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Battle of Prokhorovka- a battle between parts of the German and Soviet armies during the defensive phase of the Battle of Kursk. It happened on July 12, 1943, on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge (Belgorod direction) in the strip of the Voronezh Front, in the area of ​​the Prokhorovka station on the territory of the Oktyabrsky state farm (Belgorod region of the RSFSR). Some representatives of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces consider it one of the largest battles in military history with the use of armored forces.

The direct command of the tank formations during the battle was carried out by: Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov from the Soviet side and SS Oberstgruppenführer Paul Hausser from the German side.

None of the parties managed to achieve the goals set for July 12: the Germans failed to capture Prokhorovka, break through the defenses of the Soviet troops and enter the operational space, and the Soviet troops failed to surround the enemy grouping.

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  ✪ Valery Zamulin about the myths of the battle of Prokhorovka and attempts to rewrite history

The situation on the eve of the battle

Initially, the main attack of the Germans on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge was directed to the west - along the operational line Yakovlevo - Oboyan. On July 5, in accordance with the offensive plan, German troops as part of the 4th Tank Army (48th Tank Corps and 2nd Tank Corps SS) and the Army Group Kempf went on the offensive against the troops of the Voronezh Front, at positions 6- 1st and 7th Guards Armies on the first day of the operation, the Germans sent five infantry, eight tank and one motorized divisions. On July 6, two counterattacks were delivered against the advancing Germans from the side of the Kursk-Belgorod railway by the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and from the area of ​​Luchki (north) - Kalinin by the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Corps. Both counterattacks were repulsed by the forces of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps.

Side forces

Traditionally, Soviet sources indicate that about 1500 tanks participated in the battle: about 800 from the Soviet side and 700 from the German side (eg TSB). In some cases, a slightly smaller number is indicated - 1200.

Many modern researchers believe that the forces put into battle were probably much smaller. In particular, it is indicated that the battle took place in a narrow area (8-10 km wide), which was limited on one side by the river Psel, and on the other - by a railway embankment. It is difficult to introduce such significant masses of tanks into such a sector.

It must be said that the overestimation of enemy forces took place at the preliminary stage as well. So Shtemenko S. M. in his work indicates: “ By April 8, the enemy had concentrated 15-16 tank divisions with 2,500 tanks against the Voronezh and Central Fronts. ... On April 21, N.F. Vatutin already counted only in front of the Voronezh Front in the Belgorod region up to 20 infantry and 11 tank divisions.» Zhukov G. K. assesses the situation more realistically. We read from him: In the Battle of Kursk, the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts, as I have already said, were somewhat superior in strength and means to the enemy. ... in people - 1.4 times, in guns and mortars - 1.9 times, in tanks - 1.2 times, in aircraft - 1.4 times. However, making the main bet on tank and motorized troops, the German command grouped them in narrow areas ...". There is a version that the command of the Voronezh Front also tried to group tank forces near Prokhorovka.

Germany

From the west, the 2nd SS tank corps (2 SS TCs) advanced on Prokhorovka, while the Adolf Hitler SS division operated in the strip between the Psyol River and the railway, and from the south - the 3rd SS Tank Corps (3 TCs) . Known for the presence of tanks and assault guns without self-propelled guns: Grille, Wespe, Hummel and Marder, the data on which are being specified, in divisions of the 2nd SS TC as of the evening of July 11 and the 3rd TC as of the morning of July 12 are indicated in the table.

The staffing of units and formations of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps 4 TA and the 3rd Panzer Corps AG "Kempf" on July 11, 1943

	Pz.II	Pz.III 50/L42	Pz.III 50/L60	Pz.III 75 mm	Pz.IV L24	Pz.IV L43 and L48	Pz.VI "Tiger"	T-34	Stug III	Bef.Pz. III	Total tanks and StuG
2nd Tank Corps SS
Td Leibstandarte-SS "Adolf Hitler" (at 19.25 11.07)	4	-	5	-	-	47	4	-	10	7	77
Td SS "Das Reich" (at 19.25 11.07)	-	-	34	-	-	18	1	8	27	7	95
Td SS Totenkopf (at 19.25 11.07)	-	-	54	-	4	26	10	-	21	7	122
2nd SS Panzer Corps, total	4	-	93	-	4	91	15	8	58	21	294
3rd tank corps
6th Panzer Division (on the morning of 11.07)	2	2	11	?	-	6	-	-	-	2	23 (?)
7th Panzer Division (on the morning of 12.07)	-	-	24	2	1	9	-	-	-	3	39
19th Panzer Division (on the morning of 12.07)	-	-	7	4	-	3	-	-	-	1	15
503rd separate heavy tank battalion (on the morning of 11.07)	-	-	-	-	-	-	23	-	-	-	23
228th separate battalion of assault guns (on the morning of 12.07)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19	-	19
3rd Panzer Corps, total	2	2	42	6	1	18	23	-	19	6	119

It should be noted that the Panther tanks did not take part in the Prokhorov battle on July 12, continuing to operate as part of the Great Germany division in the Oboyan direction. In the post-war press, instead of the company of captured T-34 tanks (8 units in the 2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich), which actually participated in the battle near Prokhorovka, Panther tanks were indicated. About the "Panthers", allegedly acting against his 5th Guards. TA, said P. A. Rotmistrov.

the USSR

Commander of the Voronezh Front, General of the Army, Representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command Vasilevsky A.M. - until 14.07.43. Since July 14, Zhukov G. K has already been coordinating the actions of the front with the Headquarters.

The Soviet group included the following forces:

• 2nd Air Army (2 VA, Lieutenant General of Aviation Krasovsky S. A.);
• 5th Guards Army (5th Guards A, Lieutenant General Zhadov A. S.);
• 5th Guards Tank Army (5th Guards TA, Lieutenant General of the military unit Rotmistrov P. A.), consisting of:
  • 18th Tank Corps (18 TC, Major General of the military unit Bakharov B. S.), 148 tanks:

Subdivision	T-34	T-70	Mk IV
110th tank brigade (110 brigade, lieutenant colonel Khlyupin M. G.)	24	21
170th tank brigade (170 brigade, lieutenant colonel V. D. Tarasov)	22	17
181st Tank Brigade (181st Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Puzyrev V.A.)	24	20
36th Guards Separate Heavy Tank Breakthrough Regiment (36th Guards Separate TPP)	0	0	20

32nd motorized rifle (32nd motorized rifle brigade colonel Stukov I.A.).

• • 29th Tank Corps (29th Tank Corps, Major General of military service Kirichenko I. F.), 192 tanks and 20 self-propelled guns:

Subdivision	T-34	T-70	SU-122	SU-76
Units of combat-ready equipment and temporarily under repair as of July 11
25th tank brigade (25 brigade, Colonel Volodin N. K.)	26	32
31st Tank Brigade (31th Tank Brigade, Colonel S. F. Moiseev)	32	38
32nd tank brigade (32 brigade, Colonel Linev A. A.)	64	0
1446th self-propelled artillery regiment (1146 SAP)			12	8

53rd Motorized Rifle (53 MSB, Lieutenant Colonel Lipichev N.P.). 1529th Heavy Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment SU-152 (1529 TSAPs. The regiment in the amount of 11 out of 12 vehicles arrived at the place only by the evening of July 12 without shells. Did not take part in the tank battle on July 12).

• • 5th Guards Mechanized Corps (5th Guards Mk, Major General of the military unit Skvortsov B. M.)

Subdivision	T-34	T-70	SU-122	SU-76
10th Guards Mechanized Brigade (10th Guards MBR, Colonel Mikhailov I. B.)	29	12
11th Guards Mechanized Brigade (11th Guards MBR, Colonel Grishchenko N.V.)	42	22
12th Guards Mechanized Brigade (11th Guards MBR, Colonel Borisenko G. Ya.)
24th Guards Separate Tank Brigade (24th Guards Detachment Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Karpov V.P.)	51	0
1447th self-propelled artillery regiment (1147 SAPs)			12	8

• 5th Guards The TA was reinforced with formations that became part of it from July 10:
  • 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps (2nd Guards TTK, Colonel Burdeyny A.S.),

Subdivision	T-34	T-70	Mk IV
Units of equipment combat-ready and temporarily under repair as of July 11, pieces
4th Guards Mechanized Brigade (4th Guards MBR, Colonel A. K. Brazhnikov)	28	19
25th Guards Mechanized Brigade (25th Guards MBR, Lieutenant Colonel Bulygin S.M.)	28	19
26th Guards Mechanized Brigade (26th Guards MBR, Lieutenant Colonel S.K. Nesterov)	28	14
47th Guards Separate Breakthrough Tank Regiment (47th Guards Detachment, Lieutenant Colonel Shevchenko M.T.)	0	0	21

• • 2nd tank corps (2 TC, Major General of the military unit Popov A. F.):
    • 26th Tank Brigade (26th Tank Brigade, Colonel Piskarev P.V.) (as of 11.07.43 T-34 1 unit + 7 under repair and T-70 33 units + 2 under repair)
    • 99th Tank Brigade (99th Tank Brigade, Colonel Malov L.I.),
    • 169th Tank Brigade (169th Tank Brigade, Colonel Stepanov I.Ya.).

The state of the materiel and support of the 5th Guards Tank Army at 17:00 on July 11, 1943

Combat vehicles	29 tk	18 tk	2 tk	2 Guards Ttk	5 Guards mk	army units	Total
T-34	120	68	35	84	120	36	463
T-70	81	58	46	52	56	8	301
Mk IV	-	18	4	3	-	-	25
SU-122	12	-	-	-	10	-	22
SU-76	8	-	-	-	7	-	15
Total tanks and self-propelled guns	221	144	85	139	193	44	826
On the way to st. Prokhorovka	13	33	-	-	51	4	101
Under repair	2	6	9	-	1	6	24
Total armored units	236	183	94	139	245	54	951

G. A. Oleinikov, as of July 10, has 790 tanks in the 5th Guards Tank Army - 260 T-70, 501 T-34, 31 Mk IV "Churchill"  (modifications Churchill IV). And 40 (two regiments) SU-122 self-propelled assault howitzers and light infantry support assault guns based on the T-70 SU-76.

Rotmistrov himself estimated the amount of equipment as follows: “ The 5th Guards Tank Army was reinforced by the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky and 2nd Tank Corps, the 1529th Self-Propelled Artillery Corps, the 1522nd and 1148th Howitzer, the 148th and 93rd Cannon Artillery Regiments, the 16th and 80th Guards Mortar Regiment. In general, in our army with attached tank formations, there were about 850 tanks and self-propelled guns.»

The assessment of the forces of the parties very much depends on the geographical scope of the battle. In the area of ​​the Oktyabrsky state farm, the 18th and 29th tank corps advanced - a total of 348 tanks.

Side Plans

1. The enemy in the Belgorod direction, having introduced large forces of tanks into battle, is trying to develop success in the sowing. direction - to Oboyan, Kursk (up to 400 tanks) and to the east. direction - to Aleksandrovsky, Skorodnoye, Stary Oskol (up to 300 tanks).

Commander of the 29th TC, Lieutenant General T. Kirichenko

1. The task of the body is the same ...
2. The beginning of the attack - 8.30 on 12.07.43. The beginning of artillery preparation from 8.00.
3. I allow you to use the radio from 07.00 7.00 12.07.43. Commander of the 5th Guards. TA Lieutenant General P. A. Rotmistrov

2nd SS TC defeats the enemy south. Prokhorovka and thus creates the prerequisites for further advancement through Prokhorovka. Division assignments:

Division "MG" go on the offensive from the bridgehead at dawn, capture the heights of the north-east. and first of all go to the road Prokhorovka, Kartashevka. Take control of the river valley. Psyol with an attack from the southwest, securing the left flank of the AG division.

The AG division, holding the occupied line on the left flank, on the right flag, take Storozhevoye and the forest to the north, the department of the Stalinskoye state farm and x. Pits, as well as heights of 2 km east. With the onset of the threat from the river valley. Psyol, together with parts of the "MG" to capture Prokhorovka and height 252.4.

Division "R", holding the achieved lines on the right flank, take Vinogradovka and Ivanovka. After mastering the right-flank units of the "AG" division Storozhevoye and the forest to the north, using their success, transfer the main efforts in the direction of the south-west heights. Right-handedness. Hold the new frontier Ivanovka, heights southwest. Right-hand, heights 2 km east. Watchtower (suit).

The course of the battle

There are different versions of this battle.

The first clash in the Prokhorovka area took place on the evening of 11 July. According to the memoirs of Pavel Rotmistrov, at 5 p.m., together with Marshal Vasilevsky, during reconnaissance, he discovered a column of enemy tanks that were moving towards the station. The attack was stopped by the forces of two tank brigades.

At 8 am the next day, the Soviet side carried out artillery preparation and at 8:15 went on the offensive. The first attacking echelon consisted of four tank corps: the 18th, 29th, 2nd and 2nd Guards. The second echelon was the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps.

At the beginning of the battle, Soviet tankers got some advantage: the rising sun blinded the Germans advancing from the west. Very soon the battle formations mixed up. The high density of the battle, during which the tanks fought at short distances, deprived the Germans of the advantage of more powerful and long-range guns. Soviet tankers got the opportunity to hit the most vulnerable places of heavily armored German vehicles.

When the Soviet tanks during the counterattack reached the distance of a direct shot of their guns and they were met with dense fire from the German anti-tank guns, the tankers were simply stunned. Under hurricane fire, it was necessary not only to fight, but above all to psychologically reorganize from a breakthrough deep into the enemy’s defenses to a positional fight against enemy anti-tank weapons.

To the south of the main battle, the German tank group "Kempf" was advancing, which sought to enter the advancing Soviet grouping on the left flank. The threat of coverage forced the Soviet command to divert part of its reserves to this direction.

At about 1 pm, the Germans withdrew the 11th Panzer Division from the reserve, which, together with the Totenkopf Division, attacked the Soviet right flank, on which the forces of the 5th Guards Army were located. Two brigades of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps were sent to help them, and the attack was repulsed.

By 2 p.m., the Soviet tank armies began to push the enemy to the west. By evening, Soviet tankers were able to advance 10-12 kilometers, thus leaving the battlefield in their rear. The battle was won.

According to the memoirs of German generals

Based on the memoirs of German generals (E. von Manstein, G.   Guderian, F. von Mellenthin, etc.) [ ], about 700 Soviet tanks took part in the battle (some of them probably lagged behind on the march - “on paper” the army had more than a thousand vehicles), of which about 270 were knocked out (meaning only the morning battle on July 12).

From the memoirs of Rotmistrov it follows [ ] that his army had to break through the front and move to Kharkov (this is indirectly confirmed by the qualitative composition of the army, half consisting of light vehicles and almost no heavy vehicles), bypassing the German tank cluster, located, according to intelligence, 70 km from Prokhorovka and "Successfully attacked" at that moment by ground attack aircraft. The clash of tank masses was unexpected for both sides, since both tank groupings were solving their offensive tasks and did not expect to meet a serious enemy.

The groups were moving towards each other not "head on", but at a noticeable angle. The Germans were the first to notice the Soviet tanks and managed to regroup and prepare for battle. Light and most of the medium vehicles attacked from the flank and forced Rotmistrov's tankers to draw all the attention, who began to change the direction of the attack on the move. This caused the inevitable confusion and allowed the Tiger company, supported by self-propelled guns and part of the medium tanks, to surprise attack from the other side.

Research by V. N. Zamulin

According to his research, the battle at Prokhorovka was planned by the German command in advance: “4 TA was supposed to move from Belgorod not strictly to the north, but by breaking through two army lanes and defeating the 6th Guards. A and 1 TA, turn around to the east, so that on the fourth day of the operation, meet the Soviet tank and mechanized corps in the most convenient place for using their tank divisions - the Prokhorovka direction. At the same time, the participation of the Soviet side in it was an improvisation.

According to the plan of the Soviet side, the counterattack on July 12, 1943 in the area of ​​the Prokhorovka station was supposed to finally turn the tide of the defensive stage of the Battle of Kursk:

the main reason for this was the decision on a frontal attack by the corps of the 5th Guards. TA and 5 Guards. And not on the flanks, but “on the forehead” of the most powerful enemy formation at that time, which part of the forces went on the defensive. The counterattack plan by its beginning no longer corresponded to the changed operational situation, the deployment area of ​​the main counterattack grouping was inconvenient for using a large number of tanks, and the capabilities of the 2nd SS TC while holding the territory occupied by it on July 11 near Prokhorovka were underestimated.

According to V.N. Zamulin, July 12, 1943 in the 5th Guards. A and 5 Guards. TA failed at least 7019 fighters and commanders. The loss of four corps and the advance detachment of the 5th Guards. TA consisted of 340 tanks and 17 self-propelled guns, of which 194 burned out, and 146 could be restored. But due to the fact that most of the wrecked combat vehicles ended up on the territory controlled by German troops, the vehicles that were to be restored were also lost. Thus, in total, 53% of the armored vehicles of the army that took part in the counterattack were lost. According to V.N. Zamulin,

the main reason for the high loss of tanks and the failure to fulfill the tasks of the 5th Guards. TA was the misuse of a homogeneous tank army, ignoring the order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 325 of October 16, 1942, which accumulated the experience accumulated over the previous years of the war in the use of armored forces. The dispersal of strategic reserves in an unsuccessful counterattack had a significant negative impact on the results of the final stage of the Kursk defensive operation.

Assessing the role of the tank battle near the Prokhorovka station on July 12, 1943, V.N. to July 16, and the disruption of the offensive of the GA "South" was the result of the joint efforts of the troops of the Voronezh Front and the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

Results

According to the study of A. V. Isaev:

The counterattack of the Soviet troops in the Prokhorovka area was an expected move for the Germans. Back in the spring of 1943, more than a month before the offensive, the option of repelling a counterattack from the Prokhorovka area was being worked out, and units of the II SS Panzer Corps knew perfectly well what to do. Instead of moving to Oboyan, the SS divisions "Leibstandarte" and "Dead Head" were substituted under the counterattack of the army of P. A. Rotmistrov. As a result, the planned flank counterattack degenerated into a head-on collision with large German tank forces. The 18th and 29th tank corps lost up to 70% of their tanks and were actually taken out of the game ...

Despite this, the operation took place in a very tense situation, and only offensive, I emphasize, offensive actions of other fronts made it possible to avoid a catastrophic development of events.

Information about a flank strike is nothing more than a myth. The Prokhorov battle was part of the (main) general offensive, which included 5 of the 7 armies of the Voronezh Front, namely: 5 Guards. TA, 5th Guards. A, 1 TA, 6 Guards. A and 69 A. The offensive of absolutely all armies was planned in the forehead of the advancing German troops:

• 5 Guards TA against the SS division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler".
• 5 Guards And against the SS division "Dead Head".
• 40 A (with attached units of 2 tk and 2 guards Ttk) against the SS division "Das Reich"
• 1 TA and 6 Guards. A (with attached parts of 40 A, 10 tk and 5 guards Stk) against 3 td, 11 td and md "Great Germany" (including the 100th brigade "panthers").

However, the idea of ​​a flank strike by the 5th Guards. TA in the direction of Shakhovo, Yakovlevo was really considered and, moreover, thoroughly. The fact is that in this sector, the 48th sk of the 69th A was opposed by a relatively weak enemy - the German 167th infantry division. On July 11, on the orders of P. A. Rotmistrov, the commander of the 29th TC, I. F. Kirichenko, with a group of staff officers, began reconnaissance of the Leski, Shakhovo area. If the breakthrough of the 29th TC was successful, there would be a threat of encirclement of the main forces of 4 TA. But this option was not accepted, probably because of the need to overcome difficult obstacles: the swampy floodplain of the Lipovoy Donets and the embankment of the railway mined by the Germans. The offensive plan of the 5th Guards was also considered. TA on x. Cheerful, against the SS division "Dead Head", but due to lack of funds for crossing the river. Psyol also abandoned this plan.

The area in which the troops fought on July 11 was very rugged along the entire front: with deep gullies, ravines, river floodplains and railway embankments. According to the situation on July 10, the offensive from the area of ​​temporary storage warehouses. Komsomolets was the most preferred for a tank attack. However, by the evening of July 11, the 2nd Grenadier Regiment of the SS Leibstandarte Division had already reached the outskirts of Prokhorovka, depriving the 5th Guards. TA of all the advantages of maneuver. The army was forced to advance in echelons in two possible very narrow places, bypassing a deep beam:
- To the village of Vasilievka, along the river Psyol.
- through svh. Oktyabrsky, along the railway embankment, forcing its own anti-tank ditch, passed by the Germans the day before.
Thus, taking into account the terrain and the arrival of the 5th Guards. TA near Prokhorovka, there were simply no other opportunities for a concentrated strike by tank units on July 11th. Especially in the flank of the advancing 2 SS TC.

However, the German offensive ended in failure, and the Germans did not undertake such large-scale attacks near Kursk.

The losses of Soviet tankers amounted to at least 270 vehicles (of which only two tanks were heavy) in the morning battle and several dozen more during the day - according to the memoirs of the Germans, small groups of Soviet tanks and even individual vehicles appeared on the battlefield until evening. Probably, it was the stragglers who were pulling up on the march. Anti-tank artillery was already fighting them, armored vehicles were withdrawn and camouflaged.

Nevertheless, having disabled a quarter of the enemy tanks (and given the qualitative balance of forces of the parties and the unexpectedness of the strike, this was extremely difficult), the Soviet tankers forced him to stop and, ultimately, abandon the offensive.

Summary data on the losses of the 5th Guards. TA for July 12 , d. 70 . The total losses of tanks and assault guns of the 2nd SS TC on July 12 amounted to about 80 tanks and assault guns, including at least 40 units lost by the “Dead Head” division, which did not participate in the morning battle.

Compound	Personnel, total	Dead Losses	Source of loss	Tanks and self-propelled guns in the ranks	Participated in battle	Losses (burned out / knocked out)	Source of loss of tanks and self-propelled guns	In service at 13.00 13.07.43

The presence of combat-ready tanks and assault guns in the 2nd SS TC on the evening of July 13, 1943 (the feast day of these saints falls on July 12, the day of the battle). The names of 7 thousand soldiers who died here are carved on the marble slabs of its walls. Marduk has a tank mission "Kursk", and the actions take place near Prokhorovka.

Number, connection name	Pz.II	Pz.III 50/L42	Pz.III 50/L60	Pz.III 75 mm	Pz.IV L24	Pz.IV L43 and L48	Pz.VI "Tiger"	T-34	StuG	Bef.Pz. III	Total tanks and StuG
TD Leibstandarte-SS "Adolf Hitler"	4	-	5	-	-	31	3	-	20	7	70
Td SS "Das Reich"	-	-	43

Exactly 70 years ago, in 1943, on the very same days when this note is being written, one of the largest battles in the history of mankind was going on in the region of Kursk, Orel and Belgorod. The "Kursk Bulge", which ended in the complete victory of the Soviet troops, became the turning point of the Second World War. But the assessments of one of the most famous episodes of the battle - the tank battle near Prokhorovka - are so contradictory that it is very difficult to figure out who actually emerged victorious from it. They say that the real, objective history of any event is written not earlier than 50 years after it. The 70th anniversary of the Battle of Kursk is an excellent opportunity to find out what really happened near Prokhorovka.

The "Kursk Bulge" was the name given to a ledge on the front line about 200 km wide and up to 150 km deep, which was formed as a result of the winter campaign of 1942-1943. In mid-April, the German command developed an operation code-named "Citadel": it was planned to encircle and destroy Soviet troops in the Kursk region with simultaneous attacks from the north, in the Orel region, and from the south, from Belgorod. Further, the Germans were to advance again to the east.

It would seem that it is not so difficult to predict such plans: an attack from the north, an attack from the south, an envelopment in “pincers” ... In fact, the “Kursk Bulge” was not the only such ledge on the front line. In order for the German plans to be confirmed, it was necessary to use all the forces of Soviet intelligence, which this time turned out to be on top (there is even a beautiful version that all operational information was supplied to Moscow by Hitler's personal photographer). The main details of the German operation near Kursk were known long before it began. The Soviet command knew exactly the day and hour appointed for the German offensive.

Battle of Kursk Battle scheme.

They decided to meet the "guests" in an appropriate way: for the first time in the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army built a powerful, deeply echeloned defense on the alleged directions of the enemy's main attacks. It was necessary to wear down the enemy in defensive battles, and then go on the counterattack (Marshals G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky are considered the main authors of this idea). The Soviet defense with an extensive network of trenches and minefields consisted of eight lines with a total depth of up to 300 kilometers. The numerical superiority was also on the side of the USSR: more than 1300 thousand personnel against 900 thousand of the Germans, 19 thousand guns and mortars against 10 thousand, 3400 tanks against 2700, 2172 aircraft against 2050. True, here we must take into account the fact that the German army received a significant "technical" replenishment: tanks "Tiger" and "Panther", assault guns "Ferdinand", Focke-Wulf fighters of new modifications, bombers "Junkers-87 D5". But the Soviet command had a certain advantage due to the favorable location of the troops: the Central and Voronezh fronts were supposed to repel the offensive, the troops of the Western, Bryansk and South-Western fronts could come to their aid if necessary, and another front was deployed in the rear - Stepnoy, the creation of which the Nazi military leaders, as they later admitted in their memoirs, missed it completely.

Bomber "Junkers 87" modificationsD5- one of the samples of new German technology near Kursk. Our aircraft received the nickname "lappet" for a non-retractable landing gear.

However, preparing to repel a blow is only half the battle. The second half is to prevent fatal miscalculations in combat conditions, when the situation is constantly changing and plans are being adjusted. To begin with, the Soviet command used a psychological technique. The Germans were to launch their offensive at 3 am on 5 July. However, at exactly this hour, a massive fire of Soviet artillery fell on their positions. Thus, already at the very beginning of the battle, the Nazi commanders received a signal that their plans had been revealed.

The first three days of the battle, for all their magnitude, can be described quite briefly: the German troops were bogged down in a dense Soviet defense. On the northern face of the "Kursk Bulge", at the cost of heavy losses, the enemy managed to advance 6-8 kilometers in the direction of Olkhovatka. But on July 9 the situation changed. Deciding that it was enough to hit the wall with their foreheads, the Germans (first of all, the commander of Army Group South E. von Manstein) tried to concentrate all their forces in one, southern direction. And here the German offensive was stopped after a large-scale tank battle at Prokhorovka, which I will consider in detail.

The battle, perhaps, is unique in its own way in that the points of view on it among modern historians differ literally in everything. From the recognition of the unconditional victory of the Red Army (the version entrenched in Soviet textbooks) to talk about the complete defeat by the Germans of the 5th Guards Army of General P.A. Rotmistrov. As proof of the last thesis, the figures of the losses of Soviet tanks are usually cited, as well as the fact that the general himself almost fell under the tribunal for these losses. However, the position of the "defeatists" also cannot be accepted unconditionally for several reasons.

General Pavel Rotmistrov - Commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army.

Firstly, the battle near Prokhorovka is often considered by supporters of the "defeatist" version outside the general strategic situation. But the period from July 8 to 12 was the time of the most intense fighting on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge. The main goal of the German offensive was the city of Oboyan - this important strategic point made it possible to combine the forces of Army Group South and the 9th German Army advancing in the north. To prevent a breakthrough, the commander of the Voronezh Front, General N.F. Vatutin concentrated a large tank grouping on the right flank of the enemy. If the Nazis immediately tried to break through to Oboyan, Soviet tanks would hit them from the Prokhorovka area to the flank and rear. Realizing this, the commander of the 4th German Panzer Army Goth decided to first take Prokhorovka, and then continue moving north.

Secondly, the very name “battle of Prokhorovka” is not entirely correct. The fighting on July 12 took place not only directly near this village, but also to the north and south of it. It is the clashes of tank armadas along the entire width of the front that make it possible to more or less objectively assess the results of the day. It is also not difficult to trace where the promoted (in modern terms) name "Prokhorovka" came from. It began to appear on the pages of Russian historical literature in the 1950s, when Nikita Khrushchev became the General Secretary of the CPSU, who - what a coincidence! - in July 1943 he was on the southern face of the Kursk ledge as a member of the military council of the Voronezh Front. It is not surprising that Nikita Sergeevich needed vivid descriptions of the victories of the Soviet troops in this area.

Scheme of a tank battle near Prokhorovka. The three main German divisions are designated by abbreviations: "MG", "AG" and "R".

But back to the fighting on July 10-12. By the 12th, the operational situation at Prokhorovka was extremely tense. The Germans had no more than two kilometers to the village itself - it was one thing to attack decisively. If they managed to take Prokhorovka and gain a foothold in it, part of the tank corps could calmly turn north and break through to Oboyan. Over the two fronts - Central and Voronezh - in this case, there would be a real threat of encirclement. At the disposal of Vatutin remained the last significant reserve - the 5th Guards Tank Army of General P.A. Rotmistrov, numbering about 850 vehicles (tanks and self-propelled artillery pieces). The Germans had three tank divisions, which included a total of 211 tanks and self-propelled guns. But, assessing the balance of power, it must be borne in mind that the Nazis were armed with the latest heavy Tigers, as well as modernized fourth Panzers (Pz-IV) with enhanced armor protection. The main strength of the Soviet tank corps was the legendary "thirty-four" (T-34) - excellent medium tanks, but, for all their merits, they could not compete on equal terms with heavy equipment. In addition, Nazi tanks could fire at long distances, had better optics and, accordingly, firing accuracy. Taking into account all these factors, Rotmistrov's advantage was very insignificant.

The heavy tank "Tiger" is the main strike unit of the German tank forces near Kursk.

However, one cannot write off several mistakes made by Soviet generals. The first was made by Vatutin himself. Having set the task of advancing on the Germans, at the last moment he moved the time of the offensive from 10 am to 8.30. The question of the quality of intelligence involuntarily arises: the Germans stood in position in the morning and themselves waited for the order to attack (as it became known later, it was scheduled for 9.00), and their anti-tank artillery was deployed in battle formation in case of Soviet counterattacks. To deliver a preemptive strike in such a situation was a suicidal decision, which was shown by the further course of the battle. Surely Vatutin, if he had been accurately informed about the German location, would have preferred to wait for the Nazis to attack.

The second mistake behind the “authorship” of P.A. Rotmistrov himself concerns the use of T-70 light tanks (120 vehicles in two corps of the 5th Guards Army, which launched a morning attack). Under Prokhorovka, the T-70s were in the forefront and were especially hard hit by the fire of German tanks and artillery. The roots of this mistake are quite unexpectedly found in the Soviet military doctrine of the late 1930s: it was believed that light tanks were intended primarily for “reconnaissance in force”, while medium and heavy tanks were intended for a decisive strike. The Germans, on the other hand, acted exactly the opposite: their heavy wedges broke through the defenses, and light tanks and infantry followed, “clearing” the territory. Undoubtedly, to Kursk, the Soviet generals were familiar with the tactics of the Nazis in detail. What made Rotmistrov make such a strange decision is a mystery. Perhaps he was counting on the effect of surprise and hoped to crush the enemy with numbers, but, as I wrote above, a surprise attack did not work.

What actually happened near Prokhorovka, and why did Rotmistrov barely manage to avoid the tribunal? At 8.30 in the morning, Soviet tanks began to attack the Germans, who were in good positions. In parallel, an air battle ensued, where, apparently, neither side gained the upper hand. The first ranks of Rotmistrov's two tank corps were shot by fascist tanks and artillery. Closer to noon, in the course of violent attacks, part of the vehicles broke through to the positions of the Nazis, but failed to push the enemy. After waiting for the offensive impulse of Rotmistrov's army to dry up, the Germans themselves went on the attack, and ... It would seem that they should have easily won the battle, but no!

General view of the battlefield near Prokhorovka.

Speaking about the actions of the Soviet military leaders, it should be noted that they competently disposed of the reserves. On the southern sector of the front, the SS Reich division advanced only a couple of kilometers and was stopped mainly due to anti-tank artillery fire with the support of ground attack aircraft. The division "Adolf Hitler", exhausted by the attacks of the Soviet troops, remained in the same place. To the north of Prokhorovka, the “Dead Head” tank division was operating, which, according to German reports, did not meet Soviet troops at all that day, but for some reason it only covered 5 kilometers! This is an unrealistically small figure, and we can rightfully assume that the delay of the "Dead Head" is on the "conscience" of Soviet tanks. Moreover, it was in this area that a reserve of 150 tanks of the 5th and 1st Guards Tank Armies remained.

And one more thing: the failure in the morning clash near Prokhorovka in no way detracts from the merits of the Soviet tankmen. The crews of tanks fought to the last shell, showing miracles of courage, and sometimes purely Russian ingenuity. Rotmistrov himself recalled (and it is unlikely that he invented such a vivid episode) how the commander of one of the platoons, Lieutenant Bondarenko, on whom two “tigers” were moving, managed to hide his tank behind a burning German car. The Germans decided that Bondarenko's tank had been hit, turned around, and one of the "tigers" immediately received a shell in the side.

Attack of the Soviet "thirty-fours" with the support of the infantry.

The losses of the 5th Guards Army that day amounted to 343 tanks. The Germans, according to modern historians, lost up to 70 vehicles. However, here we are talking only about irretrievable losses. Soviet troops could pull up reserves and send damaged tanks for repairs. The Germans, who had to advance at all costs, did not have such an opportunity.

How to evaluate the results of the battle at Prokhorovka? From a tactical point of view, and also taking into account the ratio of losses - a draw, or even a minor victory for the Germans. However, if you look at the strategic map, it is obvious that the Soviet tankers were able to complete the main task - to slow down the German offensive. July 12 was a turning point in the Battle of Kursk: Operation Citadel failed, and on the same day, a counter-offensive of the Red Army began north of Orel. The second stage of the battle (Operation Kutuzov, primarily by the forces of the Bryansk and Western fronts) was successful for the Soviet troops: by the end of July, the enemy was driven back to their original positions, and already in August the Red Army liberated Orel and Kharkov. The military power of Germany was finally broken, which predetermined the victory of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War.

Broken Nazi equipment near Kursk.

Curious fact. It would be unfair not to give the floor to one of the initiators of the Soviet operation near Kursk, so I give the version of the events of Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov: “In his memoirs, the former commander of the 5th tank army, P.A. armies "South" was played by the 5th Panzer Army. This is immodest and not entirely true. The troops of the 6th and 7th Guards and 1st Tank Armies, supported by the artillery of the reserve of the High Command and the air army during the fierce battles of July 4-12, bled and exhausted the enemy. The 5th Panzer Army was already dealing with an extremely weakened grouping of German troops, which had lost faith in the possibility of a successful fight against the Soviet troops.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov.

Tank counterattack. A still from the movie Liberation: Arc of Fire. 1968

Silence over the Prokhorovsky field. Only from time to time a bell bell is heard, calling parishioners to worship in the church of Peter and Paul, which was built with public donations in memory of the soldiers who died on the Kursk Bulge.
Gertsovka, Cherkasskoye, Lukhanino, Luchki, Yakovlevo, Belenikhino, Mikhailovka, Melehovo… These names now hardly say anything to the younger generation. And 70 years ago, a terrible battle was in full swing here, in the Prokhorovka area, the largest oncoming tank battle unfolded. Everything that could burn was on fire, everything was covered with dust, fumes and smoke from burning tanks, villages, forests and grain fields. The earth was scorched to such an extent that not a single blade of grass remained on it. Here the Soviet guardsmen and the elite of the Wehrmacht, the SS Panzer Divisions, met head-on.
Before the Prokhorov tank battle, there were fierce clashes between the tank forces of both sides in the zone of the 13th Army of the Central Front, in which up to 1000 tanks took part in the most critical moments.
But tank battles in the Voronezh Front took on the largest scale. Here, in the first days of the battle, the forces of the 4th Tank Army and the 3rd Tank Corps of the Germans clashed with three corps of the 1st Tank Army, the 2nd and 5th Guards separate tank corps.
"WE'LL HAVE LUNCH IN KURSK!"
The fighting on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge actually began on July 4, when the German units made an attempt to shoot down the outposts in the zone of the 6th Guards Army.
But the main events unfolded early in the morning on July 5, when the Germans delivered the first massive blow with their tank formations in the direction of Oboyan.
On the morning of July 5, the commander of the Adolf Hitler division, Obergruppenführer Josef Dietrich, drove up to his Tigers, and some officer shouted to him: “We will have lunch in Kursk!”
But the SS did not have to have lunch or dinner in Kursk. Only by the end of the day on July 5 did they manage to break through the defensive zone of the 6th Army. The exhausted soldiers of the German assault battalions took refuge in the captured trenches to refresh themselves with dry rations and get some sleep.
On the right flank of Army Group South, the Kempf task force crossed the river. Seversky Donets and struck at the 7th Guards Army.
Gunner "Tiger" of the 503rd battalion of heavy tanks of the 3rd tank corps Gerhard Niemann: "Another anti-tank gun is 40 meters ahead of us. The gun crew flees in panic, except for one person. He takes aim and fires. A terrible blow to the fighting compartment. The driver maneuvers, maneuver - and another gun is crushed by our tracks. And again a terrible blow, this time to the stern of the tank. Our engine sneezes, but nevertheless continues to work.
On July 6 and 7, the 1st Panzer Army took the main blow. In a few hours of battle, as they say, only numbers remained from its 538th and 1008th anti-tank regiments. On July 7, the Germans launched a concentric attack in the direction of Oboyan. Only in the section between Syrtsev and Yakovlev on a five-six-kilometer front, the commander of the 4th German tank army, Goth, deployed up to 400 tanks, supporting their offensive with a massive strike of aviation and artillery.
The commander of the troops of the 1st Tank Army, Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces Mikhail Katukov: “We got out of the gap and climbed a small hillock, where a command post was equipped. It was half past three. But there seemed to be a solar eclipse. The sun was hidden behind clouds of dust. And ahead, in the twilight, bursts of shots could be seen, the earth took off and crumbled, engines roared and caterpillars clanged. As soon as enemy tanks approached our positions, they were met by dense artillery and tank fire. Leaving wrecked and burning vehicles on the battlefield, the enemy rolled back and again went on the attack.
By the end of July 8, the Soviet troops, after heavy defensive battles, withdrew to the second army line of defense.
300 KM MARCH
The decision to strengthen the Voronezh Front was made on July 6, despite stormy protests from the commander of the Steppe Front, I.S. Konev. Stalin ordered the advancement of the 5th Guards Tank Army to the rear of the troops of the 6th and 7th Guards Armies, as well as the strengthening of the Voronezh Front by the 2nd Tank Corps.
The 5th Guards Tank Army had about 850 tanks and self-propelled guns, including T-34-501 medium tanks and T-70-261 light tanks. On the night of July 6-7, the army moved to the front line. The march was carried out around the clock under the cover of aviation of the 2nd Air Army.
Commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, Lieutenant General of the Tank Troops Pavel Rotmistrov: “Already at 8 o’clock in the morning it became hot, and clouds of dust rose into the sky. By noon the dust had thickly covered the roadside bushes, the wheat fields, the tanks and trucks, and the dark red disk of the sun was barely visible through the gray dust curtain. Tanks, self-propelled guns and tractors (pulled guns), infantry armored vehicles and trucks moved forward in an endless stream. The faces of the soldiers were covered with dust and soot from the exhaust pipes. The heat was unbearable. The soldiers were tormented by thirst, and their tunics, soaked with sweat, stuck to their bodies. It was especially hard on the march for the driver-mechanics. The crews of the tanks tried to make their task as easy as possible. Every now and then someone replaced the drivers, and on short halts they were allowed to sleep.
Aviation of the 2nd Air Army covered the 5th Guards Tank Army on the march so reliably that German intelligence failed to detect its arrival. Having traveled 200 km, the army arrived in the area southwest of Stary Oskol on the morning of 8 July. Then, having put the materiel in order, the army corps again made a 100-kilometer throw and by the end of July 9, strictly at the appointed time, concentrated in the area of ​​​​Bobryshev, Vesely, Aleksandrovsky.
MANSTEIN CHANGES THE DIRECTION OF THE MAIN IMPACT
On the morning of July 8, an even more fierce struggle flared up in the Oboyan and Korochan directions. The main feature of the struggle that day was that the Soviet troops, repelling the massive attacks of the enemy, themselves began to deliver strong counterattacks on the flanks of the 4th German Panzer Army.
As in previous days, the fiercest fighting flared up in the area of ​​the Simferopol-Moscow highway, where units of the SS Panzer Division "Grossdeutschland", the 3rd and 11th Panzer Divisions, reinforced by separate companies and battalions of "Tigers" and "Ferdinands" advanced. Units of the 1st Panzer Army again took the brunt of the enemy's strikes. In this direction, the enemy simultaneously deployed up to 400 tanks, and fierce battles continued here all day.
Intense fighting also continued in the Korochansky direction, where by the end of the day the Kempf army group broke through in a narrow wedge in the Melekhov area.
The commander of the 19th German Panzer Division, Lieutenant-General Gustav Schmidt: “Despite the heavy losses suffered by the enemy, and the fact that entire sections of trenches and trenches were burned by flamethrower tanks, we were unable to dislodge the group that had settled there from the northern part of the defensive line enemy force up to a battalion. The Russians sat down in the trench system, knocked out our flamethrower tanks with anti-tank rifle fire and put up fanatical resistance.
On the morning of July 9, a German strike force of several hundred tanks, with massive air support, resumed the offensive on a 10-kilometer stretch. By the end of the day, she broke through to the third line of defense. And in the Korochan direction, the enemy broke into the second line of defense.
Nevertheless, the stubborn resistance of the troops of the 1st Tank and 6th Guards Armies in the Oboyan direction forced the command of Army Group South to change the direction of the main attack, moving it from the Simferopol-Moscow highway east to the Prokhorovka area. This movement of the main attack, in addition to the fact that several days of fierce fighting on the highway did not give the Germans the desired results, was also determined by the nature of the terrain. From the Prokhorovka area, a wide strip of heights extends in a northwestern direction, which dominate the surrounding area and are convenient for the operations of large tank masses.
The general plan of the command of Army Group "South" was to deliver three strong strikes in a complex manner, which were supposed to lead to the encirclement and destruction of two groupings of Soviet troops and to the opening of offensive routes to Kursk.
To develop success, it was supposed to bring fresh forces into the battle - the 24th Panzer Corps as part of the SS Viking Division and the 17th Panzer Division, which on July 10 were urgently transferred from the Donbass to Kharkov. The start of the attack on Kursk from the north and from the south was scheduled by the German command for the morning of July 11.
In turn, the command of the Voronezh Front, having received the approval of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, decided to prepare and conduct a counteroffensive in order to encircle and defeat enemy groups advancing in the Oboyan and Prokhorov directions. Formations of the 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Army were concentrated against the main grouping of SS Panzer divisions in the Prokhorovka direction. The start of the general counter-offensive was scheduled for the morning of 12 July.
On July 11, all three German groups of E. Manstein went on the offensive, and later than all, clearly expecting the attention of the Soviet command to be diverted to other directions, the main group launched an offensive in the Prokhorovka direction - the tank divisions of the 2nd SS corps under the command of Obergruppenführer Paul Hauser, who was awarded the highest Award of the Third Reich "Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross".
By the end of the day, a large group of tanks of the SS division "Reich" managed to break into the village of Storozhevoe, threatening the rear of the 5th Guards Tank Army. To eliminate this threat, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps was thrown. Fierce oncoming tank battles continued throughout the night. As a result, the main strike force of the 4th German Tank Army, having launched an offensive on a front of only about 8 km, reached the approaches to Prokhorovka in a narrow strip and was forced to suspend the offensive, occupying the line from which the 5th Guards Tank Army planned to launch its counteroffensive.
Even less success was achieved by the second strike group - the SS Panzer Division "Grossdeutschland", 3 and 11 Panzer Divisions. Our troops successfully repelled their attacks.
However, north-east of Belgorod, where the Kempf army group was advancing, a threatening situation arose. The 6th and 7th tank divisions of the enemy broke through to the north in a narrow wedge. Their forward units were only 18 km from the main grouping of SS Panzer divisions, which were advancing southwest of Prokhorovka.
To eliminate the breakthrough of German tanks against the Kempf army group, part of the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army was thrown: two brigades of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps and one brigade of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps.
In addition, the Soviet command decided to launch the planned counteroffensive two hours earlier, although the preparations for the counteroffensive were not yet completed. However, the situation forced us to act immediately and decisively. Any delay was beneficial only to the enemy.
PROKHOROVKA
At 08:30 on July 12, Soviet strike groups launched a counteroffensive against the troops of the German 4th Panzer Army. However, due to the German breakthrough to Prokhorovka, the diversion of significant forces of the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Armies to eliminate the threat to their rear and the postponement of the start of the counteroffensive, the Soviet troops went on the attack without artillery and air support. As the English historian Robin Cross writes: “The artillery preparation schedules were torn to shreds and rewritten again.”
Manstein threw all available forces to repulse the attacks of the Soviet troops, because he clearly understood that the success of the offensive of the Soviet troops could lead to the complete defeat of the entire strike force of the German Army Group South. A fierce struggle flared up on a huge front with a total length of more than 200 km.
The most fierce fighting during July 12 flared up on the so-called Prokhorov bridgehead. From the north it was limited by the river. Psel, and from the south - a railway embankment near the village of Belenikhino. This strip of terrain, up to 7 km along the front and up to 8 km in depth, was captured by the enemy as a result of a tense struggle during July 11. The main enemy grouping as part of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which had 320 tanks and assault guns, including several dozen vehicles of the Tiger, Panther and Ferdinand types, deployed and operated on the bridgehead. It was against this grouping that the Soviet command dealt its main blow with the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army and part of the forces of the 5th Guards Army.
The battlefield was clearly visible from Rotmistrov's observation post.
Pavel Rotmistrov: “A few minutes later, the tanks of the first echelon of our 29th and 18th corps, firing on the move, crashed into the battle formations of the Nazi troops with a head-on attack, literally piercing the enemy’s battle formation with a swift through attack. The Nazis obviously did not expect to meet such a large mass of our combat vehicles and their decisive attack. Management in the advanced units and subunits of the enemy was clearly violated. His "Tigers" and "Panthers", deprived of their fire advantage in close combat, which they used at the beginning of the offensive in a collision with our other tank formations, were now successfully hit by Soviet T-34 and even T-70 tanks from short distances. The battlefield was swirling with smoke and dust, the earth trembled from powerful explosions. The tanks jumped on each other and, having grappled, could no longer disperse, fought to the death until one of them flared up with a torch or stopped with broken tracks. But the wrecked tanks, if their weapons did not fail, continued to fire.
West of Prokhorovka along the left bank of the Psel River, units of the 18th Panzer Corps went on the offensive. His tank brigades upset the battle formations of the advancing enemy tank units, stopped them and began to move forward themselves.
Yevgeny Shkurdalov, deputy commander of the tank battalion of the 181st brigade of the 18th tank corps: “I only saw what was, so to speak, within the limits of my tank battalion. Ahead of us was the 170th tank brigade. With great speed, she wedged into the location of German tanks, heavy ones, which were in the first wave, and the German tanks pierced our tanks. The tanks went very close to each other, and therefore they fired literally at point-blank range, they simply shot each other. This brigade burned down in just five minutes - sixty-five cars.
Wilhelm Res, radio operator of the commander's tank of the Adolf Hitler Panzer Division: “Russian tanks were rushing at full throttle. In our area, they were prevented by an anti-tank ditch. At full speed, they flew into this ditch, due to their speed overcame three or four meters in it, but then, as it were, froze in a slightly inclined position with a cannon pulled up. Literally for a moment! Taking advantage of this, many of our tank commanders fired directly at point-blank range.
Yevgeny Shkurdalov: “I knocked out the first tank when I was moving along the railroad landing, and literally at a distance of a hundred meters I saw the Tiger tank, which was standing sideways to me and firing at our tanks. Apparently, he knocked out quite a few of our cars, as the cars came sideways towards him, and he fired at the sides of our cars. I took aim with a sub-caliber projectile, fired. The tank caught fire. I fired another shot, the tank caught fire even more. The crew jumped out, but somehow I was not up to it. I bypassed this tank, then knocked out a T-III tank and a Panther. When I knocked out the Panther, there was some, you know, a feeling of delight that you see, I did such a heroic deed.
The 29th Tank Corps, with the support of units of the 9th Guards Airborne Division, launched a counteroffensive along the railway and highway southwest of Prokhorovka. As noted in the corps combat log, the attack began without artillery treatment of the line occupied by the enemy and without air cover. This made it possible for the enemy to open concentrated fire on the battle formations of the corps and bomb its tank and infantry units with impunity, which led to heavy losses and a decrease in the rate of attack, and this, in turn, made it possible for the enemy to conduct effective artillery and tank fire from a place.
Wilhelm Res: “Suddenly, one T-34 broke through and moved straight towards us. Our first radio operator began to give shells to me one by one, so that I would put them in the cannon. At this time, our commander upstairs kept shouting: “Shot! Shot!" - because the tank was moving closer. And only after the fourth - "Shot" I heard: "Thank God!"
Then, after some time, we determined that the T-34 had stopped just eight meters from us! At the top of the tower, he had, as if stamped, 5-centimeter holes, located at the same distance from each other, as if they were measured with a compass. The combat formations of the parties mixed up. Our tankers successfully hit the enemy at close range, but they themselves suffered heavy losses.
From the documents of the Central Administration of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation: “The T-34 tank of the commander of the 2nd battalion of the 181st brigade of the 18th tank corps, Captain Skripkin, crashed into the Tigers and knocked out two enemy tanks before an 88-mm shell hit the tower of his T -34, and the other pierced the side armor. The Soviet tank caught fire, and the wounded Skripkin was pulled out of the wrecked car by his driver Sergeant Nikolaev and radio operator Zyryanov. They took cover in a funnel, but still one of the "Tigers" noticed them and moved towards them. Then Nikolaev and his loader Chernov again jumped into the burning car, started it and sent it straight at the Tiger. Both tanks exploded on impact.
The blow of Soviet armor, new tanks with a full set of ammunition thoroughly shook the exhausted Hauser divisions, and the German offensive stopped.
From the report of the representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in the area of ​​the Kursk Bulge, Marshal of the Soviet Union Alexander Vasilevsky to Stalin: “Yesterday I personally observed a tank battle of our 18th and 29th corps with more than two hundred enemy tanks in a counterattack southwest of Prokhorovka. At the same time, hundreds of guns and all the RSs we have took part in the battle. As a result, the entire battlefield was littered with burning German and our tanks for an hour.
As a result of the counter-offensive of the main forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army southwest of Prokhorovka, the offensive of the SS Panzer divisions "Dead Head", "Adolf Hitler" to the northeast was thwarted, these divisions suffered such losses, after which they could no longer launch a serious offensive.
Parts of the SS Panzer Division "Reich" also suffered heavy losses from attacks by units of the 2nd and 2nd Guards Tank Corps, which launched a counteroffensive south of Prokhorovka.
In the breakthrough area of ​​the Kempf army group south and southeast of Prokhorovka, a fierce struggle also continued throughout the day on July 12, as a result of which the attack of the Kempf army group to the north was stopped by tankmen of the 5th Guards Tank and units of the 69th Army .
LOSSES AND RESULTS
On the night of July 13, Rotmistrov took Marshal Georgy Zhukov, a representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, to the headquarters of the 29th Tank Corps. On the way, Zhukov stopped the car several times to personally inspect the sites of recent battles. In one place, he got out of the car and looked for a long time at the burned-out Panther, rammed by the T-70 tank. A few tens of meters away stood the Tiger and T-34 locked in a deadly embrace. “That's what a through tank attack means,” Zhukov said quietly, as if to himself, taking off his cap.
Data on the losses of the parties, in particular tanks, differ radically in different sources. Manstein, in his book Lost Victories, writes that in total, during the battles on the Kursk Bulge, Soviet troops lost 1,800 tanks. The collection “Secrecy Removed: Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in Wars, Combat Operations and Military Conflicts” refers to 1,600 Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns disabled during the defensive battle on the Kursk Bulge.
A very remarkable attempt to calculate German losses in tanks was made by the English historian Robin Cross in his book The Citadel. Battle of Kursk. If we shift its diagram into a table, we will get the following picture: (the number and losses of tanks and self-propelled guns in the 4th German Panzer Army in the period July 4-17, 1943, see the table).
Kross' data differs from the data from Soviet sources, which can be quite understandable to a certain extent. So, it is known that on the evening of July 6, Vatutin reported to Stalin that during the fierce battles that lasted all day, 322 enemy tanks were destroyed (at Kross - 244).
But there are also quite incomprehensible discrepancies in the figures. For example, an aerial photograph taken on July 7 at 13.15, only in the area of ​​​​Syrtsev, Krasnaya Polyana along the Belgorod-Oboyan highway, where the SS Panzer Division "Grossdeutschland" from the 48th Panzer Corps was advancing, recorded 200 burning enemy tanks. According to Kross, on July 7, 48 TC lost only three tanks (?!).
Or another fact. As Soviet sources testify, as a result of bombing and assault attacks on the concentrated enemy troops (TD SS "Great Germany" and 11th TD), on the morning of July 9, many fires broke out throughout the area in the area of ​​the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. It was burning German tanks, self-propelled guns, cars, motorcycles, tanks, fuel and ammunition depots. According to Kross, there were no losses at all in the German 4th Panzer Army on July 9, although, as he himself writes, on July 9 it fought stubborn battles, overcoming fierce resistance from the Soviet troops. But it was precisely by the evening of July 9 that Manstein decided to abandon the offensive against Oboyan and began to look for other ways to break through to Kursk from the south.
The same can be said about the Kross data for 10 and 11 July, according to which there were no casualties in the 2nd SS Panzer Corps. This is also surprising, since it was during these days that the divisions of this corps delivered the main blow and, after fierce fighting, were able to break through to Prokhorovka. And it was on July 11 that the Hero of the Soviet Union Guards Sergeant M.F. Borisov, who destroyed seven German tanks.
After the archival documents were opened, it became possible to more accurately assess Soviet losses in the tank battle near Prokhorovka. According to the combat log of the 29th Panzer Corps for July 12, out of 212 tanks and self-propelled guns that entered the battle, 150 vehicles (more than 70%) were lost by the end of the day, of which 117 (55%) were irretrievably lost. According to combat report No. 38 of the commander of the 18th tank corps dated 07/13/43, the losses of the corps amounted to 55 tanks, or 30% of their initial strength. Thus, you can get a more or less accurate figure of the losses suffered by the 5th Guards Tank Army in the battle of Prokhorovka against the SS divisions "Adolf Hitler" and "Totenkopf" - over 200 tanks and self-propelled guns.
As for German losses near Prokhorovka, there is an absolutely fantastic disparity in numbers.
According to Soviet sources, when the battles near Kursk died down and the broken military equipment began to be removed from the battlefields, more than 400 broken and burnt German tanks were counted in a small area of ​​the area southwest of Prokhorovka, where on July 12 an oncoming tank battle unfolded. Rotmistrov, in his memoirs, claimed that on July 12, in battles with the 5th Guards Tank Army, the enemy lost over 350 tanks and more than 10 thousand people were killed.
But in the late 1990s, the German military historian Karl-Heinz Frieser published sensational data he obtained after studying German archives. According to these data, the Germans lost four tanks in the battle of Prokhorovka. After additional research, he came to the conclusion that in fact the losses were even less - three tanks.
Documentary evidence refutes these absurd conclusions. So, in the combat log of the 29th Panzer Corps, it is said that the losses of the enemy amounted to 68 tanks, among other things (it is interesting to note that this coincides with Kross's data). In a combat report from the headquarters of the 33rd Guards Corps to the commander of the 5th Guards Army dated July 13, 1943, it is said that the 97th Guards Rifle Division destroyed 47 tanks over the past day. Further, it is reported that during the night of July 12, the enemy took out his wrecked tanks, the number of which exceeds 200 vehicles. Several dozens of destroyed enemy tanks were chalked up to the 18th Panzer Corps.
We can agree with Kross's statement that the losses of tanks are generally difficult to calculate, since the disabled vehicles were repaired and again went into battle. In addition, enemy losses are usually always exaggerated. Nevertheless, with a high degree of probability it can be assumed that the 2nd SS Panzer Corps lost at least over 100 tanks in the battle near Prokhorovka (excluding the losses of the SS Panzer Division "Reich" operating south of Prokhorovka). In total, according to Kross, the losses of the 4th German Panzer Army from July 4 to 14 amounted to about 600 tanks and self-propelled guns out of 916, which were counted at the beginning of Operation Citadel. This almost coincides with the data of the German historian Engelmann, who, citing Manstein's report, claims that between July 5 and 13, the German 4th Panzer Army lost 612 armored vehicles. The losses of the 3rd German Panzer Corps by July 15 amounted to 240 tanks out of 310 available.
The total losses of the parties in the oncoming tank battle near Prokhorovka, taking into account the actions of the Soviet troops against the 4th German tank army and the Kempf army group, are estimated as follows. 500 tanks and self-propelled guns were lost on the Soviet side, and 300 on the German side. Kross claims that after the Battle of Prokhorov, Hauser's sappers blew up wrecked German equipment that could not be repaired and stood in no man's land. After August 1, so many faulty equipment accumulated in German repair shops in Kharkov and Bogodukhov that it had to be sent even to Kyiv for repairs.
Of course, the German Army Group South suffered the biggest losses in the first seven days of fighting, even before the battle of Prokhorovka. But the main significance of the Prokhorov battle lies not even in the damage that was inflicted on the German tank formations, but in the fact that the Soviet soldiers dealt a severe blow and managed to stop the SS tank divisions rushing to Kursk. This undermined the morale of the elite of the German tank forces, after which they finally lost faith in the victory of German weapons.

The number and losses of tanks and self-propelled guns in the 4th German tank army on July 4-17, 1943
date of	The number of tanks in the 2nd SS TC	The number of tanks in the 48th TC	Total	Tank losses in the 2nd SS TC	Losses of tanks in the 48th TC	Total	Notes
04.07	470	446	916	39	–	39	48th shopping mall -?
05.07	431	453	884	21	–	21	48th shopping mall -?
06.07	410	455	865	110	134	244
07.07	300	321	621	2	3	5
08.07	308	318	626	30	95	125
09.07	278	223	501	–	–	–	?
10.07	292	227	519	–	6	6	2nd TC SS -?
11.07	309	221	530	–	33	33	2nd TC SS -?
12.07	320	188	508	68	–	68	48th shopping mall -?
13.07	252	253	505	–	36	36	2nd TC SS -?
14.07	271	217	488	11	9	20
15.07	260	206	466	–	–	–	?
16.07	298	232	530	–	–	?
17.07	312	279	591	no data	no data	–
Total tanks lost in the 4th Panzer Army			280	316	596

The winter of 1942-1943 was difficult for the German troops. The Wehrmacht suffered huge losses in equipment and manpower. The catastrophe near Stalingrad shook the authority of the Reich, exacerbating internal and external political problems. There was no longer any talk of a German victory in the war; the Germans could only hope to get out of it with the least losses.

To restore political and military prestige, the Nazi elite needed a victorious campaign against their main enemy, the Soviet Union. This is how the idea of ​​Operation Citadel, an offensive near Kursk, was born. Despite the fact that the chances of the success of the operation by many German commanders were extremely skeptical, it nevertheless took place and ended in a completely natural defeat for the Wehrmacht.

One of the key moments of the Battle of Kursk was the tank battle near Prokhorovka. In terms of the amount of equipment involved, it was one of the largest for the entire period of the Second World War. Candidate of Historical Sciences Valery Nikolaevich Zamulin tells us about the details of this battle.

Valery Nikolaevich, on July 12, 1943, the largest tank battle of the Battle of Kursk took place near the Prokhorovka station. Although there is a lot of information about this event, it is often contradictory ...

Let's start with the fact that the battle for Prokhorovka took place not only on July 12th. This day can be called the climax and its most dramatic moment. And it began on July 10, when the troops of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps began to fulfill the order of the commander of the 4th Panzer Army, General G. Goth: to take Prokhorovka in order to further strike at the rear of the Soviet troops defending here, primarily the 69th Army . The corps included three motorized SS divisions: "Dead Head", "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" and "Das Reich". The battle continued until 16 July. On the night of July 17, German troops began to withdraw from this area to their original positions along the Belgorod-Tomarovka-Borisovka line.

Data on the battle on July 12, 1943 near Prokhorovka in Soviet, American and German sources differ significantly from each other, including the number of armored vehicles. How many tanks were involved?

The main events with the use of a significant number of armored vehicles on July 12 near Prokhorovka unfolded in two areas. To the west of the station, on the so-called "tank field", for about 9-10 hours of battle, 514 Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns and 210 German tanks and assault guns operated. South of the station, 158 Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns fought against 119 German vehicles. Total 1001 armored unit. This is according to documents declassified in the late 1990s.

The figure of 1,500 vehicles on both sides, common in Soviet official historiography, was deliberately overstated; it first appeared in the report of the headquarters of the 5th Guards Tank Army for July 1943, and then migrated to historical literature.

Why was it necessary to inflate the numbers on the number of vehicles in battle?

It was important for the army command to show that the high losses suffered by the troops in 10 hours of battle were not the result of mistakes or miscalculations, the army simply participated in a grandiose, unprecedented battle. Consequently, the losses during such a battle could not be small. In the open press, these data were first given in the brochure “The Battle of Kursk. Brief essay, which was published in 1945. The figure of 1500 cars can still be found in print and electronic publications.

What armored vehicles were used by the opposing sides near Prokhorovka?

The Soviet side - mainly medium tanks T-34, armed with a short-barreled 76-mm cannon (there were about 70%), and light T-70s with a 45-mm gun, as well as three regiments of self-propelled artillery mounts: SU-76, SU- 122 and SU-152. In addition, in the 5th Guards Tank Army, Lieutenant General P. A. Rotmistrov, there were two regiments of English tanks "Churchill Mk IV". As for the heavy KV-1s, during the entire 7 days of the battle there were only two of them, but they were not used directly in the battles.

The SS divisions had at their disposal regular tanks Pz.Kpfw III, Pz.Kpfw IV, StuG self-propelled guns, as well as Hummel and Vespe self-propelled guns for fire support of armored attacks. "Tigers" were also, but not enough. For example, on the eve of the famous battle, on the evening of July 11, only 15 "Tigers" were listed as serviceable in three SS divisions. Moreover, in the division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler", parts of which were on the "tank field", there were only 4 vehicles.

As for the Panther tanks and self-propelled guns Ferdinand, often mentioned in connection with the events near Prokhorovka, they have never been here. The Panther battalion was planned to be transferred here by the beginning of the battle, but they were partially killed by the soldiers of the 1st Panzer Army of General M. E. Katukov west of Prokhorovka, and partially they were out of action for technical reasons. And the Ferdinands operated in the north of the Kursk Bulge, in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe Ponyri station.

I want to emphasize that the main role in disrupting our counterattack on July 12 was played by difficult terrain conditions and the fact that the SS division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" went on the defensive on the evening of July 11. And the biggest losses were not inflicted on us by enemy tanks, but by artillery.

When it comes to this battle, the picture is often presented of a huge field on which the tanks converged "hand to hand". How was it really?

There are many stereotypes regarding the Prokhorov battle, but they are, as a rule, far from reality. Firstly, in the strike area of ​​the 5th Guards Tank Army, the conditions of the terrain did not allow deploying the very “armored avalanche” that we often hear and read about in the context of the battle. If this were possible, then the German positions would have been crushed in the first hour of the battle, because the main blow was delivered by the 18th and 29th tank corps, which numbered 368 tanks and self-propelled guns. Theoretically, this is 60 tanks per kilometer, not counting the self-propelled guns.

But even more than 200 tanks of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps were in the second echelon of the army. In the event of the successful implementation of the initial plan of the counterattack of the Soviet command, this would have been an inevitable disaster for the Germans, even despite the fact that our guards were opposed by the SS corps - the most powerful and prepared formation of the enemy.

However, the Soviet tank brigades were squeezed in a gorge to the west of the station, between the floodplain of the Psyol River, deep ravines and the Storozhevoye tract. In this area, the tank-passable section is only up to 900 meters, that is, a tank battalion of a full staff (26 tanks) could hardly turn into a line here, and there is no need to talk about a brigade, let alone a corps.

The 29th Corps of General I.F. Kirichenko, operating along the Belgorod-Prokhorovka railway, could simultaneously move no more than 30-35 tanks between the Oktyabrsky state farm and height 252 in two echelons. Therefore, it was not possible to create a "tank skating rink", the formation was introduced into the battle in small units, with a significant interval for the dynamics of the battle, under heavy enemy fire. Our troops already suffered significant losses at the beginning of the attack, and the broken tanks made the task of the crews following them even more difficult.

On the way of the neighboring 18th Corps of General B.S. Bakharov to the Oktyabrsky state farm there was a large beam, passable for tanks in only one place. And even after crossing it, our tanks could not immediately turn into an offensive line, they had to go several hundred meters more under enemy fire. That is, the real offensive of the Soviet troops looked like this: our combat vehicles went in three or four groups of 30-35 vehicles in two echelons, one brigade after another with an interval of 30 minutes to an hour.

Estimates of the losses of the parties in the Prokhorov tank battle, cited by different historians, differ significantly. Which numbers are closest to reality?

The most confusing situation is with the analysis of the losses of German troops. They talk about 80, 130 and even 350 tanks and self-propelled guns. There are even stupid things - 5 German tanks. Some historians, to whom I belong, consider the most plausible such figure of losses throughout the SS corps for the entire day of July 12, 1943 - 155-163 vehicles, and irretrievable within 20-30 units.

A small number of deadweight losses can be misleading, but the SS men were badly battered. Despite the fact that they controlled the territory of the battlefield near Prokhorovka until July 17 and could take out their equipment, a large part of the damaged vehicles that could be restored were sent to Germany for repairs. This is not an irretrievable loss, but a long-term one.

Our troops on July 12 lost 340 tanks and 19 self-propelled guns. Of these, 193 tanks and 14 self-propelled guns are irrevocable. The high percentage of irretrievable losses is explained by the fact that the battlefield, as a rule, remained behind the Nazis and we could not completely evacuate the damaged equipment. And the Germans blew up all our tanks during the retreat.

On the night of the 13th, the command of the Voronezh Front received data indicating that the 5th Guards Tank Army, due to huge losses, was actually incapacitated. The best tank formation, which was aimed at a breakthrough to the Dnieper, was killed in ten hours at a small station, advancing two kilometers in the center and retreating 4.5 kilometers on the flanks. The neighboring 5th Guards Army, Lieutenant General A.S. Zhadov, who also participated in the counterattack, was also in a difficult situation.

Therefore, to hold the flanks of the 69th Army, which was defending south of Prokhorovka, Rotmistrov's guardsmen were not able to, although they fought heroically. Therefore, on the night of July 15, the SS corps and the 3rd Panzer Corps moving from the south of Belgorod managed to surround the entire 48th Rifle Corps of the 69th Army, consisting of four rifle divisions, in the Donets interfluve. At dawn, these forces nevertheless left the encirclement, but with heavy losses. These events ended the Battle of Prokhorov.

How important was the Battle of Prokhorov for the Red Army for the victory at Kursk?

On July 12, 1943, during the battle, a frontal counterattack was carried out, the main content of which was the battle between the SS corps and the 5th Guards Tank Army west of Prokhorovka. The goal - the defeat of the SS corps - was not achieved, because in those conditions it was impossible to do this. The enemy kept a powerful grouping of Soviet troops and inflicted great damage on it. Soviet propaganda distorted its essence, inflated it to "the greatest tank battle of all time." He was not like that.

Nevertheless, the result of a tank battle is precisely a victory, and far from being a "combat draw", as, for example, the German military historian Colonel Karl Frieser believes. Undoubtedly, the battle for Prokhorovka is the culminating moment of the Kursk defensive operation, after which the tension of the battles in the south of the Kursk salient subsided sharply. But once again I want to emphasize that in many publications a common logical error is made: after this, then because of this! One should not put an equal sign between the events called the Prokhorov battle and the tank battle near Prokhorovka on July 12, 1943. Tank combat is only a part, albeit an important one, of this battle.

The Soviet troops in the battle for Prokhorovka, of course, solved their task, preventing the last line of defense from breaking through and inflicting serious losses on the enemy.

About the interlocutor: Zamulin Valery Nikolaevich - military historian, candidate of sciences. In 2009 he defended his dissertation on the problems of the history of the Kursk defensive operation of the Voronezh Front on July 5-23, 1943. From March 1996 to August 2009, he worked first as a director, and then as a deputy director for scientific work of the federal state cultural institution “State Military Historical Museum-Reserve “Prokhorovskoe Pole””. Author of more than 60 scientific publications, including five monographs in Russian and English. With his participation, a number of documentaries and television programs were prepared on Russian federal channels, as well as several radio programs on the history of the Battle of Kursk.

Battle of Prokhorovka

On July 12, 1943, the largest tank battle of World War II took place.

Battle of Prokhorovka became the culmination of a grandiose strategic operation that went down in history, as which was decisive in ensuring a radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War.

The events of those days unfolded as follows. The Nazi command planned to carry out a major offensive in the summer of 1943, seize the strategic initiative and turn the tide of the war in their favor. For this, a military operation was developed and approved in April 1943, codenamed "Citadel".
Having information about the preparation of the Nazi troops for the offensive, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to temporarily go over to the defensive on the Kursk salient and bleed the enemy strike groups during a defensive battle. Thereby it was planned to create favorable conditions for the transition of Soviet troops to a counteroffensive, and then to a general strategic offensive.
July 12, 1943 near the railway station Prokhorovka(56 km north of Belgorod), the advancing German tank grouping (4th Tank Army, Task Force Kempf) was stopped by a counterattack by Soviet troops (5th Guards Army, 5th Guards). Initially, the main attack of the Germans on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge was directed to the west - along the operational line Yakovlevo - Oboyan. On July 5, in accordance with the offensive plan, German troops as part of the 4th Panzer Army (48th Panzer Corps and 2nd SS Panzer Corps) and the Kempf Army Group went on the offensive against the troops of the Voronezh Front, on the positions of 6- 1st and 7th Guards Armies on the first day of the operation, the Germans sent five infantry, eight tank and one motorized divisions. On July 6, two counterattacks were delivered against the advancing Germans from the side of the Kursk-Belgorod railway by the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and from the Luchki (northern) area - Kalinin by the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Corps. Both counterattacks were repulsed by the forces of the German 2nd SS Panzer Corps.
To assist Katukov's 1st Panzer Army, which was fighting heavy battles in the Oboyan direction, the Soviet command prepared a second counterattack. At 11 pm on July 7, Front Commander Nikolai Vatutin signed Directive No. 0014/op on readiness to move on to active operations from 10:30 am on the 8th. However, the counterattack inflicted by the forces of the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps, as well as the 2nd and 10th Tank Corps, although it eased the pressure on the brigades of the 1st TA, did not bring tangible results.
Having not achieved decisive success - by this moment the depth of advance of the advancing troops in the well-prepared Soviet defense in the Oboyansky direction was only about 35 kilometers - the German command, in accordance with its plans, shifted the tip of the main attack in the direction of Prokhorovka with the intention of reaching Kursk through the bend of the Psyol River . The change in the direction of the strike was due to the fact that, according to the plans of the German command, it was in the bend of the Psel River that it seemed most appropriate to meet the inevitable counterattack of the outnumbered Soviet tank reserves. In the event that the village of Prokhorovka was not occupied by the German troops before the approach of the Soviet tank reserves, it was supposed to suspend the offensive altogether and temporarily go on the defensive in order to use the favorable terrain for themselves, preventing the Soviet tank reserves from escaping from the narrow defile formed by the swampy floodplain the Psel River and the railway embankment, and prevent them from realizing their numerical advantages by covering the flanks of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps.

Destroyed German tank

By July 11, the Germans took up their starting positions to capture Prokhorovka. Probably having intelligence about the presence of Soviet tank reserves, the German command took action to repel the inevitable counterattack of the Soviet troops. The 1st division of the Leibstandarte-SS "Adolf Hitler", equipped better than other divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, took a defile and on July 11 did not attack in the direction of Prokhorovka, pulling up anti-tank weapons and preparing defensive positions. On the contrary, the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" and the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" providing its flanks fought active offensive battles outside the defile on July 11, trying to improve their position (in particular, the 3rd Panzer Division covering the left flank SS "Totenkopf" expanded the bridgehead on the northern bank of the Psyol River, managing to transport a tank regiment to it on the night of July 12, providing flanking fire on the expected Soviet tank reserves in the event of their attack through the defile). By this time, the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army had concentrated in positions northeast of the station, which, being in reserve, on July 6 received an order to make a 300-kilometer march and take up defenses at the Prokhorovka-Vesely line. The area of ​​concentration of the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Combined Arms Armies was chosen by the command of the Voronezh Front, taking into account the threat of a breakthrough by the 2nd SS Panzer Corps of the Soviet defense in the Prokhorovka direction. On the other hand, the choice of the specified area for the concentration of two guard armies in the Prokhorovka area, in the event of their participation in a counterattack, inevitably led to a head-on collision with the most powerful enemy grouping (2nd SS Panzer Corps), and given the nature of the defile, it excluded the possibility of covering the flanks of the defending in this direction of the 1st division of the Leibstandarte-SS "Adolf Hitler". The frontal counterattack on July 12 was planned to be carried out by the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army, the 5th Guards Army, as well as the 1st Tank, 6th and 7th Guards Armies. However, in reality, only the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Combined Arms, as well as two separate tank corps (2nd and 2nd Guards), were able to go on the attack, the rest fought defensive battles against the advancing German units. Against the front of the Soviet offensive were the 1st Leibstandarte-SS division "Adolf Hitler", the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" and the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf".

Destroyed German tank

The first clash in the Prokhorovka area took place on the evening of 11 July. According to the memoirs of Pavel Rotmistrov, at 5 pm, together with Marshal Vasilevsky, during reconnaissance, he discovered a column of enemy tanks that were moving towards the station. The attack was stopped by the forces of two tank brigades.
At 8 am, the Soviet side carried out artillery preparation and at 8:15 went on the offensive. The first attacking echelon consisted of four tank corps: 18th, 29th, 2nd and 2nd Guards. The second echelon was the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps.

At the beginning of the battle, Soviet tankers got some advantage: the rising sun blinded the Germans advancing from the west. The high density of the battle, during which the tanks fought at short distances, deprived the Germans of the advantage of more powerful and long-range guns. Soviet tankers got the opportunity to accurately hit the most vulnerable places of heavily armored German vehicles.
South of the main battle, the German tank group "Kempf" was advancing, which sought to enter the advancing Soviet grouping on the left flank. The threat of coverage forced the Soviet command to divert part of its reserves to this direction.
At about 13:00, the Germans withdrew the 11th Panzer Division from the reserve, which, together with the Totenkopf Division, attacked the Soviet right flank, on which the forces of the 5th Guards Army were located. Two brigades of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps were sent to help them, and the attack was repulsed.
By 2 p.m., the Soviet tank armies began to push the enemy to the west. By evening, Soviet tankers were able to advance 10-12 kilometers, thus leaving the battlefield in their rear. The battle was won.

The coldest day in the history of meteorological observations July, 12 was in 1887 year, when the average daily temperature in Moscow was +4.7 degrees Celsius, and the warmest - in 1903 year. That day the temperature rose to +34.5 degrees.

See also:

Battle on the Ice
battle of Borodino
German attack on the USSR