Battle of Konotop Battle of Konotop The total number of the coalition of Tatars and Vyhovsky

“The flower of the Moscow cavalry, who served the happy campaigns of 1654 and 1655, died in one day, and never after that the Tsar of Moscow could lead such a brilliant army into the field. In mourning clothes, Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich went out to the people and horror seized Moscow ... "

The lines quoted above from the historical work of the famous Russian scientist Sergei Solovyov could have been sent to a meeting of the club “What? Where? When?", Being absolutely sure that it is unlikely that erudite people will be able to answer the question: "Who was that terrible force that in the late 1650s destroyed the color of the Russian army in one day?" And even a hint like: “Did the Ukrainian army do this by chance?” - would hardly reduce your chances of winning in a game against club members.

Confidence in this inspired at least the fact that this battle, which took place only five years after the “memorable act of reunification of the Ukrainian people with the fraternal Russian people”, was not mentioned in the textbooks, they tried not to talk about it in the scientific literature. It is noteworthy that even in the Russian folk song “Under the city near Konotop”, which mourns the death of the Russian prince-bogatyr Semyon Pozharsky, to whom they “sang the eternal song” precisely after this battle, not a single word is mentioned about the “merits” of the Orthodox Zaporizhian Army in inglorious death of the royal warriors. All the blame is transferred to the Tatars, Kalmyks, Bashkirs, who "if black crows" pressed on the Orthodox.

And besides, it was the troops of the Ukrainian hetman Ivan Vyhovsky, with the help of his ally, the Crimean Khan Mehmed IV Giray, who in the summer of 1659 won a convincing victory near Konotop over the tsarist troops led by governors princes N. Trubetskoy, S. Pozharsky, S. Lvov. But did Ukraine need this victory? Was the not at all militant Ukrainian hetman striving for it? After all, as you know, even a bad peace is better than a good war...

ORIGINAL SIN OF UKRAINIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS: "TREASON" OF HETMAN IVAN VYHOVSKY?

Obviously, even people who are far from professional studies in history were fed up with the topic of “treason” by Hetman Ivan Mazepa. It is less known that Mazepa's opponent, Peter I, justifying the expediency of eliminating the hetman's office in Ukraine, called all Ukrainian rulers known to him traitors, making an exception only for Bogdan Khmelnitsky and Ivan Skoropadsky. It is clear that Bogdan's successor, Ivan Ostapovich Vygovsky, should open this "honorary" list. After all, it was he, of course, along with Mazepa, who was branded by Russian historiography as a "traitor", "lyakh", "Jesuit", "hidden Catholic" and the like.

It often follows from historical works that even during the lifetime of his predecessor, Vyhovsky hatched secret intentions to tear Ukraine away from the union with Moscow, restore the Polish-gentry order and the power of the Polish king on Ukrainian soil, and even ruin the Orthodox Church. The absurdity of the last accusation is obvious if only because it was the Vyhovsky family, occupying high positions in the Commonwealth, that never broke with Orthodoxy, but, on the contrary, took care of its interests in every possible way, initiated the founding of Orthodox brotherhoods, and was engaged in church affairs. It is just as hard to believe in the intentions of the hetman, who felt the fullness of power in his hands, to renounce it in favor of the king of the Commonwealth and the Polish magnates. The problem of his attitude towards Moscow looks somewhat more complicated.

Ukrainian jingoistically minded historians argue that from the very beginning Vyhovsky, unlike Khmelnitsky, was aware of the insecurity of a close alliance with the tsar and tried to get rid of him. In fact, the insight to the hetman came later. Having joined the struggle for the hetman's mace, Ivan Ostapovich seriously counted on the support of the tsarist government. After all, his relationship with the Polish government can hardly be called idyllic - the Poles considered the former general clerk in the Khmelnitsky government to be an even more consistent opponent of the Polish king than the hetman himself was.

From the diplomatic correspondence of the ambassador of the Hungarian prince, one can learn that between Vyhovsky and Moscow there were even some secret agreements on the support of the tsar for the candidacy of the latter in the future hetman elections. But already from Vyhovsky’s diplomatic correspondence with the tsarist government, it unequivocally follows that this assistance, as well as recognition of the competence of the hetman in general, was associated by the Russian side with his concessions in the matter of limiting the sovereignty of the Ukrainian state in favor of the tsar.

The behavior of the tsarist ambassadors in Ukraine testified to the fact that Moscow needed such a hetman at the head of the Zaporizhian Army, who, according to the apt expression of Ivan Ostapovich himself, could, “taking by the crest, lead him.” Taking into account the too great political appetites of the Muscovites and feeling the serious support of the foreman behind him, the applicant refused any concessions, declaring his intention to continue the policy of his predecessor. It was from then, from the end of the summer - the beginning of the autumn of 1657, between Vygovsky and Moscow that "a black cat ran".

Not wanting to be a puppet in the hands of the boyars and the governor of the tsar, in October 1657 Ivan Ostapovich convenes the General Council in Korsun. Having described the plans of the Russian government, the hetman renounces his powers and places a mace in front of the participants of the council. Now it is difficult to establish how sincere Vygovsky was in his renunciation of power. Most likely it was a skillful political move. His correctness was confirmed by the subsequent development of events. The Cossacks not only returned the Hetman's Kleynodes to him, but also expressed their full confidence in him. political course and swore to support his actions directed against the claims of the royal governors.

In order to win over as many of the influential Cossack elite as possible, Vyhovsky at the Rada declares his readiness to revise the fundamental foundations for the functioning of the Hetmanate's political power system, voluntarily ceding a number of his powers to the Cossack elders and thereby establishing a full-fledged republican power model, significantly violated by authoritarian methods of government. Khmelnitsky.

Vyhovsky's unexpected political moves ensured the strengthening of his authority. Having received a message about the unanimous support of Ivan Ostapovich by the participants of the Korsun Rada, the tsarist government for the first time officially recognizes the hetman's powers of Vyhovsky and declares no intention to revise the nature of Ukrainian-Russian relations.

But the political victory won in the fall of 1657 in Korsun for Vygovsky in the end turned out to be pyrrhic victory. The hetman's flirtation with the foreman against the background of the latter's rapid enrichment and the same incessant impoverishment of the ordinary Cossacks, the attempts of the Cossack elite to secure the free peasantry in subordination provoke the growth of anti-senior and anti-hetman sentiments in Ukraine. At the head of these speeches - no matter how sad it is to realize - is the Zaporizhzhya Sich. And here it should be noted that the role of the latter in the processes of Ukrainian state building in the domestic historical literature often overly idealized, which does not fully correspond to historical reality. After all, it is the leaders of the Zaporizhzhya Cossacks, in search of support in the fight against the Hetman's government, who turn to Moscow for help, simultaneously calling on its leadership to significantly limit the prerogatives of the Hetman's leadership, leaving behind the hetmans only those powers that they possessed, being subjects of the Polish king.

Internal instability in Ukraine and the appearance of an unexpected ally in the person of the Zaporizhzhya Sich allows the Russian ruling elite, ignoring the warnings of the ancient Greek philosopher, to try to enter the same river for the second time...

UKRAINIAN-CRIMEAN "REUNION" OF 1658. ITS BACKGROUND AND CONSEQUENCES

The moral support provided by Moscow to the anti-Hetman opposition significantly increased its strength. By the spring of 1658, armed anti-Hetman demonstrations engulfed the Zaporozhian Sich, the Poltava regiment, and most of Mirgorod. Vygovsky's appeals to the tsar for help to quell the riots did not bring success. Taking into account the specifics of the political situation prevailing at that time in Central and Eastern Europe, Ivan Ostapovich could receive real military assistance in taming the rebellion only from the Crimean Khanate.

It is clear that a logical question arises here: was it worth drawing external forces to resolve an internal conflict? But we must not forget that the existing internal crisis was provoked to a large extent also by external interference. Therefore, everything is not as simple as it might seem at first glance.

Geographically, the then Ukrainian state was separated from the Crimean Khanate only by a strip of neutral Wild Fields. In the political dimension, the shortest route from the hetman's residence in Chigirin to the Khan's palace in Bakhchisarai ran through ... Warsaw. After all, the Ukrainian-Russian treaty of 1654 upset the Cossack brotherhood with Crimea, but at the same time made possible the emergence of a military-political union of Crimea and Poland, which lasted for the next twelve years. And now, in order to receive military assistance from the Crimean Khan, Vyhovsky needed to establish political relations with the Polish king.

After the Ukrainian-Polish consultations began in March 1658, in April the Crimean horde, allied to Vyhovsky, entered Ukraine. With her support, at the beginning of the summer of 1658, the hetman near Poltava managed to win a decisive victory over the Ukrainian armed opposition.

Reporting the results of the Battle of Poltava to Moscow, Vyhovsky in no way hints at the desire to break off relations with the tsar and tries in every possible way to convince him of the absence of anti-Moscow sentiments in the newly concluded alliance with the Crimea. Nevertheless, in August 1658, the tsarist troops led by the Belgorod voivode G. Romodanovsky were introduced to the Left Bank, in the convoy of which the leaders of the anti-Hetman opposition who survived the Poltava rout find refuge. Romodanovsky, known for his arbitrariness, from among them, in contrast to Vyhovsky, proclaims Ivan Bespaly as hetman, who was most suitable for the role of hetman, whom the Russian governor could, “taking by the crest, lead him.” From that moment on, Vyhovsky had no choice but to speed up the conclusion of an agreement with the Polish king, since the authority of the Crimean Khan was too little to keep Moscow from intervening in Ukraine.

SHORT LIFE OF THE POLISH-LITHUANIA-UKRAINIAN (-RUSSIAN) UNION

The Gadyach agreement of 1658 proclaimed the appearance on the map of Europe of a new federal state - the Polish-Lithuanian-Ukrainian Commonwealth (that is, the republic). These political peoples were united as "free with free" and "equal with equals." Each of the parts of the state had its own administration, finances, army.

It is significant that in the text of the agreement, Ukraine retained the right to exempt its armed forces from the participation of the federation in the war with Moscow, if it comes to that. Moreover, hetman Vyhovsky, not giving up hope of avoiding an armed conflict with Moscow, offered the Russian side to join the Polish-Lithuanian-Ukrainian union. Moreover, given the desire of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich to be at the same time the Tsar of Moscow, and the King of Poland, and the Grand Duke of Lithuania, Chernigov, Kyiv, Little Russia, Volyn, Podolsk "and others, and others", the proposal of the Ukrainian hetman looked quite realistic. In any case, since the autumn of 1656, the Russian leadership had been completely sincerely discussing with the Poles the possibility of the tsar's accession to the Polish throne and the proclamation of a personal union of the two states.

Hetman's proposals took on even more realistic outlines from the end of 1658, when troops loyal to Vygovsky, together with Crimean Tatars and Polish units, drove Romodanovsky's troops from the Left Bank. The participants in the secret meeting, which took place in February 1659 in the tsar's chambers, also agreed that an agreement could be concluded with Vyhovsky on the basis of the provisions tested in Gadyach. However, according to the opinion of the tsar's advisers, it should have been bilateral, without the participation of Poles and Lithuanians.

At the same time, obviously, in order to be more convincing in negotiations with the Ukrainian leadership, the boyar A.M. Trubetskoy, sent to Ukraine, was given at the disposal of ... almost a hundred thousandth tsarist army.

It is difficult to predict what the “negotiations” with such a representative “embassy” could lead to, which in Ukraine was joined by the troops of Prince Romodanovsky, already familiar to us, and the detachments of I. Bespaly. Obviously, Vyhovsky himself was not confident in their positive results either. That is why he did not agree to Trubetskoy's proposal to meet at the negotiating table, sarcastically complaining that it was very dangerous to meet with the boyars - one could lose one's head during such meetings.

The tsar’s voivode himself did not really hope for them, who, as soon as he crossed the Ukrainian border, immediately began to “agitate” the Cossacks for the tsar by force of arms. Almost the most active in this agitation was Prince Pozharsky, already familiar to us from the mentioned Russian folk song, who, as S. Velichko testifies, “having captured the city of Serebryany, cut down some of the inhabitants there, and captured others with all their property.”

“FROM THAT DEFEAT COULD ESCAPE... IS THE ONE WHO HAD A WINGED HORSE”

This is how the Ukrainian chronicler Samiylo Velichko commented on the prospects for saving the royal warriors in the battle of Konotop. And the battle itself was preceded by the heroic defense of the Konotop fortress by five thousand Ukrainian Cossacks under the command of Nizhyn colonel Grigory Gulyanitsky, which was besieged and stormed, I repeat, by the hundred thousandth (!) Royal army. Only referring to God's help, God's providence, one can explain how the Cossacks of Gulyanitsky managed to keep the city in their hands, repelling the constant attacks of such a superior enemy, from the end of April to the end of June 1659.

The unprecedented resilience of the defenders of Konotop allowed Vyhovsky literally to collect faithful Cossack regiments bit by bit, call on the Crimean horde for help, mobilize regiments of volunteers from Poland, Moldova, Wallachia, Transylvania.

A test of strength took place on June 24 near the village of Shapovalivka, where the Ukrainian hetman defeated the enemy's forward patrol. And on June 29, 1659, on the day of Saints Peter and Paul, Vygovsky, at the head of his international forces, approached the Sosnovskaya ferry near Konotop. Not allowing the enemy to come to his senses, the hetman attacked the 15,000-strong Russian detachment defending the crossing from the march. Vygovsky's dragoons pushed the enemy back across the river, and the cavalry rushed after him. The Crimean Tatar army was left in ambush.

Having inflicted considerable losses on the enemy, the Ukrainian troops entered into battle with the regiments of Prince Pozharsky, who came to the aid of the retreating. After that, Vygovsky gave the order to withdraw his forces to their previous positions, pretending to be running. Prince Pozharsky and other Russian governors at the head of the main forces rushed after them and fell into a pre-arranged ambush. Only the vast majority of the tsarist warriors crossed to the second bank of the river, when the Tatars hit them from an ambush. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian Cossacks managed to destroy the crossing and dam the river below it. The water overflowed and made it impossible for the Russian cavalry to return to their original positions. The heavy royal cavalry got stuck in the swampy places of the river, “real konotops,” as one of the contemporaries of the events wrote about it. Noticing from the walls of Konotop the development of the battle at the crossing and near it, the regiments of Gulyanitsky, exhausted by the siege, also went on the offensive.

The result of the Battle of Konotop was one of the most sensitive and shameful defeats of the tsarist troops of the second half of the 17th century, already mentioned at the beginning. According to various sources, from 30 to 60 thousand royal warriors were killed on the Konotop field. The tsarist governors were captured: Prince Pozharsky, Prince Lvov, the Buturlin brothers, Prince Lyapunov and others. Most of them went into captivity in the Crimea. And the hero of the Russian folk song Prince Semyon Pozharsky, on the orders of the Khan, was executed at his headquarters. But the reason for this was not the knightly prowess shown by the governor on the battlefield, but, most likely, the dirty abuse that he “honored” Mehmed IV. As Velichko writes about this, Pozharsky, “inflamed with anger, scolded the khan according to the Moscow custom and spat between his eyes. For this, the khan became furious and ordered to immediately cut off the head of the prince in front of him.

Having received news from Governor Trubetskoy about the Konotop defeat, Muscovites immediately remembered the campaign against Moscow by another Ukrainian hetman, Petro Sahaidachny. As the same Solovyov wrote on this occasion, “tsarist Moscow trembled for its own safety; by order of the tsar, people of all classes hurried to earthworks to strengthen Moscow. The tsar himself with the boyars came over and over again to look at these works. Residents of the surrounding area with their families and property filled Moscow, there was a rumor that the tsar was leaving for the Volga, to Yaroslavl ... "

Russian infantry soldier. Late 1650s.
Rice. from the book "Moscow elective regiments"

On March 11, 2008, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko signed Decree No. 207/2008 "On the celebration of the 350th anniversary of the victory of troops under the command of the Hetman of Ukraine Ivan Vyhovsky in the Battle of Konotop." In order to restore the historical truth, the document proposes to widely disseminate objective information about this event, as well as to hold many different public events in honor of the anniversary. In order to commemorate the battle, it is instructed to name streets, squares and military units in his honor, to issue a postage stamp and a commemorative coin. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is obliged to convey to the international community the world-historical significance of the battle, television and radio - to conduct cycles of programs, scientists - to speak on the topic.

VICTORY OVER "OCCUPIERS"

There is not a word in the decree about who the hetman defeated. The Battle of Konotop is also silent in the eight-volume History of Ukraine. It seems that Alexandra Efimenko, an outstanding pre-revolutionary Ukrainian historian, did not know about him. However, there was a battle near Konotop in 1659, and it was remembered in Ukraine in 1995. Then in the official body of the Verkhovna Rada - the newspaper "Voice of Ukraine" - a long article was published, the author of which Yuriy Mytsyk presented one of the episodes of the 13-year Russian-Polish war of 1654-1667 as "the largest military defeat in Europe" inflicted by the Ukrainian army "occupying Russian troops".

Since then, the Battle of Konotop, thanks to the research of Ukrainian researchers, has been enriched with new interesting details. Particular attention was paid to the size of the Russian troops and the losses they suffered. The first figure, initially set at 90,000, gradually increased to 120, 150, 200, and even 360,000 people. The damage of the "occupiers" from 20-30 thousand with 15 thousand prisoners then increased to 40, 60 and finally reached 90 thousand killed. Probably, and this is not the limit. Let me remind you that at Borodino, the Russian army lost 54 thousand people, and the French - 45 thousand. Damage " Ukrainian army”at Konotop amounted, according to Yuri Mytsyk, 4 thousand Cossacks and 6 thousand Crimean Tatars, allies of Hetman Vyhovsky. Already one loss ratio of 1:9 should elevate the battle of Konotop to the Olympus of the greatest achievements of the military art of all times and peoples.

Feature of modern Ukrainian history in the fact that even doctoral dissertations are defended on the basis of narrative sources. This beautiful term means chronicles, letters, memoirs and similar texts, often telling about the event in third-hand retelling, sometimes contradicting each other. Documentary sources are not involved. Moreover, in Ukraine in the 17th century there were problems with office work and archival storage. In particular, there is no information about where and when the Konotop winner Ivan Vygovskoy, who came from a noble gentry family, was born. Only one document is connected with the battle - an enthusiastic report of the hetman, loyally sent to the Polish king along with captured cannons, a banner, sabers and other weapons.

But the Russian archives contain a huge corpus of 17th-century documents available to scholars. The events of this historical period studied by Novoselsky, Sanin, Dmitriev and other specialists who worked in detail with documentary sources. On the basis of their research, it is possible to fairly accurately establish the historical truth advocated by the President of Ukraine.

Hetman for an hour

Battles are won by commanders. Who is Ivan Vygovskoy, whose name will soon be given to the streets and ships?

Ivan Ostapovich Vygovskoy (Vigovskiy) was born at the beginning of the 17th century, according to some sources, in Volhynia, according to others - in the Kiev province. He received an excellent education. He began military service in the regular Polish army, where he rose to the rank of captain. In 1638-1648 he was a clerk of the commissar of the Commonwealth over the Zaporizhian army. In 1648 he was captured by the Crimean Tatars. According to narrative sources, Bohdan Khmelnitsky bought him "for the best horse." Vygovskoy swore allegiance to him and began to serve as a clerk, soon rising to the position of chief clerk of the army.

As Ukrainian historians have established, he created a highly effective General Chancellery, which actually became the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. In addition, Vygovskoy is one of the founders of national intelligence and counterintelligence, who sent out thousands of agents. They worked at the courts of the lords of Poland, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Moravia, Silesia, Austria, Ottoman Empire, the Crimean Khanate and the Danubian principalities. Only in Moscow, for some reason, nothing happened.

Dying, Bogdan Khmelnitsky bequeathed the hetman's mace to his son Yuri. At the Chigirinsky Rada in the autumn of 1657, the Cossack foreman assigned hetman duties to the general clerk Vyhovsky, but only until the 16-year-old Yury Khmelnitsky reached the age of majority. In 1658, the polonophile Vygovskaya in a place with the appropriate name Gadyach concluded an agreement on the entry of Ukraine into the Commonwealth on equal terms with the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The head of state was the Polish king. Since the name Ukraine did not yet exist, in the treaty it was called the Grand Duchy of Russia. The structure of the principality included Kiev, Chernihiv and Bratslav provinces. The remaining Ukrainian provinces became Polish. Under the agreement, the Cossack foreman received the privileges of the Polish gentry, in particular, enslaved the peasants. The number of Cossack registered troops was determined at 60 thousand people, and later it was supposed to be reduced to 30 thousand. However, the Polish Sejm ratified the agreement only in terms of the entry of the “Principality of Russia” into the Commonwealth.

Vyhovsky's policy led to a split in the Ukrainian Cossacks and a civil war, in which Russia initially did not interfere. The main stronghold of the hetman's opponents - Poltava - was burned. The leaders of the rebels - the Poltava colonel Martyn Pushkar and the Zaporizhzhya koshevoi Barabash - were killed. Hetman's comrade-in-arms Colonel Grigory Gulyanitsky ruined Lubny, Gadyach, Glukhov and a number of other cities. Most of the places near Poltava, including Mirgorod, were given to the Crimeans for plunder as payment for "allied assistance". The year 1658 cost Ukraine about 50 thousand killed and driven into slavery.

Troubles in the "southern Ukrainians" forced the tsar to send troops there under the command of Grigory Romodanovsky. But Vygovskoy convinced him that he had already put things in order, and the troops retreated beyond the border line. Only the detachment of Vasily Sheremetev entered Kyiv, as provided for by the Pereyaslav agreements concluded four years earlier. Hetman's brother Danilo Vyhovskoy tried to drive him out from there, but was defeated. Ivan Vygovskoy, who arrived in time to help his brother, was captured. The Gadyach betrayal might not have happened, but Sheremetev released the hetman, who swore allegiance to Russia for the second time. He undertook to disband his troops, send the khan's army back to the Crimea and no longer fight with Russia. It should be noted that hetmans and atamans easily swore allegiance to different masters and just as easily changed their oath. Moscow has never understood this.

Vygovskoy immediately attacked the army of Romodanovsky standing on the border. Was beaten, retreated, but invaded again Russian land and laid siege to the town of Stone. Only after that the king declared him a traitor. And in November 1658, the Cossacks, who remained faithful to the Pereyaslav agreements, elected Ivan Bespaly as the appointed (temporary) hetman.

In the hands of Vyhovsky was a considerable part of the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, in fact, up to Smolensk, previously recaptured by Russia. At the end of 1658, the army of Prince Lobanov-Rostovsky laid siege to Mstislavl. In the spring of 1659, she defeated the consolidated army of another brother of Hetman Samoila Vyhovsky, Ivan Nechay and Lithuanian colonels Askirka and Kmitich. After the capture of Mstislavl, the fortress of Stary Bykhov, which had strategic importance, was besieged, which was captured on December 22. In the western direction, the Polish-Lithuanian-Cossack troops were defeated.

TRUBETSKOY'S TRIP

Russia had no extra soldiers, however, in the spring of 1659, Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich gathered a large detachment under the command of the chief voivode, boyar Prince Alexei Nikitich Trubetskoy, to march on Ukraine. There was hope that the Cossacks (Cherkasy, as they were then called) would come to their senses and return under the arm of the Orthodox sovereign. The size of Trubetskoy's army has not yet been fully established, this is a matter for the future, but scientists consider the figure of 30 thousand soldiers to be the most realistic. It included regular Reiter, dragoon and soldier regiments, mounted hundreds of Moscow ranks and city nobles, archers, Kadom, Shatsk and Kasimov Tatars, Cossacks, including Don and Yaik, gunners. Later they were joined by 2,000 Cossacks and a number of Ukrainian Cossacks loyal to Russia.

Having traveled 500 miles to Putivl in two weeks, the army crossed the Seim and laid siege to Konotop. In the city area there were 20 thousand Cossacks of Colonel Gulyanitsky. He locked himself in Konotop with 4 thousand fighters, significantly strengthening his garrison. The remaining 16 thousand were led by Vygovskoy, who arrived with only a small detachment of personal mercenaries. Today's historians blame Trubetskoy that, instead of defeating the hetman, he got involved in a leisurely siege of a city that had no strategic significance. However, the royal order to the prince was preserved, in which the main thing was to “persuade the Cherkas so that they would finish off the sovereign with their foreheads in their wines, and the sovereign would grant them as before.” In the royal charter, the Poltava regiment was instructed: "Not though the spilling of the blood of Orthodox Christians, bring the Cossacks to reason with the least damage." That is why the siege of Konotop, which began on April 19, 1659, dragged on very slowly.

Meanwhile, reinforcements approached Vyhovsky. 3800 European mercenaries - Poles, Serbs, Bulgarians, Vlachs, Magyars, Moldavians. They were paid from the military treasury. And most importantly, the Crimean Khan Magmet Giray (Mohammed IV) arrived in time with his vassals - the Nogai, Azov, Belgorod and Temryuk Tatars. Khan's interpreter Terenty Frolov called the size of the horde 60 thousand horsemen. However, Russian historians agree that there were from 30 to 40 thousand of them. Thus, Vygovsky's army, together with 16 thousand Cossacks, consisted of about 50-60 thousand people, most of whom were Tatars. At the meeting, the khan demanded that the hetman and the Cossack foreman take an oath of allegiance. Vygovskoy, who had already sworn allegiance to Russia and Poland, swore allegiance to the khan.

On June 27, a small Tatar-Cossack detachment appeared near Konotop. Trubetskoy sent almost the entire local cavalry, reiter and dragoons in pursuit of him. Having crossed two rivers, the regiments saw a Cossack camp in a marshy lowland. However, this was just a lure. Behind and from the flanks, the Tatars suddenly fell upon the Russians. A fierce slash ensued in complete encirclement in a swampy field with a numerically superior enemy. Part of the cavalry was able to break through, the rest were killed or captured. Both wounded governors were full. Semyon Romanovich Pozharsky, a distant relative of Dmitry Pozharsky, beat the Crimeans more than once, which is why he was hated by them. He spat in the Khan's face and was executed. The second governor - Lvov - died of wounds, his body was thrown without burial. The losses of the Khan's army turned out to be so great that the enraged Magmet ordered to kill all the prisoners. However, the dissatisfied Horde hid about 400 captives, who were subsequently ransomed from the Crimea.

WHO IS PROUD OF WHAT

On June 29, having collected all the property, Trubetskoy's army began to retreat from Konotop. Khan and Vygovskoy almost continuously attacked her, primarily trying to recapture the rich convoys. But gunners, archers, dragoons, soldiers under the leadership of Russian and foreign governors blocked the wagons, covered themselves with slingshots and half-peaks, hitting the attacking cavalry from muskets and cannons. For 15 versts to the Seim River, the troops marched for two days in unceasing battles. The whole road was strewn with the bodies of Tatars and Cossacks. The infantry of the new system was too tough for the traditional Eastern European cavalry, which until then was considered stronger than any foot system. Having stood on the Seimas, the army crossed in perfect order to the Russian coast and on July 10 came to Putivl. A cash review was held here and the lost ones were rewritten.

In those days, loss accounting was strict. Control was exercised by the Secret Order, and the governors did not dare to underestimate the damage and lie to the king. There are lists of those who have left with an accuracy of up to a person by regiments and ranks. In total, including prisoners, 4769 warriors were missing. For example, the loss of the regiment of Trubetskoy himself “during attacks, in battles, during sendings and retreats”: okolniki - 2 people (Pozharsky and Lvov), stewards - 1, solicitors - 3, Moscow nobles - 76, residents (the lowest court rank) - 161 , translators - 1, city nobles and children of boyars - 26 cities - 887, Ryl Cossacks - 25, soldiers - 6, archers -1, reiter - 1302, dragoons - 397 ... As you can see, the brunt of the losses lies on the cavalry. The same situation in other regiments. The infantry did not lose even hundreds of people. Among the dead were 69 "Murz and Tatars". After Konotop, Khan and Vygovskaya plundered and burned the Ukrainian cities of Romny, Konstantinov, Glinsky and Lokhvitsa. Meanwhile Zaporozhye Cossacks ataman Ivan Serko walked through the defenseless Tatar uluses. This forced part of the Khan's army to return home. The rest went in corrals through southern Ukraine and Russian lands, reaching the borders of the Tula district. Tens of thousands of Orthodox "allies" drove away in full. Vygovskoy laid siege to Gadyach, which was defended by 2,000 Cossacks and 900 Russian soldiers who came to the rescue. After three weeks of unsuccessful assaults, the hetman retreated with heavy losses and disgrace. After that, he lost all support. In November, Sheremetev left Kyiv with an army and, near Khmilniki, once again defeated the hetman and the Polish detachments of Andrzej Potocki and Jan Sapieha.

Four months after Konotop, the Cossacks deposed Vyhovsky, and elected Yuri Khmelnitsky as hetman. On October 27, 1659, he signed the second Pereyaslav Treaty on the entry of Ukraine into Russia. However, in two years, Khmelnitsky Jr. will easily renounce all oaths ...

Vygovskoy fled to Poland, where he was promoted to senator of the Sejm for services to the crown. But five years later, when the anti-Polish movement flared up again in Ukraine, he was accused of treason and shot. The second "national hero" of Konotop - Colonel, he is the crown cornet Grigory Gulyanitsky - also fled to Poland, was also accused of treason and imprisoned in the Marienburg fortress. His further fate is unknown.

About Semyon Pozharsky, the people composed the song "Death of Pozharsky", in which, by the way, there is not a word about the Cossacks, only about the Tatars. In Moscow, which lost several hundred young nobles overnight, there was a long mourning. But Prince Alexei Nikitich Trubetskoy was favored by the tsar and continued state activity. In 1672, he became the godfather of Tsarevich Peter, the future Emperor Peter I.

In 1654, the Zaporizhzhya army accepted the citizenship of the Russian tsar, and this was the beginning of the Russian-Polish war. At first, it went well for the Russian troops, a temporary Vilna truce was signed. But after the death of Hetman Bogdan Khmelnytsky, a struggle for power in the Hetmanate began among the Cossack elite. Part of the Cossacks went over to the side of the Poles. Khmelnitsky wanted to give the mace to his son Yuri, but he was still small. Therefore, at the time of Yuri's infancy, the hetman's duties were performed by the clerk Ivan Vyhovsky, who later, with the support of part of the Cossacks and the Polish gentry, became the hetman. Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich approved his election. However, Vyhovsky was not popular with the left-bank regiments, who feared that he was a Pole.

Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky

In 1658, Vyhovsky finally sided with the Commonwealth in the war and concluded the Treaty of Gadyach with her, according to which he was promised the creation of the Principality of Russia. However, the Sejm approved only the title of Grand Hetman, but not the creation of a principality. The Cossacks were dissatisfied with the subjugation of Poland, the Zaporizhzhya Sich and other Cossack regiments opposed Vyhovsky. To strengthen his positions, the hetman turned to the Crimean Khan Mehmed IV Girey for support and swore allegiance to him.

With the troops of the Crimean Tatars, Vyhovsky managed to brutally suppress the Poltava uprising in June 1658. This was the beginning civil war in the Hetmanate, called "Ruin". Already in August, the hetman opposed the Russian troops: he participated in the sieges of Kyiv, encouraged the raids of the Tatars, and attacked Russian fortresses. The troops of Prince Grigory Romodanovsky entered Ukraine, who was supported by the Cossacks who opposed the hetman. Already in the fall, Vygovsky requested a truce and confirmed his loyalty to the Russian Tsar. But in December, having united with the Tatar and Polish troops, he again went against the Russian troops. Vyhovsky became a threat to the southern borders of the Russian state, and after rumors about a new campaign by Vyhovsky against Kyiv, a large campaign of Russian troops against the Hetmanate was organized.

Tatar archer

Prince Aleksey Trubetskoy, who in March 1659 moved against Vyhovsky, first tried to persuade the hetman to peace and spent about 40 days in negotiations. When it became clear that it was impossible to agree, Trubetskoy laid siege to Konotop, where Vygovsky sent Tatars who robbed and burned neighboring villages, ravaged cities and took prisoners. The troops of princes Kurakin and Romodanovsky, as well as Hetman Bespaly, came to the rescue. Trubetskoy tried to take the city by storm, but the attack failed. 252 people died and about 2,000 were injured. The prince returned to siege tactics. By June 1659, the townspeople demanded to surrender the city, desertions began. But the situation was turned by the main forces of Vygovsky and the Crimean army that approached Konotop.

On June 28, 1659, the Crimean Tatars attacked the guard detachments guarding the camp of the Russian army Trubetskoy, after which they fled across the Kukolka River. A detachment of four thousand men was sent to the river under the command of princes Semyon Pozharsky and Semyon Lvov, and the Cossacks-Cossacks loyal to the Russian Tsar also went with them. In total, the total number of Russian troops was 28,600 people, and Bespaly's detachment was 6,660 Cossacks. The coalition troops, which included the Crimean Tatars, Polish mercenaries and the detachments of Vyhovsky himself, numbered more than 50,000 people.

Reconstruction of the first stage of the battle, Pozharsky's detachment was ambushed.

When Pozharsky's detachment chased after the Tatars, the Khan's troops, coming out of the forest, attacked him from the rear. The 6,000th detachment could not resist the 40,000th army of Mehmed IV Giray. The Tatars surrounded Pozharsky's troops and defeated them in close combat. Few survived, Pozharsky himself, who fought to the last, was captured. Vygovsky did not participate in the battle, he approached the Poles already when the detachment of the Russian troops was surrounded.

Trubetskoy, having learned about the state of affairs, sent Pozharsky to help the cavalry units of the regiment of Prince Romodanovsky, but Vygovsky's troops had already approached. Romodanovsky, having learned that the Pozharsky detachment had been destroyed, began to organize defenses on Kukolka. About 2,000 more people went to help him. Even having a threefold superiority in numbers at the river crossing over the almost 5,000-strong detachment of the Russian army, Vyhovsky could not succeed. All attacks of the Vygovtsy were repulsed, there was a weak morale in the Cossack ranks, because many were recruited under the threat of giving their families into slavery to the Tatars. Vyhovsky was forced to rely on the Polish-Lithuanian banners. By evening, Vyhovsky nevertheless managed to take the crossing with a fight. Romodanovsky had to retreat to the convoy of Trubetskoy's army.

The next day, the Vygovtsy and the Tatars moved towards the camp of the Russian troops and tried to besiege it. An artillery duel ensued, and by nightfall Vygovsky decided to storm, but the attack failed. Vygovsky was wounded, his troops were thrown back 5 miles to the positions occupied before the crossing was taken. Everything was quiet for two days.

Battle of Konotop

Trubetskoy understood that it was pointless to besiege Konotop, having thousands of enemy troops in the rear. He lifted the siege of the city and began to retreat under the cover of a moving convoy. Khan and Vyhovsky tried to attack the retreating troops, but the attack failed and they lost about 6,000 men. Soon, voivode Dolgorukov left Putivl to help Trubetskoy with his troops, then Trubetskoy turned him around, declaring that he had enough strength for defense. On July 4, Russian troops began crossing the Seim River, which ended only on July 10. During it, Khan and Vyhovsky again tried to attack Russian army and fired artillery, they broke several wagons, but did not cause much damage. On July 10, Troubetzkoy came to Putivl with an army.

At first they wanted to give the captured Russians for ransom, but the Tatars were against it. In total, 4769 people were killed and captured in the Konotop battle. The main losses fell on the Pozharsky detachment. Pozharsky himself was executed in captivity, as were 249 "Moscow officials." The Cossacks of Bespaly lost about 2000 people, and Trubetskoy about 100 people during the retreat to Putivl. Vyhovsky's losses amounted to about 4,000 people, the Crimean Tatars lost 3,000-6,000 people. Vygovsky, who wanted to strengthen his legitimacy and authority with this battle, eventually lost all respect. Disappointed companions decided to overthrow the hetman.

1654 - All Ukraine raises a prayer of thanksgiving - the Kingdom of Russia came to the aid of the Cossacks in their struggle against the Commonwealth and the Polish pans, against those who brought the entire Ukrainian people to extreme poverty, who oppressed the Orthodox faith and planted the Polish language in Ukraine with all their might , those who tried to break and destroy the very essence and civilizational core of our people.

1657 - a man who, without exaggeration, saved Ukraine from Polish oppression and its people from losing their roots and losing their ancestors, language and culture, a man who prevented the death and assimilation of our ancestors, Hetman Bogdan-Zinovy ​​Mikhailovich Khmelnitsky, dies. Against the will of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Ivan Vyhovsky, the head of the General Chancellery, known for his pro-Polish orientation, becomes hetman. Terror by the hands of foreign mercenaries becomes the basis of his power.

1658 - Ivan Vygovsky, having changed his oath and precepts of the Pereyaslav Rada, signs the Gadyach Treaty with the Poles, according to which the Hetmanate, called the Grand Duchy of Russia, enters the Commonwealth as an integral part, endowed with internal autonomy. The property taken by the Cossacks is returned to the Polish gentry and the Catholic Church. The Poles expelled during the Cossack revolt are allowed to return.

However, this time an uprising broke out against Vyhovsky himself. The people did not want the return of Polish national and religious oppression in Little Russia, even in a softened form. The Commonwealth, in turn, did not intend to observe the internal autonomy of the Grand Duchy of Russia: the Polish Sejm ratified the Gadyach Treaty only in a unilaterally truncated form. The opposition against Vyhovsky was led by Colonel Martyn Pushkar from Poltava and ataman Yakov Barabash. In order to impose his power on the Cossacks, Vyhovsky swore allegiance to both the Polish king and the Crimean Khan Mehmed IV Giray, in the hope of military assistance. After the suppression of the uprising, Vyhovsky began repressions against the foreman. In June 1658, on the orders of the hetman, the Pereyaslav colonel Ivan Sulima was killed, a few months later the new Pereyaslav colonel Kolyubats was beheaded, the Korsun colonel Timofey Onikienko was shot, 12 centurions of different regiments were executed together with the colonels. Fleeing from the hetman, the Uman colonel Ivan Bespaly, the Pavolotsk colonel Mikhail Sulichich and the general captain Ivan Kovalevsky fled. Yakim Samko fled to the Don.

Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, not wanting war, began negotiations with Vygovsky on a peaceful resolution of the conflict, which did not bring results. On March 26, 1659, Prince Alexei Trubetskoy moved against Vygovsky. Having orders to first persuade Vyhovsky to peace, and not to fight, Trubetskoy spent about 40 days in negotiations with Vyhovsky's ambassadors. After the final failure of the negotiations, Trubetskoy decided to start hostilities. On April 20, Prince Trubetskoy approached Konotop and laid siege to it. On April 21, the regiments of Prince Fyodor Kurakin, Prince Romodanovsky and Hetman Bespaly approached Konotop. The regiments stood up in three separate camps: Trubetskoy's regiment stood near the village of Podlipnoe, Kurakin's regiment "on the other side of the city", Romodanovsky's regiment west of Konotop. The total force was about 28 thousand people, including almost 7 thousand Cossacks. On April 29, not wanting to waste time on a siege, the prince ordered the city to be stormed. The attack ended in vain, 252 people died, about 2 thousand were injured. Trubetskoy again switched to siege tactics, which, however, was complicated by the lack of large-caliber artillery. By the beginning of June 1659, the situation of the besieged became critical, the townspeople demanded to surrender the city. The situation changed when the Crimean army and the main forces of Vygovsky approached Konotop - 35 thousand Tatars of Mehmed Giray, about 16 thousand Cossacks and about 3 thousand mercenaries.

Actions of the detachment of Prince Pozharsky

On June 28, 1659, the Crimean Tatars attacked the small cavalry guard detachments guarding the camp of Trubetskoy's Russian army, which was besieging Konotop, after which they fled across the Kukolka (Sosnovka) river. Prince Trubetskoy with military men “went out of the carts, and from the carts, the comrades of the boyar and governor, Prince Alexei Nikitich Trubetskoy and the stolnik, Prince Fyodor Kurakin, roundabouts with the sovereign’s military men of their regiments went against those traitors Cherkasy and Tatars to the village of Sosnovka to the crossing.” The main forces of the Russian army remained near Konotop. An equestrian detachment was sent to Sosnovka under the command of princes Semyon Pozharsky and Semyon Lvov (about 4 thousand people), as well as the Cossacks-Cossacks-Cossacks of hetman Ivan Bespaly, loyal to the Russian tsar, with colonels Grigory Ivanov and Mikhail Kozlovsky "with the Zaporizhzhya Army with two thousand people." Pozharsky attacked the Tatars Nureddin Sultan Adil Giray (the second heir to the throne) and the mercenaries, defeated them and drove them in a southeast direction. Pozharsky and Lvov, pursuing the fleeing Tatars and German dragoons, were moving towards the village and the tract of Pustaya Torgovitsa, when the army of the khan, many thousands strong, emerged from the forest, finding itself in the rear of the Russian detachment. Pozharsky's detachment was ambushed. The Russian detachment was opposed by a 40,000-strong army, which included Crimean Tatars under the command of Khan Mehmed IV Giray and mercenaries. Pozharsky tried to deploy the detachment in the direction of the main attack of the Khan's troops, but did not have time. Having a significant superiority in manpower, the Tatars managed to surround the Pozharsky detachment and defeat it in close combat. Prince Semyon Pozharsky himself, fighting the enemies to the last opportunity, "many ... slaughtering and extending his courage," was captured. The stubborn nature of the battle is evidenced by the descriptions of the wounds of those who managed to escape from the encirclement and reach Trubetskoy's camp. Hetman Vyhovsky did not participate in this battle. Cossack regiments and Polish banners approached the crossing a few hours after the battle, at the second stage of the battle, when Pozharsky's detachment was already surrounded.

Actions of the detachment of Prince Romodanovsky

Having received information about the collision of the Pozharsky detachment with large enemy forces, Trubetskoy sent cavalry units from the voivodship regiment of Prince Grigory Romodanovsky to help: about 3,000 horsemen from nobles and boyar children, reiters and dragoons of the Belgorod regiment. Towards, to the crossing came the troops of Vygovsky. Having learned from those who escaped from the encirclement that Pozharsky's detachment had already been destroyed, Romodanovsky decided to organize defense on the Kukolka River. In reinforcements to Romodanovsky, the reserve Reiter regiment of Colonel Venedikt Zmeev (1200 people) and 500 nobles and boyar children from the voivodship regiment of Andrey Buturlin were sent. Having a three-fold numerical superiority at the Kukolka crossing, Vyhovsky could not succeed. Romodanovsky, dismounting his cavalry, fortified himself on the right bank of the river near the village of Shapovalovka. The battle continued until late in the evening, all the attacks of the Vygovites were repulsed. In view of the low morale of the Cossacks, many of whom were recruited by force under the threat of giving their families into slavery to the Tatars, Vyhovsky had to rely on the Polish-Lithuanian banners. By evening, the dragoons of the Crown Colonel Jozsef Lonchinsky and the mercenaries of Vyhovsky (Lithuanian captain Jan Kosakovsky) managed to take the crossing with a fight. Sources do not report success in the battle for the crossing of the Cossacks. Vygovsky himself admitted that it was "the dragoons" who knocked out the Russian units from the crossing. However, the decisive factors in the defeat of Romodanovsky were the enemy's exit to the rear of the defenders and the detour maneuver of the Crimean Khan from the Torgovitsa across the Kukolka (Sosnovka) River, a ford across the river and swamp was shown to them by a defector. Romodanovsky had to retreat to the convoy of the army of Prince Trubetskoy. The retreat of Prince Romodanovsky ended the first day of the battle.

On June 29, the troops of Vygovsky and the Crimean Khan advanced to the camp of Prince Trubetskoy near the village of Podlipnoe and "taught to shoot cannons along the convoy and into the convoy, and led the trenches to the convoy," trying to besiege the camp. By this time, Prince Trubetskoy had already managed to complete the unification of the camps of his army. An artillery duel ensued. On the night of June 30, Vygovsky decided to storm. The attack ended in failure, and as a result of a counterattack by the Russian army, Vygovsky's troops were driven out of their trenches. During the night battle, Vyhovsky himself was wounded. A little more and Trubetskoy’s army “would have captured (our) camp, because they had already broken into it,” the hetman himself recalled. The troops of the hetman and the khan were driven back 5 miles and stood behind the village of Sosnovka, rolling back to the positions occupied before the assault on the Sosnovskaya (across the river Kukolka-Sosnovka) crossing. This was followed by a two-day lull.

Despite the success of the night counterattack of Trubetskoy's army, the strategic situation in the Konotop region changed. Further besieging Konotop, having a numerous enemy in the rear, became meaningless. On July 2, Trubetskoy lifted the siege from the city and the army, under the cover of a moving convoy (Wagenburg, walk-city), began to retreat to the Semi River. A mile from Konotop, Vygovsky and the Khan tried to attack Trubetskoy's army. This attempt again ended in failure. According to the prisoners, the losses of Vygovsky and the khan amounted to about 6,000 people. In this battle, Vyhovsky's mercenaries also suffered heavy losses. The losses of the Russian side were minimal. On July 4, it became known that the governor of Putivl, Prince Grigory Dolgorukov, came to the aid of the army of Prince Trubetskoy. But Trubetskoy ordered Dolgorukov to return to Putivl, saying that he had enough strength to defend against the enemy. On the same day, Russian troops stood on the river Semi and began crossing. From 4 to 10 July, the crossing continued. From July 4 to July 6, the troops of Khan and Vyhovsky tried to attack Trubetskoy's army and fired artillery. They managed to smash several wagons with artillery, but failed to cause great damage to the prince's army. On July 10, having completed the crossing, Prince Trubetskoy arrived in Putivl.

According to Russian archival data from the Discharge Order, “Total in Konotop on a big battle and on the withdrawal: the regiment of the boyar and governor of Prince Alexei Nikitich Trubetskoy with comrades of the Moscow rank, city nobles and boyar children, and newly baptized, Murzas and Tatars, and Cossacks, and Reitarsky 4769 people were beaten and captured in the line of initial people and reiters, dragoons, soldiers and archers. The main losses fell on the detachment of Prince Pozharsky. The Reiter regiment of Anz Georg von Strobel (Fanstrobel) was almost completely killed, the losses of which amounted to 1070 people, including a colonel, lieutenant colonel, major, 8 captains, 1 captain, 12 lieutenants and ensigns. The Zaporozhian army, according to the report of Hetman I. Bespaly, lost about 2,000 Cossacks. The cavalry accounted for the main losses of the army, the infantry for the entire time of the fighting lost only 89 people killed and captured. The total losses of the army of Prince Trubetskoy during the retreat to Putivl amounted to about 100 people. The losses of Vyhovsky amounted to about 4 thousand people, the Crimean Tatars lost 3-6 thousand people.

Is it possible to consider the outcome of the battle as the defeat of the Russian troops by Vyhovsky's army? Definitely not, even a defeat is difficult to call. Acting in conditions of almost twofold superiority of the enemy forces, Trubetskoy, after the defeat of the Pozharsky detachment, was able to seize the initiative in the battle, achieved a number of important successes and ensured a successful retreat - we emphasize, not flight, but RETREAT - in the face of superior enemy forces, managing to save not only those entrusted to him the lives of soldiers, but also almost the entire convoy. So from a military point of view, the actions of Prince Trubetskoy, if not irreproachable, then very close to it.

After the clash at Konotop, the political authority of Hetman Vyhovsky, the legitimacy of whose election to the post of hetman after the death of Bohdan Khmelnitsky was initially questioned, fell even more. Disappointed with the hetman, Vyhovsky's associates decided to overthrow their leader. Actually, the battle near Konotop was an attempt by military measures to strengthen the political and personal power of Vyhovsky, which the Cossacks refused to recognize. The result was just the opposite. Immediately after Trubetskoy's retreat to Putivl, peasant and urban uprisings broke out in the Hetmanate, fueled by the actions of Crimean Tatars allied with Vygovsky, who plundered peasant and Cossack settlements and took women and children into slavery. Vygovsky was also opposed by his recent colleague Ivan Bohun, who raised an uprising in the Right-Bank Ukraine. Zaporizhia ataman Ivan Serko attacked the Nogai uluses, following the instructions of Prince Trubetskoy and Hetman Bespaly. This forced the Crimean Khan to leave Vyhovsky and leave with an army for the Crimea. After this campaign, Ivan Serko with the Zaporizhzhya army moved against Vyhovsky and defeated Colonel Timosh sent to meet him by Vyhovsky with the army. Soon, the cities of Romny, Gadyach, and Lokhvitsa that had rebelled against Vyhovsky were joined by Poltava, pacified by Vyhovsky in the previous year. Some clerics opposed Vygovsky: Maxim Filimonovich, an archpriest from Nizhyn, and Semyon Adamovich, an archpriest from Ichny. By September 1659, the former allies of Vygovsky in the Battle of Konotop took the oath of allegiance to the "White Tsar": Colonel Ivan Yekimovich of Kyiv, Colonel Ivan Yekimovich of Pereyaslav, Timofei Tsetsyura of Chernigov, Anikey Silich of Chernigov. Colonel Timofey Tsetsyura, who fought on the side of Vyhovsky near Konotop, told Sheremetev that the colonels and Cossacks fought with Russian military people “out of great captivity, fearing the traitor Ivashka Vyhovsky, that he ordered many colonels who did not want to listen, ordered to be whipped, and others shot and hung, and sent many Cossacks with their wives and children to the Crimea as Tatars.

On October 17, 1659, the Cossack Rada in Bila Tserkva finally approved Yury Khmelnytsky as the new hetman of the Cossacks. Vyhovsky was forced to abdicate and officially transfer the hetman's kleinods to Khmelnytsky. At the Rada, the entire Zaporizhzhya Host "became under its Great Sovereign by the autocratic hand in eternal allegiance as before." Vygovsky fled to Poland, where he was later executed on charges of treason - a natural end for a traitor.

Ukraine, one of the most important events in the history of independent Europe is considered the great battle of Konotop in 1659, when 15,000 Ukrainians under the command of Hetman Vyhovsky destroyed 150,000 Russian invaders and the entire color of the Russian nobility.

In 2008, President Yushchenko signed a decree on the celebration of the 350th anniversary of the Battle of Konotop. This great victory is sometimes celebrated in Ukraine almost like “Victory Day in the Second World War” - with historical reconstructions and the presence of the first persons of the state, monuments were built, commemorative coins were issued. In Crimea and Sevastopol, the administrations were instructed to consider renaming streets in honor of the participants in this battle.

Commemorative coin of the victory over the Russians at Konotop. Congratulations from Russians on the 350th anniversary of the Battle of Konotop during President Yushchenko's speech

Monument to the victory over the Russians at Konotop

Surprisingly, little is known about this terrible tragedy and shameful page in our history in Russia. How was it really?

The Battle of Konotop is one of the episodes of the Russian-Polish war, which lasted from 1654 to 1667. It began when, after repeated requests from Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the Zemsky Sobor accepted the Zaporizhzhya army with people and lands into Russian citizenship. During this war, Russia, barely recovering from the difficult times of unrest, had to fight not only with the Commonwealth (the union of Lithuania and Poland with the occupied lands of the Russian province (Little Russia)), but also with Sweden and the Crimean Khanate, that is, in general something, with everyone.

Dying, Bohdan Khmelnytsky bequeathed the hetmanship to his son Yuriy, however, Ivan Vyhovsky, a nobleman who once served in the regular troops of the Polish king Vladislav IV, was appointed Cossack hetman with the secret support of the Polish gentry. Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich approved the election of the hetman. However, ordinary Cossacks did not like the hetman, especially in the eastern part of Little Russia. As the Greek Metropolitan of Colossia Michael told, passing through Little Russia in December 1657, “ Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky is loved by the Cherkasians from behind the Dnieper. And those who are on this side of the Dnieper, and those de Cherkasy and all the rabble, do not like it, but fear the fact that he is a Pole, and that he should not have any advice from the Poles. As a result, the hetman betrayed the tsar and went over to the side of the Poles, taking the title of "Grand Hetman of the Russian Principality" (note, RUSSIAN, not Ukrainian).

Vyhovsky's actions, aimed at a new subordination to the Polish Crown, aroused strong resistance among the Cossacks. Vyhovsky was opposed by the Zaporozhian Sich, the Poltava and Mirgorod regiments. In order to impose his power on the Cossacks by force, Vyhovsky had, in addition to the Polish king, to swear allegiance to the Crimean Khan Mehmed IV Girey, so that he would provide him with military assistance.

Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, not wanting war, began negotiations with Vyhovsky on a peaceful resolution of the conflict, but they did not bring results. In the autumn of 1658, the Belgorod regiment of Prince Grigory Romodanovsky entered Ukraine.

In November, Vygovsky requested peace and confirmed his loyalty to the Russian Tsar, and in December he again changed his oath, uniting with the Tatars and the Polish detachment of Potocki.

On March 26, 1659, Prince Alexei Trubetskoy moved against Vygovsky. For 40 days, Trubetskoy tried to persuade him to settle the matter amicably, but to no avail. Then he led his army to the siege of Konotop.

Here is how many troops the Russian army had (lists from the discharge order of April 11, 1659):
Army of Prince Trubetskoy - 12302 people.
Army of Prince Romodanovsky - 7333.
Army of Prince Kurakin - 6472.

At the time of the Battle of Konotop, due to losses and the dispatch of the order of V. Filosofov to the Romain garrison, there were 5,000 people in the regiment of Prince Kurakin. In June 1659, the regiment of Prince Trubetskoy was joined by: the soldier (reinforced engineering) regiment of Nikolai Bauman - 1500 people, the regiment of William Johnston - 1000 people, Moscow and city nobles and boyar children - 1500 people.

Thus, the total number of Russian troops at the time of the battle was about 28,600 people.

The total number of the coalition of Tatars and Vyhovsky:

The army of Khan Mehmed Giray: about 30-35 thousand people.
Cossack regiments of Hetman Vyhovsky: 16 thousand people
Polish-Lithuanian mercenaries: from 1.5 to 3 thousand people
Total: the total number of troops of the Vygovsky coalition ranged from 47,500 to 54,000 people.

That is 28000 versus 47000-54000. Where did Ukrainian historians get the rest of 122,000 " polite people", unclear. Apparently, in the falsification of the Russians historical documents Putin is personally to blame (it was he who persuaded Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich to do this in exchange for a discount on gas). And the letters with the lists of service people, according to which the Russian troops then received a salary, were specially changed ...

The battle itself

On June 28, 1659, the Crimean Tatars attacked the small cavalry guard detachments guarding the camp of the Russian army of Trubetskoy. Prince Pozharsky, with 4,000 servicemen and 2,000 Zaporozhye Cossacks loyal to the Russian Tsar, attacked the Tatars Nureddin-Sultan Adil Giray and German dragoons, defeated them, defeated them and drove them in a southeast direction. Notice, around 6,000, not 150,000!

Scot Patrick Gordon described what happened: Pozharsky pursued the Tatars through the ditches and swamps. The Khan, who was standing unnoticed with the army in the valley, suddenly burst out from there in three huge, like clouds, masses.

Pozharsky's detachment of about 6 thousand people was ambushed. The Russian detachment was opposed by an almost 40,000-strong army, which included Crimean Tatars under the command of Khan Mehmed IV Giray and mercenaries. Pozharsky tried to deploy the detachment in the direction of the main attack of the Khan's troops, but did not have time. Having fired thousands of arrows, the Tatars went on the attack. Of the reiters given to Pozharsky, only one regiment (Colonel Fanstrobel) “managed to turn the front and fire a volley of carbines right at point blank range on the attacking Tatar cavalry. However, this could not stop the Horde, and after a short battle, the regiment was exterminated. Having a significant superiority in manpower, the Tatars managed to surround the Pozharsky detachment and defeat it in close combat. It was no longer a battle, but a beating by the enemy, who outnumbered the Russian avant-garde by 6 times. At this moment, that is, to the hat analysis, when the outcome of the battle was already practically decided, Vygovsky approached with his 16,000. That, in fact, is what his Great Peremoga consists of.

So we can not talk about the death of 150,000 Russian troops, but about the destruction of the 6,000th avant-garde, which broke away from the main forces (22,000 people) and fell into an ambush. And even this local defeat of the Russian army was inflicted not by Hetman Vyhovsky, with his right-bank Cossacks, but by the Crimean Tatars.

The further fate of the Russians who were ambushed was sad. According to Gordon, "Khan, being too agile for the Russians, surrounded and defeated them, so that few escaped". The Cossacks of Hetman Bespaly, who wrote to Alexei Mikhailovich, also perished: “... at that, Sovereign, battle at Prince Semyon Petrovich Lvov and Prince Semyon Romanovich Pozharsky, everyone was mortally beaten, by force, Sovereign, through the troops of Vygovsky and the Tatars, several dozen people made their way into the army to the camp”. Prince Semyon Pozharsky himself, fighting enemies to the last opportunity, “many ... slaughter and courage extend their greatness”, was captured.

Pozharsky himself was executed by the Khan already in captivity, when he called Vygovsky a traitor and spat in the face of the Khan. Other prisoners were also executed. According to Naim Chelebi, initially they wanted to release the Russian prisoners for a ransom (according to the usual practice of that time), but this was rejected by the "far-sighted and experienced Tatars": we “... must use every effort to strengthen the enmity between the Russians and the Cossacks, and completely block their path to reconciliation; we must, without dreaming of wealth, decide to cut them all ... In front of the khan's chamber, they cut off the heads of all significant captives, after which each warrior separately put the captives who had fallen to his share to the sword.

The stubborn nature of the battle is evidenced by the descriptions of the wounds of those who managed to escape from the encirclement and reach Trubetskoy's camp: Boris Semyonov, son of Tolstoy, “has been cut with a saber on the right cheek and on the nose, and shot from a bow on the right arm below the elbow”, Mikhailo Stepanov, son of Golenishchev Kutuzov (an ancestor of the great Field Marshal M. I. Kutuzov) “has been cut with a saber on both cheeks, but on the left shoulder, and on the left hand”, Ivan Ondreev son Zybin “slashed on the head with a saber and on the right temple from the eye and to the ear was shot with a bow”.

Further fighting coalitions against the Russian troops did not have much success.

On June 29, the troops of Vygovsky and the Crimean Khan advanced to the camp of Prince Trubetskoy near the village of Podlipnoe, trying to besiege the camp. By this time, Prince Trubetskoy had already managed to complete the unification of the camps of his army. An artillery duel ensued.

On the night of June 30, Vygovsky decided to storm. The attack ended in failure, and as a result of a counterattack by the Russian army, Vygovsky's troops were driven out of their fortifications. During the night battle, Vyhovsky himself was wounded. A little more, and Trubetskoy’s army “would have taken possession of (our) camp, for it had already broken into it”, - the hetman himself recalled. The troops of the hetman and khan were driven back 5 miles.

Despite the success of the night counterattack of Trubetskoy's army, the strategic situation in the Konotop region changed. Further besieging Konotop, having a numerous enemy in the rear, became meaningless. On July 2, Trubetskoy lifted the siege from the city, and the army, under the cover of the walk-city, began to retreat to the Seim River.

Vyhovsky and Khan tried to attack Trubetskoy's army again. Again, this attempt ended in failure. According to the prisoners, the losses of Vygovsky and the khan amounted to about 6,000 people. In this battle, Vygovsky's mercenaries also suffered heavy losses. The brothers of the hetman, colonels Yuri and Ilya Vyhovsky, who commanded hired banners, recalled that “At that time, many Cossack troops and Tatars were beaten in the attacks, and Mayers and cornets and captains and other initial many people were killed”. The losses of the Russian side were minimal. Hetman Bespaly reported to the tsar: “To the camp, Sovereign, our enemies made cruel attacks, and, for the grace of God ... we rebuffed those enemies and did not carry any interference, and many of those enemies were beaten on the retreat and on the campaign, and came, Sovereign, God gave to the Seim River great
On July 4, it became known that the governor of Putivl, Prince Grigory Dolgorukov, came to the aid of the army of Prince Trubetskoy. But Trubetskoy ordered Dolgorukov to return to Putivl, saying that he had enough strength to defend against the enemy and he did not need help.

According to Russian archival data, “In total, in Konotop on a big battle and on the withdrawal: the regiment of the boyar and governor, Prince Alexei Nikitich Trubetskoy, with comrades of the Moscow rank, city nobles and boyar children, and newly baptized, murz and Tatars, and Cossacks, and the Reiter system of the initial people and reiters, dragoons, soldiers and archers were beaten and 4769 people were caught in captivity". The main losses fell on the detachment of Prince Pozharsky, who was ambushed on the first day. Not 150,000 or even 30,000, but 4,769. Almost all of them died in the battle with the Tatars, and not with the garny lad and the hetmans of the Russian principality Vygovsky.

After the retreat of the Russian troops, the Tatars began to plunder the Ukrainian (although the word "Ukraine" did not exist then) farms (on the left-bank Ukraine), burned 4,674 houses and captured more than 25,000 peaceful peasants.

What do we end up with?

1. Ukrainians did not participate in the battle of Konotop. The hetman of the self-proclaimed RUSSIAN principality Vyhovsky and the subjects of this RUSSIAN principality, respectively, Russians, mostly right-bank Cossacks, participated.

2. If we assume that those Russian Cossacks were still the ancestors of the current Ukrainians and they can be called proto-Ukrainians to some extent, although they themselves did not consider themselves as such, then even in this case, all the merit of Vyhovsky, who betrayed his kings 4 times ( 2 times Polish and 2 times Russian), and his Cossacks lies in the fact that: a) he set the Tatars on Russian and Zaporizhzhya Cossacks and b) participated at the final stage in finishing off the Russian vanguard, despite the fact that against the 1st Russian was 8 Tatars, Cossacks, Lithuanians and Germans.

3. The Russian army was not defeated, but under pressure from a numerically superior enemy, it was forced to lift the siege from Konotop. The pursuit of the Russian army was unsuccessful and led to heavy losses on the part of the coalition and minimal on the part of the Russians. Russian losses amounted to only 4769 people killed and captured, that is, approximately 1/6 of the army and 2000 left-bank Cossacks. Vygovsky and the Tatars lost from 7,000 to 10,000. The Russian-Polish war itself ended in the victory of our state, Smolensk, present-day eastern Ukraine, was returned, and our enemies were defeated and soon ceased to exist.

After 150 years, Lithuania, Poland, the Russian province, the Crimean Khanate, the Nogai hordes and others, part of the Swedish kingdom and the Ottoman Empire became part of the Russian Empire.

And what do our Ukrainian brothers celebrate?

The victory of the 35,000th Tatar army over 4,000 Russians and 2,000 Zaporozhye Cossacks lured into the swamp.

Who is honored?

A man who considered himself the hetman of the RUSSIAN principality, who betrayed his sovereigns 4 times, set the Tatars against his people and began an era called in Ukraine "Ruin".

Where did the 150,000-strong Russian army and 30,000-50,000 dead come from?

And oddly enough, in the middle of the 19th century, in the writings of our compatriot Solovyov, who, during his lifetime, was criticized by historians and even his own friends, not only in Russia, but also abroad.

According to the American historian Brian Davis, “Soloviev's statement is true only in the sense that at least 259 of those killed and captured belonged to officer ranks. Based on the number of officers and nobles, Solovyov drew the number 150,000.

It must be said that in 1651 the total number of military people in Russia was generally equal to 133,210 people. What part of this army, do you think, could Russia send to fight the rebellious hetman, if it was conducting military operations from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and the main enemy forces were concentrated in the north-west of the country near the borders with Sweden, Poland and the Baltic states, and it was necessary to leave garrisons in cities and fortresses - from Irkutsk to Ivan-gorod and from Arkhangelsk to Astrakhan? The country was restless: after all, Razin's uprising would soon begin ...

You can argue about the number of armies as much as you like and come up with as much as you like, but under Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich there was such a thing as regimental lists and casualty reports by rank order. The lists of losses from the Discharge Order are not a chronicle or a chronicle of a private person who does not have accurate information, but a documentary report provided by the governor directly to the king. The paperwork documentation of Russian orders was compiled primarily in the interests of controlling finances and supplies. armed forces, therefore, she was carefully monitored and only real numbers were written, it’s just this information that is the only true one, hence the exact number of warriors who were part of the regiments and the exact number of losses among the Russians. And a wide spread of losses among the army of Vygodsky and the Crimean Tatars: they simply did not keep such statistics, but estimated the number by eye or as anyone wanted ...