Positive and negative heuristics. “Negative heuristics” in cultural analysis Negative heuristics: the “hard core” of the program

the history of science without the philosophy of science is blind”

[Lakatos, p. 457]

As a result of post-positivist critique, especially the historicist critique of Kuhn and Feyerabend, the "rationalists" have received a significant blow. "Earlier," says W. Newton-Smith, "very little was said about non-rationalistic models of explaining changes in science..." [SFN, p. 168], for the rationalists reigned. Now the situation has changed dramatically. "How does our rationalist feel?" he asks. 193]. W. Newton-Smith connects this survival with Popper's program of "moderate rationalism", continued by Lakatos, with a retreat from the classical understanding of truth in the direction of "approaching the truth", "increase in likelihood", and growth of "predictive power".

Thus, Lakatos repeatedly argues that theories are invented, and his criterion of "progressive shift of problems" essentially introduces a constructivist criterion of efficiency in the selection of research programs. However, following Popper, he proclaims belief that truth exists and that scientific theories approximate it, relying on experience, although we have no criteria by which we could assert that a given sequence of theories is moving towards the truth.

The basic unit of the model of science Imre Lakatos(1922–1974) is a “research program” consisting of a “hard core” and a “protective belt”. The model of science by I. Lakatos (as well as T. Kuhn's model) has two levels: the level of specific theories that form the changing “protective belt” of the “research program”, and the level of the unchanging “hard core”, which determines the face of the “research program”. Different research programs have different “hard cores”, i.e. there is a one-to-one correspondence between them.

The emergence of this model is due to the fact that Lakatos, on the one hand, is not satisfied with Kuhn's "reduction of the philosophy of science to the psychology of science." “From Kuhn's point of view,” he says, “the change of scientific knowledge—from one 'paradigm' to another—is a mystical transformation that has no and cannot have rules. This is a subject of psychology (perhaps social psychology) discoveries. (Such) a change in scientific knowledge is like a change in religious faith” [Lakatos, p. 274–275]. Therefore, Kuhn's position he refers to irrationalism.

On the other hand, Lakatos supports the thesis of Kuhn and Feyerabend about the absence of "crucial experiments" as a criterion for choosing between theories. “ There is nothing, he says, that can be called decisive experiments., at least if we mean by them such experiments that are capable of immediately overturning the research program (or Kuhn's paradigm - A.L.). In fact, when one research program fails and is supplanted by another, one can - looking closely at the past – to call an experiment decisive if one can see in it a spectacular confirming example in favor of the winning program and obvious evidence of the failure of the program that has already been defeated” (hereinafter, Lakatos' emphasis is in bold) [Lakatos, p. 368] “Decisive experiments are recognized as such only decades later (retroactively)” [Lakatos, p. 352] “The status of a “crucial” experiment depends on the nature of the theoretical competition in which it is involved” [Lakatos, p. 367]. Lakatos shows this on the example of the Michelson-Morley experiment and a number of others [Lakatos, p. 353–359]. He is also close to Kuhn's thesis that "the rejection of any paradigm without replacing it with another means the rejection of science in general" [Kun, p. 107]. "There can be no falsification before there is a better theory," says Lakatos, [Lakatos, p. 307].

Therefore, Lakatos aims to develop the thesis of Popper's "critical rationalism" about the rationality of changes in scientific knowledge, "to get out of the shelling of Kuhn's criticism, and to consider scientific revolutions as a rationally constructed progress of knowledge, and not as a conversion to a new faith" [Lakatos, p. 275]. To do this, he develops his methodology of "research programs" (RP). He sees the way to it as follows.

1.6.7.1. Model of “research programs”

Consider now the methodological structure of Lakatos' "research programs". All programs have hard core" and " protective belt". The assertions included in the "hard core" are protected from change by "negative heuristics". Instead of changing the elements of the 'hard core', 'we must', Lakatos says, '... develop 'auxiliary hypotheses' that form protective belt around this core... The protective belt must withstand the brunt of the checks; ... it must be adapted, redesigned or even completely replaced if the interests of defense so require. If all this gives a progressive shift of problems, the research program can be considered successful (a classic example of a successful research program is Newton's theory of gravity) ... If the research program progressively explains more than the competing one, then it “crowds out” it and this competing program can be eliminated” [ Lakatos, p. 323, 473].

AT " research program” Lakatos enter “ methodological rules”, guiding changes in the "protective belt". These rules are divided into two parts: part of them are rules indicating which paths of research should be avoided (negative heuristic), the other part are rules indicating which paths should be chosen and how to follow them (positive heuristic) ”[Lakatos, With. 322].

"Idea " negative heuristic” of a scientific research program to a large extent gives rational meaning to classical conventionalism ... But our approach differs from Poincaré's justificationist conventionalism in that we propose to abandon the hard core if the program no longer allows you to predict earlier unknown facts... (but if Duhem saw only aesthetic reasons (simplicity. - A.L.) … destruction of the core, then our assessment depends mainly on logical and empirical criteria)” [Lakatos, p. 325].

“Positive heuristic consists of a series of arguments, more or less clear, and assumptions, more or less probable, aimed at ... how to modify, refine the “refutable” protective belt ... The attention of the scientist is focused on constructing models that correspond to the instructions that are set out in the positive part of his programs” [Lakatos, p. 326]. “Our reasoning shows,” says Lakatos, “that positive heuristics play the first fiddle in the development of a research program while almost completely ignoring “refutations” ... Thus, the methodology of research programs explains relative autonomy theoretical science … Which problems are rationally chosen by scientists working in powerful research programs depends more on the positive heuristics of the program than on psychologically unpleasant but technically unavoidable anomalies” [Lakatos, p. 329].

In a later work, Lakatos generally identifies positive heuristics with a protective belt: “According to my conception,” he says, “the fundamental unit of evaluation should not be an isolated theory or set of theories, but “ research program". The latter includes a conventionally accepted (and therefore irrefutable) “hard core” and a “positive heuristic” that defines problems for investigation, highlights the protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses, anticipates anomalies and victoriously turns them into confirming examples - all this in accordance with a pre-designed plan ... Not anomalies, but the positive heuristics of his (scientist's) program - this is what the choice of problems dictates to him in the first place . And only when the active power of positive heuristics is weakened, more attention can be paid to anomalies. As a result, research program methodology can explain a high degree of autonomy of theoretical science, which an incoherent chain of conjectures and refutations cannot do... As a result, Popper's great negative decisive experiments disappear: "crucial experiment" is only an honorary title that ... can be bestowed on a certain anomaly, but only long after one program has been supplanted another... Nature may shout: "No!", but human ingenuity - contrary to the opinion of... Popper - is always capable of shouting even louder. With enough resourcefulness and some luck, it is possible to "progressively" defend any theory over a long period of time, even if that theory is false. Thus, the Popperian model of “suggestions and refutations” should be abandoned, i.e. a model in which a tentative hypothesis is followed by an experiment that shows it to be wrong: no experiment is decisive at the time ... when it fails” [Lakatos, p. 471-472].

“So. the way scientific progress is expressed rather in the verification of the additional content of the theory than in the discovery of falsifying examples. The empirical “falsification” and the real “rejection” of the theory become independent events” [Lakatos, p. 474]

“Continuity in science, perseverance in the fight for survival some theories, the justification of some dogmatism - all this can be explained only if science is understood as a field of struggle for research programs, and not individual theories ... My approach. - Lakatos argues - proposes a new demarcation criterion between "mature science", consisting of research programs, and "immature science", working on a well-worn pattern of trial and error .... Mature science, in contrast to the boring sequence of trial and error (Popper - A.L.), has “heuristic power”, ... (which) generates the autonomy of theoretical science” [Lakatos, p. 370].

1.6.7.2. “Internal” and “External” stories

The model of a research program consisting of a “hard core” and a “protective belt” is partially projected by Lakatos onto the history of science, giving rise to his division of the history of science into “internal” and “external”.

“Each rational reconstruction creates some characteristic model of the rational growth of scientific knowledge. Lakatos says. – However, all these reconstructions must be supplemented by empirical theories of external history in order to explain the remaining non-rational factors (Kun's model falls into this area. – A.L.). The true history of science is always richer than rational reconstructions. However, rational reconstruction, or internal story, is primary, and external history- only secondary, since the most important problems of external history are determined by internal history…. For any internal history, subjective factors are of no interest” [Lakatos, p. 483-484]. The "historian-internalist" will consider... historical fact as a fact of the "second world" (Popper. - A.L.), which is only a distortion of its counterpart in the “third world”. Why such distortions arise - it is none of his business, in the footnotes he can refer to the externalist the problem of finding out why some scientists have "false opinions" about what they are doing (of course, what in this context are reckoned as false opinions "... , depends on the theory of rationality that guides criticism)” [Lakatos, p. 485].

"Exactly inner history, says Lakatos, determines what the historian will look for in the history of science, what he will emphasize and what he will ignore. “ History without some theoretical “settings” is impossible, says Lakatos. - Some historians are looking for discoveries of certain facts, inductive generalizations, others for bold theories and decisive negative experiments, still others for significant theoretical simplifications or progressive and regressive shifts of problems, while all of them have some theoretical guidelines” [Lakatos, p. 487] (i.e., the empirical material in history, as well as in physics, is “theoretically loaded”).

“Inner story for inductivism consists, according to Lakatos, of recognized discoveries of indubitable facts and so-called inductive generalizations. Inner story for conventionalism consists of factual discoveries, the creation of classifying systems and their replacement by simpler systems.

Inner story for falsificationism characterized by an abundance of bold assumptions, theoretical improvements that have always more content than their predecessors, and above all - the presence of triumphant "negative decisive experiments".

And finally research program methodology speaks of a long-term theoretical and empirical rivalry between major research programs, progressive and regressive shifts in problems, and the gradually emerging victory of one program over another” [Lakatos, p. 483].

“Each historiography has its own exemplary paradigms characteristic of it (… in… the pre-Kunian sense). The main paradigms of inductivist historiography are the Keplerian generalization of Tycho Brahe's careful observations; the discovery then by Newton of the law of gravitation by means of an inductive generalization of the Keplerian "phenomena" of planetary motion; Ampère's discovery of the law of electrodynamics due to the inductive generalization of his own observations on the properties of electric current…” [Lakatos, p. 460 - 461]. “For the conventionalist, the exemplary example scientific revolution was the Copernican revolution”, and “the main scientific discoveries are, first of all, the invention of new simpler classification systems” [Lakatos, p. 465, 464]. “Favorite examples (paradigms) of great falsifiable theories for Popperians are the theories of Newton and Maxwell, the Rayleigh-Jeans and Wien radiation formulas, the Einstein revolution; their favorite examples of crucial experiments are the Michelson-Morley experiment, Eddington's eclipse experiment." “The Popperian historian is looking for great, 'daring' falsifiable theories and great negative decisive experiments” [Lakatos, p. 467]. Various variants of the theory of relativity (Einstein's, ethereal, etc. (see [Vizgin, 1985; Lipkin, 2001, p. 5.2])) could probably serve as examples of competing research programs.

Each historiography has its own characteristic Problems. “The inductivist historian cannot offer rational "internal" explanation of why these facts, and not others, were chosen as the subject of research. For him it irrational, empirical, external problem” [Lakatos, p. 461]. “Conventionalist historiography cannot rationally explain why certain facts are the first to be investigated and why certain classifying systems are analyzed before others, at a time when their comparative merits are still unclear” [Lakatos, p. 465]. “For the falsificationist historian, 'false consciousness' presents a special problem - 'false', of course, from the point of view of his theory of rationality. Why, for example, do some scientists regard crucial experiments as positive and verifiable rather than negative and falsifying? To solve these problems, it was the falsificationist Popper who developed ... the concept of the discrepancy between objective knowledge (in its “third world”) and distorted reflections of this knowledge in individual consciousness” [Lakatos, p. 469-470]. There is also a “basic epistemological problem” for the methodology of research programs. “Like Popper's methodological falsificationism, it (research program methodology) is a very radical version of conventionalism. And similarly to Popper's falsificationism, it needs to postulate some non-methodological (i.e., non-conventionalist. - A.L.) principle - in order to link (at least somehow) the scientific game of pragmatic acceptance and rejection of statements and theories with plausibility. Only such an “inductive principle” can transform science from a mere game into an epistemologically rational activity… into something more serious, into an error-prone daring approximation to the true picture of the world” [Lakatos, p. 476].

Among the approaches analyzed (and compared) by Lakatos in the philosophy of science, there is no Kuhnian one, which acts only as an object of criticism. Nevertheless, it seems to us that it could be placed in this series, i.e. apply Lakatos's historiographical methodology to Kuhn's model of the development of science. Then Kuhn's "internal history" will stand out in the study of the "external" history for Lakatos. It highlights the histories of scientific communities and competition between them, paradigms, phases of normal science and the scientific revolution. There are examples here - first of all, the Copernican coup, analyzed by Kuhn himself. There are also some problems (identification of paradigms, etc.). Generally speaking, both the Lakatosian and Kuhnian models of the development of science can apparently be applied to the considered five (including Kuhnian) trends in the philosophy of science of the 20th century. It is quite possible to speak of Kuhn's historiographical research program, which generates a powerful stream of research in the sociology of science.

1.6.7.3. Comparison of Lakatos and Kuhn models

If we compare Lakatos's model with Kuhn's, Kuhn's and Lakatos' opinions differ radically on this issue. Lakatos agrees with the analogy between his “research program” (it would probably be more correct to speak of its “core”) and Kuhn’s “paradigm”, but only in a certain degenerate case, far, in his opinion, from the real history of science: “That What he (Kuhn) calls "normal science" is really nothing more than a research program that has taken over a monopoly. In reality, research programs enjoy a complete monopoly very rarely, and for a very short time” [Lakatos, p. 348] (we will discuss the question of the validity of this statement as applied to the history of physics below). In addition, he sees fundamental differences in the selection criteria that work in the course of “revolutionary” changes: irrational (socio-psychological) for Kuhn and rational for him.

However, it is easy to spot some important structural analogies. Both models distinguish two types of development: 1) continuous, in fact, cumulative growth within the framework of one “paradigm” (“normal science” by Kuhn) or “research program” (Lakatos), in which theories are “commensurable” and the “crucial experiment” works ; and 2) a non-cumulative leap from one paradigm or research program to another – “new” (“scientific revolution”). “Scientific revolutions consist in one research program (progressively) crowding out another,” says Lakatos” [Lakatos, p. 470]. The possibility of introducing the concept of scientific revolution is due to the fact that both models have two levels: “paradigm” and production of “normal science” by Kuhn and “hard core” and production of “positive heuristics” by Lakatos (in the inductivist and Popperian trial and error models ( as in evolutionary epistemology) there are no two levels and no room for revolutions).

Therefore, Kuhn rightly speaks about the deep generality of his model with the Lakatos one [Lakatos, p. 580-582]. It seems to us that the Lakatosian criterion of “progressive shift” can be included as one of the most powerful factors involved in the Kuhnian process of community competition. Lakatos, in fact, speaks of global trends, leaving unanswered the question of the specific interaction of research programs with specific scientific communities and scientists, about the choices they face "here and now." Kuhn considers, first of all, precisely this choice, presented by him as a process of interaction of complexes of ideas (be it a paradigm, a research program) with scientific communities. From this main side for Kuhn's model - from the side of the problem of introducing something new - his model complements the Lakatos model, and does not compete with it.

Thus, the Kuhn and Lakatos models turn out to be not alternative, but complementary. These two complementary models seem to the author of these lines to be quite modern. They are the result of many of the areas of positivist and postpositivist philosophy of science discussed above. This is, to a large extent, the sum total of the entire process presented in the preceding chapters, as reflected in Lakatos' historical retrospective described above.

Sources

Grof S. Outside the brain. M .: 1993

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*Lakatos I. Falsification and methodology of research programs. (pp. 265–454); The history of science and its rational reconstructions (pp. 455–524). [[ In the book: Kuhn T. The structure of scientific revolutions M.: AST, 2001.

Mach E. Cognition and delusion Essays on the psychology of research. M., 2003

Mach E. Popular scientific essays. SPb. 1909.

*HP: Scientific realism" and problems of the evolution of scientific knowledge. Moscow: Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Institute of Philosophy, 1984.

*Pechenkin A.A. Antimetaphysical Philosophy of the Second Half of the 20th Century: Bas van Fraassen's Constructive Empiricism // Frontiers of Science, M., IFRAN, 2000, 104-120.

*Popper K. Logic and the growth of scientific knowledge. Fav. Works. M. 1983.

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Questions

What is the principle of demarcation?

What is the principle of falsification?

What is the essence of "fallibilism"?

What is Popper's model of the development of science?

What is the essence of Popper's "evolutionary epistemology"?

What is the connection between the ideology of liberalism and epistemology?

What is the essence of Popper's concept of "three worlds"?

What is Popper's view of the problem of the truth of scientific knowledge? Criterion of "credibility"?

What is Popper's attitude towards classical rationalism, empiricism and realism?

What is the difference between constructivism and realism? What pairs of concepts define it?

What is "empirical adequacy"?

What is "constructive empiricism"?

What are "naive" and "reformed" realisms?

What is Kuhn's attitude towards the "crucial experiment"?

What is the main system of concepts of T. Kuhn's model of science?

What is the "thesis about the incommensurability of theories"?

What is “normal science” and “scientific revolution”?

What is a "scientific paradigm"?

What are cumulative and non-cumulative ways of science development? How do they relate to Kuhn's notions of "normal science" and "scientific revolution"?

What is "anomaly" and "crisis"?

How does the scientific revolution take place in the Kuhnian model?

What is the essence of Feyerabend's principle of "proliferation"?

What is common and different in the positions of Kuhn and Feyerabend?

What is Lakatos' attitude towards Kuhn's model?

What is Lakatos' attitude towards having decisive experiments?

What are the main elements of the “research program” model?

What is the place of positive and negative heuristics in it?

What is a “Progressive Problem Shift”?

What are "inner" and "outer" stories?

This refers to rationalism in the broadest sense of the word (including both Descartes and Locke), which includes those who advocate a rational criterion of truth as a correspondence to fact in the selection of theories.

“Checks that are carried out ... not by comparing with the experience of a single theory, but by setting up decisive experiments that allow you to choose one of several theories”, they “involved several theories” [Feyerabend, p. 73, 72, 74].

Michelson's correspondence with Lorentz resembles a game of ping-pong: Michelson's letters contained a description of the next experiment and its result, Lorentz's letters contained theoretical objections that required a new experiment. As a result, Michelson was discouraged by the lack of attention to his results from the scientific community, so much so that when he received Nobel Prize for "the creation of precision optical instruments, as well as for the spectroscopic and metrological measurements performed with their help" did not even mention this experiment.

But "always follows remember that, even if your opponent is far behind, he can still catch up with you. No advantages of one of the parties can be considered as absolutely decisive” [Lakatos, p. 475].

“Internal history” is usually defined as spiritual, intellectual history, “external history” as social history... The definitions I have given form the rigid core of some historiographical research program, their evaluation is an integral part of assessing the fruitfulness of this program as a whole” [Lakatos, p. 458].

Conventionalism allows for the possibility of constructing any system of classification that combines facts into some coherent whole ... Genuine progress science, according to conventionalism, is cumulative and carried out on a solid foundation of “proven” facts, changes but at the theoretical level they are only instrumental in nature (... They distinguish between the “level of facts”, the “level of laws” (i.e., inductive generalizations of “facts”) and the “level of theories” (or classifying systems), at which both facts and inductive laws... Conventionalism - as it is defined here - is a philosophically justified position; instrumentalism is its degenerate variant, which is based on simple philosophical slovenliness, due to the lack of elementary logical culture” [Lakatos, p. 462–464].

At the same time, “Not only the “internal” success or “internal” failure of a certain program, but often even its content can only be established retrospectively” [Lakatos, p. 486].

The development of theories within the framework of one research program is naturally correlated with Kuhn's "normal science".

“Inside research program “small decisive experiments” designed to make a choice between successive options (the n-th and n + 1-th version - A.L.) is a common thing” [Lakatos, p. 351].

But Kuhn's model does not provide an exhaustive means of describing the interaction of scientists and ideas. For example, there are social education as "scientific schools" consisting of a leader-teacher and students who, in their history, can change paradigms. On the other hand, there are “scientific movements” that are connected by a common subject or method of research, and can combine several paradigms at the same time (see [Concepts of self-organization: the formation of a new way of scientific thinking (M., 1994), ch. 2]).

Even the most dynamic and consistently progressive research programs can "digest" their "counter-examples" only gradually. Anomalies never completely disappear. But no need to think b, as if anomalies that have not received an explanation - "puzzles", as Thomas Kuhn would call them, are taken at random, in an arbitrary order, without any deliberate plan. This plan is usually drawn up in the theorist's office, regardless of known anomalies. Only a few theorists working within the research program pay much attention to "refutations". They have a far-sighted research policy that allows anticipate such "denials".

Thomas Samuel Kuhn

This policy, or research program, to some extent assumed positive heuristic research program. If the negative heuristic specifies " hard core"program that, according to the decision of its supporters, is considered "irrefutable", then positive heuristic consists of a series of arguments, more or less clear, and assumptions, more or less probable, aimed at changing and developing the "refutable variants" of the research program, how to modify, refine the "refutable" protective belt.

Positive heuristic rescues the scientist from confusion in front of the ocean of anomalies. A positive heuristic defines a program that includes a system of more complex models of reality; The scientist's attention is focused on constructing models that correspond to the instructions given in the positive part of his program. To known "counterexamples" and available data, he just doesn't pay attention.

.

That's why positive heuristic is, generally speaking, more flexible than negative. Moreover, it happens from time to time that when a research program enters a regressive phase, a small revolution or creative push in its positive heuristics can again move it to the side of the progressive shift. (146) Therefore, it is better to separate the "hard core" from the more flexible metaphysical principles expressing positive heuristics.

Our reasoning shows that the positive heuristic plays the first fiddle in the development of the research program, while almost completely ignoring "refutations"; one might even get the impression that just " verification", a not a rebuttal create points of contact with reality. Although it should be noted that any "verification" n+1 program options is a rebuttal n-th variant, but it cannot be denied that some failures of subsequent variants can always be foreseen. It is the "verifications" that keep the program running despite recalcitrant examples.

147 "Verification" is the reinforcement of additional content in a developing program. But, of course, "verification" does not verify a program, it only shows its heuristic power.

In his studies of the nature of scientific discovery, Imre Lakatos introduced the concepts of positive and negative heuristics. Within a certain scientific school, certain rules prescribe which paths to follow in the course of further research. These rules form a positive heuristic. Other rules tell you which paths to avoid. This is the Negative heuristic. EXAMPLE. The "positive heuristic" of a research program can also be formulated as a "metaphysical principle". For example, the Newtonian program can be stated in this formula: "The planets are rotating tops of approximately spherical shape, attracted to each other." No one has ever exactly followed this principle: planets have not only gravitational properties, they have, for example, electromagnetic characteristics that affect movement. Therefore, a positive heuristic is, generally speaking, more flexible than a negative one. Moreover, it happens from time to time that when a research program enters a regressive phase, a small revolution or creative push in its positive heuristics can move it back into a progressive shift. Therefore, it is better to separate the "hard core" from the more flexible metaphysical principles expressing positive heuristics. I. Lakatos, Methodology of research programs, M., "ACT", "Ermak", 2003, p. 83. Pedagogical reception

POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE HEURISTICS

POSITIVE HEURISTICS

« In his studies of the nature of scientific discovery, Imre Lakatos introduced the concepts of positive and negative heuristics. Within the scientific school, some rules prescribe which paths to follow in the course of further reasoning. These rules form the positive heuristic. Other rules tell you which paths to avoid. It -NEGATIVE HEURISTICS.

EXAMPLE. The "positive heuristic" of a research program can also be formulated as a "metaphysical principle". For example, the Newtonian program can be stated in this formula: "The planets are rotating tops of approximately spherical shape, attracted to each other." No one has ever exactly followed this principle: planets have not only gravitational properties, they have, for example, electromagnetic characteristics that affect movement. Therefore, a positive heuristic is, generally speaking, more flexible than a negative one. Moreover, it happens from time to time that when a research program enters a regressive phase, a small revolution or creative push in its positive heuristics can move it back into a progressive shift. Therefore, it is better to separate the "hard core" from the more flexible metaphysical principles expressing positive heuristics.

I. Lakatos, Methodology of research programs, M., "AST", "Ermak", 2003, p. 83. Source: http://msk.treko.ru/show_dict_201

NEGATIVE HEURISTICS

« Within a community or school of thought, there are rules that explicitly or implicitly prescribe which paths of research should be avoided. This was called the researcher of scientific creativity Imre Lakatos negative heuristics. On the contrary, the rules to be used are called by himPOSITIVE HEURISTICS.

“The negative heuristic according to Imre Lakatos forbids, in the process of checking research programs, to doubt the correctness of this “hard core” when faced with anomalies and counterexamples. Instead, she proposes to invent auxiliary hypotheses that form a "safety or protective belt" around the core of the research program, which must be adapted, modified, or even completely replaced when confronted with counterexamples. For its part, positive heuristics includes a number of assumptions about the modification or development of refuted variants of the research program, about the modification or refinement of the "protective belt", about new models that need to be developed to expand the scope of the program.

Baksansky O.E., Kucher E.N., Cognitive sciences: from knowledge to action, M., KomKniga, 2005, p. 17.

EXAMPLE. “The Chinese are considered a reserved and ceremonial people. In fact, they express emotions violently and often laugh. Oddly enough, their sense of humor is close to American: the same simple tricks cause laughter. True, the Chinese have zones that are closed to humor - these are parents and rulers. According to Confucian norms, both are not subject to criticism. The Chinese willingly laugh at foreigners, which the Japanese never do.”

Billevich V.V., School of wit or how to learn to joke, M., "Williams", 2005, p. 271.

EXAMPLE. “... the persistent search for new structures - as integral forms for large semantic systems - is characteristic of any ambitious work, and not just science fiction literature. And, finally, we must indicate which transformations of the material are fundamentally impermissible. Above the realm of literature, like the sky above the earth, stretches a law that none of the authors has the right to violate: until the end of the work, the same scheme that opened it. You can call this law, if you wish, the law of stabilization of the ontology of discovery (or beginning) or the principle of invariance of the rules of that literary game to which the author invites readers. Just as there is no such game of chess that, during the game, would turn into checkers or even a game of buttons, so there are no texts that would begin like a fairy tale and end like a realistic novel. Works that differ in such gradients of variability can appear at best as parodies with a genological addressee, for example, as a story about an orphan who finds a chest of gold coins, but because they are fake, goes to prison (as about this already was told above), or the story of the Sleeping Princess, awakened by the prince, who turns out to be a secret pimp and gives her to a brothel. (Such anti-tales were written, for example, by Mark Twain.) But it is impossible to seriously engage in such creativity: after all, there cannot be a crime story in which a dragon hunts down a criminal instead of a detective; there are no such epic narratives in which the heroes first eat bread and butter and leave the house through the door, and then they can go through the walls to collect manna from heaven for food. What is the highest law forbidding incest for all cultures, the taboo of “plot incest” has become for all literary genres - that is, such a transformation of the course of events, which in its scale goes beyond the initially established ontology (empirical, “spiritualistic”, etc. .). Intuitively, all authors know that it is impossible to do this, but in practice, “plot perversions” sometimes happen to them. Most often, such a misfortune occurs as a change in the scheme of the plausibility of events; for example, the hero is relieved from the beginning of danger by forces that are still empirically plausible, but then more and more inclined towards magic; the postulate of empiricism is not formally violated, but in fact the author's vacillation shakes it. In the area of ​​verism of collision, the plot begins to “carry” to the post-empirical coast even more easily, where the narrative is based on events unknown to the experience of neither the author nor the reader (this is what is typical for science fiction). Then "incest" is difficult to prove, since we lack intuition as a criterion for the plausibility of what is happening. Another thing is when the author transfers the plot to an environment that the reader knows better than the author himself; for example, the author, as a person who did not make German occupation starts writing about her. And the reader who has encountered it in the past constantly finds in the description unintentional errors or even distortions of real events.

“Negative Heuristics”

The “negative heuristics” of the princely retinue subculture, as well as the pagan culture of the Eastern Slavs, are: the lack of awareness of the “I” of a person as a specific spiritual reality; "reflectivity" as an activity of self-understanding, self-construction of culture; high authority of the theme of "reason", the presence of which in spiritual culture is an indicator of its development.

The formation of the princely retinue subculture did not lead to the development of an individual, spiritual principle in a person. It also lacked an idea of ​​the value of the human person as a spiritual, non-natural being. AT Kievan Rus In the 9th - 10th centuries, a naturalistic attitude to man as a physical, material being prevailed. According to V.O. Klyuchevsky: “... The property of a person in Pravda is valued not cheaper, but even more expensive than the person himself, his health, personal safety. The work of labor for the law is more important than the living instrument of labor - the labor force of man. ... The law valued the security of capital more and provided it more carefully than the personal freedom of a person. The personality of a person is regarded as a mere value and comes in the place of property.” Vladimir Monomakh said about himself: “And he fell a lot from his horse, broke his head twice, and injured his arms and legs - in his youth he injured, not valuing his life, not sparing his head.”

Unlike Western European culture, in which chivalry, an in-depth analysis inner world man in Christian religious and fiction, etc. contributed to the growth of individualistic processes in ancient Russian culture in the IX-X centuries. in general, there was practically no interest in the subjective world of man, the reflexive attitude itself, which found expression in the absence of chivalry and lyrical literature, and in particular love lyrics. In the Russian heroic epic, the motif of the struggle for salvation, the liberation of an individual, sounds very weak. Meanwhile, one of the main goals of the chivalrous movement in Western Europe was to protect the weak and disadvantaged, the unfortunate and those who suffered from the lust for power and self-interest of the strong. In the knight's oath, after defending the faith and religion, the king and the fatherland, the third point is: "The shield of the knights should be a refuge for the weak and oppressed; the courage of the knights should always support the just cause of the one who turns to them." One of the main tasks of the wandering knights was the protection of the oppressed and the unfortunate, the punishment of violence and injustice. The epic heroes fight monsters (the serpent, the Idolish, the Nightingale the Robber), possessing great physical strength, the Tatars and defeat them, thanks to the advantage in physical strength, but in this struggle the humanism of the heroes is abstract. In their exploits, their desire to serve the prince and overcome evil forces is more expressed than the salvation of specific people.

In ancient Russian culture (both in pagan Slavic and princely retinues) the theme of reason, the “high” authority of wisdom, does not sound, while in the most developed world civilizations, respect and admiration for wisdom goes back to ancient times. In ancient Russian literature, wisdom, knowledge, reason do not appear in their pure form, but to a large extent with a touch of witchcraft, magic, sorcery. The founder of the state of Kievan Rus Oleg is called prophetic. Princess Olga is traditionally considered a wise ruler. However, her "wisdom" lies in cunning, deceit, infidelity to the word, i.e. in the "virtues" of a barbarian, pagan order, which already Christian-minded writers continue to regard as high virtues.

Like the pagan Slavic, the princely retinue is a subculture whose spiritual reality was limited to existing existence. If in Western European culture in the X-XI centuries. “reflexive” activity unfolds in order to self-understand, overcome barbarism, create a more perfect, sublime spiritual reality, then in ancient Russian culture such processes are practically not visible.

Thus, the mental space of ancient Russian culture by the end of the tenth century. was a complex formation, consisting of two sub-spatial configurations, partially overlapping structures and partially broken value-thinking systems, agricultural pagan Slavic and princely-druzhina subcultures. Unfortunately, the formation of the princely retinue subculture as an elite culture did not lead to a spiritual outburst. On the contrary, pagan naturalism was further developed, became more sensually rich and diverse. The princely-boyar elite manifested not so much creative and productive as consumer-destructive ability. Changes in the thematic space took place within the framework of pagan, naturalistic value and thought orientations. Universals, coloring the entire spiritual space, were the themes of "prey", "nature", "liberty", "kind", "prince" and "physical strength". Therefore, in the structure of the explanation of spiritual processes in the ancient Russian culture of the 9th - 10th centuries. in the explanatory part (“explanance”), these topics should be used in the function of laws (otherwise the explanation will be incomplete). An essential role in overcoming the barbarism of the Germanic tribes in Western Europe was played by the external influence of ancient culture. The relative isolation of the territory of Kievan Rus, the aggressiveness and “naturalistic Russocentrism” of Old Russian culture prevented the expansion of cultural ties with Byzantium and Western Europe, its inclusion in a single European cultural and creative process.

It is also necessary to pay attention to the fact that the study of the formation and development of ancient Russian culture until the 11th century. does not provide grounds for affirming the existence of Belarusian, Ukrainian and Russian cultures as specific value-thinking realities. The fundamental, initial, defining criterion for the existence of a certain culture is the presence of a specific value-thematic reality (“spirit” of culture). The language of the people, ethnos as an expression of the organic unity of the people are concomitant, but still secondary formations, because in the absence of a specific mental reality, the existence of language as its reflection and ethnos is impossible. Therefore, it can be argued that the isolation of these cultures is not possible. Consequently, their existence did not take place, however, as well as the language and ethnic groups.

Meanwhile, the assertion of the existence of the Old Russian culture, consisting of the agricultural pagan Slavic and princely retinue subcultures, does not provide grounds for asserting the existence of the Old Russian nationality. Predominantly naturalistic, “tribal” thinking dominated throughout the history of Kievan Rus, on the vast expanses of which many peoples lived. The emergence of the Kyiv state did not significantly change their lives. Tribal formations became lands, but basically tribal self-identification remained the same. land, probably realized himself as Pereyaslovtsy or moreover, representatives of this or that city or locality. A thin layer of princes, boyars, warriors was to a large extent a closed formation, to a large extent was cut off from the local population. Since the centralizing, integrating state activity of this layer was small (in fact, it was reduced to receiving tribute), there is no need to talk about the emergence of spiritual unity. It is impossible to confuse the unity of the level of existence, the analysis of which was carried out, and the unity of self-consciousness, the consciousness of "We". There was certainly no consciousness of "We" - dew as the totality of all the peoples of Kievan Rus. Unless sporadically, during the campaigns against Byzantium, the dews were united by a single spirit. Therefore, in this sense, there was nothing to disintegrate. There was a persistent consciousness of "We" - the people of Kiev, Chernigov, Novgorod, Polotsk, Vladimir, Galicia, etc. In the absence of written language, one should keep in mind the conventionality of using the phrase "Old Russian language". This phrase denotes the language of not a single people, but of many tribes, which has retained in the language, way of life kinship from the Proto-Slavic unity.

Moreover, this community in the IX-X centuries. goes beyond the borders of the Kievan state. In a developed multi-ethnic state, a supra-ethnic level of unity arises: in the Roman Empire - the Romans, in Byzantium - the Romans, in the USSR - the Soviet people. At the same time, the ethnic level of consciousness is preserved (it can be traced very clearly among Roman and Byzantine historians). In the amorphous, barbarian state of Kievan Rus, the supra-ethnic level was not formed at all. Therefore, it is not necessary and inappropriate to use the term “Old Russian nationality” in the analysis, which would otherwise be an obvious modernization.

Thus, the arrival of the Varangians to Russia and the socio-economic differentiation of the Old Russian society led to the formation of the estate of combatants, and in the mental plan - the princely-rescue subspace, which did not differ significantly in its value-thematic structure and arose through the transformation of the FCS of the pagan East Slavic culture. Two genetically and thematically related mental subspatial configurations were formed, having a common value-thematic center (FCS).

The ancient Russian culture, consisting of agricultural pagan Slavic and princely retinue subcultures, on the eve of the adoption of Christianity, remained a pagan, barbaric culture, the spiritual space of which was limited to naturalistic values. The “existential” way of functioning of cultures prevented the emergence of a professional culture that formed a “reflexive” attitude and, thus, leading beyond the limits of existing being into the area of ​​“pure spirit”, the construction of a multi-layered value-thinking reality, etc.

In preparing this work, materials from the site www.studentu.ru were used.

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