From Molkino to Palmyra: how Russian mercenaries are trained How “polite people” appeared in the Russian army 10 special forces brigade old Crimea

On October 24, Russia celebrates the day of special forces units - units known as special forces. This word is included in foreign languages, has become a symbol of extremely effective, secretive and highly skillful military power. How did the creation of special forces begin and what are the most important tasks these units solve today?

For 12 years now, Special Forces Day has been an official holiday. Now the country is openly honoring those who used to remain in the shadows. After all, even the name "special forces" was secret. Our "sworn friends" did not even guess about the presence of these units in the Armed Forces of the USSR.

Fight against nuclear danger

After the end of World War II, all reconnaissance and sabotage units were disbanded in the armies and navies of all countries. anti-Hitler coalition. But by the end of the 1940s, relations between the recent allied countries cooled noticeably. Showing the world nuclear bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Americans made it clear that the era of nuclear dictatorship was beginning - and the US would be the dictator. To implement these plans, the Americans developed programs for the use of tactical nuclear weapons. And if stationary launchers (PU) could be detected and delivered a preemptive strike on them, then mobile launchers posed a particular danger, as they could change the place of the starting positions. Something had to be done to counter this.

Therefore, by directive of the Minister of War of the USSR of October 24, 1950, 46 separate special-purpose companies were created with combined arms and mechanized armies, in the airborne army, as well as in military districts that did not have armies. The general management of the formation and preparation of companies was entrusted to the 2nd Main Directorate of the General Staff.

One of the main tasks of the new units was the reconnaissance and destruction of operational-tactical means of nuclear attack. In addition, special forces were assigned the task of conducting special reconnaissance of enemy troop concentration areas, his headquarters, communication centers and control centers in the interests of the front headquarters. Also, the special forces were supposed to be engaged in the preparation of the reserve for the formation of reconnaissance and sabotage formations and the deployment of partisan operations behind enemy lines in the event of his invasion of the territory of the USSR.

The commanders of special purpose companies were recent participants in the war - carriers of unique combat experience. The leadership of the special forces included legendary scouts and commanders of partisan formations.

Marshal Zhukov's contribution

In 1953, a significant part of the special forces companies was reduced, leaving only 12.

The staff structure of a separate company did not allow organizing full-fledged combat training, as well as training the necessary reserve, due to the fact that the personnel were also assigned the tasks of carrying out internal and guard duty and performing household work. In this regard, the head of operational intelligence, Major General Sherstnev N.V., turned to the Minister of Defense G.K. Zhukov with a proposal to form three battalions on the regular strength of the remaining companies. Understanding the importance of special intelligence, Georgy Konstantinovich decided to form not three, but five separate battalions, at the same time he decided to leave three separate companies. Realizing that war veterans were gradually leaving the troops, and special forces required special training, Zhukov also decided to create a second airborne school in Tambov, where special forces officers were to be trained.

However, it ended up costing him the job. The party leadership was frightened by the initiative of the strong-willed marshal, and he was accused of preparing units for organizing a military coup in the country and seizing power.

Fortunately, battalions were nevertheless formed in the Northern Group of Forces, Group Soviet troops in Germany, as well as in the Carpathian, Transcaucasian and Turkestan districts of the first strategic echelon. These organizational and staff measures made it possible to improve the quality of combat training and strengthen the capabilities of special intelligence.

In connection with the aggravation of the international situation in the early 1960s, veterans of partisan actions turned to the Central Committee of the CPSU with a letter in which they proposed to form full-time units, on the basis of which, during the war years, partisan formations could be quickly formed for operations behind enemy lines. As a result, the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU No. 338 "On the training of personnel and the development of special equipment for organizing and equipping partisan detachments". The Ministry of Defense, in pursuance of this decree, conducted exercises, during which in each district, brigades of 1,700 people were formed from the reserve servicemen, who for a month mastered the secrets of reconnaissance and sabotage activities behind enemy lines under the guidance of experienced saboteurs who went through the war. The results of the exercises were considered positive, and on July 19, 1962, General Staff Directive No. 140547 was issued, which ordered the commanders of the troops of the respective districts to form separate special-purpose brigades (obrSpN). In addition, in accordance with the directive of the General Staff, by October 1, 1961, eight more separate special-purpose companies were formed.

Unique technique

In the early 1960s, the formation of special intelligence as a type of operational intelligence began. The reconnaissance and sabotage departments and the intelligence and sabotage direction of the 5th Directorate of the GRU, which led the formations and military units for special purposes, received the name of the departments and directions of special intelligence. With the adoption in 1968 of the Manual on Operational Intelligence, special intelligence was officially separated into an independent type of intelligence, including command and control agencies and forces and means: brigades, reconnaissance points, special-purpose companies. Thus, in 1968, the organizational design of the special forces as an integral part of military intelligence was completed.

From the moment of their formation, all special forces units were armed with special equipment and funds at the expense of the GRU General Staff of the USSR. That is, the special forces were armed with small-sized short-wave radio stations, which made it possible to communicate with the group operating behind enemy lines with the center at a distance of several thousand kilometers, VHF radio stations for communication within the group, which ensured stable control of the group's organs at a distance of up to 10 kilometers with a whip antenna Kulikov, and with a traveling wave antenna - at a distance of up to 25 kilometers, silent weapons and small-sized mine-explosive means of increased power, which no other branch of the military had Soviet army. For communication, special-purpose ciphers were used. All this was classified as "top secret". Special-purpose guided parachutes (PSN-66, PSN-71) were used to deliver groups behind enemy lines and quickly assemble at the landing site.

For the supply of special-purpose units, special rations "Etalon No. 5" were received. They were small in size and weight with a high calorie content. This made it possible to reduce the total weight of the cargo that each scout carried. But, nevertheless, on average, the weight of the reconnaissance combat calculation was about 30–35 kilograms.

The emergence of new and unique equipment and weapons in spetsnaz required special knowledge from spetsnaz commanders. The tactics of the special intelligence agencies also differed greatly from the combined arms. All this required the creation educational institution, which would train the commanders of special forces groups.

In 1968, at the Ryazan Airborne Command School. Lenin Komsomol began the formation of the 9th company of cadets, who were trained according to a separate program. This has seriously improved the quality of training of Special Forces units. The Main Intelligence Directorate oversaw the process of training cadets, and the final exams were taken by a commission that came from the GRU.

Legendary operation in Afghanistan

As for the combat use of special forces, it was very limited. So, during the Czechoslovak events in 1968, three special forces operated from eight special forces, which carried out the arrest of the rebellious government of Dubcek, and also solved other special tasks.

Afghanistan became a serious baptism of fire for special forces, where the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, under the leadership of Nur Mohammad Taraki, carried out the April Revolution and seized power in the country. Initially, the course of the new government of Afghanistan was pro-Soviet. At the same time, intra-party disagreements and a power struggle led to Taraki being killed, and his closest associate, Hafizula Amin, seized power. He hid from the Soviet leadership the fact of the elimination of Taraki and constantly turned to the Soviet government with a request to send troops to support the power of his regime. In extreme cases, he asked to send a battalion of paratroopers to strengthen personal protection.

In this regard, on May 2, 1979, the head of the GRU of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Army General Ivashutin P.I. personnel of three Central Asian nationalities: Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmens. That is why the battalion received the unofficial name "Muslim battalion", or shortly - "Musbat". The difference between the battalion and all special forces units was that it was armed with Combat vehicles: BMP-1, BMD-1, etc. The staff was more like a motorized rifle battalion. Therefore, it was completed by recruiting military personnel from the tank and motorized rifle units of the TurkVO and SAVO. But not only the composition of the unit, its equipment and weapons were unique, the combat training program was also unique. The battalion mainly practiced assault actions.

In mid-December, the battalion was airlifted to Bagram and subsequently arrived on its own in Kabul, where it was placed at the disposal of Major Javdat, the commander of the security brigade of the Taj Beck Palace, Amin's residence. The palace itself was guarded by a bodyguard company, staffed by Amin's relatives. Around the palace were units of the brigade, numbering about 3,000 people. "Musbat" took up security positions between the brigade units and the security company, the so-called. second ring of protection. Together with the detachment, V. V. Kolesnik arrived, as well as Yu. I. Drozdov and the Grom and Zenit special forces groups of the KGB. At a certain time, Colonel Kolesnik was given the task of developing an assault on the palace and the elimination of Amin. A detailed plan was developed and approved by the NGSH Marshal Ogarkov. On December 27, 1979, the battalion brilliantly fulfilled the plan of V. V. Kolesnik. The operation took less than 50 minutes. From the detachment and from the special forces of the KGB, five people died during the assault. The security brigade was neutralized, and the security company, having suffered heavy losses, surrendered after the death of Amin. This operation is the standard and the subject of study of special forces around the world.

Having successfully completed the task, the Musbat returned to the Union and became part of the 15th brigade. This is how it started afghan epic special forces. On the initial stage the 459th oorSpN operated in Afghanistan, the so-called. Kabul company. Its actions were recognized as effective, after which two detachments were first introduced into Afghanistan, in 1984 - two more, and in 1985 - three detachments and headquarters of the 15th and 22nd Special Forces. The eighth detachment was already formed in Afghanistan.

The special forces blocked the caravan routes and intercepted the supply of weapons, ammunition and other logistical supplies that came from the territory of Pakistan and Iran. Special Forces smashed Mujahideen caravans from ambushes, destroyed bases and base areas. Conducting air patrols during the day, special forces groups prevented the movement of units and vehicles of the Mujahideen. It was the GRU special forces who captured the first sample of the latest Stinger MANPADS, which the Americans supplied to the Mujahideen.

And today in Syria

The coming to power of M. S. Gorbachev reduced the intensity of hostilities, which ultimately led to the withdrawal of troops in February 1989. But processes began in the Union that led to the collapse of the USSR. Gorbachev's actions plunged the country into a series of interethnic conflicts - from Central Asia and Transcaucasia in 1989 to Chechnya and the North Caucasus as a whole to the present. In the period 1999–2001 special forces units operated in Yugoslavia.

The role of special forces in all these conflicts was not limited to banal participation. Everywhere, special forces units solved the most complex and responsible tasks. For example, it was the special forces in Tajikistan that stood at the origins of the formation of the Popular Front of Tajikistan and organized its opposition to Islamist gangs. Thanks to the actions of the special forces, it was stopped Civil War in Tajikistan, and the candidacy of President Emomali Rahmon was coordinated with special forces officers. In the North Caucasus, special forces captured and eliminated the most odious field commanders: Salman Raduev, Shirvani Basaev, Ruslan Gelaev and many others. It was the special forces, operating in small groups in the mountains of Chechnya and Dagestan, that found and destroyed the disguised field bases of the bandits.

2014 demanded special skills from the special forces. It was the forces of "polite people" from the GRU special forces (and without the use of weapons) that ensured the free expression of the will of the people of Crimea and the entry of the Republic of Crimea into Russian Federation.

Currently, special forces units are successfully fulfilling the tasks of combating international terrorism on the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic. And here the special forces solve the most complex and risky tasks. Successful airborne strikes against terrorist targets would not have been possible if the special forces had not identified these targets and directed aircraft at these targets.

On the pages of this blog, the reasons for conferring the title of Hero of Russia to Sergei Shevelev have already been discussed (,). Now the turn has come to understand the reasons for awarding the Order of Zhukov to the 10th Special Forces Brigade.

D. Medvedev's awarding the 10th separate brigade of the GRU Special Forces of the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense with the Order of Zhukov "for participation in the operation to force Georgia to peace in 2008" is, frankly, an unusual event.

Judge for yourself.

Scout Sniper Alexey Batuev ended up in South Ossetia at the beginning of May 2008.:
Approximately the same thing about the evacuation from the South Ossetian capital is told by reconnaissance sniper Alexei Batuev from the Krasnodar part of the special forces , seconded to the peacekeeping contingent three months ago:

The official brief historical note of the unit, seen by participants in press tours to the 10th brigade, reports that the commandos were already there April 2008.:
The units of the compound performed special tasks on the territory:
...
Republic of North Ossetia KP - Tskhinvali
Task Force from OO SpN from April 30, 2008 to August 28, 2008
http://twower.livejournal.com/870155.html

Raushan Abdullin, reconnaissance sapper of the 107th Special Forces detachment, ended up in South Ossetia in 2007.:
«... in 2007, he remained to serve under a contract as part of the Russian peacekeeping forces in South Ossetia»:
http://warheroes.ru/hero/hero.asp?Hero_id=12094

Paratrooper (special forces) Sergei Aboimov, ended up in the future theater of operations back at the end of 2006:
...remembers... paratrooper Sergey ABOIMOV , Served in the peacekeeping troops in Tskhinvali for a year and eight months .
http://www.kp.md/daily/24143.5/361507/

This time series, gradually receding into history, can be continued further. So now we can move on to its origin, which quite frankly reveals the answer to the key question, when it all began:
«... situation on beginning of XXI century dictated the need to strengthen the Russian-Georgian border in the area from the Krasnodar Territory to Dagestan. It was decided that it was necessary to form a separate special-purpose brigade here, the fighters of which could work effectively in the problem area. On October 10, 2002, the President of the Russian Federation signed an order to recreate the 10th ObrSpN GRU. The corresponding directive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation is dated November 30 - the settlement of Molkino in the North Caucasian Military District was chosen as the place of deployment of the 10th Brigade.
Military unit 51532 began to form in Molkino in January 2003, but by May 1, the new part of the GRU special forces was already functioning. The main tasks of the 10th Brig. Detachments of the 10th Special Forces Brigade were in ... Abkhazia, South Ossetia - hotbeds of tension here are a permanent phenomenon, the fighters of the 10th Special Forces GRU from Molkino from the very beginning and to this day are in constant combat readiness ...
We all still have fresh memories of the conflict in South Ossetia in 2008 - it was the 10th separate special forces brigade that took the main blow here. As mentioned above, 10 ObrSpN in Molkino was formed specifically to protect the southern borders of Russia. As part of the tasks assigned to a separate special-purpose brigade in the territory of South Ossetia, before the start of hostilities, there was a peacekeeping contingent from the 107th special forces brigade of the 10th special forces brigade - it was this GRU Special Forces unit that was the first to engage in battles with the Georgian Armed Forces ».
http://voenpro.ru/infolenta/flag-10-brigady

Military unit 51532 was formed on the basis of Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of October 10, 2002 No. 1334 p. Directives of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation D - 063 of November 30, 2002. The formation of the formation began in January 2003 ... Military unit 51532 was formed on May 1, 2003 with the task of covering the state border in the south of the Russian Federation ...

So - long before the night of August 7-8, 2008, when Georgian troops launched an operation to save the inhabitants of the Liakhvi Gorge from the destruction promised to them by Kokoit's thugsaccording to the Abkhaz scenario, long before the “growth of the defense budget of Georgia by 33 times”, long before the appearance of the modern Georgian army, long before the arrest of Russian spies in Georgia in the autumn of 2006, long before the overthrow of Aslan Abashidze in Batumi and the subsequent integration of Adjara into Georgia in May 2004 ., long before Mikhail Saakashvili's first visit to Moscow in February 2004, full of then illusory hopes for successful cooperation with Putin, long before Saakashvili's victory in the presidential elections in January 2004, long before the Rose Revolution in November 2003 - long before all this (including more than a year before the Rose Revolution), V. Putin signed a simple order to createa separate special forces brigade, whose fighters could work effectively on a problematic area - the Russian-Georgian border, which, as it turned out, turned out to be the internal territory of Georgia. Apparently, it is in this place that it should be emphasized that according to the decisions of the JCC in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, only motorized riflemen were allowed to be deployed as peacekeepers, the deployment of special military units - special forces and paratroopers- was strictly prohibited.

How many special forces and other Russian military were deployed on the territory of Georgia before the start of full-scale hostilities?
The deployment of special forces was not the only violation by the Russian side of the Dagomys agreements and decisions of the JCC. According to the decision of the JCC of June 4, 1992, the size of the peacekeeping battalions on each of the three sides was limited to 500 military personnel (plus a possible additional increase in contingents by another 300 people in case of mutual agreement of all parties). Any increase in forces in the conflict zone required, of course, the consent of all three parties to the Dagomys agreement (Russia, Georgia, North Ossetia). Georgia has never given its permission to increase the size of the peacekeeping contingents.

However, only the so-called. The "peacekeeping battalion" under the command of K. Timerman from 135 SMEs consisted of at least 526 people:

The exact strength of the 107th detachment of the 10th Special Forces Brigade is unknown. The possible size of such a detachment can be judged by the size of the special forces detachments of the Soviet army that operated during the war in Afghanistan - from 520 to 583 people:
http://desantura.ru/forum/forum6/topic2990/
http://wiki.bratishka.ru/index.php/%D0%93%D0%A0%D0%A3

In addition to the 107th detachment, other85th and 104th Special Forces Detachments 10th Special Forces Brigade.

In addition, units of the 2nd and 22nd special forces brigades were also introduced into the territory of Georgia:
In August 2008, the reconnaissance groups of the 2nd, 10th and 22nd special forces brigades took part in the "five-day war" of 2008 in South Ossetia:
http://milkavkaz.net/?q=node/71

In addition, the Yamadayev company "Vostok" (approximately 200 people) was also deployed in the conflict zone.

In addition, during the maneuvers "Kavkaz-2008" they crossed the internationally recognized (including Russia) state Russian-Georgian border, entered the territory of Georgia and there and remained at the bases in Java, Urgadant, Elbakiat, waiting for a signal to attack battalion-tactical groups of the 135th and 693rd motorized rifle regiments (under the command of colonels G. Gostev and A. Kazachenko) - each numbering more than 700 people:

All this, of course, took place in violation of the UN Charter, the Dagomys agreements, and the decisions of the JCC.
And all this, according to international law, of course, was clearly identifiable signs of Russian aggression against Georgia.
And all this information, of course, was known to Ms. J. Tagliavini and her German deputies in the EU Commission during the preparation of her infamous report.
And all this information by Ms. Tagliavini and her German deputies, of course, was completely ignored.

Who were the special forces subordinate to?
Despite the fact that the Verkhny Gorodok was the direct location of the 107th special forces detachment, the commandos did not obey the commander of the peacekeeping battalion, Lieutenant Colonel K. Timerman.

Here is how Timerman describes the units subordinate to him, thrown by him in a suicidal attack on Georgian tanks in Zemo Nikozi:
[in] the base camp of the peacekeepers ... there were only about 220 troops. Combat units - four platoons: two motorized rifle, one reconnaissance and one grenade launcher. The rest - providing (out of 526 regular servicemen of the battalion, about 250 were at posts and outposts). Four platoons, 100 men, held the line...
http://old.redstar.ru/2008/08/19_08/3_01.html

As you can see, there are no special forces among the units subordinate to Timerman. How the special forces used their weapons, against whom - this is a separate conversation (see below). Moreover, the servicemen of the 107th detachment, stationed at the same base as the "ordinary peacekeepers", not only did not obey Timerman, but, it seems, were not even familiar with him.

This is how he told about the meeting with Timerman in the middle of the day on August 8 deputy group leader107th Special Forces Detachmentensign Andrei Danilyuk:
Then a colonel came up to me, I do not know his last name, and ordered to collect all the wounded in one place. He explained that the observers of the OSCE mission had arrived. They agreed with the Georgians that they would provide us with a corridor to leave the city. We loaded into the armored "Ural" first the seriously wounded, then the civilians, then the lightly wounded and the survivors boarded. And on command they left the town .
http://www.stihi.ru/2009/03/10/6019

The “colonel” who approached (!) the Spetsnaz ensign (!) was, obviously, Lieutenant Colonel K. Timerman, whom A. Danilyuk did not seem to know by sight until that moment. In addition, in subsequent reprints of this text by journalist A. Kovylkov, the remark about Danilyuk's unfamiliarity with Timerman was prudently removed.

The commandos did not obey only Timerman?
There is no evidence that the so-called. “peacekeeping special forces” or “special forces peacekeepers” (“attached to the peacekeeping battalion”) were also subordinate to the Commander of the peacekeeping forces, Major General M. Kulakhmetov. Moreover, they did not even obey the commander of the main invasion army - the commander of the 58th Army, Lieutenant General A. Khrulev, who also was not aware of what the special forces were doing in the zone of operations of his army:

V.Sh. It is known that around this time the 10th brigade of the GRU special forces was actively operating here. Have you had contact with them? ?
OH. Yes, the interaction was organized, but they acted according to their tasks, set by the senior military commander.
V.Sh. There is a report that they gave target designations to your army's artillery. .
OH. Perhaps they gave them when they contacted the combat control group at the CBU. The fact is that special forces groups act on the orders of a senior military commander. They have their own specific tasks. If they have a need, they interact with us through the command center...
http://www.regnum.ru/news/1525951.html

Thus, Khrulev confirmed what, in principle, all the military already know - the special forces groups were and are subordinate to the "senior military commander" - directly to the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, bypassing, therefore, the regimental, and divisional, and army, and district levels management. In other words, the tasks of the special forces detachments were set by the General Staff directly, reports from them were received by him.

Perhaps it was permissible for Timerman, Kulakhmetov, Khrulev not to know what the special forces were doing on the territory of Georgia. But we are not generals, we, Russian citizens who want to understand why they kill and why Russian soldiers and officers are then awarded, need to know this.

What did the 10th brigade do in Georgia?
Since the units of the brigade were on the territory of Georgia for a long time (several years), they apparently managed to do a lot.Of course, you can’t tell about everything, but with a careful acquaintance with the materials milestones are still drawn.

1. "Third Force".
In 2008-09 the author of these lines spent a lot of time in the Tbilisi region of Krtsanisi, in a small mansion, which then housed the headquarters of OSCE observer officers in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. Among the various topics that we had time to discuss before the mission was closed under unprecedented pressure from Russia, the main one, of course, was the situation in the zone prior to August 7th. For a long time, the mission officers did not go into a serious conversation too much. As they later admitted, they did not want to be frank with the Russian.

But at some point, they still started talking. The main observation they made in July 2008, which they eventually shared with me, was that a "third force" had emerged in the region.
- What is a "third force"? I wondered.
“Here’s the thing,” they explained to me. - Skirmishes between the parties to the conflict - South Ossetians and Georgians - were, if not regular, but quite familiar. After each such shelling, OSCE officers went to the scene, examined it, identified the perpetrators, drew up a protocol, sent copies of it to the parties to the conflict, to the JCC, Kulakhmetov, to their headquarters in Vienna. Everything was clear enough - yesterday the Ossetians fired, today - the Georgians. Or vice versa. After the shelling, the identification of the perpetrators and the corresponding representations, the situation stabilized for some time. Until the next outbreak.

However, in the summer of 2008 the situation changed radically. First, the shelling has become much bolder and more professional. Secondly, professionally prepared car bombings began to take place on the roads. Thirdly, it became unclear who carried out the explosions and shelling. One day Georgians will be fired on, Georgians will immediately protest: “Again, these Ossetians have committed a violation!” OSCE officers go to the place, examine the evidence and circumstances, try to identify the culprits and are forced to come to the conclusion that the Ossetians could not fire at the Georgians at such and such a time in such and such a place.

On another day, the South Ossetians will be shelled, they have no limit to their indignation: “Again, these Georgians do not give life!” OSCE observers go to the place, examine it, try to determine the culprit and are forced to come to the conclusion that the Georgians could not have fired at the Ossetians at that time and in this place. After this kind of shelling was repeated several times, the OSCE observer mission came to the conclusion that some new - "third" - force appeared in the region, not Georgians and not Ossetians.

And who? - I asked almost automatically, at the same time catching myself thinking that I didn’t expect at all that I would be forced to listen now from the lips of foreign military men to some regular tales about black forces, evil spirits, elusive Joes and other nonsense that is usually told on dark evenings by seasoned citizens in some drunkenness.

The OSCE staff were silent for a long time, obviously considering whether I should speak or not. Then, finally, they decided. And, gloomily looking at me point-blank, they said:
- Russians.
- Russians? - I was surprised to only repeat the same word with an interrogative intonation. - What Russians?
The OSCE staff were silent for a while. And then even more gloomily they said:
- Saboteurs. Professional saboteurs.
- Are you sure? was all I could ask.
They looked at me longingly, filled with undisguised pity for my civil naivety, and just shook their heads.

2. "C soldiers and officers of the GRU ObrSpN are required to be able to conduct inversion and subversion”.
Among the educational courses for the special forces of the 10th brigade, a special place is occupied by preparation for sabotage and subversive acts:
The mandatory training program for military personnel of the 10th Special Forces Brigade includes sapper business. On the territory of military unit 51532 in Molkino, a training ground has been equipped where special forces of the 10th ObrSpN hone their mining skills, of course, having previously mastered the theory in the classroom ... There are many myths and legends about the training of military intelligence special forces soldiers - of course, a lot of fiction, but the fact remains: in accordance with the charter, the soldiers and officers of the ObrSpN GRU are required to be able to conduct sabotage and subversive activities (for example, derail trains alone or mine large industrial facilities.)

In some new light, I recalled the story of the mother of R. Abdullin, who posthumously became the Hero of Russia:
« I called him on August 6 in the evening, and the tank was roaring on the phone. "Where did you go?" - I ask. "Mom, call me back later, okay?" And the phone turned off.
Gulfruz Sergeevna sat and looked at the wall past me and Anna Viktorovna.
- And before that I called on the second of August. He asks, "What day is it today?" I say: "The second of August." - "No, what day is it today?" “Saturday,” I say. “Today is Airborne Forces Day, we have a holiday, they gave me an award.” And what reward, he did not say ».
http://www.kp.ru/daily/24145/362608/

What a rewardthe special forces paratrooper of the Airborne Forces R. Abdullin was awarded by his superiors August 2, 2008 , unknown. But the date of his award suggests what exactly he could receive his award for. The day before, on the morning of August 1, a car with Georgian policemen was blown up on the Eredvi-Kurta road, six were injured, five of them seriously:

6 employees of the special forces were wounded today on the bypass road connecting the Small and Big Liakhvi gorges in the Tskhinvali conflict zone as a result of an explosion. At about 09:40 in the morning, a pickup car, in which representatives of the Georgian special services were located, was blown up by a mine. 5 of them were badly wounded...
According to Emzar Beruashvili, chairman of the Maloye Liakhvi village assembly, the explosion took place approximately in the place where a terrorist attack on the head of the provisional administration of South Ossetia, Dmitry Sanakoev, was carried out a month ago. It is believed that an explosive device was used remote control, since the mines were placed at a distance of 10-15 meters from each other. The first explosion was soon followed by a second, control explosion.
The area where the incident took place borders on Ossetian-controlled separatist slopes, where illegal armed groups are constantly hiding.
http://www.apsny.ge/news/1217608406.php

The explosion of a Georgian police car in the early morning of August 1 launched a long-established operation. Believing that the terrorist act was committed by Ossetians, the Georgians in the evening of the same day carried out a retaliatory operation following the Israeli model (as in previous years), firing at the positions of the separatists, during which 6 employees of the South Ossetian security forces were killed. But instead of the usual calm in such cases, the escalation of violence only intensified. The separatists responded with massive fire, so that on the night of August 1-2, real battles unfolded in the conflict zone, the number of those killed on both sides went to dozens. Thus, by the morning of August 2, it became quite clear that the provocative terrorist attack on the road between Eredvi and Kurta not only led to the expected consequences, but also turned out to be extremely successful. About 50 journalists from Moscow were brought to Tskhinvali on August 1, ready to cover the pre-declared war. Now, on August 2, on the day of the Airborne Forces, the special forces paratrooper R. Abdullin could safely present the award he deserved.

3. "The main advantages of the mortar as a special forces weapon."
Does the reader remember what happened in the early morning of August 8 in the Upper Town, what the doctors attached to the peacekeepers told about? They reported in particular, that at first there was a mortar shelling of the Upper Town.

DZ: There was mortar shelling along the fence, and then it started with small arms. They started firing at the same time...
AK: At first, they fired at us from small arms, but it was more frightening, most likely. It started somewhere around 5:50...
Thus, at about 5.50 am, “along the fence” surrounding the location of the peacekeeping battalion in the Upper Town, mortar shelling began, and then shelling from small arms. It has already been noted above that during the shelling of Tskhinvali on the night of August 7-8, the Georgian units did not use mortars, and on August 8 there were no Georgian infantry in the Upper Town area ...
If on August 8 there were no Georgian infantry in the Upper Town area, if the Georgian units did not open mortar fire on Tskhinvali on the morning of August 8, then who exactly started firing at 5.50 in the morning on August 8:
- from mortars and small arms,
- and at first they "scared, most likely",
- “along the fence” of the Upper Town and along the location of the peacekeeping battalion in the Upper Town?
http://aillarionov.livejournal.com/563585.html

As you know, mortars are in service with special forces. Moreover, according to experts, mortars have serious advantages for special forces.

The same applies to firearms - on the balance sheet of 10 separate special forces brigade there are the latest models of foreign automatic weapons, sniper rifles, mortars, etc. .
http://voenpro.ru/voentorg/brelok-10obrspn

In the early 2000s, the 82-mm mortar 2 B14 (2 B14-1) "Tray" was adopted by individual detachments and special forces brigades. The main advantages of the 82-mm mortar as a special forces weapon are the high accuracy of fire and the power of ammunition, the possibility of covert fire, high rate of fire (10-25 rounds / min.) And the mobility of this artillery weapon system.
For firing from all domestic 82-mm mortars, fragmentation six-pronged (old models) and ten-pronged mines, as well as smoke and lighting mines, are used. To increase the firing range, additional powder charges(charge No. 1, 2, 3 and "long-range"). Mortar ammunition is carried by crew in special trays of 4 mines or in pack bags.

Silent mortar complex 2 B25
Currently, domestic designers are developing an 82-mm silent mortar system BSHMK 2 B25 and an 82-mm mortar with an increased firing range of up to 6000 m.
Designed for special forces in order to ensure stealth and surprise in combat use due to noiselessness, flamelessness and smokelessness when defeating enemy manpower in personal armor protection. The mass of the mortar is not more than 13 kg, the calculation is 2 people. The effectiveness of the fragmentation action of a mine is at the level of a standard 82-mm mine.
http://army-news.ru/2011/02/arsenal-specnaza/

The main advantages of the 82-mm mortar as a special forces weapon are not only its high firing accuracy, but also the possibility of covert firing, as well as the high mobility of this artillery weapon system.
http://www.fastmarksman.ru/1_pyt/2_specnaz_8.ph p

Of course, the fact of the presence of a particular weapon is not in itself a confirmation of its use. But then the testimonies of other Russian military men who happened to be in the same places a few days later come to the rescue.

Senior Lieutenant Artur Kurbanov recalls:
On August 11, our mortar battery took up a position south of Tskhinval. Having equipped the position, I went to reconnaissance with a group of officers. It was decided to inspect the nearby hills, to outline landmarks. Not far from the dirt road, we found the destroyed position of our mortar battery. It was evident that the mortar-throwers - peacekeepers were fired upon, the firing points of our "samovars" were suppressed by superior fire. The abomination of desolation reigned all around, but there were no corpses of our peacekeepers.
We found a completely complete compass - a device for correcting art fire PAB - 2. The device is completely intact and always necessary in the household. We took the compass for ourselves.
http://maxpark.com/user/1954118055/content/1809568

A. Kurbanov does not doubt for a second that the mortar battery belonged - in his opinion, it belonged to the Russian "peacekeepers". But in the language of military slang in South Ossetia, "peacekeepers" meant servicemen of only two units - the second battalion of the 135th infantry regiment and the 107th detachment of the 10th special forces brigade. At the same time, there is not a single evidence that Timerman's mortars left the territory of the Upper Town and generally opened fire. In addition, it would obviously be difficult for Timerman to order them, and for them to obey the order to open fire. - according to their own positions in the Upper Town, even "along its fence."

However, for the special forces, among whom the deputy commander of the group did not know the commander of his neighbors from the 135th regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Timerman, it was apparently much easier to do this.

4. "The best in the Union in terms of sniper training."
In the museum of the brigade, the foreman of the company of the 107th special forces detachment, Hero of Russia Mikhail Oganesyan spoke about the events of 2008. “On the seventh evening, the Georgians began shelling our positions from the Grad launchers and tanks. We tried to contact the Georgian formations, but they launched equipment without explanation,” he said. "Is there a fight going on. Then he called again at 5 am, and Vladimir Putin called at 7 am. Then it became clear that this was a real attack, and the president received an order to respond."
http://kommersant.ru/doc/1693648

The “foreman of the company”, acting as a guide for the presidential journalistic pool, is, of course, still those spetsnaz-disinformation jokes. Just like the foremen's "title of Hero". Here, as they say, one of them is sure to misinform: either the foreman and the "Hero of Russia", or sites telling about the 10th brigade, according to which there is only one Hero in it - R. Abdullin.

But the most remarkable, of course, is the following Freudian confession of the "foreman":
«... and at 7 am Vladimir Putin called. Then it became clear that this was a real attack, and the president received an order to respond.”

"Company foreman" and "Hero of Russia" Oganesyan this time seemed to tell the truth. It was completely impossible to understand what exactly was the “real attack” on the Upper Town, when exactly it happened, and who exactly attacked whom, while being in Tskhinvali at that time, as everyone understands, was completely impossible. This could be done only by being thousands of kilometers away, at the Olympics in the city of Beijing. Along the way, the "foreman" "laid the same" Vladimir Vladimirovich, revealing the main military secret Russian-Georgian war - from whom exactly did the order come to the snipers of the 107th detachment at 7 am on August 8 to "answer", i.e. shoot at senior lieutenants of the peacekeeping battalion Shevelev and Bobrov.

In 1987, the 10th Special Forces Brigade was recognized as the best in the Union in terms of sniper training, and in 1990, the team of the 10th Special Forces Brigade won the All-Union GRU Special Forces competitions. Today's 10 ObrSpN in Molkino is also famous for its snipers. Of course, the selection of 10 ObrSpN sniper groups is quite serious - here everyone is an experienced hunter or sportsman-shooter. But the ability to shoot a sniper of the Special Forces troops is not enough - the training of recruits provides for training in the art of disguise at the highest level. In addition, a military intelligence special forces sniper needs extreme restraint - sometimes it is necessary to spend a day or more in a practically motionless state. Firstly, for an unprepared person, this is the strongest stress, psychological stress at the limit of possibilities, and secondly, it is corny hard physically. But the second problem is easier to solve - in the arsenal of snipers of the ObrSpN GRU there are many specialized exercises that help activate blood flow in the body. The snipers of the 10th GRU special forces brigade are armed with not only standard SVD, but also the best foreign models - SSG-04, Truvelo.50BMG, etc.
http://voenpro.ru/infolenta/flag-10-brigady

Training of snipers in shooting from the Dragunov sniper rifle (SVD) in the 10th Special Forces Brigade, Molkino

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C2Ty2In0CB0&feature=player_embedded#t=1

Snipers use different rifles, including Truvelo .50BMG, Mannlicher SSG-04 .
http://twower.livejournal.com/870155.html

« Honorably fulfilled their duty» .
Despite the fact that by the morning of August 8, the commander of the "peacekeeping battalion" K. Timerman had repeatedly received from the commander of the "peacekeeping forces" General M. Kulakhmetov a completely unambiguous order "Shoot to kill!" The upper town had already been subjected to small arms and mortar fire from the "third force", but Timerman was still slow to open fire from his infantry fighting vehicles. Firstly, he perfectly understood that the opening of cannon fire by him meant a gross violation of his peacekeeping mandate. Secondly, in the face of vastly superior Georgian forces, this practically guaranteed suicide, if not to himself personally, then undoubtedly to many of his subordinates. Thirdly, Timerman still had no reason, or even a reason to open fire on the Georgians - despite the shelling of Zemo Nikozi from small arms from the Upper Town, the Georgians, who received orders from their command not to respond to the Russian peacekeeping contingent, followed it strictly and continued to remain silent, despite the intensifying provocations.

Timerman hesitated.

When, together with the commander of the reconnaissance platoon, Sergei Shevelev, he was returning from positions south of the Upper Town and was already approaching the command post set up by Timerman in the medical unit, a sniper bullet fired “under the cover of small arms fire from all sides” from above (from the roof of the barracks?), pierced Shevelev’s neck and exited in his back at the seventh vertebra. It was a classic black mark. Timerman did not need to explain its meaning. He had little choice - either a possible projectile from a Georgian tank, or a guaranteed bullet from a Russian sniper. Timerman chose the former.

It was then that the Thunder cannons, mounted on “peacekeeping” infantry fighting vehicles, advanced to open positions south of the Upper Town, began to work along Zemo-Nikozi. It was then that the Georgian tanks could not help but respond to cannon fire, for five minutes, as at a firing range, they burned infantry fighting vehicles that violated the Dagomys agreements along with their crews. It was then that the corpses of Russian peacekeepers, so demanded by Kulakhmetov and his superiors - military and political, were received. Now they could be presented to the Russian and world public, to shout to the whole planet about the treachery of the Georgian military and to justify the massive invasion of Russian troops into Georgia by the need to "protect the lives of Russian peacekeepers".

And three years later, Medvedev could have calmly arrived at the base of the 10th brigade in Molkino to award her a high state award for merits "in the development and conduct of major military operations", i.e. for "the ability to make the right adequate decisions in a very difficult situation, to selflessly carry out the tasks of the command in the shortest possible time."

10th Separate Special Forces Brigade GRU GSh (10 ObrSpN)
On the basis of the Directive of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, from September 22 to October 4, 1962, 10 special forces were formed, location: Stary Krym (village Pervomayskoye).
The work on the formation of the brigade was headed by Colonel M. Ya. Kochetkov, who later became the chief of staff.
According to the order of the USSR Ministry of Defense No. 005 of 04/23/63, the day of the unit was set on October 4, 1962.
April 24, 1964 the brigade was awarded the Battle Banner.
In 1967, by order of the commander of the OdVO troops, the 1st Special Forces detachment and the special radio communications detachment were awarded the honorary title of the 50th anniversary of October revolution.
From 1979 to 1987, the brigade was repeatedly awarded the Challenge Red Banner of the Military Council of the OdVO, was entered in the Book of Honor of the Military Council of the OdVO and was awarded with diplomas.

In 1985, when recruiting the 186th ooSpN, when entering the DRA, it was partially completed with the l / s of the 10th brig.

On October 11, 1991, the brigade became part of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. By the Directive of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine on 06/03/1998, 10 obrSpN was reorganized into 1 separate special-purpose regiment (1 opSN 32 AK) (since 09/01/2000, the 3rd separate regiment of Special Forces, military unit A-0680, deployed in Kirovograd).

Military unit 51532 was formed on the basis of Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of October 10, 2002 No. 1334 p. Directives of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation D - 063 of November 30, 2002
The formation of the connection began in January 2003. The beginning of the formation is considered to be the arrival in the settlement. Molkino military unit 46266 from the military unit 11659 (22nd brig.) North Caucasian Military District.

On August 8, 2011, Dmitry Medvedev presented the Order of Zhukov to the 10th Separate Special Forces Brigade of the Ministry of Defense. This state award is given for merit in the development and conduct of major military operations.
Combat losses...
2 Chechen:
1. Kalinin Alexander Sergeevich, born in 1983, Partizansk, Primorsky Territory, junior sergeant, reconnaissance officer of the 3rd company. Died at 5:45 am November 5, 2003 in the area locality Galashki in the Sunzhensky district during the detonation of an explosive device installed by Chechen fighters. Buried in Partizansk.
2. Shatalov Denis Valerievich, born in 1984, Severo-Evensk, Magadan Region, junior sergeant, squad leader. He died on July 4, 2003 from acute poisoning with an unspecified poison. He was buried in the "old" cemetery of Nakhodka.

South Ossetia:
1. Private contract-based officer Abdulin Rashufan Mulkhametovich. He died on 08.08.08 as part of a peacekeeping battalion. 107 spn.
2. Private contract-based soldier Soloviev Vasily Gennadievich. He died on 08.08.08 as part of a peacekeeping battalion. 107 spn.
3. Private contract-based soldier Schreider Alexander Vladimirovich. He died on 08.08.08 as part of a peacekeeping battalion. 107 spn. The 85th, 104th and 107th oSpN were attached to the means of strengthening the JPKF in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict in August 2008.

North Ossetia:
Komgaron: In September 2005. As a result of the clash, ml. contract sergeant Redko S.P. and 2 co-workers were seriously injured. During the entire trip, 23 people were injured, mostly explosions on IEDs

Reference information on special forces units of Russia, former USSR and peace

10 ObrSpN GRU GSH MO (V / h: 65564)

51532 - brigade department (Russia)

43078 - 4th ob (Krasnodar)

55005 - 107 spn

Compound:

USSR:

- 3 battalions of Special Forces:

- 325 ooSpN (3rd bn)

- communications battalion (4th bn)

Karagoz village (Pervomaisky village) (6 km from Stary Krym) - 1st b-n, 4th b-n connection, RMO, 7th mining company, autobahn, headquarters, VDS and everything else.

Feodosia-13 - 2nd and 3rd b-n (325 ooSpN)

- 85th ooSpN; transferred to a separate reconnaissance brigade

Story:

On the basis of the Directive of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, from September 22 to October 04, 1962, 10 special forces were formed, location: Stary Krym (village Pervomayskoye).

The work on the formation of the brigade was headed by Colonel M. Ya. Kochetkov, who later became the chief of staff. According to the order of the USSR Ministry of Defense No. 005 of 04/23/63, the day of the unit was set on October 04, 1962. April 24, 1964 the brigade was awarded the Battle Banner. In 1967, by order of the commander of the OdVO troops, the 1st Special Forces detachment and the special radio communications detachment were awarded the honorary title of the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution. From 1979 to 1987, the brigade was repeatedly awarded the Challenge Red Banner of the Military Council of the OdVO, was entered in the Book of Honor of the Military Council of the OdVO and was awarded with diplomas. In 1987, the special purpose group of the brigade was recognized as the best in the USSR Armed Forces in sniper shooting. At the competition between the special forces of the USSR Armed Forces on the basis of 5 Special Forces in 1990, a group of 10 Special Forces under the command of Sergei Vdovin took 1st place.

In 1985, when recruiting the 186th ooSpN, when entering the DRA, it was partially completed with the l / s of the 10th brig.

Ukraine:

On October 11, 1991, the brigade became part of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. By the directive of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine in June 1998, 10 Special Forces Regiment was reorganized into 1 separate special purpose regiment (since 09/01/2000, the 3rd separate Special Forces regiment, military unit A-0680).

Russia:

It was re-formed on May 1, 2003 in the North Caucasus Military District near Krasnodar in the area of ​​the village of Molkino on the funds of the 2nd and 16th Specialized Special Forces.

Military unit 51532 was formed on the basis of Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of October 10, 2002 No. 1334 p. Directives of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation D - 063 of November 30, 2002

The formation of the connection began in January 2003. The beginning of the formation is considered to be the arrival in the settlement. Molkino military unit 46266 from the military unit 11659 North Caucasus Military District.

The connection management was staffed from among the officers of the Far Eastern Military District and the North Caucasus Military District. The formation of the military unit 41726 came from the composition of the obrSpN LenVO and obrSpN MVO; military unit 41742 came from the composition of the obrSpN PUrVO; military unit 44183 came from the SibVO ObrSpN; military unit 55005 came from the composition of the military personnel who arrived from the units of the Far Eastern Military District and the North Caucasus Military District; a separate training battalion was formed from personnel who arrived for recruitment from the military commissariats of the North Caucasus Military District.

Military unit 51532 was formed on May 1, 2003 with the task of covering the state border in the south of the Russian Federation, searching for and destroying illegal armed formations.

The overwhelming majority of the personnel of the unit selflessly fulfill their military duty, risking their lives, ensuring the maintenance of constitutional order on the southern borders of our Fatherland.

Parts of the connection to perform the tasks assigned to them are equipped modern means weapons and equipment.

Constant and intensive combat training, a good training and material base at the point of permanent deployment make it possible to prepare a worthy replacement for servicemen who are retiring to the reserve.

According to the results of combat and reconnaissance activities, in terms of the quality of the fulfillment of the assigned tasks and the effectiveness of the management of intelligence agencies in 2004 among the units and subunits of the Special Forces performing combat missions on the territory of the Chechen Republic, they were evaluated by the Chief of the Main Directorate of the General Staff and the command of the Joint Group of Troops (Forces) in the North Caucasus for the better.

Awards for military personnel of the 10th ObrSpN:

Order of Lenin - 1

Order of the Battle Red Banner - 9

Order Patriotic War — 2

Order of the Red Star - 49

Order ‘For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces’ — 10

Order ‘Badge of Honor’ — 1

Order of the 'Star' DRA - 5

Order of ‘Glory’ DRA – 2

Order of the Red Banner DRA - 1

Medal ‘For Courage’ — 8

Medal ‘For Military Merit’ — 29

Medal 'For the victory over Germany' - 14

Medal ‘Victory over Japan’ — 2

Medal 'Warrior-Internationalist' - 38

Medal ‘For Impeccable Service’ — 2

Commanders:

1963-1965 - Colonel Popov A.M.

1965-1971 - Colonel Kochetkov N. Ya.

1971-1973 - Lieutenant Colonel Tyshkevich V.P.

1973-1978 - Lieutenant Colonel Eremenko N.I.

1978-1983 - Colonel Yu. T. Starov

1983-1988 - Colonel Ilyin A.S.

1988-1992 - Colonel Yu. M. Rendel

1992-1996 - Colonel Yakubets I.N.

1996-1997 - Colonel Dokuchaev S.P.

1997-2000 - Colonel Girbich V.F.

2000-2004 - Colonel Mezhuev G.E.

Losses

1. Kalinin Alexander Sergeevich, born in 1983, Partizansk, Primorsky Territory, junior sergeant, reconnaissance officer of the 3rd company. He died at 05:45 on November 5, 2003 near the settlement of Galashki in the Sunzhensky district when an explosive device was set up by Chechen fighters. Buried in Partizansk.

2. Shatalov Denis Valerievich, born in 1984, Severo-Evensk, Magadan Region, junior sergeant, squad leader. He died on July 4, 2003 from acute poisoning with an unspecified poison. He was buried in the "old" cemetery of Nakhodka.

South Ossetia:

1. Private contract-based officer Abdulin Rashufan Mulkhametovich. He died on 08.08.08 as part of a peacekeeping battalion. 107 spn.

2. Private contract-based soldier Soloviev Vasily Gennadievich. He died on 08.08.08 as part of a peacekeeping battalion. 107 spn.

3. Private contract-based soldier Schreider Alexander Vladimirovich. He died on 08.08.08 as part of a peacekeeping battalion. 107 spn.

The 85th, 104th and 107th oSpN were attached to the means of strengthening the JPKF in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict in August 2008.

North Ossetia:

Komgaron: In September 2005. As a result of the clash, ml. contract sergeant Redko S.P. and 2 co-workers were seriously injured. During the entire trip, 23 people were injured, mostly explosions on IEDs

military unit 51532 Molkino village, Krasnodar Territory (10th detachment of Special Forces of the GRU)

Hello everyone =) You said that you can contact My boyfriend narrows in Molkino, part 51532. For a week and a half there is no news at all what to do. I would be glad for any information. Thanks in advance. I do not know what to do:***(((

Added after 1 minute
Can you really call? Somehow uncomfortable.

Malyavka said: 01/20/2010 04:17 PM

Re: My boyfriend is in the village. Molkino in the Krasnodar Territory!

Everything comes to those who know how to wait!

DMB 11/24/2010!

Tutorial: Krasnodar region, p.Molkino, special forces.
Served: Armenia, Yerevan, infantry.

10th separate brigade of special purpose GRU (military unit 51532)

The place of deployment of the 10th separate brigade of the GRU special forces, or military unit 51532, is the Molkino farm in the Krasnodar Territory. The brigade includes several special forces units (85th, 95th, 104th and 551st separate), a training battalion, a medical support company and management units.

The 10th separate brigade was formed in October 1962 and was stationed in the village. Pervomaiskoye near Stary Krym. In 1967, two units from its composition received the name of the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution. Today's Military Unit 51532 was established in 2003. It was then that the personnel and officers of military units 46266 and 11659 were redeployed to Molkino. The main task of the 10th separate brigade of the GRU special forces is to protect the southern borders of the Russian Federation. In 2004, the personnel and officers of military unit 51532 performed combat missions on the territory of Chechnya, and in 2011 the unit was awarded the Order of Zhukov.

Brigade sleeve patch

Since the GRU special forces are a militarized military structure that performs reconnaissance and defensive operations, training in such a unit as military unit 51532 is appropriate.

Employees spend several hours a day on the obstacle course, making forced marches in full gear, learning to jump with a parachute and mastering the skills of various methods of combat (improvised means, hand-to-hand combat, combat without the use of force). The training of military personnel is considered enhanced, because. it also provides for a battle with stronger opponents. Combat and physical training skills are tested by special forces once every 6 months.
Each soldier performs from 4 to 6 jumps during his service. For contract servicemen, preferential length of service is accrued and annual leave is extended. For conscript soldiers - additional leave out of turn.

Applicants are accepted for contract service in military unit 51532 (that is, in the GRU special forces):

• From 18 to 35 years old;
• With education not lower than completed secondary (11 classes);
• Having a medical certificate of the form "A-1";
• Passed a psychological test;
• Previously served in the military formations of the airborne troops;
• Having the rights of categories "C", "D" and "E".

Monetary allowance for both contract and fixed-term employees is paid to the Sberbank of Russia card, the terminal of which is located in the Lesnaya Skazka store (garrison chip). Other Sberbank ATMs in the vicinity of the Molkino farm:

• stanitsa Imeretinskaya (shop on Lenina street);
• sanatorium "Foothills of the Caucasus" (on Lenin street in the town of Goryachiy Klyuch);
• near the SBV market (Goryachiy Klyuch, on Lenina street);
• in the building of the Real-Prestige agency (on Psekupskaya street);
• stanitsa Saratovskaya (along Lenina street).