Crimean strategic offensive operation (1944). The third Stalinist blow. Liberation of Crimea Chronology of the liberation of Crimea from the Nazis

In early February 1944, Soviet troops completed the liquidation of the last enemy bridgehead on the left bank of the Dnieper. Next in line was the liquidation of the Crimean group of the enemy.

By this time, the internal situation of Romania, its relations with Germany, had sharply deteriorated. During the Uman-Botoshansk operation, Soviet troops crossed the state border at the end of March 1944 and by mid-April deepened into the territory of Romania for 100 km, freeing 10 thousand square meters. km, where 400 thousand people lived. On April 2, the Soviet government declared that it was not pursuing the goal of acquiring part of the Romanian territory or changing the existing system. It offered Romania the terms of a truce to withdraw from the war. At the same time, progressive forces within the country filed a declaration with the government, in which they demanded an end to the war and the conclusion of peace with the states. anti-Hitler coalition. But the Antonescu government, fearing responsibility for the crimes, decided to continue the war on the side of Germany.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to strike the main blow with the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front from the north of Perekop and Sivash and the auxiliary one - with the troops of the Separate Primorsky Army from the Kerch region in the general direction of Simferopol, Sevastopol.

The Black Sea Fleet was ordered to block the Crimean peninsula from the sea.

By this time, the 17th German Army had 5 German and 7 Romanian divisions, separate rifle regiments "Crimea" and "Bergman", 13 separate security battalions, 12 engineer battalions. It had a large artillery reinforcement: the 191st and 279th assault gun brigades, the 9th anti-aircraft artillery division, the 60th artillery regiment, three regiments (704, 766, 938) of coastal defense, ten high-capacity artillery battalions. The German 4th Air Fleet and the Romanian Air Force had from 150 to 300 aircraft at the Crimean airfields.

The main forces of the 17th German Army are the 49th Mountain Rifle Corps (50th, 111th, 336th Infantry Divisions, 279th Brigade of Assault Guns), the 3rd Romanian Cavalry Corps (9th Cavalry, 10th and 19th I infantry divisions) defended in the northern part of the Crimea. On the Kerch Peninsula was the 5th Army Corps (73rd, 98th Infantry Divisions, 191st Brigade of Assault Guns), the 6th Cavalry and 3rd Mountain Rifle Division of the Romanians. The coast from Feodosia to Sevastopol was covered by the 1st Romanian mountain rifle corps (1st, 2nd infantry divisions). The west coast was controlled by two regiments of the 9th Romanian Mountain Division. The 1st Romanian Corps was entrusted with the fight against the partisans.

Using the experience of defense on the Taman Peninsula, the enemy equipped the strongest defensive lines: in the north - three lines of defense, on the Kerch Peninsula - four. From Saki through Sarabuz and Karasubazar to Feodosia, a rear defensive line was being prepared.

German soldiers and officers understood the hopelessness of their situation, but were not yet morally broken. Corporal of the 73rd Infantry Division Helfrid Merzinger, who defected near Kerch in early April, said that the German soldier was not yet ready to stop fighting. "Russian leaflets are read by German soldiers, but I will say frankly - the hurricane fire of Russian artillery works much more convincingly than these leaflets."

Table 6. The ratio of the forces of the parties to the beginning of the operation *

* History of the Second World War, 1939-1945. T. 8. S. 104-105.

There was a hard fight ahead. Therefore, it was decided to create a significant superiority in forces. The 2nd Guards Army of General G.F. began to operate on the Perekop Isthmus. Zakharov (13th Guards, 54th and 55th Corps - a total of 9 rifle divisions) and on the Sivash - the 51st Army of General Ya.G. Cruisers (1st Guards, 10th and 63rd Corps - 10 rifle divisions in total) and reinforcement units.

The 51st Army, which delivered the main blow, was reinforced by two artillery divisions, two tank divisions, two mortar divisions, two anti-aircraft artillery and ten artillery regiments, and four engineering brigades. The army of 91 thousand people was armed with 68,463 rifles and machine guns, 3,752 machine guns, 1,428 guns, 1,059 mortars, 1,072 anti-aircraft guns and 49 tanks.

To ensure a quick breakthrough of the enemy's defenses, a four to five-fold superiority in manpower and firepower was created in selected areas of the offensive.

Start time Crimean operation was postponed several times due to the need to complete the liquidation of the Nikopol enemy grouping, the incomplete readiness of the crossings over the Sivash, due to the condition of the roads. Finally, they decided to start the operation after the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front had reached the Odessa region. This meant an increase in the negative psychological impact on the enemy, feelings of isolation and doom.

In the Kerch direction, the offensive was to begin two or three days later than the offensive of the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front.

The troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front delivered the main blow from Sivash, from where the enemy did not expect him, since the supply routes here were much more difficult than at Perekop. The main role in breaking through the defense was to be played by the 1st Guards Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General I.I. Missan. At the same time, the troops of the 2nd Guards Army broke through the defenses at Perekop. At a meeting before the operation, General of the Army F.I. Tolbukhin said: “General Eneka will need some time to correctly orient himself in the events taking place. Probably, he will understand the situation only by the end of the first day of the offensive, when the most important tasks of the breakthrough will have already been resolved in favor of Soviet troops, and the opportunity for counter-action will be lost.

The outstanding commander F.I. Before the operation, Tolbukhin talked with each regiment commander, seeking a detailed knowledge of the task, the degree of provision of the troops with everything necessary.

The peculiarity of the formation of the troops of the 51st Army was that the second echelons of the rifle corps could be brought into battle in two adjacent directions, depending on the success indicated.

On the eve of the offensive, almost all formations carried out reconnaissance in force, which confirmed the enemy's grouping.

April 8, 1944 at 10 a.m. 30 minutes. after a powerful artillery preparation that lasted 2.5 hours, the troops of the 2nd Guards and 51st Armies went on the offensive. The greatest success on the first day was achieved by the 267th Rifle Division of Colonel A.I. Tolstov from the 63rd Corps of General P.K. Koshevoy. To develop the success emerging here, the front commander ordered the 417th rifle division of General F.M. Bobrakov and the 32nd tank brigade. At the same time, the 2nd battalion of the 848th rifle regiment of the 267th division, on the personal instructions of F.I. Tolbukhin crossed the Aigul Lake and attacked the enemy in the flank. At night, another battalion under the command of Major M. Kulenko broke through to this bridgehead.

The enemy, highly experienced, experienced in offensive and defense, did not expect a quick transfer of the main attack from the zone of the 1st Guards Corps to the zone of the 63rd Rifle Corps, did not expect detours and coverage in the cramped area of ​​inter-lake defiles. But Soviet troops used the shallow lakes to seep through enemy defenses. Having repulsed the counterattacks, the troops of the corps on April 9 advanced from 4 to 7 km. The front commander reinforced the 63rd corps with the 77th division from the army reserve and the breakthrough artillery division from the front reserve, and also aimed aviation of the 8th air army of General T.T. Khryukin. During April 10, the troops of the corps drove the enemy out of the inter-lake defile and created the conditions for the entry of the 19th tank corps into the breakthrough.

Early in the morning of April 11, the tank corps of Lieutenant General I.D. Vasiliev, from the line south of Tomashevka, entered the gap in three columns and, three hours later, on the move, he entered into battle with the garrison defending the city of Dzhankoy. The enemy was defeated and by 18 o'clock withdrew to the south. This outlined a deep coverage of the Perekop-Ishunsky enemy grouping.

By this time, the troops of the 2nd Guards Army, advancing on the Perekop Isthmus, also achieved significant success. On the first day of the offensive, the 3rd Guards Rifle Division of General K.A. Tsalikov and the 126th Infantry Division of General A.I. Kazartsev mastered Armenian. By the end of the second day, the 2nd Guards Army broke through the first defensive line and the enemy hastily retreated to the Ishun positions.

The success of the Soviet troops on the Perekop Isthmus was facilitated by the landing across the Perekop Bay - a battalion of the 1271st Infantry Regiment of the 387th Division under the command of Captain F.D. Dibrov. The battalion numbered 512 people and had good weapons: 166 machine guns, 45 machine guns, two 45-mm guns, six 82-mm mortars, grenades. On April 10, at 5 o'clock in the morning, the battalion secretly landed from sapper boats and began to advance. Soon the enemy sent 13 tanks and a reinforced company of submachine gunners against the landing. In a hot battle, the enemy lost 3 tanks and up to 40 people killed (battalion losses: 4 killed, 11 wounded, one gun and three mortars). The enemy began to retreat. Pursuing him, the battalion captured a battery of mortars and prisoners. For this brave battle, all the soldiers and officers of the battalion were awarded orders and medals, and Captain F.D. Dibrov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

For 34 hours of stubborn fighting, the troops of the 2nd Guards Army broke through the Perekop positions. This was reflected not only in the moral and political state of our troops and superiority in strength, but also in the increased combat skills of the officers and rank and file, the growth of technical equipment and material support for the army. Almost complete suppression of enemy artillery and fire weapons was achieved. This explains the relatively fast breaking of enemy defenses.

At the junction of the two armies, the 347th Melitopol Red Banner Rifle Division of Major General A.Kh. Yukhimchuk, who in 1941 defended the Crimea here with his regiment. In order to reduce the time of movement from their trench to enemy positions, they dug messages in the direction of the enemy - “mustache”. They went on the attack behind the explosions of their shells and without the traditional "cheers", which the enemy took as a signal to open fire. Groups of shooters in the first trench did not linger and continued to move deep into the enemy defenses.

Lieutenant-General I. Strelbitsky, commander of artillery of the 2nd Guards Army, notes the decisive role of artillery of special and high power in breaking through strong fortifications. Small-caliber artillery and light mortars did not use up even half of the reserves. Rifle cartridges were now consumed ten times less. Here is how dramatically the ratio of fire in combined arms combat has changed in comparison with 1941. Close fire combat and hand-to-hand combat became a rarity. The breakthrough of the enemy defense was carried out with comparatively small losses.

By the end of April 10, the troops of the 2nd Guards Army were detained by the enemy at the Ishun positions. The decisive advance of the 51st Army, as well as bypassing enemy positions from the flanks, contributed to the success of the breakthrough of the 2nd Guards Army. 87th Guards Rifle Division under the command of Colonel K.Ya. Tymchik part of the forces forded Karkinitsky Bay, and the 126th Infantry Division of General A.I. Kazartseva part of the forces forded Staroe Lake and at 6 o'clock on April 12 hit the rear of the enemy. Taking advantage of the confusion in the camp of the enemy, the remaining units of the army attacked the enemy from the front and overturned him. In view of the possible encirclement, the enemy was no longer able to defend the third position (along the Chatyrlyk River) and hastily began to retreat. Soviet troops broke through the defenses at Perekop faster and more skillfully than the enemy did in the fall of 1941.

The persecution of the enemy began, in which the F.I. Tolbukhin, a front-line mobile group: the 19th tank corps, the 279th rifle division, mounted on vehicles, and the 21st anti-tank artillery brigade. The rate of advance of the troops of the 51st Army was on average 22 km per day (on some days up to 35 km). But the enemy, having a lot of transport, retreated quickly.

The mobile front group, commanded by the deputy commander of the 51st Army, Major General V.N. Razuvaev, on April 12, approached Simferopol, but it was not possible to break the resistance of a strong garrison on the move. Having regrouped forces at night, and also replenished with approaching units, the mobile group launched an attack on the city on the morning of April 13. Five hours later, by 11 o'clock in the afternoon, the capital of Crimea, Simferopol, was completely liberated. At the same time, up to 1 thousand people were captured. At the same time, a lateral mobile detachment from the 63rd Rifle Corps under the command of Lieutenant Colonel M.I. Sukhorukov moved to the regional center Zuya to block the way for the troops retreating from the Kerch Peninsula and force them to turn onto a narrow and uncomfortable seaside road. A heated battle took place in Zuya - artillery fired on buckshot, the fights went hand-to-hand. More than 300 fascists were destroyed and almost 800 people were captured. The enemy, leaving cars, guns and several tanks, began to retreat through the mountains to the sea.

Commander of the Separate Primorsky Army, General of the Army A.I. Eremenko, preparing an offensive, decided to break through the enemy defenses in the center, while bypassing the heavily fortified Bulganak knot from the north and south. It was also decided to bypass the city of Kerch and the heavily fortified coast of the Sea of ​​Azov. The troops had groups of obstacles, securing the area, and artillery escort. Mobile groups were created in the army, corps and divisions in case of pursuit of the retreating enemy. The main concern of the command was to prevent a covert withdrawal of the enemy.

The successful actions of the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front endangered the encirclement of the entire Kerch grouping of the enemy. The command of the 17th German Army decided to withdraw its forces from the Kerch Peninsula. Intelligence on April 10 discovered the enemy was preparing to withdraw. In this regard, General A.I. Eremenko ordered at 21 o'clock. 30 minutes. to begin artillery and aviation preparation and at 2200 forward detachments attack the front line. The attack was successful, at 2 o'clock the main forces of the army went on the offensive and by 4 o'clock on April 11 captured the first position of the enemy defense. The seemingly impregnable defense of the enemy was broken through. Mobile groups of corps were introduced into the gap in order not to allow the enemy to gain a foothold in intermediate positions.

The left-flank 16th rifle corps of General K.I. Provalova began to flow around the city of Kerch and surrounded up to 2000 soldiers and officers on its northern outskirts. The 255th Naval Infantry Brigade of Colonel I.A. Vlasova made an even deeper detour and went to the southern slopes of Mount Mithridates. According to the corps commander, this maneuver completed the job. By 6 am on April 11, Kerch was liberated.

On April 11, throughout the Crimea, forward detachments of all armies and corps, planted on vehicles, tanks, guns, pursued the hastily retreating enemy. As soon as the opportunity arose, they overtook the retreating enemy troops, captured prisoners, weapons, and equipment.

The enemy's attempt to delay the offensive of the Separate Primorsky Army on the Ak-Manai positions was not successful. Parts of the 11th Guards Rifle Corps, commanded by Major General S.E. Rozhdestvensky, ahead of the retreating enemy, quickly took possession of this line, capturing more than 100 guns. Using this success, the 3rd Mountain Rifle Corps, which until April 17 was commanded by General N.A. Shvarev (while General A.A. Luchinsky was recovering), advanced without delay to Vladislavovna station.

The corps were given new tasks to liberate the central and southern parts of the Crimea: the 11th Guards Corps continued to pursue the enemy in the direction of Karasubazar - Simferopol; 3rd mountain rifle - through the mountains to Sevastopol; 16th rifle - along the southern coast of Crimea. General K.I. Provalov recalls that the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters K.E. Voroshilov set the task for the 16th Corps: "... at all costs to preserve the Crimean health resorts."

The corps commanders skillfully carried out the offensive on disunited directions. The 16th Rifle Corps managed to get in the way of the enemy's retreat near Feodosia, Sudak, and Yalta. For bypassing Yalta through Mount Ai-Petri, the commander of the 227th Infantry Division, Colonel G.N. Preobrazhensky was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Retreating, the German command left the Romanian units as cover units. The Romanian captured officers testified: “At first, we retreated together with the Germans, but when the Soviet troops overtook our columns and, as they say, grabbed our collars, the Germans quickly got into the vehicles. Some of the Romanian soldiers and officers also tried to get into the cars, but the Germans opened fire on them. But it still didn't save them. A day later, we also met them at collection point prisoners of war".

On April 13, Evpatoria and Feodosia were liberated. In Karasubazar, the troops of the 51st and Primorye armies united, forming a common front. On April 14, Bakhchisaray, Sudak and Alushta were liberated.

The enemy, having left barriers, prepared mechanized means and withdrew significant forces. The troops pursuing him failed to bypass and destroy his large groupings in the foothills. In the area of ​​Bakhchisarai, the troops of the 2nd Guards and 51st armies joined, there was some mixing of the troops. As a result, the rate of pursuit of the enemy decreased. This allowed him to "bounce" to Sevastopol and take back the defense there. On April 15, Soviet troops reached the outer defensive perimeter of Sevastopol. Here the enemy occupied a powerful defensive area, counting on its long-term retention.

Hitler declared Sevastopol a "fortified city". But no one wanted to defend this fortress to the last soldier. The Germans retreated to Sevastopol in order to be the first to evacuate. The Romanians did not want to die for the sake of saving the German regiments and preferred to surrender. Some decisions of the Hitlerite command are curious.

On April 9, the commander of the German-Romanian forces, c. In the Crimea, General Eneke asks for authority to prepare for withdrawal to the Sevastopol fortified area in order to "avoid the destruction of the entire army," that is, he asks for freedom of action. Despite the support of this request by the commander of Army Group A, Scherner, Hitler did not give such consent.

On April 10, Eneke reported that with his permission, the 5th Army Corps would withdraw to the Ak-Manai positions, the Romanian 19th Division from the Chongar Peninsula, and the 49th Corps would hold positions until the evening of April 12.

On April 11, Eneke reported on the breakthrough of the northern front and that he had ordered the army to retreat at a rapid pace towards Sevastopol. This caused sharp discontent of the chief of the general staff and Hitler himself. The commander of the 49th Corps, General Konrad, was dismissed and then put on trial (General Hartman became the commander of the corps on May 6). No one knew whether the retreat to Sevastopol was the beginning of the evacuation.

April 12 - Hitler's order "to hold Sevastopol for a long time and not to evacuate combat units from there." On this day, Scherner visited the Crimea and agreed with the fear that "the Russians with their tanks will be in Sevastopol before us."

On April 13, the main task of the 5th Army Corps is to arrive in Sevastopol as soon as possible, for which it will turn south onto the coastal highway. On April 14, the advanced units of the army corps “reached” Sevastopol and took up defensive positions.

Attempts by the Soviet troops to capture Sevastopol on the move and thereby disrupt the evacuation that had begun failed. April 17, the 63rd Corps of General P.K. Koshevoy went to the line of the Black River. On April 18, the troops of the Primorsky Army and the 77th Simferopol Division of the 51st Army captured Balaklava and Kadykovka, and the 267th Division and units of the 19th Tank Corps approached the last powerful defensive line - Sapun Mountain. By this time, there was a shortage of ammunition in all formations, and aviation was without fuel. Former Chief of Staff of the Front Marshal of the Soviet Union S.S. Biryuzov wrote that the difficulty with fuel was the result of the fact that, in preparation for the operation, "The Headquarters significantly reduced our applications, considering them too high." It was necessary to prepare an assault on the fortified Sevastopol.

The Soviet command decided to supply ammunition (1.5 rounds), pull up the 19th tank corps and heavy artillery to the Balaklava area, go on the offensive on April 23 in order to cut off Sevastopol from the bays located to the southwest, in at the same time, the 2nd Guards Army to break through the Inkerman Valley to the Northern Bay and take it under the fire of direct flood guns. Air strikes should be concentrated on the berths of the port and transports at sea.

By this time organizational changes had taken place. A separate Primorsky Army was included in the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front. It became known simply as the Primorsky Army, and Lieutenant General K.S. took command of it. Miller. Departed from the Crimea, the management of the 4th Air Army K.A. Vershinin, the 55th Guards and 20th Mountain Rifle Divisions, as well as the 20th Rifle Corps, which was in reserve on the Taman Peninsula.

Preparing for the assault on Sevastopol, on April 18, the front commander issued an order calling for a last effort:

“Comrade soldiers and officers of the 4th Ukrainian Front! Under your blow, within 3 days, the "impregnable" German defense collapsed to the entire depth of the Perekop, Ishun, Sivash and Ak-Manai positions.

On the sixth day you occupied the capital of the Crimea - Simferopol and one of the main ports - Feodosia and Evpatoria ...

Today, units of the armies have reached the last line of the enemy's Sevastopol defense on the Chernaya River and the Sapun Gora ridge, which is 5-7 km from Sevastopol.

A last organized decisive assault is needed to drown the enemy in the sea and capture his equipment, and I urge you to do this ... ".

The offensive on April 23 showed that, despite the excellent work of artillery and aviation, it was not possible to destroy the defensive structures, although the infantry advanced 2-3 km in some directions and occupied the enemy’s front trenches. According to intelligence data, the enemy still had 72,700 soldiers and officers, 1,345 artillery pieces, 430 mortars, 2,355 machine guns and 50 tanks in the bridgehead.

After lengthy discussions of the situation in the Sevastopol region in all command instances, they came to the conclusion: in order to put an end to the remnants of the enemy in the Crimea as soon as possible, a general assault on the Sevastopol fortified region by all troops of the front with the active use of aviation, fleet and partisans is necessary.

So, the general assault on the Sevastopol fortified area! Despite the repeated reminders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin on the need to complete the liquidation of the Crimean enemy grouping in the coming days, the preparation of the assault was not yet completed, it required time to replenish and regroup forces, transport ammunition and fuel, destroy the most dangerous enemy defense facilities, form assault groups and train them. It was decided to launch the offensive on 5 May.

On April 16, the command of the German 17th Army reported that the retreat had been completed, preventing the pursuing enemy from entering Sevastopol. Eneke considered this a feat, despite the fact that only a third of the guns and a quarter of the anti-tank weapons remained. The morale of the Romanians fell, and they could not be used for defense. From the 235 thousand people who were on allowance on April 9, the number of their troops by April 18 was reduced to 124 thousand.

human. This indicates losses, although part was evacuated (without Hitler's permission).

On April 12, General Scherner reported to Bucharest that he had ordered "to ensure the safe evacuation of the Romanians from the Crimea." On April 14-18, Sherner reported to the General Staff that in order to hold the Sevastopol region, it was necessary to deliver six divisions and supply 600 tons of food daily. Since this is impossible, therefore, he proposed to evacuate Sevastopol. Hitler was in favor of holding Sevastopol for a long time by strengthening the area with heavy weapons.

On April 22, the command of the 17th Army, together with the naval commandant of the Crimea, developed an evacuation plan ("Leopard") by sea and air, designed for 14 days.

On April 21, Turkey stopped deliveries of chromium ore to Germany and "joined" the anti-fascist coalition.

On April 25, Hitler decided to hold Sevastopol for some more time. To cheer up the soldiers and officers, double monetary salaries were established in the Crimea, land allotments were promised to those who distinguished themselves in battles.

On April 30, General E. Eneke was removed from command of the 17th Army. General K. Almendinger took command.

But now the situation in the Crimea was determined by the Soviet, and not by the German command. Throughout the last ten days of April and the beginning of May, guns and ammunition wagons stretched along the roads to Sevastopol. Fuel and bombs were brought to the airfields. In the divisions, assault groups were formed, the core of which were communists and Komsomol members, obstacle groups and even groups to overcome anti-tank ditches. In all regiments and battalions, training took place on terrain similar to enemy positions and their fortifications.

On April 29, artillery and aviation began to systematically destroy enemy fortifications. The aviation of the front, the fleet and the long-range aviation attached to the Headquarters made 8200 sorties until May 5.

In the battles for Sevastopol, the squadron of Captain P.M. Komozina destroyed 63 enemy aircraft. Komozin personally and in the group shot down 19 enemy aircraft and was awarded the second medal " Golden Star". The 3rd Fighter Air Corps under the command of General E.Ya. Savitsky. He himself flew several times for reconnaissance on a captured Me-109 fighter. For the skillful command of the air corps and personally shot down 22 enemy aircraft, he was again awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The brave air fighter V.D. Lavrinenkov was also awarded a second Gold Star medal. Many heroic deeds were accomplished in the Crimean sky that spring.

According to the plan of the front commander, the main blow was delivered on the left flank by the forces of the Primorsky Army and the 63rd Corps of the 51st Army in the Sapun-Gora-Karan sector in order to reach the sea (berths) west of Sevastopol. But in order to deceive the enemy, to pin down his forces, on May 5, the troops of the 2nd Guards Army, with the powerful support of the 8th Air Army, attacked the enemy from the north. The enemy transferred part of his reserve to this direction. On May 6, the 51st Army went on the offensive with part of its forces, and at 10 a.m. 30 minutes. On May 7, the Primorsky Army dealt the main blow.

F.I. Tolbukhin recalled that the enemy was expecting an offensive along the Balaklava highway. This was the only possible way, and here he placed almost all his artillery. “We had no hope of going anywhere else; then we were forced to launch a demonstrative offensive on the Mekenziev Mountains sector from west to east. For three days the 2nd Guards Army and the cavalry defiantly advanced, for three days our aviation made 3,000 sorties over these mountains.

I remember how we expected when the enemy would finally begin to withdraw his units from the Balaklava direction. And early in the morning on the third day, it was found that part of the artillery reached the Mekenziev mountains, and at 7 o'clock on the fourth day we delivered the main blow south of Sapun Mountain.

There is a large amount of historical and fiction literature about the storming of Sevastopol, and a beautiful diorama has been built on Sapun Mountain.

On the outer contour of the defense with a total length of up to 29 km, the Nazis were able to concentrate large forces and means, create their high density: up to 2 thousand people and 65 guns and mortars per 1 km of the front. On the steep stone slopes of this mountain, the enemy built four tiers of trenches, 36 pillboxes and 27 pillboxes. The assault on Sapun Mountain and the liberation of Sevastopol is one of the brilliant pages in the annals of the Great Patriotic War.

May 7 at 10 a.m. 30 minutes. the attack of Sapun Mountain began. It lasted nine hours. The 63rd Corps of P.K. operated in the main direction. Koshevoy (77th, 267th, 417th Rifle Divisions) and the 11th Guards Corps S.E. Rozhdestvensky (32nd Guards, 318th, 414th Rifle Divisions, 83rd and 255th Naval Infantry Brigades). Only at 19 o'clock. 30 minutes. on the crest of the mountain, the 77th Infantry Division of Colonel A.P. Rodionov from the 63rd Corps and the 32nd Guards Rifle Division of Colonel N.K. Zakurenkov from the 11th Guards Corps of the Primorsky Army. With the mastery of this key position, the troops were able to develop a strike directly on Sevastopol. During the night, the 10th Rifle Corps of the 51st Army, commanded by K.P. Neverov.

On May 8, on the second day of the assault, the 2nd Guards Army achieved significant success. Troops of the 13th Guards and 55th Rifle Corps drove the enemy out of the Mekenziev Mountains and reached Severnaya Bay by evening. The remnants of the 50th German infantry and the 2nd Romanian mountain divisions were cut off from the main forces and pressed to the sea. On the same day, the troops of the 51st and Primorsky armies broke through the enemy's main line of defense and reached the inner bypass of the city's defenses.

On the night of May 9, the offensive continued so that the enemy would not have time to regroup and put his units in order. He was led from each division by one rifle regiment. By morning, the troops of the 2nd Guards Army reached the North Bay along its entire length. Its direct-fire artillery fired through the Severnaya, Yuzhnaya and Streletskaya bays. At the same time, units of the 55th Rifle Corps, commanded by Major General P.E. Lovyagin, went to the Ship side and to the South Bay.

By decision of the front commander, on May 9, at 8 o'clock, the general attack was resumed. Troops of the 51st Army broke into the city from the southeast in the afternoon. Troops of the 11th Guards Corps entered the city from the south. 24th Guards Rifle Division Colonel G.Ya. Kolesnikova crossed the Northern Bay. By the end of May 9, the heroic Sevastopol was completely liberated. Moscow saluted this victory with twenty-four salvos from 324 guns.

The commander of the 54th Rifle Corps of the 2nd Guards Army, General T.K. Kolomiets, who commanded the 25th Chapaev division during the defense of Sevastopol, became the first commandant of the liberated Sevastopol.

This operation of the Soviet Armed Forces, brilliant in many respects, required great moral and physical exertion. After the assault on Sevastopol, the soldiers lay where the soybeans had cut them down: near a stone, in a roadside ditch, in the dust on the road. The dream was like a swoon, and only the weapons in their hands spoke of their readiness to rush at the enemy again.

The Primorsky Army, together with the 19th Tank Corps advanced to this direction, was advancing at that time in the direction of Cape Khersones, from where the enemy continued to evacuate. The 10th Rifle Corps of the 51st Army was also turned there.

General Boehme, who now commanded all the enemy troops on the Chersonesos Peninsula, put anti-aircraft, anti-tank and field artillery on direct fire and thus hoped to hold the bridgehead until the evacuation was completed. The remaining slippers were also buried in the ground. They set minefields, barbed wire, flamethrowers and everything else that could be adapted for defense.

During May 10 and 11, the troops of the Primorsky Army, the 19th Tank Corps and the 10th Rifle Corps were preparing for a decisive assault on the last defensive rampart that covered Cape Khersones. Artillerymen pushed their guns forward to destroy enemy fortifications with direct fire; engineering troops were preparing the attack area; scouts were actively searching. The captured prisoners showed that on the night of May 12, numerous ships would approach Chersonesos to shine the remaining troops. The general withdrawal for boarding troops on ships is scheduled for 4 o'clock in the morning.

Front commander F.I. Tolbukhin ordered to attack the enemy at 3 o'clock, prevent evacuation, exterminate or capture the remnants of enemy troops. Exactly at 3 o'clock on May 12, a thousand guns and mortars of the Primorsky Army and the 10th Rifle Corps of the 51st Army opened fire on the enemy defenses and the accumulation of troops. Even under the cover of darkness, the assault squads launched an attack and broke through narrow corridors in the enemy defenses. Behind them, the advanced regiments began to assault. By 7 o'clock in the morning the coast of the bays Streletskaya, Kruglaya, Omega, Kamyshovaya was cleared of the enemy; our troops reached the isthmus of Cape Khersones (between the Cossack Bay and the sea). On this piece of Crimean land, the enemy accumulated guns, slippers, people. But there was no longer a force that could stop the Soviet soldiers. By 10 o'clock on May 12, units of the Primorsky Army and the 19th Panzer Corps broke through to Cape Khersones. At the same time, the Black Sea Fleet and aviation did not let enemy ships come to the shore, sinking some of them in front of the eyes of the fascist army rushing along the coast. Seeing the hopelessness of the situation, over 21 thousand soldiers and officers (including more than 100 seniors) surrendered. General Boehme himself was also captured at the airfield.

What happened at that time at sea? The commander of the 17th German Army, Almendinger, asked that sea and air vehicles be sent to Sevastopol to evacuate "Romanians unfit for battle" and deliver reinforcements and ammunition. After April 8, the Germans were able to transfer two marching battalions (1300 people), 15 anti-tank and 14 other guns to Sevastopol. On the evening of May 8, in response to Scherner's report that the evacuation of Sevastopol would take eight days in its normal course, Hitler agreed to the evacuation. A day later, General Almendinger, at the request to leave Hartman, the senior commander of the 49th Corps, on Chersonese, was ordered to "justify the Fuhrer's trust." On May 8, the last 13 fighters flew from Chersonese to Romania. All transport and military ships were sent from Romania to Sevastopol - about a hundred units. The intentions of the Nazi command on the night of May 11 to withdraw everyone "in one go" did not materialize. The remnants of the Nazi troops during the last day fought without heavy weapons and almost without ammunition, suffering heavy losses.

From April 8 to May 13, the Black Sea Fleet carried out an operation to disrupt enemy sea communications. For this, submarines, bomber and mine-torpedo aircraft were used, and in close communications - attack aircraft and torpedo boats. In view of the impossibility of creating a fighter cover due to the remoteness of our airfields from communications, the actions of large surface ships were not envisaged. However, during the operation, when the enemy, having lost airfields, had no aircraft, it was advisable to use destroyers and cruisers to blockade Sevastopol. From the book by A. Hilgruber "Evacuation of the Crimea in 1944" it can be seen that by May 5, in the Sevastopol region, the enemy had only fighters that covered the evacuation. On May 9, Soviet artillery began shelling the last enemy airfield at Cape Khersones, and enemy aircraft stopped operating in the Crimean sky.

Two brigades of torpedo boats were used to destroy ships leaving Sevastopol. Further into the sea, a brigade (7-9 units) of submarines operated. The aviation of the fleet struck all along the communications from the ports of the Crimea to the Romanian ports of Sulina and Constanta, it was the main strike force. About 400 aircraft took part in the fighting (including 12 torpedo bombers, 45 bombers, 66 attack aircraft and 289 fighters). Ports from Ak-Meschet to Feodosia were constant targets of their attacks. At the first stage, while the enemy retained airfields and a strong aviation group, the Fleet Air Force systematically attacked enemy ships at sea. At the second stage, when the enemy withdrew to Sevastopol, they, together with torpedo boats and artillery, tried to establish a close blockade of the Sevastopol Bay, and then Cape Khersones.

Torpedo boats went to sea at night. Due to the remoteness of their bases, they spent most of their time on transitions and only a few hours remained in the area of ​​​​action. Submarines searched for the enemy using intelligence data and the results of air strikes and torpedo boats. However, there were not enough submarines and boats to block the flow of various ships. Therefore, it was rarely possible to completely destroy the convoy.

On April 11, 34 attack aircraft under the cover of 48 fighters launched several successive strikes on the accumulation of enemy floating assets in the port of Feodosia, making 218 sorties. A minesweeper, two landing barges, three boats and other watercraft were sunk, an attempt to evacuate by sea was thwarted. On April 13, 80 attack aircraft of the 11th assault aviation division under the command of Colonel D.I. Manzhosov, accompanied by 42 fighters, committed massive raid to the accumulation of vehicles with German troops preparing to leave the port of Sudak. As a result of the strike, three self-propelled landing barges with German troops were sunk and five barges were damaged. Panic and confusion reigned on the piers, the orders of the officers regarding the further loading of troops were not carried out. The loading stopped, the soldiers refused to follow the ships and fled towards Alushta. A high percentage of hits on ships at sea was achieved by attack aircraft, using, unexpectedly for the enemy, the top-mast method of bombing, i.e. strafing bombing. By the end of April, a certain number of attack and fighter aircraft of the fleet were relocated to the Saki airfield (Evpatoria region), which improved the conditions for the struggle for air supremacy in the Sevastopol region and made it possible for attack aircraft to strike at single ships at sea. During the operation on communications (since May 8), the Air Force of the Fleet made 4506 sorties, sank 68 different ships. In air battles and from anti-aircraft artillery fire, they lost 47 aircraft. The enemy during this time lost about 80 aircraft.

Torpedo boats were active, using torpedoes and rockets. Their capabilities after relocating to Yalta and Evpatoria have increased. In small groups, boats went out at night to a given area of ​​the sea, searched for enemy ships or lay down to drift, waiting for the passage of enemy convoys. So, a group of four torpedo boats under the command of the captain of the 3rd rank A.P. Tuula discovered a large convoy of 30 ships and warships guarding them; as a result of a bold attack, four self-propelled barges with troops and one security boat were sunk. On three occasions (May 5, 7, and 11), the torpedo boats managed to break through the strong guards of the convoys and attack the transport ships. At the same time, rocket projectiles proved to be effective. After the first volleys, the enemy usually quickly left the battlefield.

Submarines successfully operated, which made 20 campaigns during the operation, fired 55 torpedoes and 28 shells at the enemy, sank 12 transport ships and damaged several ships.

Each convoy from Romania to the Crimea was attacked by different types of forces, each in its own area. As a result of decisive actions by Soviet aviation, torpedo boats and submarines, 102 different enemy ships were sunk and more than 60 were damaged. Of every ten enemy ships and ships that took part in the evacuation, nine ships were sunk or heavily damaged.

It is appropriate to give some information about how the German command assessed the evacuation of troops from the Crimea. General K. Tippelskirch writes: “The remnants of three German divisions and a large number of scattered groups of German and Romanian soldiers fled to the Kherson Cape, the approaches to which they defended with the desperation of the doomed ... Caught in a narrow patch of land, suppressed by continuous air raids and exhausted by attacks much superior enemy forces, the German troops, having lost all hope of escaping from this hell, could not stand it. The document of the Romanian main naval headquarters says that during the evacuation from the Crimea, 43% of the tonnage of German, Romanian and Hungarian ships in the Black Sea was sunk. Approximately the same number of ships were damaged. The German Admiral F. Ruge bitterly admitted: “Russian aviation turned out to be the most unpleasant thing for small ships, especially during the evacuation of the Crimea ...”.

The chief of staff of the German-Romanian fleet on the Black Sea, Konradi, describes the last days of the evacuation of Sevastopol as follows: On the night of May 11, panic began on the piers. Places on ships were taken from the battlefield. The ships were forced to leave without completing their loading, otherwise they could sink.

On the night of May 10, the last enemy convoy approached Sevastopol, consisting of diesel-electric ships "Totila", "Teya" and several landing barges. Having received 5-6 thousand people each, the ships left for Constanta at dawn. However, "Totila" was sunk by aircraft not far from Cape Chersonese, while "Thea" with a strong guard at full speed went to the southwest. Every 20 minutes, the ships guarding her had to open fire on the attacking Soviet aircraft. In the end, they used up all the ammunition. Around noon, a torpedo dropped from an aircraft hit the transport and it sank, taking about 5 thousand people to the bottom of the sea. On the morning of May 12, the large ship "Romania" burned out and sank.

In the Yubileiny park in Feodosia, a monument was erected to the soldiers of the Separate Primorsky Army, who in April 1944 liberated the city from Nazi invaders. A monument in honor of the valiant warriors was erected in the park in 1970. It is a 16-meter steel column. It is crowned with a bronze image of the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st class. At the foot of the sculpture, the Eternal Flame burns. To the right of the monument is a stele with memorial plaques on which are written the names of the commanders of units and formations who took part in the liberation of Feodosia.

In the Victory Square, a memorial sign in the form of a T-34 tank was installed. It is also a reminder of the heroism of Soviet soldiers during the Great Patriotic War.

During the liberation of Crimea from enemy troops, the 19th Tank Corps, which was part of the 4th Ukrainian Front, took an active part in the battles. In particular, this military formation fought for Perekop and Sivash, participated in the liberation of Simferopol and Sevastopol. A monument in the form of a tank mounted on a pedestal appeared in the Crimean capital in 1944. On the territory where the sculpture stands, a complex was created in the form of a stylized portico with columns, between which there are plates with the names of parts and compounds that liberated Simferopol and the peninsula as a whole.

According to experts, the T-34 is the best tank of World War II. It was produced in 1940 at the Kharkov Design Bureau.

In Crimea, one of the first monuments dedicated to the events of the Great Patriotic War was the Obelisk of Glory on Mount Mithridates in Kerch. It was opened in 1944. The monument was erected in memory of the soldiers and officers of the Separate Primorsky Army and the sailors of the Azov military flotilla, as well as all the soldiers who died in the battles for the liberation of Crimea. The obelisk was built from the stones of the Holy Trinity Cathedral, which at that time was considered the central church of Kerch.

Sevastopol is one of the main cities of military glory. It contains a large number of monuments dedicated to the First Defense of the city during the Crimean War and the Second Defense in the Second World War. The latter also includes a monument to the soldiers of the Second Guards Army. This historical and memorial sight of Sevastopol is located on the high cape of the Northern side - not far from the square named after General Zakharov.

The monument was erected by the personnel of the 2nd Guards Army. The author of the project was the architect K. Chankvetadze, who also participated in fierce battles for Sevastopol. The memorial composition is located on the site of a mass grave in which the heroes who gave their lives in the defense of the city from the Nazis are buried.

The formation of the Second Guards Army was completed by October 1942. She passed a tragic and glorious way to the cities of East Prussia from Stalingrad itself. And in the spring of 1944, its units took part in bloody battles for the liberation of Sevastopol. The army was commanded by Lieutenant-General G. Zakharov. The soldiers under his command liberated the northern side from the Germans on May 9, 1944. Then the guardsmen, together with units of the Primorsky 51st Army, drove the enemy out of the city.

Monument to the Soldier and the Sailor - reminds the living of one of the bloodiest events of the Second World War - the liberation of Sevastopol in 1944 from the fascist invaders. Sevastopol was the most significant bridgehead for the Germans and they were ready to hold it at any cost. Along with the German fascists, the remnants of Vlasov's army and 7 Romanian divisions fought here.

By the end of April 1944, the hope of holding the Crimea and, in particular, Sevastopol had completely died out, and the mass flight of the enemy from the peninsula began.

May 8, 1944, fleeing from Soviet army, the Nazis threw themselves into the sea and tried to swim to Turkey or Romania. But the chances of salvation were equal to zero. By May 9, the entire Sevastopol Strait was littered with corpses and small pockets of resistance were completely destroyed. By noon, the same day, on the flagpole, over the Grafskaya pier, instead of the flag, the black sea sailors' vest and peakless cap loomed, and in the late afternoon, red flags fluttered all over the city

Location point - Sapun Mountain - the natural and most important mountain barrier on the outskirts of the city. The most fierce battles took place here, both during the entire period of the heroic defense of Sevastopol in 1941-1942, and during its liberation in 1944. At the very top of Sapun Mountain there is a memorial complex in honor of the soldiers who heroically defended and then liberated the hero city of Sevastopol. This is the largest diorama in the world, it is a huge canvas 25.5 m long and 5.5 m high.

At the foot of Sapun Mountain, monuments were erected to the soldiers of the 32nd Guards and 77th Rifle Divisions, who were the first to reach its summit on May 7, 1944.

Next to the Diorama, in the park, there is an obelisk of Glory, built in 1944. The names of the army and navy formations that participated in the liberation of the city are carved on the steles: 230 formations and separate units of the 4th Ukrainian Front and a number of other nationwide structures that took part in the liberation of Sevastopol .

In 1903, the French writer L. Bussenard, the author of well-known adventure novels, argued: "The masters of the Crimea will always be the masters of the Black Sea." 40 years later, representatives of the military command of the USSR and Germany agreed with his opinion. The Crimean offensive operation of 1944 was designed to provide the Soviet fleet with unequivocal dominance in the local waters and finally turn the tide of the war in favor of the anti-Hitler coalition.

preliminary alignment

The situation that developed in the Crimea at the beginning of 1944 was somewhat reminiscent of the situation in which he found himself. The forces of the aggressive bloc were blocked from land as a result of the successful conduct of two landing operations by the USSR - Melitopol and Kerch-Etilgen at the end of 1943. But they had reliable fortification systems and were numerous, only about 200 thousand people:

• 17th Army,
• several mountain rifle and cavalry corps and divisions,
• 215 tanks,
• more than 3500 pieces of artillery.

True, almost half of the personnel were Romanian units, and the leader of Romania, Antonescu, protested against their use in Tauris and even demanded evacuation. The Odessa operation put an end to these requirements - it became simply impossible to withdraw the Romanians from the Crimea.

Disposition of forces before the start of the Crimean operation

Some of the German military also offered Hitler to leave the Crimea. But he opposed, stating that then Romania, Bulgaria and would inevitably fall away from Germany. In this he was absolutely right.

The troops of the Union were in a much better position than in 1920. By the beginning of the year, they already owned bridgeheads in the Kerch region and on the southern coast of the Rotten Sea, and also overcame. Maritime capacities were of great importance - the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla operated from the sea coast.

They all had a significant advantage over the enemy in terms of the number of soldiers who had the appropriate attitude - during the year the Red Army won significant victories. The Union sought to return the Crimea as an ideal base for the Black Sea Flotilla - then it would really be possible to control the Black Sea. Ideology also played a role - the Nazis had to "remember" 255 days of the Second Sevastopol Defense.

Strategic plans

The leadership of the operation was entrusted to experienced commanders. The main force was to be the 4th Ukrainian Front (under the command of General F.I. Tolbukhin) and the Primorye Army (with General A.I. Eremenko). Troopers, guardsmen and a tank corps also participated. The general leadership and control from the headquarters was carried out by marshals K.E. Voroshilov and A.M. Vasilevsky.

Initially, the start of the operation was planned for mid-February. But then it was postponed several times - both for tactical and natural reasons. First, it was decided to finally gain a foothold on the right bank of the Dnieper region (the Odessa operation can also be considered a particle of this idea). Then a storm and prolonged heavy rains prevented, interfering with the crossing of troops.

The alignment of forces of Nazi Germany

The last option for the start of the offensive was a new date - April 8th. By this time, Odessa was almost completed: the “pearl by the sea” was taken by the Red Army on the 9th, therefore, the enemy units were completely blocked in the Crimea.

Wide grip

The beginning of the operation also resembled the actions of M.V. Frunze in 1920. After a powerful artillery preparation on April 8, the Fourth Ukrainian Front went on the offensive simultaneously from the Sivash bridgehead and at Perekop. On the 11th, the coastal army struck at and took the city on the same day.

For a week (from April 8 to April 16), our troops also liberated Armyansk and Evpatoria and Simferopol, and Dzhankoy, Belogorsk, and Sudak, went to Sevastopol. The last city on the list required three assaults. The attempts made on 19 and 23 April produced no tangible results, with only marginal success. The capture from where the Germans fired artillery was of great difficulty.

The last assault was scheduled for May 5th. By this time, the USSR could already afford to regroup troops, since a significant part of the combat missions in the Crimea had already been completed. The 2nd Guards Army went to the forefront of the attack - such detachments did not retreat. But all the same, it took 4 days for the final release of the “pride of Russian sailors”. The remnants of the Nazis retreated to the Chersonese region. They were promised evacuation, but the attack aircraft of the Land of Soviets thwarted all plans - instead of saving the Nazis, the Black Sea became a grave for 42 thousand of them.

The Crimean partisans made a huge contribution to the success of the offensive. They cut communication channels and communication routes, obtained intelligence information, and prevented the destruction of enterprises and infrastructure. One of the compounds was liberated city Old Crimea, partisan scouts did not give it up, although the Nazis, when trying to counterattack, captured one city block and killed everyone they found there - almost 600 people. On May 12, 1944, the Crimean operation ended with the unconditional victory of the Soviet troops.

Further west!

The results of the operation were impressive. In general, the losses of the aggressor in the Crimea are estimated at 140,000 irretrievable losses (killed and captured). Despite the fierce resistance of the enemy, the losses of the Red Army were noticeably less - about 40 thousand killed and less than 70 thousand wounded. The whole operation took 35 days. At one time, one resisted the enemy for more than 250 days.

Hitler was not mistaken - the authority of Germany among the allies after the defeat in the Crimea fell sharply. And the Red Army, on the contrary, once again proved its strength. Now a safe rear and a reliable base for the fleet opened up opportunities for her to further advance - to the Balkans, beyond the Danube, to the west. Symbolically - the day of the liberation of Sevastopol is celebrated on May 9! So convincingly the Crimean operation predicted Great Victory over fascism and Nazism!

The liberation of Crimea in 1944 is often referred to as the "Third Stalinist strike", which is not entirely true. Firstly, as the Crimean historian V.E. explained in his work “The Third Stalinist Strike - Myth and Reality”. Polyakov, the very concept of "Stalin's strikes" is a post-war fiction, the impetus for which was the speech of I.V. Stalin in 1944, where he mentioned ten crushing blows. As well as one of the first post-war films "The Third Strike", which told about the liberation of the Crimea. As a result, the Soviet press came up with "Stalinist blows."

In any case, the "third blow" includes not only the liberation of Crimea, but also the liberation of Odessa. So the Crimean offensive operation of 1944 is only an integral part of the so-called. "strike".

Although many different works (mostly creative, not historical) are devoted to the topic of the liberation of Crimea, little is known for certain about the losses.

Forces of the Red Army in the Crimean operation

The offensive in the Crimea was planned to be carried out from Perekop and from the Kerch Peninsula.

From the north, the 4th Ukrainian Front under the command of General of the Army F.I. Tolbukhin was to enter the Crimea. The front includes two combined-arms (51st and 2nd guards) and 8th air armies, 19th tank corps. A total of 18 rifle divisions, a tank corps, a separate tank brigade, a separate tank and self-propelled artillery regiment, a flamethrower tank battalion, 2 artillery divisions and 4 engineering brigades, separate units.

The tank fleet of the front was extremely colorful: there were already outgoing Soviet KV and T-60s, various American and British vehicles. In total there were 337 tanks and self-propelled guns. Of these, the 51st Army was supported by 82, and the 2nd Guards by 43 tanks and self-propelled guns. The front had powerful artillery, including 203 mm howitzers and 280 mm mortars.

The Separate Primorsky Army under the command of General of the Army A. I. Eremenko advanced from the east. The army consists of 12 rifle and mountain rifle divisions, 2 naval rifle brigades, a tank brigade, 4 separate tank and self-propelled artillery regiments, separate units. From the air, Eremenko's troops were supported by the 4th Air Army. The tank park of the army was also colorful and consisted of 204-211 tanks and self-propelled guns.

The 8th Air Army had 600 serviceable aircraft (out of 750), the 4th Army - 561 aircraft (out of 580), Cherno navy could allocate up to 300 aircraft. The total number of aircraft was 1456 vehicles, including 683 fighters and 382 attack aircraft.

The size of the Primorsky Army is indicated by the beginning of the operation 92,367 people, the 2nd Guards - 72,230 people, the 51st Army - 93,300 people. There were 20,681 people in front-line subordination units. Soviet troops, after huge losses in previous operations, still had a significant shortage. In the divisions, according to the data given in the book by A. Isaev “The Battle for Crimea”, there were only 6500-7000 people each. In the companies of the divisions of the 2nd shock army, according to the report No. 1195 / sh of April 16, there were 70-75 people each.

Who defended in the Crimea?

In Soviet times, it was customary to overestimate the number of German troops in all possible ways. However, it should be recognized that in the Crimean operation a significant advantage was on the side of the Red Army.

The 17th German Army was in the Crimea. It consisted of only five German infantry divisions. Of these, two were in the north, two on the Kerch Peninsula, and one on the coast (later transferred to Perekop). In addition, there were seven Romanian divisions: cavalry and mountain on the Kerch Peninsula, infantry and cavalry in the northern part, and three guarded the coast from possible landings. There were 77 assault guns, which included two corresponding divisions. The Romanian troops had two tank companies, in which there were up to two dozen Czech tanks, which had zero combat value.

On the other hand, the 17th Army had 583 anti-tank guns (of which 98 were 75 mm), 30 Marder self-propelled guns, 485 Panzerschreck grenade launchers and 9645 disposable Panzerfausts. The anti-tank defense consisted of the guns of the 9th anti-aircraft division, which had 134 88-mm anti-aircraft guns.

The combat effectiveness of the Romanian troops was extremely low, both in moral terms and in terms of training and weapons. The German units experienced a significant shortage in personnel and weapons. At the same time, there was a significant number of various freelance and auxiliary formations. For example, the 50th Infantry Division, which defended Perekop, had a total of 19 battalions, including two "Caucasian" battalions and one Slovak battalion. The regiments of the division were reinforced with 20 mm and 88 mm anti-aircraft guns.

German aviation in the Crimea consisted of 48 fighters and 88 attack aircraft.

The total number of personnel of the Crimean grouping on April 1 was 230,000 people. Of these, about 65,000 are soldiers of the Romanian units. More than half of them accounted for all kinds of rear services, law enforcement, civilian personnel, and how fighting force they should not be considered. However, after huge losses (the 73rd and 98th Infantry Divisions that fled from the Kerch Peninsula lost 79% and 43% of their personnel, respectively), the German command threw into the positions of the rear and everyone who could only be used.

What did the victory cost?

According to official data, the losses of the Red Army during the Crimean offensive operation amounted to 84,819 people, including irretrievable losses - 17,754 people. Based on the fact that by the beginning of the operation there were 278,578 people, then 30% of the personnel left.

But it is worth noting that the victory was complete, the 17th Army suffered huge losses. A. Polishchuk in his work “Payback for the Bustard Hunt” gives data that differs from the official Soviet ones, but is also very impressive.

During the hostilities, 38,854 Germans and 24,674 Romanians died and went missing - a total of 63,528 people. 97,875 people were evacuated - 63,499 Germans and 34,376 Romanians, this number includes about 10,000 people who were on transports sunk by Soviet aircraft. On May 12–13, 21,000 soldiers and officers were captured at Cape Khersones. It should be remembered that the German reports concern only military personnel, and, as mentioned above, there were many different people in the Crimea, including civilians. Therefore, it is not surprising that Soviet and German data can differ greatly.

After the evacuation from the Crimea, the number of personnel of the 17th Army was 9741 people, of which 2680 were rear soldiers.

It was for this victory that tens of thousands of Soviet soldiers in the Crimea in 1944 paid with their lives and health.

On May 9, 1944, 70 years ago, after a general assault, Sevastopol was liberated. By May 12, the remnants of the German 17th Army, which fled to Cape Chersonese, were finally defeated. "Stalin's third blow" - the Crimean offensive operation, led to full release Crimean peninsula from the Nazis. Having recaptured the Crimea and Sevastopol, the Soviet Union regained control of the Black Sea.

Soviet soldiers salute in honor of the liberation of Sevastopol

General situation before the start of the operation. Previous Operations

1943 The German military-political leadership clung to the Crimea to the last opportunity. The Crimean peninsula was of great military-strategic and political importance. Adolf Hitler demanded to keep the Crimea at any cost. The Crimean peninsula was necessary for Berlin not only for operational reasons (a base for the air and sea fleet, an advanced outpost of ground forces to stabilize the position of the southern flank of the entire front), but also for political ones. The surrender of Crimea could have influenced the position of Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, and the general situation on the Balkan Peninsula. The loss of Crimea strengthened the capabilities of the Soviet Air Force and Black Sea Fleet.

On August 13 - September 22, 1943, the troops of the Southwestern Front under the command of General F.I. Tolbukhin, during the Donbass offensive operation, reached the line of the Dnieper and Molochnaya rivers. Conditions appeared for the liberation of Northern Tavria and the Crimean peninsula. September 9 - October 9, 1943, the Novorossiysk-Taman operation was carried out (). During this operation, Soviet troops liberated Novorossiysk, the Taman Peninsula and reached the coast of the Kerch Strait. The successful completion of the operation created favorable opportunities for attacks on the Crimean Wehrmacht grouping from the sea and through the Kerch Strait.

The position of German troops on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front continued to deteriorate further. September 26 - November 5, 1943, the Southern Front (from October 20, 1943 - the 4th Ukrainian) carried out the Melitopol offensive operation. October 24-25, 1943 19th tank corps of General I.D. Vasiliev, Guards Kuban Cossack Cavalry Corps of General N.Ya. Kirichenko and rifle units broke through the German defenses. The Red Army was rapidly advancing towards Perekop, Sivash and the lower reaches of the Dnieper. As a result of the Melitopol operation, the Red Army defeated 8 enemy divisions and inflicted heavy damage on 12 divisions. Soviet troops advanced 50-230 km, liberating almost the entire Northern Tavria and reaching the lower reaches of the Dnieper. German troops in the Crimea were cut off from the rest of the troops. By the end of the day on October 31, the advanced units of the 19th Tank Corps and the Cavalry Corps approached the Turkish Wall and broke through it on the move. Nov. 1 soviet soldiers fought in the area of ​​Armyansk. The blow of the Soviet tankers and cavalry on the Turkish Wall was so sudden that the Nazis did not have time to organize a powerful defense.

The problem of the advanced units was that they did not have enough artillery, ammunition, besides, the rifle units fell behind. The German command, realizing that the Turkish shaft was broken, organized a powerful counterattack. All day there was a stubborn battle. On the night of November 2, the Nazis again occupied the Turkish Wall with a blow from the flanks. The advanced Soviet units were forced to fight surrounded. German attacks followed one after another. Komkor Vasiliev was wounded, but remained in the ranks and continued to lead the troops. On November 3, the units had 6-7 shells per gun and 20-25 rounds per rifle. The situation was critical. The front headquarters ordered to leave the encirclement, but if possible, to hold the bridgehead. The commander of the 19th tank corps, Ivan Vasiliev (by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of November 3, 1943, Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces Vasiliev was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union) decided to hold the bridgehead and strike from it (from the south) again break through the German positions on the rampart. At night, two small assault detachments (each with 100 fighters) made up of tankers, dismounted cavalrymen, sappers, signalmen and drivers broke through the German defenses. So, the bridgehead south of the Turkish Wall, 3.5 km wide and up to 4 km deep, was able to hold.

At the same time, parts of the 10th Rifle Corps, Major General K.P. Neverov forced the Sivash and captured another important bridgehead. The German command, realizing the danger of this breakthrough, sent reinforcements with tanks and artillery into battle. However, the Soviet troops received reinforcements. The bridgehead was retained and expanded to 18 km along the front and 14 km in depth. Thus, the operation ended with the capture of bridgeheads at Perekop and south of Sivash, which played a crucial role during the Crimean operation.

Soviet troops crossing the Sivash

The commander of the 17th Army, General Erwin Gustav Jeneke, fearing a "new Stalingrad", drew up a plan for the evacuation of German troops from the peninsula through Perekop to Ukraine ("Operation Michael"). The evacuation was scheduled for October 29, 1943. However, Hitler banned the operation at the last moment. Hitler proceeded from the strategic and military-political significance of the peninsula. He was supported by the Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces, Grand Admiral K. Doenitz. The German Navy needed Crimea to control a significant part of the Black Sea, the loss of the peninsula sharply worsened the capabilities of the German fleet. The admiral promised that in a critical situation, the fleet would evacuate 200,000 troops. 17th Army in 40 days (in bad weather - in 80). However, the naval command was mistaken in their forecasts, in assessing the capabilities of the Navy and Soviet troops. When the need arose, the 17th Army could not be quickly evacuated, which caused its destruction.

October 31 - November 11, 1943, Soviet troops carried out the Kerch-Eltigen landing operation. The Soviet command planned to liberate the Kerch Peninsula. It was not possible to liberate the peninsula, but an important bridgehead was captured and significant enemy forces were attracted to this direction. The German command was forced to transfer troops from the northern (Perekop) direction, where the Nazis planned to launch a strong counterattack on the advancing troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front. The German 17th Army became even more bogged down in the Crimea, now under the threat of attacks from two directions. The Romanian leadership, having lost confidence in the Germans, began to evacuate their troops from the Crimea.

Soldiers of the Separate Primorsky Army attack an enemy stronghold on the territory of a metallurgical plant in Kerch

1944 German forces and defense

The 17th Army of Yeneke (Yeneke) was still a powerful and quite combat-ready grouping. It consisted of up to 200 thousand soldiers, 215 tanks and assault guns and about 360 guns and mortars, 148 aircraft. The headquarters of the 17th Army was in Simferopol.

The army was ordered by Adolf Hitler to stay on the peninsula. In the future, the 17th Army, together with the 6th Army, located in the Nikopol region, was to launch a counterattack on the Red Army and restore land communications cut by the Soviet troops with the rest of the German troops. The 17th Army was to play an important role in disrupting the Soviet offensive on the southern wing of the Eastern Front. Back in November 1943, the Litzman and Ruderboot plans were developed. They provided for the breakthrough of most of the 17th Army from the Crimea through Perekop to join the 6th Army, which was holding the Nikopol bridgehead, and the evacuation of a smaller part of the army by naval forces.

However, the actions of the Soviet troops thwarted these plans. Parts of the 10th Rifle Corps, which held the bridgehead south of Sivash, improved their tactical position and expanded the bridgehead during several local operations. The troops of the Separate Primorsky Army in the Kerch region also conducted a number of local operations, improving their position and expanding their foothold. The 17th Army found itself in an even more difficult position. As General E. Yeneke noted on January 19, 1944: "... the defense of the Crimea hangs on a" silk thread "...".

The position of the 17th Army was aggravated by the actions of the Crimean partisans. On December 20, 1943, the operational and intelligence departments of the 5th Army Corps recognized the futility of fighting partisan detachments, since: "the complete destruction of large bands in the mountains is possible only with the involvement of very large forces." The command of the 17th Army also recognized the hopelessness of the fight against the partisans. Partisan detachments were supported by an "air bridge" with the USSR. The Germans tried to terrorize, including exterminating the population of the foothill villages, among which the partisans were hiding, to suppress resistance. However, the punitive measures did not produce the expected results. In addition, Crimean Tatars were involved in the fight against the partisans, who massively collaborated with the invaders.

By April 1944, three partisan formations were active in the Crimea, total strength up to 4 thousand fighters. The most powerful was the Southern connection of partisans under the command of I. A. Makedonsky. The southern detachment was located in the reserve of the southern coast of Crimea, in the region of Alushta - Bakhchisarai - Yalta. The northern unit under the command of P. R. Yampolsky was stationed in the Zuy forests. The eastern unit under the leadership of V.S. Kuznetsov was based in the Starokrymsky forests. In fact, the Soviet partisans controlled the entire mountain-forest part of the peninsula. Throughout the occupation, they strengthened their positions. Even some invaders passed to them. So, on the side of the partisans, a group of deserted Slovaks fought.

Crimean partisans

On January 22-28, the Separate Primorsky Army conducted another local operation. The offensive did not lead to success, but showed the precarious position of the 17th Army. The German command had to transfer reserves from the northern direction, which thwarted the possibility of a counterattack at Perekop. From January 30 to February 29, 1944, the troops of the 3rd and 4th Ukrainian fronts carried out the Nikopol-Krivoy Rog operation (). The Nikopol bridgehead was liquidated, which finally deprived the Germans of the hope of restoring land communications with the 17th Army encircled in the Crimea. The 4th Ukrainian Front was able to direct all its forces to the liberation of the Crimean Peninsula.

True, in January-February, the 73rd Infantry Division from the 44th Separate Army Corps was airlifted to the Crimea from the south of Ukraine, and in March, the 111th Infantry Division from the 6th Army of Army Group A. The German high command still wanted to keep the Crimea. However, the command of the 17th Army understood that the reinforcements were not able to change the situation, they only prolong the agony. Jeneke and his staff repeatedly reported to the high command about the need for the speedy evacuation of the army.

Tanks Pz.Kpfw.38 (t) of the 2nd Romanian tank regiment in the Crimea

Romanian artillerymen fire from a 75 mm anti-tank gun during a battle in the Crimea

By April, the 17th Army had 12 divisions: 5 German and 7 Romanian, 2 assault gun brigades. In the area of ​​Perekop and against the bridgehead on Sivash, the 49th mountain rifle corps (50th, 111th, 336th infantry divisions, 279th brigade of assault guns) and the Romanian cavalry corps (9th cavalry, 10 19th and 19th Infantry Divisions). In total, the Northern group consisted of about 80 thousand soldiers. The headquarters of the group was located in Dzhankoy.

The German defense in the Perekop area consisted of three lanes up to 14 km long and up to 35 km deep. They were occupied by the 50th Infantry Division, reinforced by several separate battalions and units (a total of about 20 thousand bayonets, up to 50 tanks and assault guns and 325 guns and mortars). The main defensive line was up to 4-6 km deep, had three defensive positions with full-profile trenches and long-term firing points. The main center of defense was Armyansk. From the northern direction, the city was covered by a deep anti-tank ditch, minefields and anti-tank guns. The city was prepared for all-round defense, the streets were blocked with barricades, many buildings were turned into strongholds. Communication passages connected Armyansk with the nearest settlements.

The second line of defense took place in the southern part of the Perekop Isthmus between the Karkinit Bay and the Staroe and Krasnoye lakes. The depth of the second line of defense was 6-8 km. Here the Germans built two defensive positions, covered with an anti-tank ditch, minefields and other barriers. The defense was based on the Ishun positions, which closed the exit to the steppe regions of the peninsula. The third line of defense, the construction of which was not completed by the beginning of the offensive of the Red Army, passed along the Chartylyk River. In the intervals between the defense lines there were separate nodes of resistance and strongholds, minefields. Antiamphibious defenses were prepared on the coast of the Karkinitsky Gulf. The command of the 17th Army was expecting the main attack of the Red Army in the Perekop area.

On the southern bank of the Sivash, the Germans built 2-3 defensive lines up to 15-17 km deep. They were occupied by the 336th German and 10th Romanian infantry divisions. Defensive positions passed along the shores of four lakes and had a land length of only 10 km. Due to this, a high density of defense was achieved, saturated with manpower and firing points. In addition, the defense was strengthened by numerous engineering barriers, minefields and pillboxes, bunkers. The 111th German Infantry Division, the 279th Assault Gun Brigade and part of the 9th Romanian Cavalry Division were in reserve at Dzhankoy.

The Kerch direction was defended by the 5th Army Corps: the 73rd, 98th Infantry Divisions, the 191st Brigade of Assault Guns, the Romanian 6th Cavalry Division and the 3rd Mountain Rifle Division. In total, the group consisted of about 60 thousand soldiers. Coastal defense in the area from Feodosia to Sevastopol was assigned to the Romanian 1st Mountain Rifle Corps (1st and 2nd Mountain Rifle Divisions). The same corps was engaged in the fight against partisans. The coast from Sevastopol to Perekop was controlled by two cavalry regiments from the Romanian 9th Cavalry Division. In total, about 60 thousand soldiers were allocated for antiamphibious defense and the fight against partisans. The headquarters of the 17th Army and the Romanian 1st Mountain Rifle Corps were located in Simferopol. In addition, the 17th Army included the 9th Air Force Anti-Aircraft Division, an artillery regiment, three coastal defense artillery regiments, the Krym mountain rifle regiment, a separate Bergman regiment, and other units (security, engineer battalions, etc. .).

There were four lines of defense on the Kerch Peninsula. Their total depth reached 70 kilometers. The main line of defense was based on Kerch and the heights surrounding the city. The second line of defense ran along the Turkish Wall - from Adzhibay to Uzunlar Lake. The third lane went near the settlements of Seven Wells, Kenegez, Adyk, Obekchi and Karasan. The fourth lane covered the Ak-Monai isthmus ("Perpach-position"). In addition, the Germans equipped the rear defense lines on the Evpatoria - Saki - Sarabuz - Karasubazar - Sudak - Feodosia, Alushta - Yalta line. They covered Simferopol. Sevastopol was a powerful defensive node.

Operation plan and Soviet forces

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (VGK) considered the Crimean peninsula as a strategically important area. The liberation of the Crimea restored the capabilities of the Black Sea Fleet. Sevastopol was the main base of the Soviet fleet. In addition, the peninsula was an important base for the German fleet and aviation, covering the southern strategic flank of the enemy. Crimea was important in determining the future of the Balkan Peninsula and influenced Turkish policy.

The operation to liberate the Crimea began to prepare in February 1944. On February 6, Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky and the Military Council of the 4th Ukrainian Front presented the Headquarters with a plan for the Crimean operation. On February 22, 1944, Joseph Stalin approved the decision to direct the main attack from Sivash. For this, crossings were organized through the Sivash, through which manpower and equipment began to be transferred to the bridgehead. The work took place in difficult conditions. The sea, German air raids and artillery strikes destroyed crossings more than once.

The start date of the operation was postponed several times. From the beginning, this was due to the expectation of the liberation from the Nazis of the coast of the Dnieper to Kherson, then the weather conditions (because of them, the start of the operation was postponed for the period between March 15 and 20). On March 16, the start of the operation was postponed in anticipation of the liberation of Nikolaev and the exit of the Red Army to Odessa. On March 26, the Odessa offensive operation began (). However, even after the release of Nikolaev on March 28, the operation could not be started. Bad weather interfered.

The general plan of the Crimean operation was that the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front under the command of General of the Army Fyodor Ivanovich Tolbukhin from the north - from Perekop and Sivash, and the Separate Primorskaya Army of General of the Army Andrey Ivanovich Eremenko from the east - from the Kerch Peninsula, delivered a simultaneous blow to general direction to Simferopol and Sevastopol. They were supposed to break through the German defenses, dismember and destroy the German 17th Army, preventing its evacuation from the Crimean Peninsula. The offensive of the ground forces was supported by the Black Sea Fleet under the command of Admiral Philip Sergeyevich Oktyabrsky and the Azov Flotilla under the command of Rear Admiral Sergey Georgievich Gorshkov. The naval forces included battleship, 4 cruisers, 6 destroyers, 2 patrol boats, 8 base minesweepers, 161 torpedo, patrol and armored boats, 29 submarines and other ships and vessels. From the air, the offensive of the 4th UV was supported by the 8th Air Army under the command of Colonel-General of Aviation Timofey Timofeevich Khryukin and the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet. The 4th Air Army under the command of Colonel General of Aviation Konstantin Andreevich Vershinin supported the offensive of the Separate Primorsky Army. In addition, partisans were supposed to hit the Germans from the rear. Marshals of the Soviet Union K. E. Voroshilov and A. M. Vasilevsky were responsible for the coordination of the troops. In total, about 470 thousand people, about 6 thousand guns and mortars, 559 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts, 1250 aircraft took part in the operation.

Chief of Staff of the 4th Ukrainian Front, Lieutenant General Sergei Semenovich Biryuzov, member of the State Defense Committee, Marshal of the Soviet Union Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov, Chief of the General Staff, Marshal of the Soviet Union Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky at the command post of the 4th Ukrainian Front

The 4th UV dealt the main blow. It consisted of: the 51st Army, the 2nd Guards Army and the 19th Tank Corps. The main blow from the Sivash bridgehead was delivered by the 51st Army under the command of the Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General Yakov Grigorievich Kreizer and the reinforced 19th Tank Corps under the command of the Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces Ivan Dmitrievich Vasiliev. Ivan Vasiliev will be wounded during reconnaissance, so his deputy I. A. Potseluev will lead the offensive of the corps. They received the task of advancing in the direction of Dzhankoy - Simferopol - Sevastopol. In the event of a breakthrough of the German defense and the capture of Dzhankoy, the main grouping of the 4th UV went to the rear of the German positions at Perekop. She could also develop an offensive on Simferopol and in the rear of the enemy's Kerch grouping. The 2nd Guards Army under the command of Lieutenant General Georgy Fedorovich Zakharov delivered an auxiliary strike on the Perekop Isthmus and was supposed to advance in the direction of Evpatoria - Sevastopol. Zakharov's army was also supposed to clear the western coast of Crimea from the Nazis. A separate Primorsky army received the task of breaking through the German defenses at Kerch and advancing in the direction of Vladislavovka and Feodosia. In the future, part of the forces of the Primorsky Army was to advance in the direction of Simferopol - Sevastopol, the other part - along the coast, from Feodosia to Sudak, Alushta, Yalta and Sevastopol.

The Black Sea Fleet received the task of disrupting enemy sea communications. Submarines and torpedo boats were to attack enemy ships on the near and far approaches to Sevastopol. Aviation (more than 400 aircraft) was supposed to operate throughout the German sea lanes - from Sevastopol to Romania. Large surface ships did not participate in the operation. The headquarters ordered them to be saved for future naval operations. The actions of the Black Sea Fleet were coordinated by the representative of the Headquarters - the Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces of the USSR People's Commissar of the Navy Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov. The Azov Flotilla transported troops and cargo across the Kerch Strait and supported the offensive of the Separate Primorsky Army from the sea.

Long-range aviation under the command of Air Marshal A.E. Golovanov (more than 500 aircraft) was supposed to paralyze the work of railway junctions and ports, strike at important enemy targets, sink German ships and ships with massive night attacks. Long-range aviation was supposed to strike at the most important Romanian ports of Galati and Constanta.

The Crimean partisans were given the task of disrupting the movement of the Germans on the roads, interrupting wire communications, organizing attacks on enemy headquarters and command posts, preventing the Nazis from destroying cities and settlements when retreating, to prevent the destruction and theft of the population. They also had to destroy the Yalta port.

To be continued…