Patriotic war of 1812 partisan war. Guerrilla war. Partisan detachments of the Cossacks and the regular army
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The Patriotic War of 1812 was one of the turning points in Russian history, a serious shock to Russian society, which faced a number of new problems and phenomena that still require reflection by modern historians.
One such phenomenon was the People's War, which spawned an incredible amount of rumors and then enduring legends.
The history of the Patriotic War of 1812 has been studied to a sufficient extent, but at the same time there are many controversial episodes in it, since there are conflicting opinions in assessing this event. Differences begin from the very beginning - from the causes of the war, go through all the battles and personalities and end only with the departure of the French from Russia. The question of the popular partisan movement is not fully understood until today, which is why this topic will always be relevant.
In historiography, this topic is presented quite fully, however, the opinions of domestic historians about the partisan war itself and its participants, about their role in the Patriotic War of 1812, are extremely ambiguous.
Dzhivelegov A.K. wrote the following: “The peasants participated in the war only after Smolensk, but especially after the surrender of Moscow. If there had been more discipline in the Grand Army, normal relations with the peasants would have been established very soon. But the foragers turned into marauders, from whom the peasants “naturally defended themselves, and for protection, precisely for protection and for nothing else, peasant detachments were formed ... all of them, we repeat, meant exclusively self-defense. The People's War of 1812 is nothing more than an optical illusion created by the ideology of the nobility...” (6, p. 219).
The opinion of the historian Tarle E.V. was a little more condescending, but on the whole it was similar to the opinion of the author presented above: “All this led to the fact that the mythical “peasant partisans” began to be attributed to what the retreating Russian army actually carried out. There were classical partisans, but mostly only in the Smolensk province. On the other hand, the peasants were terribly annoyed by endless foreign foragers and marauders. And, of course, they were actively resisted. And yet “many peasants fled into the forests at the approach of the French army, often simply out of fear. And not from some great patriotism” (9, p. 12).
Historian Popov A.I. does not deny the existence of peasant partisan detachments, however, he believes that it is wrong to call them the word “partisans”, that they were more like a militia (8, p. 9). Davydov clearly distinguished between "partisans and villagers." In the leaflets, partisan detachments are clearly distinguished from "peasants from the villages adjacent to the theater of war", who "arrange militias among themselves"; they fix the difference between armed settlers and partisans, between “our detached detachments and zemstvo militias” (8, p. 10). So the accusations by Soviet authors of noble and bourgeois historians that they did not consider the peasants to be partisans are completely groundless, because their contemporaries did not consider them as such.
Modern historian N.A. Troitsky in his article “The Patriotic War of 1812. From Moscow to the Neman” wrote: “In the meantime, a guerrilla war, destructive for the French, broke out around Moscow. Peaceful townspeople and villagers of both sexes and all ages, armed with whatever - from axes to simple clubs, multiplied the ranks of partisans and militias ... The total number of people's militia exceeded 400 thousand people. In the war zone, almost all the peasants who were able to bear arms became partisans. It was the nationwide upsurge of the masses, who came out in defense of the Fatherland, that became the main reason for Russia's victory in the war of 1812 "(11)
In pre-revolutionary historiography, there were facts discrediting the actions of partisans. Some historians called the partisans marauders, showed their indecent actions not only in relation to the French, but also in relation to ordinary residents. In many works of domestic and foreign historians, the role of the resistance movement of the broad masses, who responded to a foreign invasion with a nationwide war, is clearly belittled.
Our study presents an analysis of the works of such historians as: Alekseev V.P., Babkin V.I., Beskrovny L.G., Bichkov L.N., Knyazkov S.A., Popov A.I., Tarle E.V. ., Dzhivilegov A.K., Troitsky N.A.
The object of our study is the partisan war of 1812, and the subject of the study is the historical assessment of the partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812.
At the same time, we used the following research methods: narrative, hermeneutic, content analysis, historical-comparative, historical-genetic.
Based on all of the above, the purpose of our work is to give a historical assessment of such a phenomenon as the guerrilla war of 1812.
1. Theoretical analysis of sources and works related to the topic of our study;
2. To identify whether such a phenomenon as the "People's War" took place according to the narrative tradition;
3. Consider the concept of "partisan movement of 1812" and its causes;
4. Consider the peasant and army partisan detachments of 1812;
5. Conduct their comparative analysis in order to determine the role of peasant and army partisan detachments in achieving victory in the Patriotic War of 1812.
Thus, the structure of our work looks like this:
Introduction
Chapter 1: People's War According to the Narrative Tradition
Chapter 2: general characteristics and comparative analysis of partisan detachments
Conclusion
Bibliography
Chapter 1
Modern historians often question the existence of the People's War, believing that such actions of the peasants were carried out solely for the purpose of self-defense and that detachments of peasants should by no means be distinguished as separate types of partisans.
In the course of our work, a large number of sources were analyzed, ranging from essays to collections of documents, and allowing us to understand whether such a phenomenon as the "People's War" took place.
Reporting documentation always provides the most reliable evidence, since it lacks subjectivity and clearly traces information that proves certain hypotheses. Many different facts can be found in it, such as: the size of the army, the names of the detachments, the actions at various stages of the war, the number of casualties and, in our case, facts about the location, number, methods and motives of the peasant partisan detachments. In our case, this documentation includes manifestos, reports, government messages.
1) It all started with the "Manifesto of Alexander I on the collection of the Zemstvo militia of 1812 on July 6." In it, in plain text, the tsar calls on the peasants to fight the French troops, believing that only a regular army will not be enough to win the war (4, p. 14).
2) Typical raids on small detachments of the French can be clearly seen in the report of the marshal of the nobility from Zhizdra to the civil governor of Kaluga (10, p. 117)
3) From the report of E.I. Vlastova Ya.X. Wittgenstein from the town of Bely "On the actions of the peasants against the enemy" from the government report "On the activities of peasant detachments against the army of Napoleon in the Moscow province", from the "Short journal of military operations" on the struggle of the peasants of Velsky district. Smolensk lips. with the army of Napoleon, we see that the actions of peasant partisan detachments really took place during the Patriotic War of 1812, mainly in the Smolensk province (10, p. 118, 119, 123).
Memoirs, like memories, are not the most reliable source of information, since, by definition, memoirs are notes of contemporaries that tell about events in which their author directly took part. Memoirs are not identical to the chronicle of events, since in the memoirs the author tries to comprehend the historical context of his own life, accordingly, memoirs differ from the chronicles of events in subjectivity - in that the events described are refracted through the prism of the author's consciousness with their own sympathy and vision of what is happening. Therefore, memoirs, unfortunately, in our case practically do not provide evidence.
1) The attitude of the peasants in the Smolensk province and their readiness to fight is clearly traced in the memoirs of A.P. Buteneva (10, p. 28)
2) From the memoirs of I.V. Snegirev, we can conclude that the peasants are ready to defend Moscow (10, p. 75)
However, we see that memoirs and memoirs are not a reliable source of information, since they contain too many subjective assessments, and we will not take them into account in the end.
Notes and letters are also subject to subjectivity, but their difference from memoirs is such that they were written directly at the time of these historical events, and not for the purpose of subsequent acquaintance of the masses with them, as in the case of journalism, but as personal correspondence or notes, respectively, although their reliability is questioned, they can be considered as evidence. In our case, notes and letters provide us with evidence not so much of the existence of the People's War as such, but they prove the courage and strong spirit of the Russian people, showing that peasant partisan detachments were created in large numbers based on patriotism, and not from the need for self-defense.
1) The first attempts at peasant resistance can be traced in a letter from Rostopchin to Balashov dated August 1, 1812 (10, p. 28)
2) From the notes of A.D. Bestuzhev-Ryumin dated August 31, 1812, from a letter to P.M. Longinova S.R. Vorontsov, from the diary of Ya.N. Pushchin about the battle of the peasants with the enemy detachment near Borodino and about the mood of the officers after leaving Moscow, we see that the actions of the peasant partisan detachments during the Patriotic War of 1812 were caused not only by the need for self-defense, but also by deep patriotic feelings and the desire to protect their homeland. enemy (10, p. 74, 76, 114).
Publicism at the beginning of the XIX century in the Russian Empire was subjected to censorship. So in the "First censorship decree" of Alexander I of July 9, 1804, the following is stated: "... censorship is obliged to consider all books and writings intended for distribution in society", i.e. in fact, it was impossible to publish anything without the permission of the controlling body, and, accordingly, all descriptions of the exploits of the Russian people could turn out to be banal propaganda or a kind of “call to action” (12, p. 32). However, this does not mean that journalism does not provide us with any evidence of the existence of the People's War. With the seeming severity of censorship, it is worth noting that she coped with the tasks set not in the best way. Professor of Illion University Marianna Tex Choldin writes: "... a significant number of "harmful" writings penetrated the country despite all the efforts of the government to prevent this" (12, p. 37). Accordingly, journalism does not claim to be 100% reliable, but it also provides us with some evidence of the existence of the People's War and a description of the exploits of the Russian people.
Having analyzed the “Notes of the Fatherland” about the activities of one of the organizers of the peasant partisan detachments Yemelyanov, the correspondence to the newspaper “Northern Post” about the actions of the peasants against the enemy and the article by N.P. Polikarpov "Unknown and elusive Russian partisan detachment", we see that excerpts from these newspapers and magazines reinforce the evidence of the existence of peasant partisan detachments as such and confirm their patriotic motives (10, p. 31, 118; 1, p. 125) .
Based on this reasoning, one can conclude that the most useful in proving the existence of the People's War was reporting documentation because of the lack of subjectivity. Reporting documentation provides proof of the existence of the People's War(description of the actions of peasant partisan detachments, their methods, number and motives), and notes and letters confirm that the formation of such detachments and the People's War itself was caused by Not only in order to self defense, but also based on deep patriotism and courage Russian people. Publicism also reinforces both these judgments. Based on the above analysis of numerous documentation, we can conclude that contemporaries of the Patriotic War of 1812 were aware that the People's War had taken place and clearly distinguished peasant partisan detachments from army partisan detachments, and were also aware that this phenomenon was not caused by self-defense. Thus, from all of the above, we can say that there was a People's War.
Chapter 2. General characteristics and comparative analysis of partisan detachments
The partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812 is an armed conflict between the multinational army of Napoleon and Russian partisans on the territory of Russia in 1812 (1, p. 227).
Guerrilla warfare was one of the three main forms of the Russian people's war against the invasion of Napoleon, along with passive resistance (for example, the destruction of food and fodder, burning their own houses, going into the forests) and massive participation in militias.
The reasons for the emergence of the Partisan war were associated, first of all, with the unsuccessful start of the war and the retreat of the Russian army deep into its territory showed that the enemy could hardly be defeated by the forces of regular troops alone. This required the efforts of the whole people. In the overwhelming majority of the areas occupied by the enemy, he perceived the "Great Army" not as his liberator from serfdom, but as an enslaver. Napoleon did not even think about any liberation of the peasants from serfdom or improvement of their disenfranchised position. If at the beginning promising phrases were uttered about the liberation of serfs from serfdom, and even they talked about the need to issue some kind of proclamation, then this was only a tactical move with which Napoleon hoped to intimidate the landowners.
Napoleon understood that the liberation of the Russian serfs would inevitably lead to revolutionary consequences, which he feared most of all. Yes, this did not meet his political goals when entering Russia. According to Napoleon's comrades-in-arms, it was “important for him to strengthen monarchism in France, and it was difficult for him to preach the revolution in Russia” (3, p. 12).
The very first orders of the administration established by Napoleon in the occupied regions were directed against the serfs, in defense of the serf landowners. The provisional Lithuanian "government", subordinate to the Napoleonic governor, in one of the very first decrees obliged all peasants and rural residents in general to unquestioningly obey the landlords, to continue to perform all work and duties, and those who would evade were to be severely punished, involving for this , if circumstances so require, military force (3, p. 15).
The peasants quickly realized that the invasion of the French conquerors put them in an even more difficult and humiliating position, something in which they were before. The peasants also associated the struggle against foreign enslavers with the hope of liberating them from serfdom.
In reality, things were somewhat different. Even before the start of the war, Lieutenant Colonel P.A. Chuikevich compiled a note on the conduct of an active partisan war, and in 1811 the work of the Prussian colonel Valentini "Small War" was published in Russian. This was the beginning of the creation of partisan detachments in the war of 1812. However, in the Russian army they looked at the partisans with a significant degree of skepticism, seeing in the partisan movement "a pernicious system of divisive action of the army" (2, p. 27).
The partisan forces consisted of detachments of the Russian army operating in the rear of Napoleon's troops; Russian soldiers who escaped from captivity; volunteers from the local population.
§2.1 Peasant partisan detachments
The first partisan detachments were created even before the Battle of Borodino. On July 23, after connecting with Bagration near Smolensk, Barclay de Tolly formed a flying partisan detachment from the Kazan Dragoon, three Don Cossack and Stavropol Kalmyk regiments under the general command of F. Wintzingerode. Wintzingerode was supposed to act against the left flank of the French and provide communication with Wittgenstein's corps. The flying detachment of Wintzingerode also proved to be an important source of information. On the night of July 26-27, Barclay received word from Wintzingerode from Velizh about Napoleon's plans to advance from Porechye to Smolensk in order to cut off the Russian army's escape routes. After the Battle of Borodino, the Wintzingerode detachment was reinforced by three Cossack regiments and two battalions of rangers and continued to operate against the enemy's flanks, breaking up into smaller detachments (5, p. 31).
With the invasion of the Napoleonic hordes, the locals initially simply left the villages and went to forests and areas remote from hostilities. Later, retreating through the Smolensk lands, the commander of the Russian 1st Western Army, M.B. Barclay de Tolly urged his compatriots to take up arms against the invaders. His proclamation, which was obviously based on the work of the Prussian colonel Valentini, indicated how to act against the enemy and how to wage guerrilla warfare.
It arose spontaneously and was a speech by small scattered detachments of local residents and soldiers lagging behind their units against the predatory actions of the rear units of the Napoleonic army. Trying to protect their property and food supplies, the population was forced to resort to self-defense. According to the memoirs of D.V. Davydov, “in every village the gates were locked; with them stood old and young with pitchforks, stakes, axes, and some of them with firearms” (8, p. 74).
The French foragers sent to the countryside for food faced not only passive resistance. In the region of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, detachments of peasants made frequent day and night raids on enemy carts, destroyed his foragers, and captured French soldiers.
Later, the Smolensk province was also plundered. Some researchers believe that it was from this moment that the war became domestic for the Russian people. Here the popular resistance also gained the widest scope. It began in Krasnensky, Porechsky districts, and then in Belsky, Sychevsky, Roslavl, Gzhatsky and Vyazemsky counties. At first, before the appeal of M.B. Barclay de Tolly, the peasants were afraid to arm themselves, fearing that they would then be held accountable. However, later this process became more active (3, p. 13).
In the city of Bely and Belsky district, peasant detachments attacked parties of the French that made their way to them, destroyed them or took them prisoner. The leaders of the Sychevsk detachments, police officer Boguslavsky and retired major Yemelyanov, armed their villagers with guns taken from the French, established proper order and discipline. Sychevsk partisans attacked the enemy 15 times in two weeks (from August 18 to September 1). During this time, they destroyed 572 soldiers and captured 325 people (7, p. 209).
Residents of the Roslavl district created several peasant detachments on horseback and on foot, arming the villagers with pikes, sabers and guns. They not only defended their county from the enemy, but also attacked marauders who made their way to the neighboring Yelnensky county. Many peasant detachments operated in the Yukhnovsky district. Organizing defense along the river. Ugra, they blocked the path of the enemy in Kaluga, provided significant assistance to the army partisan detachment D.V. Davydov.
In the Gzhatsk district, another detachment was also active, created from peasants, headed by Yermolai Chetvertak (Chetvertakov), a private of the Kyiv Dragoon Regiment. The detachment of Chetvertakov began not only to protect the villages from marauders, but to attack the enemy, inflicting significant losses on him. As a result, in the entire space of 35 versts from the Gzhatsk pier, the lands were not devastated, despite the fact that all the surrounding villages lay in ruins. For this feat, the inhabitants of those places “with sensitive gratitude” called Chetvertakov “the savior of that side” (5, p. 39).
Private Eremenko did the same. With the help of the landowner Michulovo, by the name of Krechetov, he also organized a peasant detachment, with which on October 30 he exterminated 47 people from the enemy.
The actions of the peasant detachments were especially intensified during the stay of the Russian army in Tarutino. At this time, they widely deployed the front of the struggle in the Smolensk, Moscow, Ryazan and Kaluga provinces.
In the Zvenigorod district, peasant detachments destroyed and captured more than 2 thousand French soldiers. Here the detachments became famous, the leaders of which were the volost head Ivan Andreev and the centurion Pavel Ivanov. In the Volokolamsk district, such detachments were led by retired non-commissioned officer Novikov and private Nemchinov, volost head Mikhail Fedorov, peasants Akim Fedorov, Filipp Mikhailov, Kuzma Kuzmin and Gerasim Semenov. In the Bronnitsky district of the Moscow province, peasant detachments united up to 2 thousand people. History has preserved for us the names of the most distinguished peasants from the Bronnitsky district: Mikhail Andreev, Vasily Kirillov, Sidor Timofeev, Yakov Kondratiev, Vladimir Afanasiev (5, p. 46).
The largest peasant detachment in the Moscow region was a detachment of Bogorodsk partisans. In one of the first publications for 1813 about the formation of this detachment, it was written that “the economic volosts of Vokhnovskaya, the head of Yegor Stulov, the centurion Ivan Chushkin and the peasant Gerasim Kurin, the head of Amerevsky, Emelyan Vasiliev, gathered peasants subordinate to them, and also invited neighboring ones” (1, p. .228).
The detachment numbered in its ranks about 6 thousand people, the leader of this detachment was the peasant Gerasim Kurin. His detachment and other smaller detachments not only reliably protected the entire Bogorodsk district from the penetration of French marauders, but also entered into an armed struggle with the enemy troops.
It should be noted that even women participated in sorties against the enemy. Subsequently, these episodes were overgrown with legends and in some cases did not even remotely resemble real events. A typical example is with Vasilisa Kozhina, to whom popular rumor and propaganda of that time attributed neither more nor less leadership of the peasant detachment, which in reality was not.
During the war, many active members of the peasant detachments were awarded. Emperor Alexander I ordered to reward people subordinate to Count F.V. Rostopchin: 23 people "in command" - insignia of the Military Order (George Crosses), and the other 27 people - a special silver medal "For Love of the Fatherland" on the Vladimir ribbon.
Thus, as a result of the actions of military and peasant detachments, as well as militias, the enemy was deprived of the opportunity to expand the zone controlled by him and create additional bases for supplying the main forces. He failed to gain a foothold either in Bogorodsk, or in Dmitrov, or in Voskresensk. His attempt to get additional communications that would link the main forces with the corps of Schwarzenberg and Rainier was thwarted. The enemy also failed to capture Bryansk and reach Kyiv.
§2.2 Army partisan detachments
Along with the formation of large peasant partisan detachments and their activities, army partisan detachments played an important role in the war.
The first army partisan detachment was created on the initiative of M. B. Barclay de Tolly. Its commander was General F.F. Vintsengerode, who led the combined Kazan Dragoon, 11 Stavropol, Kalmyk and three Cossack regiments, which began to operate in the area of the city of Dukhovshchina.
A real thunderstorm for the French was the detachment of Denis Davydov. This detachment arose on the initiative of Davydov himself, lieutenant colonel, commander of the Akhtyrsky hussar regiment. Together with his hussars, he retreated as part of Bagration's army to Borodin. A passionate desire to be even more useful in the fight against the invaders prompted D. Davydov "to ask for a separate detachment." In this intention, he was strengthened by Lieutenant M.F. Orlov, who was sent to Smolensk to find out the fate of the seriously wounded General P.A. Tuchkov. After returning from Smolensk, Orlov spoke about the unrest, the poor protection of the rear in the French army (8, p. 83).
While driving through the territory occupied by Napoleonic troops, he realized how vulnerable the French food warehouses, guarded by small detachments. At the same time, he saw how difficult it was to fight without an agreed plan of action for the flying peasant detachments. According to Orlov, small army detachments sent behind enemy lines could inflict great damage on him and help the actions of the partisans.
D. Davydov asked General P.I. Bagration allowed him to organize a partisan detachment for operations behind enemy lines. For a "test" Kutuzov allowed Davydov to take 50 hussars and 1280 Cossacks and go to Medynen and Yukhnov. Having received a detachment at his disposal, Davydov began bold raids on the rear of the enemy. In the very first skirmishes near Tsarev - Zaymishch, Slavsky, he achieved success: he defeated several French detachments, captured a wagon train with ammunition.
In the autumn of 1812, partisan detachments surrounded the French army in a continuous mobile ring.
Between Smolensk and Gzhatsk, a detachment of Lieutenant Colonel Davydov, reinforced by two Cossack regiments, operated. From Gzhatsk to Mozhaisk, a detachment of General I.S. Dorokhov. Captain A.S. Figner with his flying detachment attacked the French on the road from Mozhaisk to Moscow.
In the Mozhaisk region and to the south, a detachment of Colonel I. M. Vadbolsky operated as part of the Mariupol Hussar Regiment and 500 Cossacks. Between Borovsk and Moscow, the roads were controlled by a detachment of Captain A.N. Seslavin. Colonel N.D. was sent to the Serpukhov road with two Cossack regiments. Kudashiv. On the Ryazan road there was a detachment of Colonel I.E. Efremov. From the north, Moscow was blocked by a large detachment of F.F. Vintsengerode, who, separating small detachments from himself to Volokolamsk, to the Yaroslavl and Dmitrov roads, blocked the access of Napoleon's troops to the northern regions of the Moscow region (6, p. 210).
The main task of the partisan detachments was formulated by Kutuzov: “Since now the autumn time is coming, through which the movement of a large army becomes completely difficult, I decided, avoiding a general battle, to wage a small war, because the separate forces of the enemy and his oversight give me more ways to exterminate him , and for this, being now 50 versts from Moscow with the main forces, I give away important parts from me in the direction of Mozhaisk, Vyazma and Smolensk ”(2, p. 74). Army partisan detachments were created mainly from the Cossack troops and were not the same in size: from 50 to 500 people. They were tasked with bold and sudden actions behind enemy lines to destroy his manpower, strike at garrisons, suitable reserves, disable transport, deprive the enemy of the opportunity to get food and fodder, monitor the movement of troops and report this to the General Staff of the Russian Army. . The commanders of the partisan detachments were indicated the main direction of action and were informed of the areas of operations of neighboring detachments in case of joint operations.
Partisan detachments operated in difficult conditions. At first, there were many difficulties. Even the inhabitants of villages and villages at first treated the partisans with great distrust, often mistaking them for enemy soldiers. Often the hussars had to change into peasant caftans and grow beards.
Partisan detachments did not stand in one place, they were constantly on the move, and no one except the commander knew in advance when and where the detachment would go. The actions of the partisans were sudden and swift. To fly like snow on the head, and quickly hide became the basic rule of the partisans.
Detachments attacked individual teams, foragers, transports, took away weapons and distributed them to the peasants, took tens and hundreds of prisoners.
On the evening of September 3, 1812, Davydov's detachment went to Tsarev-Zaimishch. Short of 6 miles to the village, Davydov sent reconnaissance there, which established that there was a large French convoy with shells, guarded by 250 horsemen. The detachment at the edge of the forest was discovered by French foragers, who rushed to Tsarevo-Zaimishche to warn their own. But Davydov did not let them do this. The detachment rushed in pursuit of the foragers and almost broke into the village with them. The baggage train and its guards were taken by surprise, and an attempt by a small group of Frenchmen to resist was quickly crushed. 130 soldiers, 2 officers, 10 wagons with food and fodder ended up in the hands of the partisans (1, p. 247).
Sometimes, knowing in advance the location of the enemy, the partisans made a sudden raid. So, General Wintsengerode, having established that in the village of Sokolov - 15 there is an outpost of two squadrons of cavalry and three companies of infantry, singled out 100 Cossacks from his detachment, who quickly broke into the village, killed more than 120 people and captured 3 officers, 15 non-commissioned officers -officers, 83 soldiers (1, p. 249).
The detachment of Colonel Kudashiva, having established that there were about 2,500 French soldiers and officers in the village of Nikolsky, suddenly attacked the enemy, killed more than 100 people and took 200 prisoners.
Most often, partisan detachments set up ambushes and attacked enemy vehicles on the way, captured couriers, and freed Russian prisoners. The partisans of the detachment of General Dorokhov, acting along the Mozhaisk road, on September 12 seized two couriers with dispatches, burned 20 boxes of shells and captured 200 people (including 5 officers). On September 6, a detachment of Colonel Efremov, having met an enemy column heading for Podolsk, attacked it and captured more than 500 people (5, p. 56).
The detachment of Captain Figner, who was always in the vicinity of the enemy troops, in a short time destroyed almost all the food in the vicinity of Moscow, blew up the artillery park on the Mozhaisk road, destroyed 6 guns, exterminated up to 400 people, captured a colonel, 4 officers and 58 soldiers (7 , p. 215).
Later, partisan detachments were consolidated into three large parties. One of them, under the command of Major General Dorokhov, consisting of five battalions of infantry, four squadrons of cavalry, two Cossack regiments with eight guns, on September 28, 1812, took the city of Vereya, destroying part of the French garrison.
§2.3 Comparative analysis peasant and army partisan detachments of 1812
Peasant partisan detachments arose spontaneously in connection with the oppression of the peasants by the French troops. Army partisan detachments arose with the consent of the top command leadership due to the insufficient effectiveness of the regular regular army, on the one hand, and with the chosen tactics aimed at disuniting and exhausting the enemy, on the other hand.
Basically, both types of partisan detachments operated in the region of Smolensk and adjacent cities: Gzhaisk, Mozhaisk, etc., as well as in the following counties: Krasnensky, Porechsky, Belsky, Sychevsky, Roslavl, Gzhatsky, Vyazemsky.
The composition and degree of organization of the partisan detachments were radically different: the first group consisted of peasants who began their activities due to the fact that the invading French troops aggravated the already poor situation of the peasants with their first actions. In this regard, this group included men and women, young and old, and at first acted spontaneously and not always in a coordinated manner. The second group consisted of the military (hussars, Cossacks, officers, soldiers), created to help the regular army. This group, being professional soldiers, acted more cohesively and harmoniously, most often taking not by quantity, but by skill and ingenuity.
Peasant partisan detachments were armed mainly with pitchforks, spears, axes, and less often with firearms. Army partisan detachments were equipped better and better.
In this regard, peasant partisan detachments carried out raids on carts, set up ambushes, and sorties to the rear. Army partisan detachments exercised control over roads, destroyed food depots and small French detachments, carried out raids and raids on larger enemy detachments, and staged sabotage.
In quantitative terms, the peasant partisan detachments outnumbered the army ones.
The results of the activities were also not too similar, but, perhaps, equally important. With the help of peasant partisan detachments, the enemy was deprived of the opportunity to expand the zone he controlled and create additional bases for supplying the main forces, while with the help of army partisan detachments, Napoleon's army was weakened and subsequently destroyed.
Thus, the peasant partisan detachments stopped the strengthening of Napoleon's army, and the army partisan detachments helped the regular army to destroy it, which was no longer able to increase its power.
Conclusion
It was not by chance that the War of 1812 was called the Patriotic War. The popular character of this war was most clearly manifested in the partisan movement, which played a strategic role in the victory of Russia. Responding to reproaches of "a war against the rules," Kutuzov said that such were the feelings of the people. In response to a letter from Marshal Berthier, he wrote on October 8, 1818: “It is difficult to stop a people who have been embittered by everything they have seen; a people who for so many years did not know the war on their territory; people ready to sacrifice themselves for the Motherland...” (1, p. 310).
In our work, on the basis of evidence from multiple analyzed sources and works, we proved that peasant partisan detachments existed on a par with army partisan detachments, and this phenomenon was also caused on the wave of patriotism, and not out of people's fear of the French "oppressors".
Activities aimed at attracting the masses of the people to active participation in the war proceeded from the interests of Russia, correctly reflected the objective conditions of the war and took into account the broad possibilities that manifested themselves in the national liberation war.
The guerrilla war that unfolded near Moscow made a significant contribution to the victory over Napoleon's army and the expulsion of the enemy from Russia.
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The invasion of foreign invaders caused an unprecedented popular upsurge. Literally the whole of Russia rose to fight the invaders. The peasantry, as the class with the strongest spiritual traditions, unitedly, in a single outburst of patriotic feelings, stood up against the invaders.
The invasion of foreign invaders caused an unprecedented popular upsurge. Literally the whole of Russia rose to fight the invaders. Napoleon miscalculated when, trying to win over the peasants to his side, he announced to them that he would abolish serfdom. Not! The peasantry, as the class with the strongest spiritual traditions, unitedly, in a single outburst of patriotic feelings, stood up against the invaders.
Immediately after the appearance of the enemy army in Lithuania and Belarus, a spontaneous partisan movement of local peasants was born. The partisans inflicted significant damage on foreigners, destroyed enemy soldiers, and upset the rear. At the very beginning of the war, the French army felt a shortage of food and fodder. Due to the death of horses, the French were forced to abandon 100 guns in Belarus.
The people's militia was actively created in Ukraine. 19 Cossack regiments were formed here. Most of them were armed and maintained at their own expense by the peasants.
Peasant partisan detachments arose in the Smolensk region and in other occupied regions of Russia. A powerful partisan movement also operated on the territory of the Moscow province. Such folk heroes as Gerasim Kurin and Ivan Chushkin distinguished themselves here. Some of the peasant detachments numbered several thousand people. For example, the detachment of Gerasim Kurin consisted of 5,000 people. The detachments of Yermolai Chetvertakov, Fyodor Potapov, Vasilisa Kozhina were widely known.
The actions of the partisans inflicted heavy human and material losses on the enemy, and disrupted his connection with the rear. In just six weeks of autumn, the partisans destroyed about 30,000 enemy soldiers. Here is what is said in the report on the actions of peasant partisan detachments in the territory of only one Moscow province (written by the Governor-General of Moscow F.V. Rastopchin):
REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF PEASANT PARTISAN GROUPS
AGAINST NAPOLEON'S ARMY IN MOSCOW PROVINCE
In pursuance of his highest and. in. of will, the news of the brave and commendable deeds of the settlers of the Moscow province, who unanimously and courageously took up arms against the parties sent from the enemy to rob and incite parties, is given here for general information, with the indication of the names and deeds of those merchants, philistines and peasants who in this time most distinguished themselves.
Bogorodsk district Egor Stulov, the head of the Vokhon economic volost, Ivan Chushkin of Sotsky, and the peasant Gerasim Kurin and the head of the Amerevsky volost, Emelyai Vasiliev, having gathered the peasants under their jurisdiction and inviting also neighboring ones, courageously defended themselves from the enemy and not only did not allow him to ruin and rob their villages, but, reflecting and driving away the enemies, the Vokhon peasants beat and took up to fifty in full, while the Amerev peasants up to three hundred people. Such courageous deeds of theirs were testified and approved in writing by the head of the Vladimir militia, Mr. Lieutenant-General Prince Golitsyn.
In Bronnitsky district peasants of the villages: Shubin, Veshnyakov, Konstantinov, Voskresensky and Pochinok; villages: Salvacheva, Zhiroshkina, Rogacheva, Ganusova, Zalesye, Golushina and Zhdanskaya, according to appeals from the Zemstvo police, up to 2 thousand armed horsemen and footmen repeatedly gathered on the road leading to the city of Podol, where, under cover in the forest, they waited with the Cossacks of the enemy, who, passing from Bronnitsy to the aforementioned city, ravaged entire villages. Finally, they saw a detached enemy detachment, which included up to 700 people, which, with the help of the Cossacks, they courageously attacked and, putting 30 people in place, forced the others to drop their weapons and took them prisoner with their carts and booty. These prisoners were escorted by the Cossacks to our Main Army. During this incident, they distinguished themselves most for their bravery and courage, encouraging others to defend against enemies: the village of Konstantinov, the headman Semyon Tikhonov, the village of Salvacheva, the headman Yegor Vasilyev, and the village of Pochinok, the headman Yakov Petrov.
The villagers of Zalesye, the peasants, noticing that the one who called himself a Russian native served the French, immediately seized him and handed him over to the Cossacks who were in their village for presentation where they should.
The village of Ganusov, the peasant Pavel Prokhorov, seeing 5 French people riding towards him, set off on horseback in a Cossack dress and, not having a firearm with him, took them prisoner with only one lance and delivered them to the Cossacks for sending on command.
In the villages of Velin, Krivtsy and Sofyino, the peasants, arming themselves against the French, who arrived in sufficient numbers to rob the holy churches and to seduce those living in these places, not only did not allow them to do so, but, having overcome, exterminated them. In this case, 62 yards with all the buildings and property were burned from enemy shots in the village of Sofyino.
The villages of Mikhailovskaya Sloboda and Yaganova, the villages of Durnikha, Chulkova, Kulakova and Kakuzeva, peasants daily up to 2 thousand people gathered for the Borovsky transport of the Moscow River to the mountain, having the strictest supervision of the crossing of enemy detachments. Some of them dressed in Cossack clothes and armed themselves with tsiks to greatly intimidate their enemies. -They repeatedly hit and drove the enemy; and on September 22, seeing that the enemy detachment, quite numerous, stretched along the other side of the river to the village of Myachkovo, many of them, together with the Cossacks, crossed the river ford and, attacking the enemies swiftly, 11 people were put in place and 46 people were taken prisoner with weapons, horses and two wagons; the rest, having been scattered, fled.
In the Bronnitsky district, during the defeat and dispersion of the enemy detachment, which was striving to plunder the village of Myachkovo, the peasants of the village of Durnikha showed the greatest courage: Mikhailo Andreev., Vasily Kirillov and Ivan Ivanov; the villages of Mikhailovskaya Sloboda: Sidor Timofeev, Yakov Kondratiev and Vladimir Afanasiev; the village of Yaganova: the headman Vasily Leontiev and the peasant Fedul Dmitriev, who encouraged others to cross the river and attack the enemy. In the village of Vokhrin and the villages of Lubniv and Lytkarino, the inhabitants, arming themselves against small enemy detachments, often exterminated the naked, and the inhabitants of Vokhrino lost 84 yards with all their buildings and property from the burning, and in Lubnin two master's yards were burned - horse and cattle. Two Frenchmen came to the village of Khripav and, taking a horse harnessed to a cart that was standing behind the yards, mounted it and drove into the forest. The peasant of that village, Yegor Ivanov, who was guarding the village, having seen this, chased after them with an ax and threatened to cut them down if they did not leave the horse. The robbers, seeing that they could not leave him, were frightened, abandoned the cart with the horse and ran themselves; but the aforesaid peasant, having unharnessed his horse from the cart, pursued them on horseback, and first he chopped one of them, and then he overtook and killed the other.
Volokolamsk district. The peasants of this district, who were constantly armed until the very removal of the enemies from there, courageously repulsed all their attacks, taking many prisoners, and exterminating others on the spot. When the police captain who was in charge of these peasants was away to carry out other assignments, then the order and power over them were entrusted to Mr. Actual Privy Councilor and Senator Alyabyev to the steward Gavril Ankudinov, who, as well as those who were with him, Mr. Alyabyev, courtyard people : Dmitry Ivanov, Fedor Feopemptov, Nikolai Mikhailov, also the economic Seredinsky volost, the village of Seredy, the volost head Boris Borisov and his son Vasily Borisov, the village of Burtsev, the volost headman Ivan Ermolaev, the volost clerk Mikhailo Fedorov, the peasant Filipp Mikhailov, the village of Podsukhina, the peasants Kozma Kozmin and Gerasim Semyonov, they acted excellently against the enemy and were always the first to strive for him, setting an example to others with their fearlessness.
Zvenigorod district. When almost all of this district was already occupied by the enemy, except for a small part of the villages lying on the side of the provincial city of Voskresensk, which the enemy detachments did not have time to occupy, then the city and surrounding residents, even from the places occupied by the enemy, united, decided unanimously to defend the city of Voskresensk. They armed themselves with whatever they could, established guards and agreed among themselves that, at the ringing of bells from her, everyone should immediately gather there on horseback and on foot. According to this conventional sign, they always flocked in considerable numbers, armed with guns, pikes, axes, pitchforks, scythes, and repeatedly drove away the enemy parties approaching Voskresensk from the side of Zvenigorod and Ruza. They often fought near the city itself and far from it, sometimes alone, sometimes with the Cossacks, they killed many, took them in full and delivered them to the Cossack teams, so that more than 2 thousand enemies were exterminated in one Zvenigorod district and by the townsfolk alone. Thus, the city of Voskresensk, some villages and the monastery, called New Jerusalem, were saved from the invasion and destruction of the enemy. In this, they distinguished themselves: the head of the economic Velyaminovskaya volost, Ivan Andreev, who, in addition to being engaged in the outfit and ordering people, went out on horseback to the battle and inspired courage in others by his example; of the village of Luchinsky, Mr. Golokhvastov, Sotsky Pavel Ivanov, who also not only dressed up people, but always himself with his children was in battles, in which he was wounded with one of his sons; Nikolai Ovchinnikov, a tradesman from Zvenigorod, who lived in Voskresensk, repeatedly went to battle and was wounded in the arm; Resurrection merchant Pentiokhov, Zvenigorod tradesman Ivan Goryainov, courtyard people: Prince Golitsyn - Alexei Abramov, gentlemen] Colonshna - Alexei Dmitriev and Prokhor Ignatiev, gentlemen] Yaroslavova - Fedor Sergeyev, patrimonial elders: the village of Ilyinsky gr. Osterman - Yegor Yakovlev, the village of Ivashkov mister] Ardalionova - Ustin Ivanov and a peasant of the same village Yegor Alekseev. All of them have been in battle many times and encouraged others to exterminate and drive away the enemy.
Serpukhov district. When the enemy parties were divided for robbery, then the peasants who remained in the houses used cunning to exterminate the enemies of the fatherland. They tried first to get them drunk and mislead them, and then they attacked them. In this way, 5 people were killed in the state-owned village of Stromilov 5, in the village of Lopasna 2, in the village of Teterkah (Mr.] Zhukov) 1, in the village of Dubna (Mr.] Akimov) 2, in the village of Artishchevo (Mr.] Volkov) 7 people. Burmese Akim Dementyev and Countess A. A. Orlova-Chesmenskoy of the village of Khatuni, clerk Ivan Ilyin and landowner Orlova of the village of Gorok Burmese Nikifor Savelyev, according to rumors, the enemy is walking along the Kashira road , gathered the departments of their peasants and, arming them with pikes, pitchforks, axes and house guns of Count Orlov, boldly expected the enemy in the village of Papushkina, who, having learned about it and being in small forces, was forced to pass by.
Ruza district. The peasants, having armed themselves and wound up in each village to collect the bell, hastily gathered up to several thousand people when enemy detachments appeared and attacked the enemy parties with such unanimity and courage that more than a thousand of them were exterminated by them, not counting those taken with their help by the Cossacks in captivity. On the past October 11, having gathered up to 1,500 people, they helped the Cossacks and completely drive the enemy out of Ruza.
According to Vereyskomu county. When the enemy repeatedly attacked the Vyshegorodsky estate of Countess Golovkina in the last days of August and at the beginning of September, it was always repulsed by the patrimonial elders Nikita Fedorov, Gavril Mironov and the clerks of the same landowner Alexei Kirpichnikov, Nikolai Uskov and Afanasiev * Shcheglov with the peasants. In October, when the enemy, returning from Moscow, attempted to cross the Protva river (on which a flour mill with five posts was built) in order to plunder the Church of the Assumption of the Most Holy Theotokos and located near the landowner's house and the state-owned bread store, in which more than 500 quarters of rye were stored, at that time, the aforementioned clerks - Alexei Kirpichnikov and Nikolai Uskov, having gathered peasants up to 500 people, tried by all means to repel the enemy, who had up to 300 people in his detachment. The peasant Pyotr Petrov Kolupanov and her wife, Countess Golovkina, of the village of Lobanova, the peasant Emelyan Minaev, who were workers at the mill in the Mozhaisk district of the economic Reitarsky volost of the Ilyinsky settlement, torn down the lava on the dam and, dismantling the boards, drained the water , which kept the enemy party and saved the aforementioned church, the landowner's house with all the services, the bakery shop, also church houses and the embankment settlement, in which there are 48 peasant houses. The villages of Dubrova and Ponizovye with the churches in them were also saved in the same way, by the defense from the peasants of these and villages close to them, who were especially encouraged by the advice and exhortations of the Verona cathedral priest John Skobeev, who was in the village of Dubrov, to whom the sexton also contributed a lot Vasily Semyonov, who not only encouraged others, but also participated in repelling the enemy himself.
This news. sent and certified by the commander-in-chief in Moscow, General of Infantry, Count F. V. Rostopchin. The commanding people mentioned in it are distinguished by the highest behavior with the St. George 5th class badge, and the rest with a silver medal on the Vladimir ribbon with the inscription: "for love for the fatherland." Without a doubt, many excellent and courageous deeds of other peasants, according to information that has not come down to them, remain unknown.
Simultaneously with the peasants, army partisan detachments operated, formed by order of the command for reconnaissance and military operations behind enemy lines. The first army partisan commander was hussar lieutenant colonel Denis Vasilyevich Davydov. Here is how he himself recalls how he became a partisan:
“Seeing myself useful to the fatherland no more than an ordinary hussar, I decided to ask myself a separate command, despite the words uttered and extolled by mediocrity: do not ask anywhere and do not refuse anything. On the contrary, I have always been sure that in our craft he only fulfills his duty, who crosses his line, is not equal in spirit, as in shoulders, in a line with his comrades, asks for everything and does not refuse anything.
With these thoughts, I sent a letter to Prince Bagration with the following content:
“Your Excellency! You know that, having left the post of your adjutant, which is so flattering to my pride, and joining the hussars, I had partisan service as a subject both according to the strength of my years, and experience, and, if I dare say, according to my courage. Circumstances lead me to this time in the ranks of my comrades, where I have no will of my own and, consequently, I can neither undertake nor accomplish anything remarkable. Prince! You are my only benefactor; let me come to you to explain my intentions; if they please you, use me at my will and be sure that the one who held the rank of Bagration's adjutant for five years in a row will support this honor with all the reverence that the plight of our dear fatherland requires. Denis Davydov.
On the twenty-first of August the prince called me to his place; presenting myself to him, I explained to him the benefits of guerrilla warfare under the circumstances of the time. “The enemy follows one path,” I told him, “this path has gone out of measure in its length; transports of vital and combat food of the enemy cover the area from Gzhat to Smolensk and beyond. Meanwhile, the vastness of the part of Russia lying in the south of the Moscow Route contributes to the twists and turns not only of the parties, but of our entire army. What are the crowds of Cossacks doing at the vanguard? Leaving a sufficient number of them to maintain the outposts, it is necessary to divide the rest into parties and let them into the middle of the caravan following Napoleon. Will strong troops go to them? “They have plenty of room to avoid defeat. Will they be left alone? - They will destroy the source of strength and life of the enemy army. Where will she get supplies and food from? - Our land is not so abundant that the roadside part could feed two hundred thousand troops; weapons and gunpowder factories - not on the Smolensk road. In addition, the return appearance of our villagers among the villagers scattered from the war will encourage them and turn the military war into a people's war. Prince! I'll tell you frankly: the soul hurts from everyday parallel positions! It's time to see that they do not close the bowels of Russia. Who doesn't know that The best way to defend the object of the enemy's desire does not consist in a parallel, but in a perpendicular or, at least, in an indirect position of the army relative to this object? And therefore, if the retreat, chosen by Barclay and continued by the most illustrious, does not stop, Moscow will be taken, peace is signed in it, and we will go to India to fight for the French! I'll lie down here! In India, I will disappear with a hundred thousand of my compatriots without a name and for a benefit alien to Russia, and here I will die under the banner of independence, around which the villagers will crowd, grumbling at the violence and godlessness of our enemies ... And who knows! Maybe an army determined to operate in India! .. "
The prince interrupted the indiscreet flight of my imagination; he shook hands with me and said: “Today I will go to the most illustrious and tell him your thoughts.”
In addition to the detachment of D.V. Davydov, the detachments of A.N. Seslavin, A.S. Figner, I.S. Dorokhov, N.D. Kudashev, I.M. Vadbolsky also successfully operated. The partisan movement was such an unexpected and unpleasant surprise for the French occupiers that they tried to accuse Russia of violating the rules of war; the head of the General Staff of the French Army, Marshal Berthier, even sent Colonel Bertemi to the Headquarters of M.I. Kutuzov with a letter full of indignation. To which Kutuzov replied with a letter with the following content:
Colonel Berthemy, whom I allowed to pass to my main quarters, handed me the letter that Your Grace had instructed him to convey to me. About everything that is the subject of this new appeal, I immediately presented it to the Imperial Majesty, and the transmitter of this was, as you no doubt know, Adjutant General Prince Volkonsky. However, considering the long distance and bad roads at this time of the year, it is impossible that I can already receive an answer on this matter. Therefore, it only remains for me to refer to what I had the honor to say on this subject to General Lauriston. However, I will repeat here the truth, the significance and strength of which you, the prince, will undoubtedly appreciate: it is difficult to stop a people who are hardened by everything that they have seen, a people who have not seen wars on their land for two hundred years, a people ready to sacrifice themselves for homeland and who makes no distinction between what is accepted and what is not accepted in ordinary wars.
As for the armies entrusted to me, I hope, prince, that everyone recognizes in their mode of action the rules that characterize a brave, honest and generous people. In the course of my many years of military service, I have never known any other rules, and I am sure that the enemies with whom I have ever fought have always done justice to my principles.
Accept, Prince, the assurances of my deepest respect.
Commander-in-Chief of the Armies Field Marshal
Prince Kutuzov
The partisan and militia movement made a huge contribution to the defeat and extermination of the enemy. Cutting off the enemy's communications, exterminating his detachments, instilling fear and horror in him, hour after hour, it brought the inevitable defeat of the invaders closer. And the experience gained by the people in 1812 was very useful in the future.
Russian Civilization
The partisan movement of 1812 (partisan war) is an armed conflict between Napoleon's army and detachments of Russian partisans that broke out during the time with the French.
The partisan troops consisted mainly of Cossacks and detachments of the regular army located in the rear. Gradually they were joined by released prisoners of war, as well as volunteers from the civilian population (peasants). Partisan detachments were one of the main military forces of Russia in this war and offered significant resistance.
Creation of partisan detachments
Napoleon's army very quickly advanced inland, pursuing the Russian troops, who were forced to retreat. As a result of this, quite soon Napoleon's soldiers spread over a large territory of Russia and created communication networks with the border, along which the delivery of weapons, food and prisoners of war took place. To defeat Napoleon, it was necessary to interrupt these networks. The leadership of the Russian army decided to create numerous partisan detachments throughout the country, which were supposed to be engaged in subversive work and prevent the French army from getting everything they needed.
The first detachment was formed under the command of Lieutenant Colonel D. Davydov.
Cossack partisan detachments
Davydov presented to the leadership a plan for the partisans to attack the French, which was quickly approved. To implement the plan, the army leadership gave Davydov 50 Cossacks and 50 officers.
In September 1812, Davydov's detachment attacked a French detachment that was secretly transporting additional manpower and provisions to the camp of the main army. Due to the effect of surprise, the French were captured, some were killed, and the entire cargo was destroyed. This attack was followed by several more of the same, which turned out to be extremely successful.
Davydov's detachment began to gradually replenish with released prisoners of war and volunteers from the peasants. At the very beginning of the guerrilla war, the peasants were wary of soldiers conducting subversive activities, but soon they began to actively help and even participated in attacks on the French.
However, the height of the guerrilla war began after Kutuzov was forced to leave Moscow. He gave the order to start an active partisan activity in all directions. By that time, partisan detachments had already been formed throughout the country and numbered from 200 to 1,500 people. The main force was the Cossacks and soldiers, but the peasants also actively participated in the resistance.
Several factors contributed to the success of the guerrilla war. Firstly, the detachments always attacked suddenly and acted secretly - the French could not predict where and when the next attack would occur and could not prepare. Secondly, after the capture of Moscow, discord began in the ranks of the French.
In the middle of the war, the guerrilla attack was at its most acute stage. The French were exhausted by military operations, and the number of partisans had increased so much that they could already form their own army, not inferior to the troops of the emperor.
Peasant partisan detachments
The peasants also play an important role in the resistance. Although they did not join the detachments very actively, they actively helped the partisans. The French, deprived of food supplies from their own, in the rear constantly tried to get food from the peasants, but they did not give up and did not conduct any trade with the enemy. Moreover, the peasants burned their own warehouses and houses, if only the grain did not go to the enemies.
When the guerrilla war grew, the peasants became more actively involved in it and often attacked the enemy themselves, armed with whatever they could. The first peasant partisan detachments appeared.
Results of the partisan war of 1812
The role of the partisan war of 1812 in the victory over the French is difficult to overestimate - it was the partisans who were able to undermine the enemy's forces, weaken him and allow the regular army to drive Napoleon out of Russia.
After the victory, the heroes of the guerrilla war were duly rewarded.
State educational institution
Education Center No. 000
Heroes - partisans of the Patriotic War of 1812 D. Davydov, A. Seslavin, A. Figner, their role in the victory of Russia and the reflection of their names in the names of the streets of Moscow.
Students of 6 "A" class
Degtyareva Anastasia
Grishchenko Valeria
Markosova Karina
Project leaders:
history teacher
history teacher
Ph.D. head Scientific and Information Department of the State Institution of Culture “Museum-panorama “Battle of Borodino””
Moscow
Introduction | |
Chapter 1 Heroes - partisans D. Davydov, A. Seslavin, A. Figner | Page 6 |
1.1 Basic concepts used in the work | Page 6 |
1.2 Hero - partisan D. Davydov | Page 8 |
1.3 Hero - partisan A. Seslavin | Page 11 |
1.4 Hero - partisan A. Figner | Page 16 |
Page 27 |
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Page 27 |
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2.2 Monuments of the Patriotic War of 1812 in Moscow | Wed.30 |
Conclusion | Page 35 |
Bibliography | Page 36 |
Applications | |
Introduction
The Patriotic War of 1812 is one of the brightest events in the history of Russia. As the famous publicist and literary critic of the XIX century wrote. : "Every nation has its own history, and in history there are critical moments by which one can judge the strength and greatness of his spirit ...". [Zaichenko [In 1812, Russia showed the whole world the strength and greatness of its spirit and proved that it was impossible to defeat it , even striking in the heart, capturing Moscow. From the first days of the war, the people rose to war with the invaders, all classes of Russian society were united: nobles, peasants, raznochintsy, clergymen.
Having visited the Museum-panorama "Battle of Borodino", we wanted to learn more about the partisan heroes of the Patriotic War of 1812. From the guide we learned that for the first time the partisan movement arose during the Patriotic War of 1812. Kutuzov combined partisan struggle with the actions of the regular army, D. Davydov, A. Seslavin, A. Figner played a big role in this.
Therefore, the choice of the theme of our project is not accidental. We turned to the head of the scientific information department, Ph.D. GUK "Museum-Panorama" Battle of Borodino "" with a request to tell us about the heroes of the partisans and provide us with materials on the activities of partisan detachments.
The aim of our study- to show the need to create partisan detachments, the activities of their leaders D. Davydov, A. Seslavin, A. Figner, to note their personal qualities and fully appreciate their contribution to the victory in the Patriotic War of 1812.
In 2012 we will celebrate the 200th anniversary of the Patriotic War of 1812. It became interesting to us how the descendants paid tribute to the memory and honor, the courage of the heroes who saved Russia in that terrible time.
Hence the theme of our project "Heroes - partisans of the Patriotic War of 1812 D. Davydov, A. Seslavin, A. Figner, their role in the victory of Russia and the reflection of their names in the names of the streets of Moscow."
Object of study are the activities of partisans in the Patriotic War.
Subject of research are the personalities of D. Davydov, A. Seslavin, A. Figner and their activities in the Patriotic War of 1812.
We assume that without the action of the partisans, without their courage, heroism and dedication, the defeat of the Napoleonic army, its expulsion from Russia, is not possible.
Having studied the literature, diaries, memoirs, letters and poems on this topic, we developed a research strategy and defined research objectives.
Tasks
1. Analyze literature (essays, poems, stories, memoirs) and find out how partisan detachments acquired mass character and became widespread.
2. To study in what ways and means the partisans acted to achieve their goals and victories in the war of 1812.
3. To study the biography and activities of D. Davydov, A. Seslavin, A. Figner.
4. Name the character traits of the partisan heroes (D. Davydova, A. Seslavin, A. Figner), provide for discussion the appearance of partisans, partisan detachments, show how necessary, difficult and heroic their work was.
5. To study and visit the memorable places in Moscow associated with the war of 1812.
6. Collect material for the school - military museum and speak to the students of the education center.
To solve the tasks we used the following methods: definition of concepts, theoretical - analysis, synthesis, generalization, free interviewing, application of toponymic knowledge in the search for memorable places in Moscow.
The work was carried out in several stages:
First stage, organizational, visit to the Museum - panorama "Battle of Borodino". Research planning. Finding sources of information (interviews, reading printed sources, viewing a map, finding Internet resources) for study. Determination in what form the result of the work can be presented. Distribution of responsibilities among team members.
Second phase stating the selection of the necessary material. Interviewing (Head of the Scientific Information Department, Candidate of Historical Sciences, GUK "Panorama Museum" Battle of Borodino ""). Studying the map of Moscow. Reading and analysis of sources of information.
Third stage, forming, selection of the necessary material, finding memorable places in Moscow associated with the Patriotic War of 1812.
Fourth stage, control, report of each team member on the work done.
Fifth stage, promotional, creating a presentation, collecting material for the school - military museum and speaking to the students of the education center
Chapter 1
1.1 Basic concepts used in the work.
What is Guerrilla Warfare? How is it different from ordinary war? When and where did it appear? What are the goals and significance of the Guerrilla War? What is the difference between the Guerrilla War from the Small War and from the People's War? These questions appeared in our study of the literature. In order to correctly understand and use these terms, we need to give their concepts. Using the encyclopedia "Patriotic War of 1812": Encyclopedia. M., 2004., we learned that:
guerrilla war
In the XVIII-XIX centuries. guerrilla warfare was understood as independent actions of small mobile army detachments on the flanks, in the rear and on enemy communications. The purpose of the Guerrilla war was to disrupt the communication of enemy troops with each other and with the rear, with convoys, destroy stocks (stores) and rear military establishments, transports, reinforcements, as well as attacks on milestone posts, release of their prisoners, interception of couriers. The partisan detachments were entrusted with establishing communication between the divided parts of their army, initiating people's war behind enemy lines, obtaining information about the movement and strength of the enemy army, as well as the constant anxiety of the enemy in order to deprive him of the necessary rest and thereby lead "to exhaustion and frustration." Guerrilla warfare was seen as part of small war, since the actions of the partisans did not lead to the defeat of the enemy, but only contributed to the achievement of this goal.
In the XVIII-XIX centuries. the concept of a small war denoted the actions of troops in small detachments, as opposed to the actions of large units and formations. The Small War included guarding own troops (service at outposts, guards, patrols, pickets, patrols, etc.) and actions by detachments (simple and enhanced reconnaissance, ambushes, attacks). Guerrilla warfare was carried out in the form of short-term raids by relatively strong "flying corps" or in the form of long-term "search" for small partisan parties behind enemy lines.
Partisan actions were first used by the commander-in-chief of the 3rd Western Army, General. By permission, on August 25 (September 6), the party of the lieutenant colonel was sent to the "search".
The partisan war intensified in the autumn of 1812, when the army stood near Tarutino. In September, a “flying corps” was sent to the raid on the Mozhaisk road. In September, a colonel’s party was sent to the rear of the enemy. September 23 (October 5) - the party of the captain. September 26 (Oct. 8) - the party of the colonel, September 30 (12 Oct.) - the party of the captain.
Temporary army mobile detachments, created by the Russian command for short raids ("raids", "expeditions"), were also called "small corps", "detachments of light troops". The "light corps" consisted of regular (light cavalry, dragoons, rangers, horse artillery) and irregular (Cossacks, Bashkirs, Kalmyks) troops. Average number: 2-3 thousand people. The actions of the "light corps" were one of the forms of guerrilla warfare.
We learned that guerrilla warfare is understood as the independent actions of small mobile army detachments on the flanks, in the rear and on enemy communications. We also learned the goals of the Guerrilla War, that the Guerrilla War is part of a small war, that “flying corps” are temporary mobile units.
1.2 Davydov (1784 - 1839)
Nevstruev, 1998
Shmurzdyuk, 1998
1.3 Hero of the partisans - A. Seslavin
Along with Denis Davydov, he is one of the most famous partisans of 1812. His name is inextricably linked with the events immediately preceding the transition of the Russian troops to the offensive, which led to the death of the Napoleonic army.
Only shortly before World War II, Seslavin was promoted to captain. Such a modest progress along the "ladder of ranks" was the result of a two-time break in military service. Having graduated from the Artillery and Engineering Cadet Corps in 1798, the best military educational institution At that time, Seslavin was released as a second lieutenant in the guards artillery, in which he served for 7 years, being promoted to the next rank for this, and at the beginning of 1805 "resigned from service at the request." In the autumn of the same year, after the declaration of war with Napoleonic France, Seslavin returned to service and was assigned to the horse artillery.
For the first time he took part in hostilities in the campaign of 1807 in East Prussia. In the battle of Heilsberg, he was seriously wounded and awarded a golden weapon for his bravery. Soon after the end of the war, he left the service for the second time and spent 3 years in retirement, being treated for the consequences of a wound.
In 1810, Seslavin again returned to the army and fought against the Turks on the Danube. During the assault on Ruschuk, he walked in the head of one of the columns and, having already climbed the earthen rampart, was seriously wounded in his right hand. For differences in battles with the Turks, Seslavin was promoted to staff captain and soon after to captain.
At the beginning of World War II, Seslavin was Barclay de Tolly's adjutant. Possessing a good theoretical background, a broad military outlook and combat experience, he served in the headquarters of Barclay de Tolly as a "quartermaster", that is, an officer of the general staff. With units of the 1st Army, Seslavin took part in almost all the battles of the first period of the war - near Ostrovnaya, Smolensk, Valutina Gora and others. In the battle near Shevardino he was wounded, but remained in the ranks, participated in the Battle of Borodino and was awarded the St. George Cross of the 4th degree among the most distinguished officers.
Soon after leaving Moscow, Seslavin received a "flying detachment" and began partisan searches, in which he fully showed his brilliant military talents. His detachment, like other partisan detachments, attacked enemy transports, destroyed or captured parties of foragers and marauders. But Seslavin considered his main task to be tireless monitoring of the movement of large formations of the enemy army, believing that this reconnaissance activity could most of all contribute to the success of the operations of the main forces of the Russian army. It was these actions that glorified his name.
Having decided in Tarutino to unleash a "small war" and surround the Napoleonic army with a ring of army partisan detachments, Kutuzov clearly organized their actions, assigning a certain area to each detachment. So, Denis Davydov was ordered to act between Mozhaisk and Vyazma, Dorokhov - in the Vereya - Gzhatsk region, Efremov - on the Ryazan road, Kudashev - on Tulskaya, Seslavin and Fonvizin (the future Decembrist) - between the Smolensk and Kaluga roads.
On October 7, the day after the battle of Murat's corps near Tarutin, Napoleon gave the order to leave Moscow, intending to go to Smolensk through Kaluga and Yelnya. However, in an effort to maintain the morale of his army and at the same time mislead Kutuzov, Napoleon set out from Moscow along the old Kaluga road in the direction of Tarutino, thus giving his movement an “offensive character”. Halfway to Tarutin, unexpectedly for his army, he ordered to turn right at Krasnaya Pakhra, went by country roads to the New Kaluga road and moved along it south, to Maloyaroslavets, trying to bypass the main forces of the Russian army. Ney's corps at first continued to move along the Old Kaluga road to Tarutino and united with Murat's troops. According to Napoleon's calculation, this was to disorient Kutuzov and give him the impression that the entire Napoleonic army was marching towards Tarutino with the intention of imposing a general battle on the Russian army.
On October 10, Seslavin discovered the main forces of the French army near the village of Fominskoye and, having notified the command about this, gave the Russian troops the opportunity to preempt the enemy at Maloyaroslavets and block his path to Kaluga. Seslavin himself described this most important episode of his military activity as follows: “I was standing on a tree when I opened the movement of the French army, which stretched at my feet, where Napoleon himself was in a carriage. Several people (French) separated from the edge of the forest and the road, were captured and delivered to the Most Serene, as evidence of such an important discovery for Russia, deciding the fate of the Fatherland, Europe and Napoleon himself ... I found General Dokhturov in Aristov by accident, not at all knowing about his stay there; I rushed to Kutuzov in Tarutino. Having handed over the prisoners for presentation to the most illustrious, I went back to the detachment in order to observe Napoleon's movement more closely.
On the night of October 11, the messenger informed Kutuzov about the "discovery" of Seslavin. Everyone remembers from War and Peace the meeting between Kutuzov and the messenger sent by Dokhturov (in the Bolkhovitinov novel), described by Tolstoy on the basis of Bolgovsky's memoirs.
For the next month and a half, Seslavin acted with his detachment with exceptional courage and energy, fully justifying the characterization given to him by one of the participants in the Patriotic War as an officer of "tried courage and zeal, extraordinary enterprise." So, on October 22, near Vyazma, Seslavin, having galloped between the enemy columns, discovered the beginning of their retreat and let the Russian detachments know about it, and he himself broke into the city with the Pernovsky regiment. On October 28, near Lyakhov, together with Denis Davydov and Orlov-Denisov, he captured the brigade of General Augereau, for which he was promoted to colonel; together with another famous partisan, Figner, he recaptured from the French transport with valuables stolen in Moscow. On November 16, Seslavin broke into Borisov with his detachment, captured 3,000 prisoners, and established communication between the troops of Wittgenstein and Chichagov. Finally, on November 27, he was the first to attack the French troops in Vilna and was seriously wounded in the process.
In December 1812, Seslavin was appointed commander of the Sumy Hussar Regiment. In the autumn of 1813 and in 1814 he commanded the forward detachments of the Allied army, participated in the battles near Leipzig and Ferchampenoise; Promoted to major general for military distinction.
Seslavin, according to him, took part "in 74 combat battles" and was wounded 9 times. Intense combat service and severe injuries affected his health and mental balance. At the end of hostilities, he received a long leave for treatment abroad, visited France, Italy, Switzerland, where he walked along the path of Suvorov - through St. Gotthard and the Chortov bridge, was treated on the waters, but his health did not improve. In 1820, he left the service and retired to his small Tver estate Yesemovo, where he lived alone, without meeting with any of the neighboring landowners, for more than 30 years.
Seslavin was distinguished by exceptional courage and energy, courage fully justifying the characterization given to him by one of the participants in the Patriotic War as an officer of "tried courage and zeal, extraordinary enterprise" .. () Alexander Nikitich was a deeply educated person, was interested in various sciences. After retiring, he wrote memoirs of which only fragments have survived. This man was undeservedly forgotten by his contemporaries, but deserves to be remembered and studied by posterity.
Nevstruev, 1998
Shmurzdyuk, 1998
1.4 Hero of the partisans - A. Figner
The famous partisan of the Patriotic War, a descendant of an ancient German family who left for Russia under Peter I, b. in 1787, died on October 1, 1813. Figner's grandfather, Baron Figner von Rutmersbach, lived in Livonia, and his father, Samuil Samuilovich, having started his service from an ordinary rank, reached the rank of headquarters officer, was appointed director of a state-owned crystal factory near St. Petersburg and soon after, renamed state councilors, appointed in 1809 as vice-governor in the Pskov province (died July 8, 1811). Alexander Figner, having successfully completed the course in the 2nd Cadet Corps, was released on April 13, 1805 as a second lieutenant in the 6th artillery regiment and in the same year was sent to the Anglo-Russian expedition to the Mediterranean. Here he found an opportunity to be in Italy and lived for several months in Milan, diligently studying the Italian language, with a thorough knowledge of which he subsequently managed to render so many services to the fatherland. Upon his return to Russia, on January 17, 1807, Figner was promoted to lieutenant, and on March 16 he was transferred to the 13th artillery brigade. With the beginning of the Turkish campaign of 1810, he entered the Moldavian army, participated with a detachment of General Zass in the case on May 19 during the capture of the Turtukaya fortress and from June 14 to September 15 - in the blockade and capitulation of the Ruschuk fortress by the troops of gr. Kamensky. In a number of cases near Ruschuk, Figner managed to show excellent courage and bravery. Commanding, during the imposition of the fortress, in the nearest flying sap 8 guns, he, during the repulsion of one of the enemy's sorties, was seriously wounded in the chest, but did not leave the line, but soon volunteered for a new feat. When gr. Kamensky decided to storm Ruschuk, Figner volunteered to measure the depth of the moat and did it with a boldness that amazed the Turks themselves. The assault on July 22 failed, but Figner, who brilliantly participated in it, was awarded the Order of St. George, removed by the commander-in-chief from the artillery general Sievers, who was killed on the glacis of the fortress, and on December 8, 1810, he was honored to receive a personalized Most Gracious Rescript. In 1811, Figner returned to his homeland to meet with his father and here he married the daughter of a Pskov landowner, retired state councilor Bibikov, Olga Mikhailovna Bibikova. On December 29, 1811, he was promoted to staff captain, with a transfer to the 11th artillery brigade, and soon received a light company in command of the same brigade. The Patriotic War again called Figner to the military field. His first feat in this war was the courageous defense by fire of the guns of the left flank of the Russian troops in the case at the river. Stragani; here, having stopped the shooters overturned by the French, he, at the head of them, recaptured one of the guns of his company from the enemy, for which the commander-in-chief personally congratulated Figner with the rank of captain. With the retreat of the Russian troops through Moscow to Tarutino, Figner's combat activity changed: he handed over the command of the company to the senior officer in it, having acted shortly before in the field of partisan operations. On a secret order from Kutuzov, disguised as a peasant, Figner, accompanied by several Cossacks, went to Moscow, already occupied by the French. Figner failed to fulfill his secret intention - to somehow get to Napoleon and kill him, but nevertheless his stay in Moscow was a true horror for the French. Having formed an armed party from the inhabitants who remained in the city, he made ambushes with it, exterminated lone enemies, and after his nightly attacks, many corpses of the killed French were found every morning. His actions inspired panic fear in the enemy. The French tried in vain to find a brave and secretive avenger: Figner was elusive. Knowing fluently French, German, Italian and Polish, he wandered in all kinds of costumes during the day between the heterogeneous soldiers of the Napoleonic army and listened to their conversations, and at nightfall he ordered his daring men to kill the hated enemy. At the same time, Figner found out everything necessary about the intentions of the French, and with the collected important information, on September 20, having safely got out of Moscow, he arrived at the main apartment of the Russian army, in Tarutino. Figner's courageous enterprise and sharpness attracted the attention of the commander in chief, and he was instructed, along with other partisans, Davydov and Seslavin, to develop partisan actions on enemy messages. Gathering two hundred daring hunters and backwards, putting the footmen on peasant horses, Figner led this combined detachment to the Mozhaisk road and began to carry out his disastrous raids here in the rear of the enemy army. During the day, he hid the detachment somewhere in the nearest forest, and he himself, disguised as a Frenchman, Italian or Pole, sometimes accompanied by a trumpeter, drove around the enemy outposts, looked out for their location and, after dark, flew into the French with his partisans and every day sent to the main apartment of hundreds of prisoners. Taking advantage of the enemy's oversight, Figner beat him wherever possible; in particular, his actions intensified when armed peasants near Moscow joined the detachment. At 10 versts from Moscow, he overtook an enemy transport, took away and riveted six 12-pound. guns, blew up several charging trucks, put up to 400 people on the spot. and about 200 people, together with the Hanoverian colonel Tink, took prisoner. Napoleon appointed a prize for the head of Figner, but the latter did not stop his courageous activities; wanting to bring his heterogeneous detachment into a larger organization, he began to introduce order and discipline into it, which, however, did not please his hunters, and they fled. Then Kutuzov gave Figner 600 people at his disposal. regular cavalry and Cossacks, with officers of his choice. With this well-organized detachment, Figner became even more terrible for the French, here his outstanding abilities as a partisan developed even more, and his enterprise, reaching insane audacity, manifested itself in full splendor. Deceiving the enemy's vigilance with skillful maneuvers and secrecy of transitions and having good guides, he unexpectedly flew into the enemy, smashed foragers, burned wagons, intercepted couriers and disturbed the French day and night, appearing at different points and everywhere carrying death and captivity. Napoleon was forced to send infantry and Ornano's cavalry division to the Mozhaisk road against Figner and other partisans, but all searches for the enemy were in vain. Several times the French overtook the Figner detachment, surrounded it with superior forces, it seemed that the death of the brave partisan was inevitable, but he always managed to deceive the enemy with cunning maneuvers. Figner's courage reached the point that once, near Moscow itself, he attacked Napoleon's guards cuirassiers, wounded their colonel and captured them, along with 50 soldiers. Before the battle of Tarutino, he passed "through all the French outposts", made sure of the isolation of the French avant-garde, reported that to the commander-in-chief and thereby had considerable benefit in the complete defeat of Murat's troops that followed the next day. With the beginning of Napoleon's retreat from Moscow, the people's war ; Taking advantage of this favorable circumstance for the partisan, Figner acted tirelessly. Together with Seslavin, he recaptured a whole transport with jewels looted by the French in Moscow; soon after, meeting with an enemy detachment at the village. Stone, broke it, put in place up to 350 people. and took about the same number of lower ranks with 5 officers captured, and, finally, on November 27, in the case of p. Lyakhov, uniting with the partisan detachments of Count Orlov-Denisov, Seslavin and Denis Davydov, contributed to the defeat of the French General Augereau, who laid down his weapons by the end of the battle. Admired by the exploits of Figner, Emperor Alexander promoted him to lieutenant colonel, with a transfer to the guards artillery, and awarded him 7,000 rubles. and, at the same time, at the request of the commander-in-chief and the English agent at the main apartment, R. Wilson, who was a witness to many of Figner's exploits, freed his father-in-law, the former Pskov vice-governor Bibikov, from trial and punishment. Upon his return from St. Petersburg, Figner overtook our army already in northern Germany, under besieged Danzig. Here he volunteered to fulfill the courageous commission of Mr. Wittgenstein - to get into the fortress, collect all the necessary information about the strength and location of the fortress werks, about the size of the garrison, the number of military and food supplies, and also secretly incite the inhabitants of Danzig to revolt against the French. Only with an extraordinary presence of mind and an excellent knowledge of foreign languages could Figner dare to carry out such a dangerous assignment. Under the guise of an unfortunate Italian, robbed by the Cossacks, he entered the city; here, however, they did not immediately believe his stories and put him in prison. For two months Figner languished in it, tormented by incessant interrogations; he was required to prove his true origin from Italy, any minute he could be recognized as a spy and shot. The stern commandant of Danzig himself, General Rapp, interrogated him, but his extraordinary ingenuity and resourcefulness saved this time the brave daredevil. Remembering his long stay in Milan, he introduced himself as the son of a well-known Italian family, told, at a confrontation with a native of Milan, who happened to be in Danzig, all the smallest details about how old his father and mother were, what condition, on what street they were standing. house and even the color of the roof and shutters, and not only managed to justify himself, but, hiding behind ardent devotion to the emperor of the French, even crept into the confidence of Rapp so much that he sent him with important dispatches to Napoleon. Of course, Figner, having got out of Danzig, delivered the dispatches, together with the information he had obtained, to our main apartment. For the accomplished feat, he was promoted to colonel and temporarily left at the main apartment. Following, however, his vocation, he again devoted himself to the activities of the partisan. At his suggestion, a detachment was formed from various deserters of the Napoleonic army, mostly Spaniards, forcibly recruited into it, as well as from German volunteers, and was called the "legion of revenge"; in order to ensure the reliability of partisan actions, a combined team from various hussar and Cossack regiments was attached to the detachment, which formed the core of the detachment. With this detachment, Figner again opened his disastrous raids on the enemy in the new theater of war. On August 22, 1813, he defeated an enemy detachment that he met at Cape Niske, three days later appeared in the vicinity of Bautzen, on August 26, at Koenigsbrück, he passed 800 paces past a puzzled enemy who had not even fired a single shot, and on August 29 attacked the French General Mortier at Speyrsweiler and took several hundred people prisoner. Continuing further movement ahead of the Silesian army, illuminating the area, the Figner partisan detachment met on September 26 at Eulenburg with the corps of General Sacken, but on the same day, separated from it, took the direction of the Elbe. Twice the detachment then encountered enemy detachments, so few in number that their extermination could be certain, but Figner evaded attacks and did not even allow the Cossacks to chase the lagging behind. The brave partisan was obviously saving men and horses for some more important undertaking. Seeing from the movements of the belligerents that between the Elbe and Sala the fate of Germany would be decided, Figner assumed that in early October, Napoleon, in view of the decisive battle, would remove his troops from the left bank of the Elbe, and therefore, in anticipation of this movement, he wanted, holding out for several days near Dessau, then invade Westphalia, which remained loyal to the Prussian government, and raise its population against the French. But his assumptions were not justified. Napoleon, due to changed circumstances, decided to move to the right bank of the Elbe, and, in accordance with the orders given to them, Marshals Renier and Ney moved to Wittenberg and Dessau to master the crossings. On September 30, one of the patrols informed Figner about several squadrons of enemy cavalry that had appeared on the road from Leipzig to Dessau, but he, confident that the French troops had already begun a retreat towards Sala, explained the appearance of the squadrons by foragers sent from the enemy. Soon a party of Prussian black hussars ran into the detachment, explaining that the enemy squadrons belonged to a strong vanguard, followed by the entire army of Napoleon. Realizing the danger, Figner immediately turned the detachment into the gap between the main roads that went to Wörlitz and Dessau, and approached the Elbe with a forced march towards evening. Here news was received from the head of the Prussian troops stationed at Dessau that, in view of the unexpected advance of the French army towards this city, the Tauenzin corps would retreat to the right bank of the river, leaving not a single detachment on the left. But the people and horses of the Figner detachment were tired of the reinforced transition in the vicinity of Dessau, devastated by the French and allies; in addition, Figner was sure that the French movement was only a demonstration to divert the attention of Bernadotte and Blucher, and that Tauentzin, convinced of this, would cancel the proposed retreat to the right bank of the Elbe. Figner decided to stay on the left bank. On the next day, he planned to hide his detachment in the dense bushes of a small island near Wörlitz and then, letting the French pass, rush, depending on the circumstances, either to Westphalia or to the Leipzig road to search for enemy carts and parks. On the basis of all these considerations, Figner deployed his detachment seven versts above Dessau; the left flank of the detachment adjoined the coastal road to this city, the right flank to the forest, which stretched for a verst along the river, in front, about seventy sazhens, lay a small village; in it, as in the forest, were the Spaniards, and two platoons of Mariupol and Belorussian hussars stood between the village and the forest, the Don Cossacks - on the left flank. The patrols sent in all directions reported that the enemy was nowhere to be seen at a distance of 5 versts, and the reassured Figner allowed the detachment to make fire and indulge in rest. Ho, this was the last rest for almost the entire detachment. Before dawn on October 1, the partisans roused themselves with a drawn-out command: "to the horses!" Rifle shots and the cries of the fighting were heard in the village. It turned out that two or three platoons of the enemy cavalry, taking advantage of the night and the carelessness of the Spaniards, broke their picket and rushed through the streets, but, met by the hussars, turned back and, pursued by shots, scattered across the field. Several captured Polish lancers showed that they belonged to the vanguard of Ney's corps advancing along the Dessau road. Meanwhile, dawn began, and no more than a hundred fathoms from the village, the formation of the enemy cavalry was discovered. The situation became critical, moreover, with the rising of the sun, the presence of the enemy was detected not on one, but on all sides. Obviously, a detachment of brave men was bypassed and pressed against the Elbe. Figner gathered the officers of the detachment. “Gentlemen,” he said, “we are surrounded; we must break through; if the enemy breaks our ranks, then don’t think about me anymore, save yourself in all directions; I told you about this many times. on the Torgau road, about ten versts from here ... "The detachment entered the gap between the village, occupied by a platoon of Spaniards, and the forest and prepared for a friendly attack. Commanding words of enemy officers were heard in the fog. "Akhtyrians, Alexandrians, peaks at the ready, march - march!" Figner commanded, and the detachment cut into the enemy, making his way with bayonets and pikes. Inspired by the example of their leader, a handful of brave men performed miracles of courage, but, crushed by disproportionately superior forces, were pushed back to the very bank of the Elbe. The partisans fought to the death: their ranks were broken through, the flanks were covered, most of the officers and lower ranks were killed. Finally, the detachment could not stand it and rushed into the river, seeking salvation by swimming. Weakened and wounded people and horses were carried by the current and died in the waves or from enemy bullets raining down on them from the shore. Figner was among the dead; on the shore they found only his saber, taken by him in 1812 from a French general. Thus ended the days of the famous partisan. His name became the best asset in the history of the exploits of the Russian troops, to increase the glory of which, it seemed, he devoted all his strength.
Disregarding life, he volunteered to carry out the most dangerous assignments, led the most risky enterprises, selflessly loving his homeland, he seemed to be looking for an opportunity for cruel revenge on Napoleon and his hordes. The entire Russian army knew about his exploits and highly appreciated them. Back in 1812, Kutuzov, sending a letter to his wife with Figner, punished her: “Look at him intently: this is an extraordinary person; I have never seen such a high soul; he is a fanatic in courage and patriotism, and God knows what he won't do it." , Comrade Figner. by occupation, he decided to cast a shadow on the glorious partisan, explaining, in his letter to, all the heroism of Figner only with a thirst to satisfy his immense feelings of ambition and pride. Figner is depicted in different colors according to the testimony of his other comrades and contemporaries, who valued in the famous partisan his true heroism, bright mind, captivating eloquence and outstanding willpower.
Despite different opinions about Figner's personal qualities, this man was brave, courageous, daring, fearless. He knew several foreign languages. The French appointed a large sum for the capture, they called him a “terrible robber”, who is elusive like the devil .. This man deserves the attention and memory of his descendants.
Conclusion
During the preparation of the counteroffensive, the combined forces of the army, militias and partisans fettered the actions of the Napoleonic troops, inflicted damage on the enemy's manpower, and destroyed military property. The troops of the Tarutinsky camp firmly covered the paths to the southern regions not devastated by the war. During the stay of the French in Moscow, their army, not conducting open hostilities, at the same time suffered significant losses every day. It became more and more difficult for Napoleon from Moscow to communicate with the rear troops, to send urgent dispatches to France and other Western European countries. The Smolensk road, which remained the only protected postal route leading from Moscow to the west, was constantly subjected to partisan raids. They intercepted French correspondence, especially valuable ones were delivered to the Headquarters of the Russian army.
The actions of the partisans forced Napoleon to send large forces to guard the roads. So, to ensure the safety of the Smolensk road, Napoleon advanced to Mozhaisk part of the corps of Marshal Victor. Marshals Junot and Murat were ordered to strengthen the protection of the Borovsk and Podolsk roads.
The heroic struggle of the army, partisans, the people's militia, led by Kutuzov and his headquarters, the feat of the people in the rear created favorable conditions for the Russian army to go on the counteroffensive. The war entered a new phase.
Analyzing the actions of military partisans and summing up their activities during the army’s stay in the Tarutino camp, Kutuzov wrote: “During the six-week rest of the Main Army at Tarutino, my partisans instilled fear and horror in the enemy, taking away all means of food.” Thus was laid the foundation for the impending victory. The names of Davydov, Seslavin, Figner and other brave commanders became known throughout Russia.
Denis Davydov, one of the first theorists of the partisan war in 1812, reasonably believed that during the retreat of the Napoleonic army, the partisans participated, together with the main parts of the Russian army, in all the most important military operations, inflicting enormous damage on the enemy. He emphasized that “partisan warfare also has an impact on the main operations of the enemy army” and that partisan detachments “help the pursuing army to push back the retreating army and take advantage of local benefits for its final destruction” 55. More than a third of the prisoners, a huge number of rifles, even cannons, various wagons were taken by the partisans. During the retreat of the Napoleonic army, the number of prisoners increased so rapidly that the command of the advancing Russian troops did not have time to allocate detachments for their escort and left a significant part of the prisoners in the villages under the protection of armed villagers.
Kutuzov had every reason to inform the tsar that "my partisans instilled fear and horror in the enemy, taking away all means of food."
Chapter 2 Gratitude of the descendants to the heroes of the Patriotic War of 1812 in Moscow
2.1 Patriotic War of 1812 in the names of Moscow streets Many architectural ensembles and monuments of Moscow today remind of the feat of the people in 1812. At Poklonnaya Hill on Kutuzovsky Prospekt, the Triumphal Arch rises. Not far from the Arc de Triomphe are the Battle of Borodino Panorama Museum, a monument to the heroes of this battle, and the famous Kutuzovskaya Hut. The monument was erected on Victory Square.
From here, the road to the center of Moscow leads through the monument to the heroes of Borodino - the Borodino Bridge. And there, not far from Kropotkinskaya Street, where the partisan's house of 1812 is located, and to the Khamovniki barracks (on Komsomolsky Prospekt), where the Moscow militia was formed in 1812. Not far from here is the Manege located next to the Kremlin - also a monument to the heroes of the Patriotic War of 1812, built for the 5th anniversary of victory in this war.
Every place, every house or other monument associated with the Patriotic War of 1812,
gives rise to a sense of pride: for the heroic past of our people
Street names are also reminiscent of the war of 1812. So, in Moscow, a number of streets are named after the heroes of 1812: Kutuzovsky Prospekt, Bagrationovsky, Platovsky, Barclay Drives, streets of General Yermolov, D. Davydov, Seslavin, Vasilisa Kozhina, Gerasim Kurin, st. Bolshaya Filevskaya, st. Tuchkovskaya and many others.
Metro stations Bagrationovskaya, Kutuzovskaya, Fili, Filevsky Park are also reminiscent of the war.
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Fig.1 Seslavinskaya street
Seslavinskaya street (July 17, 1963) Named in honor of A.N. Seslavin () - lieutenant general of the hero of the Patriotic War of 1812
· 
Denis Davydov Street (May 9, 1961) Named after DV Davydov () - a poet one of the organizers of the partisan movement in 1812
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One thousand eight hundred and twelfth year (1812) street (May 12, 1959) Named in honor of the feat committed by the peoples of Russia in 1812 to protect their Fatherland
· Kutuzovsky Prospekt (December 13, 1957). Named after -Kutuzov ()
Field Marshal General, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army during https://pandia.ru/text/77/500/images/image007_5.jpg" width="296" height="222">
Rice. 3 on
2.2 Monuments of the Patriotic War of 1812 in Moscow
· The 1812 memorial at Poklonnaya Gora includes several objects.
Triumphal Arch
Kutuzov hut
Church of the Archangel Michael near the Kutuzov hut
Panorama Museum "Battle of Borodino"
Kutuzov and glorious sons of the Russian people
Fig. 4 Arc de Triomphe
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Fig. 5 Kutuzov and the glorious sons of the Russian people
Fig.6 Kutuzovskaya hut
Rice. 7 Church of the Archangel Michael near the Kutuzov hut
Monuments of the Patriotic War of 1812 in Moscow
Cathedral of Christ the Savior
Kremlin arsenal
Moscow Manege
Alexander Garden
Georgievsky Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace
Borodinsky bridge
Fig. 8 Cathedral of Christ the Savior
Fig. 9 Kremlin arsenal
Rice. 10 Moscow Manege
Fig. 11 Alexander Garden
Fig. 12 Georgievsky Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace
Fig.13 Borodinsky bridge
Conclusion
In the process of working on the project, we studied a lot of material about partisans and their activities during the Patriotic War of 1812.
Even from literature lessons, we know the name of Denis Davydov, but he was known as a poet. Having visited the Museum-panorama "Battle of Borodino", we recognized Denis Davydov from the other side - a brave, brave partisan, a competent commander. Reading his biography in more detail, we became aware of the names of Alexander Seslavin,
Alexander Figner, who were also leaders of partisan detachments.
The guerrillas made daring raids on the enemy, obtained important information about the activities of the enemy. highly appreciated the activities of military partisans for their courage, unbridled courage,
Denis Davydov after the Patriotic War of 1812 summarized and systematized
military results of the actions of military partisans in two works of 1821: "Experience in the theory of partisan actions" and "Diary of partisan
actions of 1812”, where he rightly emphasized the significant effect of the new
for the 19th century forms of war to defeat the enemy. [12 c.181]
The collected material replenished the information fund of the school museum.
1. 1812 in Russian poetry and memoirs of contemporaries. M., 1987.
2. . Moscow: Moscow worker, 1971.
3. Heroes of 1812: Collection. M .: Young Guard, 1987.
4. , . Military Gallery of the Winter Palace. L .: Publishing house "Aurora", 1974.
5. Davydov Denis. Military notes. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1940.
6. Moscow. Big illustrated encyclopedia. Moscow studies from A to. Eksmo, 2007
7. Moscow magazine. History of Russian Goverment. 2001. No. 1. p.64
8. Moscow is modern. Atlas. M. Print, 2005.
9. "Thunderstorm of the twelfth year ..." M. "Science" 1987 p.192
10. Patriotic War of 1812: Encyclopedia. M., 2004.
11. Popov Davydov. Moscow: Education, 1971.
12. Sirotkin war of 1812: Prince. For students Art. environment classes. school-M.: Enlightenment, 198s.: ill.
13. Khataevich. Moscow: Moscow worker, 1973.
14. Figner Posluzhn. list, store in the archives of St. Petersburg. artillery. museum. - I. R .: "Travel notes of an artilleryman from 1812 to 1816", Moscow, 1835 - "Northern Post", 1813, No. 49. - "Rus. Inv.", 1838, No. No. 91-99. - "Military Collection", 1870, No. 8. - "To All. Illustr.", 1848, No. 35. - "Russian Star", 1887, v. 55, p. 321- 338. - "Military encyclical lexicon", St. Petersburg, 1857. D.S. [Polovtsov]
The partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812 significantly influenced the outcome of the campaign. The French met fierce resistance from the local population. Demoralized, deprived of the opportunity to replenish their food supplies, ragged and frozen, Napoleon's army was brutally beaten by flying and peasant partisan detachments of Russians.
Squadrons of flying hussars and detachments of peasants
The greatly stretched Napoleonic army, pursuing the retreating Russian troops, quickly became a convenient target for partisan attacks - the French often found themselves far removed from the main forces. The command of the Russian army decided to create mobile detachments to carry out sabotage behind enemy lines and deprive him of food and fodder.
During the Patriotic War, there were two main types of such detachments: flying squadrons of army cavalrymen and Cossacks, formed by order of the commander-in-chief Mikhail Kutuzov, and groups of peasant partisans, united spontaneously, without army leadership. In addition to the actual sabotage actions, the flying detachments were also engaged in reconnaissance. Peasant self-defense forces basically fought off the enemy from their villages and villages.
Denis Davydov was mistaken for a Frenchman
Denis Davydov is the most famous commander of a partisan detachment in the Patriotic War of 1812. He himself drew up a plan of action for mobile partisan formations against the Napoleonic army and offered it to Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration. The plan was simple: to annoy the enemy in his rear, to capture or destroy enemy warehouses with food and fodder, to beat small groups of the enemy.
Under the command of Davydov there were over one and a half hundred hussars and Cossacks. Already in September 1812, in the area of the Smolensk village of Tsarevo-Zaimishche, they captured a French caravan of three dozen carts. More than 100 Frenchmen from the accompanying detachment were killed by Davydov's cavalrymen, another 100 were captured. This operation was followed by others, also successful.
Davydov and his team did not immediately find support from the local population: at first, the peasants mistook them for the French. The commander of the flying detachment even had to put on a peasant's caftan, hang an icon of St. Nicholas on his chest, grow a beard and switch to the language of the Russian common people - otherwise the peasants did not believe him.
Over time, the detachment of Denis Davydov increased to 300 people. The cavalry attacked the French units, sometimes having a fivefold numerical superiority, and defeated them, taking the carts and freeing the prisoners, it even happened to capture enemy artillery.
After leaving Moscow, on the orders of Kutuzov, flying partisan detachments were created everywhere. Mostly these were Cossack formations, each numbering up to 500 sabers. At the end of September, Major General Ivan Dorokhov, who commanded such a formation, captured the city of Vereya near Moscow. The combined partisan groups could withstand the large military formations of Napoleon's army. So, at the end of October, during a battle near the Smolensk village of Lyakhovo, four partisan detachments completely defeated the more than one and a half thousandth brigade of General Jean-Pierre Augereau, capturing him himself. For the French, this defeat was a terrible blow. On the contrary, the Russian troops, this success, encouraged and set them up for further victories.
Peasant Initiative
A significant contribution to the destruction and exhaustion of the French units was made by the peasants who organized themselves into combat detachments. Their partisan units began to form even before Kutuzov's instructions. While willingly helping the flying detachments and units of the regular Russian army with food and fodder, the peasants at the same time harmed the French everywhere and in every possible way - they exterminated enemy foragers and marauders, often at the approaches of the enemy they themselves burned their houses and went into the forests. Fierce resistance on the ground intensified as the demoralized French army became more and more a collection of robbers and marauders.
One of these detachments was assembled by the dragoons Yermolai Chetvertakov. He taught the peasants how to use captured weapons, organized and successfully carried out many sabotage against the French, capturing dozens of enemy carts with food and livestock. At one time, up to 4 thousand people entered the Chetvertakov compound. And such cases when peasant partisans, led by military personnel, noble landlords, successfully operated in the rear of the Napoleonic troops, were not isolated.
