Scheme of the Prokhorov battle. Battle of Prokhorovka museum guide “Prokhorovka tank battle. When did it happen

July 12th, 2013

Exactly 70 years ago, in 1943, on the very same days when this note is being written, one of the largest battles in the history of mankind was going on in the region of Kursk, Orel and Belgorod. The "Kursk Bulge", which ended in the complete victory of the Soviet troops, became the turning point of the Second World War. But the assessments of one of the most famous episodes of the battle - the tank battle near Prokhorovka - are so contradictory that it is very difficult to figure out who actually emerged victorious from it. They say that the real, objective history of any event is written not earlier than 50 years after it. The 70th anniversary of the Battle of Kursk is an excellent opportunity to find out what really happened near Prokhorovka.

The "Kursk Bulge" was the name given to a ledge on the front line about 200 km wide and up to 150 km deep, which was formed as a result of the winter campaign of 1942-1943. In mid-April, the German command developed an operation code-named "Citadel": it was planned to encircle and destroy Soviet troops in the Kursk region with simultaneous attacks from the north, in the Orel region, and from the south, from Belgorod. Further, the Germans were to advance again to the east.

It would seem that it is not so difficult to predict such plans: an attack from the north, an attack from the south, an envelopment in “pincers” ... In fact, the “Kursk Bulge” was not the only such ledge on the front line. In order for the German plans to be confirmed, it was necessary to use all the forces of Soviet intelligence, which this time turned out to be on top (there is even a beautiful version that all operational information was supplied to Moscow by Hitler's personal photographer). The main details of the German operation near Kursk were known long before it began. The Soviet command knew exactly the day and hour appointed for the German offensive.

Battle of Kursk Battle scheme.

They decided to meet the "guests" in an appropriate way: for the first time in the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army built a powerful, deeply echeloned defense on the alleged directions of the enemy's main attacks. It was necessary to wear down the enemy in defensive battles, and then go on the counterattack (Marshals G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky are considered the main authors of this idea). The Soviet defense with an extensive network of trenches and minefields consisted of eight lines with a total depth of up to 300 kilometers. The numerical superiority was also on the side of the USSR: more than 1300 thousand personnel against 900 thousand of the Germans, 19 thousand guns and mortars against 10 thousand, 3400 tanks against 2700, 2172 aircraft against 2050. True, here we must take into account the fact that the German army received a significant "technical" replenishment: tanks "Tiger" and "Panther", assault guns "Ferdinand", Focke-Wulf fighters of new modifications, bombers "Junkers-87 D5". But the Soviet command had a certain advantage due to the favorable location of the troops: the Central and Voronezh fronts were supposed to repel the offensive, the troops of the Western, Bryansk and South-Western fronts could come to their aid if necessary, and another front was deployed in the rear - Stepnoy, the creation of which the Nazi commanders, as they later admitted in their memoirs, missed it completely.

The Junkers 87 bomber, modification D5, is one of the samples of new German technology near Kursk. Our aircraft received the nickname "lappet" for a non-retractable landing gear.

However, preparing to repel a blow is only half the battle. The second half is to prevent fatal miscalculations in combat conditions, when the situation is constantly changing and plans are being adjusted. To begin with, the Soviet command used a psychological technique. The Germans were to launch their offensive at 3 am on 5 July. However, at exactly this hour, a massive fire of Soviet artillery fell on their positions. Thus, already at the very beginning of the battle, the Nazi commanders received a signal that their plans had been revealed.

The first three days of the battle, for all their magnitude, can be described quite briefly: the German troops were bogged down in a dense Soviet defense. On the northern face of the "Kursk Bulge", at the cost of heavy losses, the enemy managed to advance 6-8 kilometers in the direction of Olkhovatka. But on July 9 the situation changed. Having decided that it was enough to hit the wall with their foreheads, the Germans (first of all, the commander of Army Group South E. von Manstein) tried to concentrate all their forces in one, southern direction. And here the German offensive was stopped after a large-scale tank battle at Prokhorovka, which I will consider in detail.

The battle, perhaps, is unique in its own way in that the points of view on it among modern historians differ literally in everything. From the recognition of the unconditional victory of the Red Army (the version entrenched in Soviet textbooks) to talk about the complete defeat by the Germans of the 5th Guards Army of General P.A. Rotmistrov. As proof of the latter thesis, the figures of the losses of Soviet tanks are usually cited, as well as the fact that the general himself almost fell under the tribunal for these losses. However, the position of the "defeatists" also cannot be accepted unconditionally for several reasons.

General Pavel Rotmistrov - Commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army.

Firstly, the battle near Prokhorovka is often considered by supporters of the "defeatist" version outside the general strategic situation. But the period from July 8 to 12 was the time of the most intense battles on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge. The main goal of the German offensive was the city of Oboyan - this important strategic point made it possible to combine the forces of Army Group South and the 9th German Army advancing in the north. To prevent a breakthrough, the commander of the Voronezh Front, General N.F. Vatutin concentrated a large tank grouping on the right flank of the enemy. If the Nazis immediately tried to break through to Oboyan, Soviet tanks would hit them from the Prokhorovka area to the flank and rear. Realizing this, the commander of the 4th German Panzer Army Goth decided to first take Prokhorovka, and then continue moving north.

Secondly, the very name “battle of Prokhorovka” is not entirely correct. The fighting on July 12 took place not only directly near this village, but also to the north and south of it. It is the clashes of tank armadas along the entire width of the front that make it possible to more or less objectively assess the results of the day. It is also not difficult to trace where the promoted (in modern terms) name "Prokhorovka" came from. It began to appear on the pages of Russian historical literature in the 1950s, when Nikita Khrushchev became the General Secretary of the CPSU, who - what a coincidence! - in July 1943 he was on the southern face of the Kursk ledge as a member of the military council of the Voronezh Front. It is not surprising that Nikita Sergeevich needed vivid descriptions of the victories of the Soviet troops in this sector.

Scheme of a tank battle near Prokhorovka. The three main German divisions are designated by abbreviations: "MG", "AG" and "R".

But back to the fighting on July 10-12. By the 12th, the operational situation at Prokhorovka was extremely tense. The Germans had no more than two kilometers to the village itself - it was one thing to attack decisively. If they managed to take Prokhorovka and gain a foothold in it, part of the tank corps could calmly turn north and break through to Oboyan. Over the two fronts - Central and Voronezh - in this case, there would be a real threat of encirclement. Vatutin had at his disposal the last significant reserve - the 5th Guards Tank Army of General P.A. Rotmistrov, which numbered about 850 vehicles (tanks and self-propelled artillery guns). The Germans had three tank divisions, which included a total of 211 tanks and self-propelled guns. But, assessing the balance of power, it must be borne in mind that the Nazis were armed with the latest heavy Tigers, as well as modernized fourth Panzers (Pz-IV) with enhanced armor protection. The main strength of the Soviet tank corps was the legendary "thirty-four" (T-34) - excellent medium tanks, but for all their merits, they could not compete on equal terms with heavy equipment. In addition, Nazi tanks could fire over long distances, had better optics and, accordingly, firing accuracy. Taking into account all these factors, Rotmistrov's advantage was very insignificant.

The heavy tank "Tiger" is the main strike unit of the German tank forces near Kursk.

However, one cannot write off several mistakes made by Soviet generals. The first was made by Vatutin himself. Having set the task of advancing on the Germans, at the last moment he moved the time of the offensive from 10 am to 8.30. The question of the quality of intelligence involuntarily arises: the Germans stood in position in the morning and themselves waited for the order to attack (as it became known later, it was scheduled for 9.00), and their anti-tank artillery was deployed in battle formation in case of Soviet counterattacks. To deliver a preemptive strike in such a situation was a suicidal decision, which was shown by the further course of the battle. Surely Vatutin, if he had been accurately informed about the German location, would have preferred to wait for the Nazis to attack.

The second mistake behind the “authorship” of P.A. Rotmistrov himself concerns the use of T-70 light tanks (120 vehicles in two corps of the 5th Guards Army, which launched a morning attack). Under Prokhorovka, the T-70s were in the forefront and were especially hard hit by the fire of German tanks and artillery. The roots of this mistake are quite unexpectedly found in the Soviet military doctrine of the late 1930s: it was believed that light tanks were intended primarily for “reconnaissance in force”, while medium and heavy tanks were intended for a decisive strike. The Germans, on the other hand, acted exactly the opposite: their heavy wedges broke through the defenses, and light tanks and infantry followed, “clearing” the territory. Undoubtedly, to Kursk, the Soviet generals were familiar with the tactics of the Nazis in detail. What made Rotmistrov make such a strange decision is a mystery. Perhaps he was counting on the effect of surprise and hoped to crush the enemy with numbers, but, as I wrote above, a surprise attack did not work.

What actually happened near Prokhorovka, and why did Rotmistrov barely manage to avoid the tribunal? At 8.30 in the morning, Soviet tanks began to attack the Germans, who were in good positions. In parallel, an air battle ensued, where, apparently, neither side gained the upper hand. The first ranks of Rotmistrov's two tank corps were shot by fascist tanks and artillery. Closer to noon, in the course of violent attacks, part of the vehicles broke through to the positions of the Nazis, but failed to push the enemy. After waiting for the offensive impulse of Rotmistrov's army to dry up, the Germans themselves went on the attack, and ... It would seem that they should have easily won the battle, but no!

General view of the battlefield near Prokhorovka.

Speaking about the actions of the Soviet military leaders, it should be noted that they competently disposed of the reserves. On the southern sector of the front, the SS Reich division advanced only a couple of kilometers and was stopped mainly due to anti-tank artillery fire with the support of ground attack aircraft. The division "Adolf Hitler", exhausted by the attacks of the Soviet troops, remained in the same place. To the north of Prokhorovka, the “Dead Head” tank division was operating, which, according to German reports, did not meet Soviet troops at all that day, but for some reason it only covered 5 kilometers! This is an unrealistically small figure, and we can rightfully assume that the delay of the "Dead Head" is on the "conscience" of Soviet tanks. Moreover, it was in this area that a reserve of 150 tanks of the 5th and 1st Guards Tank Armies remained.

And one more thing: the failure in the morning clash near Prokhorovka in no way detracts from the merits of the Soviet tankmen. The crews of tanks fought to the last shell, showing miracles of courage, and sometimes purely Russian ingenuity. Rotmistrov himself recalled (and it is unlikely that he invented such a vivid episode) how the commander of one of the platoons, Lieutenant Bondarenko, on whom two “tigers” were moving, managed to hide his tank behind a burning German car. The Germans decided that Bondarenko's tank had been hit, turned around, and one of the "tigers" immediately received a shell in the side.

Attack of the Soviet "thirty-fours" with the support of the infantry.

The losses of the 5th Guards Army that day amounted to 343 tanks. The Germans, according to modern historians, lost up to 70 vehicles. However, here we are talking only about irretrievable losses. Soviet troops could pull up reserves and send damaged tanks for repairs. The Germans, who had to advance at all costs, did not have such an opportunity.

How to evaluate the results of the battle at Prokhorovka? From a tactical point of view, and also taking into account the ratio of losses - a draw, or even a minor victory for the Germans. However, if you look at the strategic map, it is obvious that the Soviet tankers were able to complete the main task - to slow down the German offensive. July 12 was a turning point in the Battle of Kursk: Operation Citadel failed, and on the same day, a counter-offensive of the Red Army began north of Orel. The second stage of the battle (Operation Kutuzov, primarily by the forces of the Bryansk and Western fronts) was successful for the Soviet troops: by the end of July, the enemy was driven back to their original positions, and already in August the Red Army liberated Orel and Kharkov. The military power of Germany was finally broken, which predetermined the victory of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War

Broken Nazi equipment near Kursk ..

Curious fact. It would be unfair not to give the floor to one of the initiators of the Soviet operation near Kursk, so I give the version of the events of Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov: “In his memoirs, the former commander of the 5th tank army, P.A. armies "South" was played by the 5th Panzer Army. This is immodest and not entirely true. The troops of the 6th and 7th Guards and 1st Tank Armies, supported by the artillery of the reserve of the High Command and the air army during the fierce battles of July 4-12, bled and exhausted the enemy. The 5th Panzer Army was already dealing with an extremely weakened grouping of German troops, which had lost faith in the possibility of a successful fight against the Soviet troops.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov.

People do not learn the lessons of history well, and perhaps because there are no truthful and accurate textbooks. The views of domestic historians on some events of the past largely depend on the official point of view. Now there are more opportunities to express one's own opinion and heated debates are flaring up around global historical phenomena and individual episodes.

Some call the battle of Prokhorovka the decisive part of the defensive phase of the Battle of Kursk, while others call it an accidental clash of motorized units that ended in terrible losses for the Red Army.

fire arc

The Stalingrad defeat shook the war machine of fascist Germany, but its power was still great. The main strike force of the Wehrmacht, which had not failed the Nazi command until now, was the tank corps, which included the elite - the armored divisions of the SS. It was they who were supposed to break through the echeloned Soviet defenses during the liquidation of the Kursk ledge, it was with their participation that the battle took place near Prokhorovka on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge (“face” is the side of the defensive fortifications facing the enemy).

The fact that the main events would take place near Kursk became clear to both sides by the spring of 1943. Intelligence data spoke of the concentration of powerful military groupings in this area, but further showed that Hitler was surprised by the number and power of defensive lines prepared by the Red Army, the number of Soviet "thirty-fours" that became the main force of the tank armies of the Red Army, which influenced the course of the Battle of Kursk, on the course of the battle near Prokhorovka.

The operation of the German troops, which received the name "Citadel", was aimed at returning Germany to the strategic initiative, but was the result of a final turning point in the course of the war. The tactical plan of the German command was simple and logical and consisted of two converging strikes from Orel and Belgorod with a formation at Kursk. If successful, one and a half million Soviet soldiers would have been in the cauldron.

Participants of the confrontation

In the southern sector of the Kursk Bulge, Soviet troops operated as part of the Voronezh Front, commanded by General of the Army N.F. Vatutin. The main force was the armored units, which were used to cement the defense and deliver counterattacks: the 1st Tank Army under the command of Lieutenant General M. E. Katukov and the 5th Guards Tank Army of Lieutenant General P. A. Rotmistrov, with the participation of which and there was a battle near Prokhorovka. In the 5th Guards Army under the command of Lieutenant General A.S. Zhadov, which acted with the support of the 2nd Air Army of General S.A. Krasovsky, all Soviet infantry and anti-tank weapons were concentrated in this sector.

They were opposed by two German tank corps - the 3rd and 2nd, which was listed as part of the SS field troops, and the tank divisions "Adolf Hitler", "Das Reich" and "Totenkopf" ("Dead Head") included in its composition were to the elite units of the German army.

Number of tanks and self-propelled guns

Different sources give different information about the number of tanks, self-propelled artillery mounts involved in the battles near Prokhorovka. The official version, which was based on the memoirs of some Soviet commanders, depicted a great tank battle near Prokhorovka with the participation of one and a half thousand tanks, of which 700 were German, including the newest - the Tiger T-VI and the Panther.

In any case, what happened in the field near Prokhorovka was a very extraordinary event in the history of the armored forces, although more independent studies showed that the Wehrmacht tank corps had about 400 armored vehicles, of which 250 were light and medium tanks, heavy " Tigers - about 40. There were no Panthers near Prokhorovka at all, and the tank corps, which included 200 of the latest vehicles, operated in the northern section of the arc.

Rotmistrov's army had 900 tanks and self-propelled guns, including 460 T-34s and 300 light T-70s.

Qualitative composition

Military factories evacuated to the rear began operating in record time. T-34 with a 76 mm caliber gun - the main tanks of the battle near Prokhorovka. By 1943, German tankers had already appreciated the Soviet “thirty-four”, and a call to command was born among them: instead of expensive developments, simply copy the T-34, but make it at German factories and with a new gun. The lack of armament of the main Soviet tank was clear to our specialists, and especially clear - after the battles on the Kursk Bulge. Only in 1944 did the T-34s gain the ability to confidently hit enemy tanks with the help of a long-barreled 85 mm cannon,

In addition to the fact that the battle near Prokhorovka still showed a tangible qualitative superiority of the enemy’s tank equipment, shortcomings in the organization of the battle and in crew management were revealed. The service instructions ordered the crews of the T-34 to use the main advantages of the tank: speed and maneuverability, to fire on the move, approaching the German vehicles at a lethal distance. It was impossible to achieve a reliable hit without special firing stabilizers, which appeared only thirty years later, which reduced the effectiveness of the combat use of tanks during an attack.

In addition to a more powerful gun, which made it possible to hit targets at a distance of up to 2 km, Wehrmacht tanks were equipped with wireless communications, namely, poor coordination of actions in battle conditions became one of the most important reasons for the huge losses in Rotmistrov's army.

Southern section of the arc

The course of events on the southern face of the Kursk salient showed that the command of the Central Front (Colonel General K. K. Rokossovsky), who defended the northern section of the Kursk salient, more accurately guessed the direction of the main attack. The Germans managed to overcome the defense lines to a depth of 8 km, and the defense of the Voronezh Front was passed in some areas by 35 km, although the Germans failed to enter the operational space. The Battle of Prokhorovka was the result of a change in the main direction of the German offensive.

Initially, the German tank corps rushed to the west of Kursk, in the direction of Oboyan, but got stuck in the defensive formations of the 6th and 7th Guards Armies under powerful counterattacks from Katukov's 1st Tank Army. The heroism and military skill of the tankers of the 1st Army is considered by many historians to be underestimated, although it was in battles with them that the Germans lost the strength of a further breakthrough to Kursk.

The choice of Prokhorovka as a new target for the attack of the Nazi army is considered by some to be forced, and in some sources it is indicated as planned, envisaged even during the development of Operation Citadel in the spring of 1943. The capture of the Prokhorovka railway station, moreover, led to a critical difficulty in supplying the troops of the Voronezh Front. The German division "Adolf Hitler" and the units of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps covering it from the flanks reached the line of attack on Prokhorovka by July 10.

To eliminate the threat of a breakthrough, Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army was sent against them, marching to the outskirts of Prokhorovka and entering into a combat clash with tank divisions under the command of P. Hausser - this is how the tank battle near Prokhorovka began. The date, which is considered the day of the great tank battle - July 12, 1943 - cannot fully reflect the events, fierce battles continued for several days.

different look

There are several options for describing what was later called the battle of Prokhorovka. The summary of these descriptions shows the different attitudes of official Soviet historiography, Western European and American historians to the events of the Great Patriotic War. A special opinion is found in the memoirs of German generals, who put all the blame for their military defeats on the inadequate decisions of the Fuhrer, who interfered with them with his ambitions as a great commander. Where is the truth?

Rotmistrov's memoirs depict the events of July 12, 1943 as a meeting battle with the participation of a huge number of tanks, during which the elite tank units of the Nazis suffered irreparable damage, after which they retreated, not thinking about further advance towards a breakthrough from the north. Moreover, the battle near Prokhorovka can briefly be called the largest defeat of the Wehrmacht's tank forces, after which they never recovered.

The ideological opponents of Soviet historians describe the events in their own way. In their presentation, the Red Army suffered a terrible defeat, losing a huge number of manpower and armored vehicles. German tanks and anti-tank guns, being in well-prepared positions, shot from afar Soviet tanks, unable to inflict significant damage on the enemy, and the advance of the German troops was stopped by a balanced decision of the command, including due to the start of the allied offensive in Italy.

The course of the battle

Now it is difficult to restore in detail the true order of events, to discern it among the varnished pages of Soviet textbooks and among the memoirs of beaten Wehrmacht generals - subjectivity and politicization distort the historical view, directed even at global events, such as the Great Patriotic War. The tank battle near Prokhorovka can be presented in the form of concrete facts.

The 2nd SS Panzer Corps under the command of P. Hausser, which was part of the 4th Panzer Army, following the order of its commander, General G. Goth, goes to the vicinity of the Prokhorovka railway station to strike at the rear of the 69th Soviet Army and break out to Kursk.

The German generals assumed that tank units from the reserve of the Voronezh Front might meet on their way, and they chose the place of a possible collision, taking into account the combat qualities of their armored vehicles.

The counterattack of the 5th Guards Tank Army came tangentially, almost head-on. The tank battle near Prokhorovka (date - July 12 - the day of the climax of the battles) began on July 10 and lasted about a week.

The meeting with the elite SS Panzer divisions came as a surprise, and the battlefield did not allow the deployment of Soviet tanks in a single avalanche - this was prevented by deep beams and the bank of the Psyol River. Therefore, German tanks and self-propelled guns with long-range guns, which had taken convenient positions, could first shoot groups of 30-35 combat vehicles coming at them. The greatest damage to the German tank corps was able to inflict high-speed T-34s, which managed to approach a lethal distance.

Having lost a large amount of equipment, Rotmistrov's army withdrew from the battlefield, but Prokhorovka was not captured by the bloodless Germans, who by July 17 began to retreat to the positions they had occupied before the start of the Battle of Kursk.

Losses

The exact number of losses suffered is a matter of dispute for everyone who wrote about the history of tank battles, which abounded in the Great Patriotic War. The battle near Prokhorovka was the bloodiest of them. The latest research says that on July 12, Soviet troops lost 340 tanks and 19 self-propelled guns, and the Germans lost 163 combat vehicles. The difference in the number of irretrievable losses is even greater: 193 tanks at Rotmistrov and 20-30 at the 2nd SS Panzer Corps. This is explained by the fact that the battlefield remained with the Germans and they were able to send most of their damaged equipment for repairs, while mining and exploding Soviet tanks.

The 5th Guards Tank Army was to become the main force of the Soviet counteroffensive, planned after the end of the defensive phase of the battle in the south near Kursk. Therefore, when in one day - July 12 - more than half of the tanks and self-propelled guns burned down in the battle near Prokhorovka, Stalin ordered the creation of a commission of the State Defense Committee, designed to find the causes of such losses.

Results

The latest publications of military historians, based on the study of archives that have become available only recently, destroy the myths of Soviet history of the Second World War. The battle of Prokhorovka does not look like the largest confrontation between the armored units of the two armies, in which the Wehrmacht lost the main forces of this type of troops, which became the main reason for subsequent defeats. But the conclusion about the complete defeat of the Soviet tank army, which accidentally stumbled upon the elite SS divisions, looks unjustified.

The Germans ousted the enemy from the “tank field”, knocked out most of the Soviet armored vehicles, but did not complete the main task - they did not capture Prokhorovka, did not go out towards the northern grouping of their troops in order to close the encirclement. Of course, the battle at Prokhorovka did not become the main reason that forced the Germans to retreat, it did not become the final design of the turning point in the Great War. It is known that the decision to terminate Operation Citadel was announced at a meeting with Hitler on July 13, and Field Marshal Manstein names in his memoirs the main reason for the landing of allied troops in Sicily. At the same time, he points out that only one SS Panzer Division was sent to Italy, which gives this reason minimal importance.

It is more logical to conclude that the German offensive in the area of ​​the Kursk salient was stopped by the successful defensive actions of the Soviet fronts and a powerful counteroffensive, which began in the Central Front in the northern section of the arc, and was soon supported in the Belgorod area. The Battle of Prokhorovka also made a big contribution to the collapse of Operation Citadel. The year 1943 became the year of the final transfer of the strategic initiative to the Soviet troops.

Memory

An event of real historical significance does not need additional ideological justification. In 1995, during the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Victory, at an altitude of 252.2, in the Belgorod region, a memorial complex was opened.

The main theme of it was the tank battle near Prokhorovka. A photo of a high, 60-meter belfry is always present in the gadgets of tourists passing by this memorial field. The monument turned out to be worthy of the greatness of courage and fortitude shown on the legendary Russian field.

In May last year, I very actively traveled to places associated with tragic events. I managed to talk about some of them in the blog, about some I haven’t yet. Why? Well, firstly, this topic is very difficult for me to write, both morally and technically, and secondly, many citizens of the Russian Federation remember the Second World War only when Victory Day and related days off approach. And during the year they try not to bother themselves with patriotism and terrible details of hostilities. Accordingly, there is no interest, and then just no one reads the posts, and the statistics do not show even half of the average views for my blog. It is for these two reasons that quite a lot of photographic material lay on the hard drive for almost a year. But spring is in full swing, many will go on various trips for the May holidays and, perhaps, even stop somewhere along the way to honor the memory of soldiers and officers who fell in battle. For example, to Prokhorovka, where on July 12, 1943, during the defensive phase of the Battle of Kursk, one of the largest battles in military history took place with the use of armored forces.

In this post, I will give an overview of what you can see in Prokhorovka, where to spend the night, eat, and so on. And, of course, as briefly as possible (after all, May 9 is still far away) I will tell you about the meat grinder that happened here in the summer of 1943.

So, north, urban-type settlement Prokhorovka. In fairness, it is worth noting that the famous tank battle took place near the Prokhorovka railway station, named after the railway engineer V. I. Prokhorov, and located a little to the side. This settlement until 1968 was called the village of Aleksandrovskoe. In the post-war years, it grew and included the very Prokhorovka station, which became the western part of the village.

02 . There are no hotels in Prokhorovka other than the one you see in the photo below, so I recommend booking rooms in advance through the website of the Prokhorovskoe Pole hotel complex. The hotel is not bad, especially for the provincial. The only bad thing is the catering for the guests. Breakfast is extremely slow, and we didn’t manage to have dinner at all, because the restaurant at the hotel closes very early. We also wanted to walk at sunset. However, public catering is bad everywhere in Prokhorovka. More than 9 thousand people live in the village, there is a sports complex, a cinema, an elevator, factories, but there is nowhere to eat. We made a raid on three cafes that the administrator at the hotel advised us, and as a result, one had a wedding, the other served only beer and snacks, and the third turned out to be completely closed. Therefore, we had to improvise ourselves in the room. We had a three-year-old daughter with us, who did not really want to feed sandwiches at night.

03 . Next to the hotel parking there is a sculptural group "Tankman and infantryman". It is clear that the role of the infantry in the tank duel was the most unenviable and, in fact, suicidal.

04 . Almost opposite the hotel complex there is a huge building of the Museum of Military Glory "The Third Military Field of Russia".

05 . The building was opened on May 02, 2010. Outwardly, it resembles an arc, lined with gray granite, and the main facade, according to the architect's idea, imitates tank tracks.

06 . A sculptural composition that struck me to the core. Two Soviet and three life-size German tanks converged in a powerful ram. They write on the Internet that you can climb into one of the tanks and see a defeated fascist there, but they open this door, as I understand it, only for large organized groups.

06 . Traditionally, Soviet sources indicate that about 1,500 tanks participated in the battle of Prokhorov. 800 Soviet and 700 German. Some modern historians claim that there were fewer tanks, but looking at this monument, I can’t even imagine what hell was going on here then.

07 . To the right of the museum building is a rather unusual church of Peter and Paul.

08 . Novodel. Built for the 50th anniversary of the Great Victory.

09 . In the courtyard there is also a small Nikolskaya church and the so-called. "Bell of Unity". This is a monument erected as a symbol of the unity of the three Slavic peoples: Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. Opened on the anniversary of the 55th Victory Day. The opening was attended by Patriarch Alexy II, Putin, Kuchma and Lukashenko.

10 . By the evening light we drove from the village, in fact, to the battlefield. Now bread grows on it everyday, but how much blood it once absorbed into itself ...

11. Height 252.2 is marked by a belfry.

12. The height of the belfry itself is 59 meters. Inside, under the dome, there is an alarm bell weighing 3.5 tons, and on 4-wall pylons there are 24 high reliefs with 130 images. I specially publish a photo in a large size so that you can appreciate this work of art and the main monument of the entire Prokhorovskoye Pole memorial complex.

13 . A little further away, a monument was erected to one of its creators - the sculptor Vyacheslav Klykov. He died in 2006

14 . Nearby is another sculptural group - "The great commanders of the three military fields of Russia - Dmitry Donskoy, Mikhail Kutuzov, Georgy Zhukov."

15 . And, of course, tanks.

16 . More precisely, tanks, Katyushas, ​​cannons and other military equipment of the Great Patriotic War.

17 . T-34-85 and my favorite Vikushonok.

18 . The next morning we continued to explore Prokhorovka. We had breakfast, checked out of the hotel and went to the museum.

19 . But first they went around him in a circle. Behind the building, a rather interesting exposition was found, showing a fragment of the defense line: trenches and enemy equipment in positions.

20 . In the post-war years, almost all German equipment was melted down, so the German tank is represented only by a turret on a stand.

21 . Shortly before our arrival, next to the museum for the 70th anniversary of the Victory, another monument was opened, which is called "Tank landing". Work on the improvement of the territory was in full swing around him (we were in Prokhorovka on May 1) and by the ninth there was still a lot to be done.

22 . Also, work was going on at another exhibition site of military equipment, where 12 of the most significant vehicles in the history of armored vehicles are presented, through which you can trace the main stages in the development of armored vehicles and tank weapons. In addition, on May 9, the opening of the tank track with an obstacle course, stands for spectators for 1300 seats and other things was to take place. It is a pity that we did not manage to see the tank show, but there will be a reason to return somehow.

23 . In general, then we go to see the museum exhibition. It is huge and, perhaps, I will talk about it in a separate post, and now there are just a couple of fragments. An excellent interactive map of the sights of the Belgorod region. It can be seen that now the belfry and the Peter and Paul Cathedral are highlighted on it, but if you turn on another area on the multimedia screen next to the map, then other objects will be highlighted, and you can read general information on the monitor. Very cool, in my opinion.

24 . I note that everything in the museum is very modern and interactive. It does not feel the typical museum "naphthalene", if you know what I mean.

25 . Although not without overlays, as it turned out. In my presence, one of the spectators puzzled the guide with a question about some discrepancy between the details of the soldier’s uniform (I don’t remember what exactly) the form of the 1943 model. The woman was embarrassed and said that the stands were made and designed by some Moscow office and in a very fast mode, so there could be slight discrepancies.

26. And finally, let's return to the topic of public catering in Prokhorovka. Not far from the belfry there is a rather interesting themed cafe "Dugout". In general, I give the institution a "test" (a wooden jukebox with songs of the war years and shells of artillery shells as vases for wildflowers is five!), But in the evening of the first day it was already closed, and at lunchtime on the second day, almost the entire ration was eaten.

27 . In particular, there was not enough foie gras potatoes. The last portion was snatched for the daughter (the cook scratched the bottom of the barrel for a little girl), and Lena and I took the less popular millet for ourselves. I note that around the "Blindage" there were also landscaping works and it is quite possible that another cafe appeared nearby. At least on Wikimapia there is a mark for the "Prival" cafe, so I hope that people who, on my advice, go to Prokhorovka, will not go hungry after all.

28 . After lunch, we went to see the observation post of the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, General Rotmistrov. It was from here that the command of the Prokhorov battle was carried out. Alas, there was a lock on the door and I had to limit myself to only an external examination. After that, our program had a wonderful

For reasons that are not entirely clear, a number of researchers studying the events on the Kursk Bulge, for some reason, attach great importance to the battle of Prokhorovka. As if this battle was the culmination of the battle, and everything that happened in other parts of the arc was almost secondary. Although the Prokhorov battle, for all its intensity and drama, was only one of the episodes of the grandiose battle on the Kursk Bulge.
For example, the battles in the Oboyan direction deserve no less attention, but many historians come to the point that even the Prokhorov battle is narrowed down to the framework of one day - July 12, 1943. Although it lasted at least a week. Of course, such a narrow-minded approach leads to a distorted understanding of what happened on the Kursk salient. It is not surprising that some researchers, based on the results of the battles on July 12, generally agreed that the Soviet troops were defeated near Prokhorovka and, they say, only a miracle did not allow the Wehrmacht to defeat the Red Army.

But was it really so? Especially if we consider the entire battle on the Kursk Bulge, and not just one counterattack near Prokhorovka on July 12?

As you know, at the initial stage of the battle, success accompanied the Germans, who, in two days of fighting, managed to break through the defenses that had been prepared for three months. On the evening of July 6, the German advanced units were only 10 kilometers from the Prokhorovka station, however, having encountered fierce resistance from the 1st Panzer Army, they could not immediately capture it.

Starting from July 6, fierce battles unfolded in the Prokhorovka direction, which continued here until July 16. They reached a special bitterness by July 10. It is this day that can be considered the official date of the beginning of the Battle of Prokhorov.

On July 11, the Soviet command, seeing that the pace of the German offensive was declining, decided to launch a counterattack, the main role in which was assigned to the 5th Guards Tank Army of P. A. Rotmistrov. The army included about 860 tanks and self-propelled guns. The counterattack was scheduled for 10.00 on July 12, but on July 11 the Germans broke through the defenses of the 69th Army and began to threaten the flanks of the 5th Panzer Army. Therefore, it was decided to postpone the start of the counterattack to 8.30.

Rotmistrov's army was a reserve and had not participated in the battles on the Kursk Bulge before. However, the deployment of the 5th Guards. TA was carefully monitored by the Germans. Moreover, they knew in advance the direction of the strike and were able to organize a dense line of defense.

It is worth recognizing that the direction of the main attack was chosen extremely unsuccessfully, since the 5th Guards. TA was opposed by the most powerful units of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps. And when the first echelon, consisting of two tank corps (300 tanks and self-propelled guns) went on the attack on the morning of July 12, this did not come as a surprise to the Germans. Our tanks immediately came under heavy fire.

The situation was aggravated by the fact that the tanks went on a frontal attack in a very limited space 4-5 kilometers wide. The Germans, using superiority in artillery, shot down Rotmistrov's tanks with virtually impunity. The T-34 was hit by an 88-mm cannon "tiger" at a distance of up to two kilometers, and a 75-mm cannon of the medium T-IV - up to 1.5 kilometers.

Light tanks T-70, which also took part in the battles on July 12, did not pose a threat to the Germans at all, since they practically could not cause even the slightest damage to German medium, not to mention heavy, tanks. To do this, they had to get close to them literally at a distance of a pistol shot, but the Germans, using the advantages of their artillery, preferred to shoot them from afar.

In addition to tanks, the Germans had anti-tank batteries, which also chalked up a lot of Soviet tanks. These batteries were not suppressed in a timely manner, which led to very sad consequences. Of course, German aviation was not inactive either.

Soviet tanks had to fight in very unfavorable conditions. It was almost impossible to hit a "Tiger" or T-IV by firing at once, and a tank that stopped for an aimed shot immediately became an excellent target. In addition, the German tanks still had to get close to about 500-600 meters. That is why the battle immediately began to take shape not in favor of our tankers.

By 11:00 it became clear that the offensive had run out of steam. However, the tankers continued to carry out their task and in some areas they managed to wedge into the German defenses. But these were very minor successes, for which, moreover, a very high price had to be paid. The main goal of the counterattack was not achieved; moreover, Rotmistrov's army actually ceased to exist as a full-fledged combat formation.

Of the 670 tanks and self-propelled guns that took part in the battles on July 12, the 5th Guards Tank Army lost more than 450 vehicles. That is almost three-quarters of its composition. Irretrievable losses reached about three hundred tanks. The Germans also suffered losses, which are estimated at about 150 tanks, but no more than three dozen of them were irretrievably lost. And Stalin's fury is quite understandable when he learned about the price he had to pay for the so-called "defeat" of the Germans.

In addition, it was necessary to urgently make adjustments to further offensive plans, where the 5th Guards TA was assigned a prominent role. However, in just one battle, even taking into account the restored and repaired equipment, Rotmistrov's army lost more than half of its combat capability and, accordingly, could henceforth solve only limited tasks.

There was no need to expect a different result from a frontal attack on the unsuppressed German defenses. Soviet tankers initially had to act in an extremely difficult situation, where the chances of success were zero.

The saddest thing is that this happened not at the end of June 1941 near Dubno, where a tank battle of a truly unprecedented scale broke out, but two years after the start of the war. When the Soviet generals, it would seem, gained considerable experience and learned how to fight. But Rotmistrov, for some reason, threw the tanks into a frontal attack, plainly trying to knock out the German tank wedge with his tank wedge.

The widespread version of the "oncoming tank" battle is not entirely true either. During the whole day of July 12, the Germans launched counterattacks more than once, and then a duel confrontation between Soviet and German tanks really took place. But there was no question of any tank avalanche rushing towards each other. The Germans were not stupid enough to allow themselves to be run over by the outnumbered Soviet tanks. Or at least allow them to reach the distance of an effective shot, which was strictly forbidden to them by order. A tank battle "unprecedented in" is a clear embellishment of events, designed to somehow cover up the mistakes and smooth out the impression of serious losses of the 5th Guards. TA.

The number of tanks participating in the battle is also contrived. The figure of one and a half thousand is overestimated by about two times and, again, is intended to hide Rotmistrov's mistakes. After all, he had to explain how almost half a thousand cars were out of order, most of which were irretrievably lost. Therefore, hundreds of Panthers, Tigers and Ferdinands that participated in the battle and were destroyed were invented.

The casualties of the 5th Guards. TA for July 12 amounted to about 6,000 people, of which about 2,000 soldiers and officers died or went missing. In total, from July 12 until the end of active hostilities near Prokhorovka (July 18), the army lost almost 10,000 people, of which about five thousand were irretrievable.

The fact that on July 12 a decisive turning point was not reached is also evidenced by the fact that on July 16, the commander of the Voronezh Front, N.F. Vatutin ordered the troops to go on the defensive. Although it was at this moment that the Germans, due to the changed situation on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front, began to withdraw their formations. And it is July 16 that can be considered the day of the end of the Prokhorov battle.

As for the counterattack on July 12, it was just one of the episodes of the seven-day battle of Prokhorovka. Which, despite the numbers of losses unpleasant for us, ended in favor of the Red Army. The Germans did not manage to break through to the rear of our troops and enter the operational space. But there was a high price to pay for this.

The fact that the price was paid high is evidenced by the following fact. Having received updated information about what exactly happened near Prokhorovka on July 12, Stalin, which happened to him extremely rarely, was furious for the commander of the 5th Guards. TA P.A. Rotmistrov's case almost ended in a tribunal. At the direction of Stalin, a commission was created under the chairmanship of G. M. Malenkov, which, after a long trial, described the actions of the 5th Guards. TA on July 12 as "an example of an unsuccessful operation."

How unsuccessfully this operation was carried out is indirectly evidenced by Manstein's plan, who immediately after the "oncoming tank battle" planned no less ... to surround Rotmistrov. On the evening of July 12, the headquarters of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps received an orientation for July 13. The corps was instructed to go "on an enveloping offensive ... against enemy tank formations standing in the Prokhorovka area." That is, to surround parts of the 5th Guards. TA Rotmistrova.

The fact that the Germans calmly evacuated damaged tanks from the battlefield during July 13 and 14 also leads to sad reflections. In total, they managed to take out about 200 cars. Both their own and the Soviet ones. Those Soviet tanks that, for one reason or another, could not be evacuated, the Germans blow up. On July 24, this fact is also recognized by a member of the Military Council of the Voronezh Front, N.S. Khrushchev: "The battlefield was left behind by the enemy - almost all the damaged Soviet tanks were blown up and burned by the Germans, while the German equipment was evacuated."

But if it was not possible to achieve success near Prokhorovka, then in other parts of the Kursk Bulge the Germans ran out of steam, began to retreat to their original positions, and then left them. And then they rolled west without stopping until they reached Berlin, where the end of the war was put. And the Prokhorovka field will forever remain the field of Russian military glory. And although the official version does not quite correctly reflect what really happened there, the feat of the Soviet soldiers will never be forgotten. With their massive heroism and at the cost of their lives, they thwarted the offensive plans of the Wehrmacht and contributed to the victory at Kursk.

The battle of Prokhorovka was also a good lesson for Rotmistrov. In the future, he planned operations more carefully, and soon his army distinguished itself in the battles on the Dnieper and in the Pyatikhat operation. Already in October, the unsuccessful counterattack near Prokhorovka was forgotten and Rotmistrov received the rank of colonel general. And on February 21, 1944, after the brilliant Korsun-Shevchenko operation, Rotmistrov became a marshal of the armored forces. Although, apparently, he could not forget the counterattack near Prokhorovka until the end of his life ...

The battle near the small Prokhorovka station during the Great Patriotic War became an example of a grandiose tank battle in the entire history of the war. The Battle of Prokhorovka became the personification of the courage and heroism of Soviet tankers. But the outcome of this battle is still hotly debated. The amount of equipment and the scale of the operation, which, according to some historians, were exaggerated by Soviet propaganda, are called into question.

Revenge for the loss in Stalingrad

The battle near the Prokhorovka station in the Belgorod region was the largest battle of the Kursk defensive operation, which went down in history as the Kursk Bulge. The Germans planned to conduct one of the most important operations of their Citadel plan here, encircling the Soviet army group.

The fight began on July 10

Staff documents contain evidence of the first battle, which took place on July 10 near Prokhorovka. This battle was carried out not by tanks, but by the rifle units of the 69th Army, which, having exhausted the enemy, themselves suffered heavy losses and were replaced by the 9th Airborne Division. Thanks to the paratroopers, on July 11, the Nazis were stopped near the outskirts of the station. They occupied all advantageous positions in the area of ​​the station: deployed artillery. Natural fortifications - ravines and beams - reliably hid German soldiers and equipment.

Prokhorovskoye field, cut up by gullies and ravines

The Soviet units of the 5th Guards Tank Army were in a deliberately difficult situation: the strike group of tanks was located between the beams southwest of Prokhorovka and was deprived of the opportunity to deploy the tank group to its full extent. Soviet tanks were forced to advance in a small area, limited on one side by the railway, and on the other by the floodplain of the Psel River (this is the left tributary of the Dnieper). German tankers had much more operational space.

Invisible German regrouping

Despite the fact that July 12 is considered the official start date of the battle - the fighting continued until July 15 - the culmination of the battle is considered July 12.

On July 12, a huge number of German and Soviet tanks collided on a narrow section of the front, only 11-12 kilometers wide.

Tank units "Adolf Hitler", "Dead Head", division "Reich" and others were able to regroup their forces on the eve of the decisive battle. The Soviet command did not know about this. Only one German division, the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler, fought in the direction of Prokhorovka.

The offensive was postponed several times

The time of the offensive of the Soviet units was postponed several times. Finally, at 8.30 in the morning, the units went into battle. However, aviation was unable to provide cover and began to operate in the combat area only by 13.00, 2-10 fighters appeared in the sky.

The Soviet offensive proceeded in tank waves, and the attacks were frontal, in contrast to the German commanders, who were taught to use manpower and equipment prudently. Such waves appeared because, due to the small passages through the minefields, a large number of tanks could not immediately enter the battle. Tanks passed in a row, one after another, which held back the attack of the first wave. The Germans saw all these preparations and were able to effectively line up the fire of their artillery.

Tank ratio

The Red Army did not have a single analogue tank capable of withstanding the 56-ton heavy Tiger tank.

Medium tanks T-34 produced in 1942, T-70, lend-lease tanks "Churchill" and self-propelled guns opposed the German heavy "Tigers", medium tanks T-IV, assault and anti-tank self-propelled guns.

The Soviet tank crews sat in narrow and cramped cabins, while the Germans settled quite comfortably in tanks equipped with radios and the latest surveillance devices.

Not only tanks took part in this battle. Historians insist on the term armored forces, which also includes wheeled or tracked vehicles, motorcycles.

The number of tanks involved in the battle on both sides is not exactly known. Various sources have information from 1110 to 1500 tanks and self-propelled guns.

On a burning tank

The Soviet T-34 tank under the command of Pyotr Skrypnik was hit. The crew, having pulled out their commander, took refuge in the funnel. The tank was on fire. The Germans noticed him. One of the tanks moved towards the Soviet tankers to crush them with caterpillars. Then the mechanic, in order to save his comrades, rushed out of the saving trench. He ran to his burning car, and sent it to the German "Tiger". Both tanks exploded.

Special commission for Rotmistrov

At the end of the battle of Prokhorovka, Supreme Commander Joseph Stalin ordered the creation of a special commission to investigate the circumstances of the defeat. By August 1943, the commission completed its work and submitted a large report. They were preparing to hold a show trial and shoot the commander of the Fifth Tank Army, Pavel Rotmistrov. But Vasilevsky's intercession saved his life. Later, in his memoirs, Rotmistrov admitted that his army had not fulfilled its task.

The number of losses of Soviet soldiers, according to some German historians, compared with the enemy is approximately 5:1, some historians insist on a different proportion - 6:1. The number of destroyed German tanks, according to the Germans, does not exceed 25 units, Soviet - 170-180 vehicles. The Soviet military spoke of 350 enemy tanks destroyed.

The remains of warriors and ammunition are still found here, and legendary world groups compose songs about this battle.

Pavel Rotmistrov safely lived out his life in Moscow. In the 70s he became an honorary resident of the Prokhorovka station.

When the world learned about the "tank duel"

For the first time, Ivan Markin wrote about a tank duel in the late 50s in his book. He called the battle of Prokhorovka the largest tank battle of the 20th century. At the time this book was published, the country was headed by Nikita Khrushchev. During the war years, he was a member of the Military Council in the southern sector of the Kursk Bulge.