyaroslavets, forcing them to retreat along the already devastated Smolensk road.

On October 22, near Vyazma, having galloped through the French troops, Seslavin discovered the beginning of their retreat and, having reported this to the Russian command, personally led the Pernovsky regiment into battle, breaking into the city first. Near Lyakhov, together with the detachments of Davydov and Figner, he captured the two thousandth brigade of General Augereau, for which he was promoted to colonel. On November 16, Seslavin captured the city of Borisov and 3,000 prisoners, establishing a link between the armies of Wittgenstein and Chichagov. On November 23, attacking the French near Oshmyany, he almost captured Napoleon himself. Finally, on November 29, on the shoulders of the retreating French cavalry, Seslavin broke into Vilna, where he was again seriously wounded in the arm.

During the foreign campaign of the Russian army, Seslavin often commanded advanced detachments. For distinction in the Battle of Leipzig in 1813, he was promoted to major general. Since 1814 - retired. The wounded hero was treated abroad for a long time. Seslavin died in 1858 in his estate Kokoshino, Rzhevsky district, where he was buried.

FIGNER ALEXANDER SAMOYLOVICH . (1787 - 1813) - Colonel, participant in the Patriotic War of 1812, an outstanding partisan, scout and saboteur.

Born in the family of the head of the Imperial glass factories, a graduate of the 2nd Cadet Corps. In 1805, with the rank of officer, he was assigned to the troops of the Anglo-Russian expedition in Italy, where he mastered the Italian language perfectly. In 1810 he fought against the Turks in the Moldavian army. For distinction during the assault on Ruschuk, he was promoted to lieutenant and awarded the Order of St. George, 4th degree.

At the beginning of the Patriotic War of 1812, Figner was the captain of the 3rd light company of the 11th artillery brigade. In the battle near Smolensk, the fire of his battery repelled the onslaught of the French on the left wing of the Russian army.

After the occupation of Moscow by the French, he, with the permission of the commander in chief, went there as a scout, but with the secret intention of killing Napoleon, for whom he had a fanatical hatred, as well as for all the French. He failed to fulfill his intentions, but thanks to his extraordinary sharpness and knowledge of foreign languages, Figner, dressing in different costumes, freely moved among the enemy soldiers, obtained the necessary information and reported it to our main apartment. During the retreat of the French, having recruited a small detachment of hunters and backward soldiers, Figner, with the assistance of the peasants, began to disturb the rear communications of the enemy. Irritated by the activities of the Russian intelligence officer, Napoleon put a reward on his head. However, all efforts to capture Figner were fruitless; several times surrounded by the enemy, he managed to escape. Strengthened by Cossacks and cavalrymen, he began to annoy the enemy even more importunately: he intercepted couriers, burned carts, once, together with Seslavin, recaptured an entire transport with treasures stolen in Moscow. For actions in the Patriotic War, the sovereign promoted Figner to lieutenant colonel with a transfer to the guard.

With a brilliant education and appearance, Figner had strong nerves and a cruel heart. In his detachment, prisoners were not left alive. As Denis Davydov recalled, once Figner asked him to give him the French captured in battle - so that they would be “torn apart” by the Cossacks of his detachment, who were still “not incited”. “When Figner entered into feelings, and his feelings consisted solely in ambition and pride, then something satanic was revealed in him, .... when placing up to a hundred prisoners nearby, he killed them with a pistol one after another with his own hand, ”wrote Davydov. As a result of this attitude towards the prisoners, Figner's detachment very soon left all the officers.

Figner's nephew, trying to justify his uncle, cited the following information: “When the masses of prisoners were given into the hands of the winners, my uncle was at a loss for their large number and report to A.P. Yermolov asked what to do with them, because there were no means and opportunities to support them. Yermolov answered with a laconic note: "those who enter the Russian land with weapons - death." To this, my uncle sent back a report of the same laconic content: “From now on, Your Excellency will no longer disturb the prisoners,” and from that time on, the cruel extermination of prisoners, who were killed by the thousands, began.

In 1813, during the siege of Danzig, Figner entered the fortress under the guise of an Italian and tried to anger the inhabitants against the French, but was captured and imprisoned. Released from there for lack of evidence, he managed to infiltrate the confidence of the commandant of the fortress, General Rapp, to such an extent that he sent him to Napoleon with important dispatches, which, of course, ended up in the Russian headquarters. And soon, having recruited hunters, including fugitives (Italians and Spaniards) from the Napoleonic army, he again began to act on the flanks and behind enemy lines. Surrounded as a result of betrayal near the city of Dessau by enemy cavalry and pinned to the Elbe, he, not wanting to give up, rushed into the river, bandaging his hands with a handkerchief.

DOROKHOV IVAN SEMYONOVYCH (1762 - 1815) - lieutenant general, participant in the Patriotic War of 1812, partisan.

Born in 1762 in a noble family. From 1783 to 1787 he was brought up in the Artillery and Engineering Corps. In the rank of lieutenant, he fought against the Turks in 1787-1791. He distinguished himself near Focsani and Machin, served at the headquarters of A.V. Suvorov. During the Warsaw Uprising of 1794, fighting for 36 hours with his company surrounded, he managed to break through to the main Russian forces. Among the first broke into Prague. In 1797 he was appointed commander of the Life Guards Hussars. Participated in the campaign of 1806-1807. He was awarded the orders of St. George 4th and 3rd degrees, St. Vladimir 3rd degree, Red Eagle 1st degree.

At the very beginning of the war of 1812, Dorokhov, cut off from the 1st Army with his brigade, decided, on his own initiative, to join the 2nd Army. For several days he advanced between the French columns, but managed to elude them and joined Prince Bagration, under whose command he participated in the battles of Smolensk and Borodino.
On the day of the Battle of Borodino, he commanded four cavalry regiments of the 3rd Cavalry Corps. Successfully carried out a counterattack on the Bagration flushes. For his bravery, he was promoted to lieutenant general.

Since September, Dorokhov commanded a partisan detachment consisting of one dragoon, one hussar, three Cossack regiments and half a company of horse artillery and caused a lot of harm to the French, exterminating their separate teams. In just one week - from September 7 to September 14, 4 cavalry regiments, an infantry and cavalry detachment of 800 people were defeated, carts were captured, an artillery depot was blown up, about 1,500 soldiers and 48 officers were taken prisoner. Dorokhov was the first to inform Kutuzov about the French movement to Kaluga. During the Tarutinsky battle, the Cossacks of his detachment successfully pursued the retreating enemy, killing the French general Deri. Under Maloyaroslavets, he was wounded by a bullet through the leg.

The main success of the partisan detachment of Dorokhov was the capture on September 27 of the city of Vereya, the most important point of communications of the enemy. The battle was carefully planned, fleeting, with a sudden bayonet attack and almost no shooting. In just an hour, the enemy lost more than 300 people killed, 15 officers and 377 soldiers were taken prisoner. Russian losses were 7 killed and 20 wounded. Dorokhov's report to Kutuzov was brief: "By order of Your Grace, the city of Vereya was taken by storm on this date." Kutuzov announced this "excellent and brave feat" in an order for the army. Later, Dorokhov was awarded a gold sword, decorated with diamonds, with the inscription: "For the liberation of Vereya."

The wound received by the general near Maloyaroslavets did not allow him to return to duty. On April 25, 1815, Lieutenant General Ivan Semenovich Dorokhov died. He was buried, according to his dying will, in Vereya, liberated by him from the French, in the Nativity Cathedral.

CHEVERTAKOV YERMOLAY VASILIEVICH (1781 - after 1814) Non-commissioned officer, participant in the Patriotic War of 1812, partisan.

Born in 1781 in Ukraine into a family of serfs. Since 1804, a soldier of the Kiev Dragoon Regiment. Participated in the wars against Napoleon in 1805-1807.

During the Patriotic War of 1812, being in the regiment in the rearguard of the troops of General P.P. Konovnitsyn, he was captured in the battle on August 19 (31) near the village of Tsarevo-Zaimishche. Chetvertakov stayed in captivity for three days, and on the night of the fourth he fled from the French, when they had a day in the city of Gzhatsk, having obtained a horse and weapons.

He formed a partisan detachment from 50 peasants from several villages of the Gzhatsk district of the Smolensk province, which successfully operated against the invaders. He defended villages from marauders, attacked passing transports and large French units, inflicting significant losses on them. The inhabitants of the Gzhatsk district were grateful to Chetvertakov, whom they considered their savior. He managed to protect all the surrounding villages “in the space of 35 versts from the Gzhatsk pier”, “while all around all the surrounding villages lay in ruins”. Soon the size of the detachment increased to 300, and then 4 thousand people.

Chetvertakov organized shooting training for peasants, established reconnaissance and guard services, and attacked groups of Napoleonic soldiers. On the day of the Battle of Borodino, Chetvertakov with a detachment came to the village of Krasnaya and found 12 French cuirassiers there. During the battle, all the cuirassiers were killed. By the evening of the same day, an enemy foot team of 57 people with 3 wagons approached the village. The squad attacked them. 15 French were killed, the rest fled, and the partisans got the trucks. Later, at the village Skugarevo, at the head of 4 thousand peasants Chetvertakov, defeated the French battalion with artillery. Skirmishes with marauders took place during c. Antonovka, der. Krisovo, in with. Flowers, Mikhailovka and Drachev; at the Gzhatskaya pier, the peasants recaptured two cannons.
The officers of the French units who had combat clashes with Chetvertakov were amazed at his skill and did not want to believe that the commander of the partisan detachment was a simple soldier. The French considered him an officer with the rank no lower than a colonel.

In November 1812 he was promoted to non-commissioned officer, joined his regiment, in which he participated in the foreign campaigns of the Russian army in 1813-1814. For initiative and courage, E. Chetvertakov was awarded the Distinction of the Military Order.

KURIN GERASIM MATVEEVICH (1777 - 1850) Member of the Patriotic War of 1812, partisan.

Born in 1777 in the Moscow province, from state peasants. With the advent of the French, Kurin gathered around him a detachment of 200 daredevils and began hostilities. Very quickly, the number of partisans increased to 5300 people and 500 horsemen. As a result of seven clashes with Napoleonic troops from September 23 to October 2, Kurin captured many French soldiers, 3 guns and a grain convoy, without losing a single person. Using the maneuver of a false retreat, he lured and defeated the punitive detachment of two squadrons of dragoons sent against him. With their active actions, Kurin's detachment actually forced the French to leave the city of Bogorodsk.

In 1813, Gerasim Matveyevich Kurin was awarded the St. George Cross, 1st class. In 1844, Kurin participated in the opening of Pavlovsky Posad, which was formed at the confluence of Pavlov and four surrounding villages. 6 years after this event, in 1850, Gerasim Kurin died. Buried at the Pavlovsky cemetery.

ENGELHARDT PAVEL IVANOVICH (1774-1812) - retired lieutenant colonel of the Russian army, commanded a partisan detachment in the Smolensk province during the Patriotic War of 1812. Shot by the French.

Born in 1774 in a family of hereditary nobles of the Porech district of the Smolensk province. He studied in the land cadet corps. Since 1787 he served in the Russian army with the rank of lieutenant. He retired with the rank of lieutenant colonel and lived in his family estate Dyagilevo.

When French troops captured Smolensk in 1812, Engelhardt, together with several other landowners, armed the peasants and organized a partisan detachment that began to attack enemy units and transports. Engelhardt himself participated in sorties against enemy units, in skirmishes he personally killed 24 Frenchmen. Was issued by his serfs to the French. On October 3, 1812, a French military court sentenced Engelhardt to death. The French tried for two weeks to persuade Engelhardt to cooperate, they offered him the rank of colonel in the Napoleonic army, but he refused.

On October 15, 1812, Engelhardt was shot at the Molokhov Gates of the Smolensk fortress wall (now they do not exist). On his last journey, he was accompanied by the priest of the Hodegetrievskaya Church, the first Smolensk historian, Nikifor Murzakevich. This is how he described the execution of the hero: “He was calm all day and spoke with a cheerful spirit about the death assigned to him by fate ... - Behind the Molokhov Gates, in the trenches, they began to read the sentence to him, but he did not let them finish reading, shouted in French : “It’s full of lies, it’s time to stop. Charge quickly and fire! In order not to see the ruin of my fatherland and the oppression of my compatriots anymore. They began to blindfold him, but he did not allow it, saying: “Get out! No one has seen his death, but I will see it.” Then he prayed briefly and ordered to shoot.

Initially, the French shot him in the leg, promising to cancel the execution and cure Engelhardt if he went over to their side, but he again refused. Then a volley of 18 charges was fired, 2 of which went through the chest and 1 into the stomach. Engelhardt remained alive even after that. Then one of the French soldiers shot him in the head. On October 24, another member of the partisan movement, Semyon Ivanovich Shubin, was shot at the same place.

Engelhardt's feat was immortalized on a marble plaque in the church of the 1st Cadet Corps, where he studied. The Russian Emperor Alexander I provided the Engelhardt family with an annual pension. In 1833, Nicholas I gave money for the construction of a monument to Engelhardt. In 1835, a monument with the inscription: “To Lieutenant Colonel Pavel Ivanovich Engelhardt, who died in 1812 for loyalty and love for the Tsar and Fatherland” was erected at the place of his death. The monument was destroyed under the Soviet regime.

A source .